Sailors *and* Scholars

The History of the U.S. Naval War College, 1884–2009

Volume II, 1984–2009

by
John B. Hattendorf

Second edition, revised, enlarged, and illustrated

Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
2024

978-1-935352-43-3

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Put at velis etue tem euisl dunt at.
Equatem dolut lore ming esto dolore el utem vel ut lum vulput luptate tem venit la facil dui blam dunt iure tisi. Odolore feum zzriure veliquat in henim dolor suscilla consed dunt augait

Contents

President's Foreword xi
Author's Preface xiii

CHAPTER 13
History and Commemoration, 1984 292
The History behind the History • Administrative Aftermath

CHAPTER 14
Beginning the Naval War College's Second Century, 1984–1987 304
The Naval War College and the *Maritime Strategy* of the 1980s • War Games • The Beginnings of the Department of Defense Reform Movement • Change in College Presidents • The Henry E. Eccles Library—Fire and Recovery • The Beginning of Academic Accreditation for the Naval War College

CHAPTER 15
The Long Process for Joint and Academic Accreditation, 1987–1991 326
The *Naval War College Review* • The Continuing Quest for Academic Accreditation

CHAPTER 16
The Teaching Curriculum in the 1990s 344
Curriculum Revisions • The National Security Decision Making Department • The Joint Military Operations Department • Strategy and Policy Department • Continuing Education • Electives • International Programs • The Henry E. Eccles Library • The College's Curriculum in Perspective

CHAPTER 17
Research in the 1990s 368
Strategic Studies Group • War Gaming Department • Global War Game and Advanced Concepts Department • Strategic Research Department • Oceans Law and Policy Department • Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment • From a Decision Suport Center to a Decision Strategies Department • Naval War College Press • The Naval War College's Curriculum and Research Recognized

CHAPTER 18
Changes in the Wind, 1995–2001 392
The Presidency • Plans for a New Building • Naval Officers as Students and Faculty • The Naval Doctrine Command and the Navy Warfare Development Command • The Return of a Vice Admiral to the College President's Office • The Origins of the Concept of Network-Centric Warfare • Preparing for the Twenty-first Century • From The Naval Operational Planners Course to the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School • Mahan Scholars Program • Accreditation of the Fleet Seminar Program • Cafeteria • Change in Resource Sponsor • Naval War College Review • Change Again

CHAPTER 19
In the Shadow of 9/11, 2001–2004 420
The College Responds to the Events of 11 September 2001 • Sea Power 21 • Graduate Education in the Navy • Professional Military Education and Joint Professional Military Education • Research, Analysis, and Gaming • International Programs • Financial Challenges • Administrative Actions • Organizational Changes within the College • The Effects of Change • A New President • Graduate and Professional Military Education • Faculty Appointments and Promotions • Research, Analysis, and Gaming • International Programs • Fiscal Guidance and Risk Assessments • The Naval War College Foundation's *Queen Mary 2* Cruise • Change of Command

CHAPTER 20
Reaffirming Academic Accreditation and Developing Strategic and Operational Leaders 468
On Taking Charge • Reaffirmation of the College's Accreditation • Developing Strategic and Operational Leaders • TACAMO—Take Charge and Move Out • Don't Set the Plow Blade Too Deep • The Devil Is Always in the Details • Reducing a "Cost of Opportunity" • Accelerate Your Mind • The "Path to Joint"

CHAPTER 21
Helping the Chief of Naval Operations Define the Future Navy 512
The Good News • The Games That Count • The Concept Gap • The Return of the Global War Game • The "Gap" Decision Goes against the Naval War College • The Beginning of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* • The Meeting on the Barge • Make All Preparations for Getting under Way • "Kick the Tires...Light the Fires..." • The Gathering of the "Greybeards" • The College's Strategy Team • Let the Games Begin • Supporting Fires • Listening to the American People • Long on Data...Short on Options • The Completion of the College's Work on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* • Filling a Critical Gap

CHAPTER 22
Supporting Combat Readiness 556
The Overview in 2004 • The Campaign Plan • The Lines of Operations—JFMCC • Stars to Steer By: Laying the Track • The Lines of Operations—Naval Operational Planner Course and "the Short Course" • The Maritime Operations Center • New Lines of Operations • The Navy's Senior Leaders on the Operational Level of War • Matching Form with Function • Other Initiatives • The Outcome

CHAPTER 23
Evolution of the College's Mission, Functions, and Tasks, 2001–2012 590
An Anchor to Windward • Setting the Anchor • Now Set the Anchor Watch • Now Set The Underway Watch: The Course to the New Mission • Revitalizing the Navy at the Operational Level of War: Supporting Combat Readiness • The Fourth Mission Element • Epilogue: The Bureaucratic Resolution

CHAPTER 24
Strengthening Maritime Security Cooperation 610
A New Mission Element? • Suspicions Confirmed • The Challenge—How Best to Move Forward? • The College Moves Downrange • The Question of Graduate Degrees • A Broader Approach to the Field Studies Program • The Fiftieth Reunion • International Seapower Symposia XVII and XVIII • College-to-College Relationships • Reconnecting with the College's International Graduates • International Fellows • International Law Initiatives • Summing It Up

CHAPTER 25
The College and its Curriculum at 125 and Beyond 640
The New Provost • The Fifty-second President of the College • The National Debate about Teaching Strategy • Wisecup Testifies before Congress • The New Dean of Academic Affairs • Dean of Academic Affairs • Curriculum Bifurcation • Curriculum Development • Government Shutdowns, Sequestration, and Furloughs • Epilogue, 2009–2024 • An After Lookout Reports

Appendix A 674
Chronology of Courses and Significant Events at the United States Naval War College, 1884–2014

Appendix B 700
List of Presidents of the Naval War College, 1884–2014

Appendix C 702
List of Naval War College Provosts, Deans, Chair Holders, and Department Heads, 1972–2014

Appendix D 708
Distinguished Graduates, September 1885 to July 2014

Index 720

President's Foreword

Na facipis alisim digna facinibh eraesed ex ea facilisl doloreet digna con utpat.

Te venis num zzrit la facidunt ad dipsusto et atin ulla consectet wis adipsum dolor susciliquat lam at lore velismod magnis dit lore feu feum vullandreet vel ercil et, quat.

Alit lorercing er sim velis eui eummy nostrud min utatumsandre feuis ex eui eum iuscilis accummy nisim dit ulput lor sisi tatue feu feu feu faciniam nullamet lobor iustrud tat.

On et ut lamcons endiatuerat wisl digna feugiam, quissim autate tet loreril landiam qui blan erat. Ut vercillut praeseq uissiscidui bla con exero el ing ea cortionummy non ea corperaesto exer sit numsandit ip ectem doloborer sumsandre tin et, vel in vel ipsuscil er se tis dolobore velenim aut illaorem vel ut lum volessit lore conse elent amconulput iure modiamet, summod magnisit er sequissim zzriureet exerilisse coreet, ver susto ea facidunt illutpat. Duis num do commy non eu feui blamcommy num at. Duisl dolobore dolorpe rcilit lor sed mod modiat, consequat ad eros aut vel ipsum zzrillaor sequat.

Odolortie dolor iliquat dolorerci bla faciliq uamcomm olortin henim quat il et lorem dolum nisl diam dolor suscillaore dolut la feu faciduisi tiscipisi blaorem adiatis atuer sum diam, suscipis auguercidui blaore mincilis nostisl ulputpat, vent vendiat autpatet vullum vel incin henim niam adigna facil ulput er sequipisim veriureet lor sim iriliquip enis adit luptatie dit ea feu faccum et am zzrillam, core faciniam eugait dolesequisim doloreet prat nibh et do euissed dolorem volore et luptat.

Henissim vent pratue duis aliquat lummolutpat amet, quat aci blan hendio ex eum zzriustrud molor augiamet lore mod doloreet nos augiati smolorer summod eriure dipit nosto dolore magna facil eui eum zzrit velit am dipsusci blaorting ea facinit utat. Duisit adipiscinis am, cons nullaor accumsan volessecte cor sim zzrit adit dolore feum inisisi.

Ro euipis elis autem venibh ero dolor sequis nismolor irillam, quis nummodi gnisi.

Iliquis sequat. Numsandrer sectem velisci liquat autpatem numsandre dolorer cipisit ing er suscipit lore dolore volobor at. Ut exer si etue dolor aut loreetum do odolore ero diamet nos exer sed dolobore volobore tatin et, volesto odiam dolore conullaore minis eros nosto consequ ismodigna atie faccum dolenis senibh eugiamcommod eugait ercinci tat. Amet lum delendreet inci ercilit eugue dipsustie minibh ex eum quat veril ulla faci bla facipis eui elit, velis nulla feugiam incilit wis nullan hendiatin ulla feum adipsumsan ut wis delenis eros aliquamet iriureet prat eugiam irit ut iure feugiam, sectet wis eu feugue magnit doloree tumsandre magnissi tie feuip essit nit luptat dit et velendrem



The Centenary Academic Convocation, Marking Exactly 100 Years since Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler Issued General Order 325, Establishing the Naval War College, Was Held on Colbert Plaza on 6 October 1984. This image shows Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., wearing his academic robe as a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania. In front of the podium is the Naval War College mace, a gift of the Naval War College Foundation for the centenary. It was first used on this occasion and carried at the head of the faculty academic procession by the College's first faculty marshal, Dr. Richard Megargee. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Chapter Thirteen

History and Commemoration, 1984

To mark its first hundred years, the Naval War College organized a number of events. One of the first puzzles that College leaders had to face was the selection of the date on which to commemorate the event. Several possible historical dates were considered: 8 March 1884, the date that Commodore Luce first formally recommended the establishment of an advanced school to the Secretary of the Navy; 13 June 1884, the date that the Luce Board reported to the Secretary of the Navy on its plans and recommendations for the College; 20 September 1884, the date that Luce took command of the Naval War College as its first President; or 6 October 1884, the date that Secretary of the Navy William Chandler signed General Order 325, formally announcing the establishment of the Naval War College. Another alternative date considered was the opening of the first class on 4 September 1885.

In the end, the date of 6 October 1984 was selected as the official anniversary date. At the same time, the entire academic year, starting on 16 August 1983 and ending on 22 June 1984, was designated as the "centennial academic year." Opening the academic year, the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, gave the main convocation address to welcome the 347 incoming students.[1] Joining him on the stage for the occasion were former College President Vice Admiral John T. Hayward and the sculptor Felix de Weldon. As part of the event, de Weldon formally presented to the College his bust of Admiral Hayward.

Former President of the Naval War College Vice Admiral John T. Hayward Speaking at Convocation on 16 August 1983, with His Portrait Bust by Felix de Weldon. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Rear Admiral James Service Talking with Spectators Waiting for the Blue Angels, the U.S. Navy's Flight Demonstration Squadron, to Perform over Narragansett Bay in Honor of the Centennial of the Naval War College, 19 May 1984.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Among the centenary events that occurred in 1984, the Blue Angels performed over Narragansett Bay on 19 May 1984, and the Venezuelan Navy's sail training ship *Simón Bolívar* visited Newport on 13–18 July, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Eagle* visited on 11–12 August, and the U.S. Marine Corps' Silent Drill Platoon and Drum and Bugle Corps performed on 22–23 September. In Founders Hall, the Naval War College Museum opened a special exhibit on the history of the College. Complementing this, Frank Uhlig, Jr., the editor of the *Naval War College Review*, organized a special "Centennial Issue" on the history of the College.[2] As the culmination of this series of events, a special academic convocation to commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the Naval War College was held on Colbert Plaza on 6 October 1984. The principal speaker for the occasion was Dr. John F. Lehman, Jr., Secretary of the Navy.

The History behind the History

As one of the events associated with the centenary convocation, the first edition of this history of the College was launched. During the convocation ceremony, the three authors of this book jointly presented Secretary Lehman with copy number one of the specially bound, limited edition. The College had long wanted to have an institutional history. In 1916, the President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Austin Knight, had begun collaborating with a talented 1915 graduate of the College, Lieutenant William D. Puleston, to prepare the first attempt at compiling the College's history, but this was left as an unfinished chronology in rough typescript.[3] Later, Puleston went on to become Director of Naval Intelligence and an early biographer of Mahan. In 1930, the College staff began anew to collect materials for an outline history, but this, too, remained incomplete and unpublished.[4] Finally in 1967, Ronald H. Spector completed the first serious academic study of the College's history with his Yale University doctoral dissertation, entitled "'Professors of War': The Naval War College and the Modern American Navy," examining the period from 1884 to 1914.[5] While Knight and Puleston had the advantage of living memory among many of the founders, Spector undertook his pioneering study

The Centenary Convocation, 6 October 1984. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

with a wholly objective historical approach. He produced the first truly scholarly study of the Naval War College. On completing his dissertation under the guidance of three distinguished scholars—Gaddis Smith, John M. Blum, and C. Vann Woodward—Spector characterized the Naval War College's archives as being "in a rather disorganized condition with many items missing or out of place. . . . Many War College records appear to have been lost or discarded."[6]

Anthony S. Nicolosi, Naval War College Museum Director, 1978–2002, with Model of HMS *Victory*. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The College hired Anthony S. Nicolosi, who was named curator of the newly established Naval Historical Collection, a branch of the College library designed to help rectify the problem that Spector's work highlighted and to deal with the College's rare naval books, imprints, and historical objects that were scattered around the campus in various places and in a similar state of disarray. The rarest of the College's rare books, for example, were shelved in glass-fronted bookcases decorating the admiral's Mahan Hall conference room. Among them were such jewels of the collection as the 1589 and the 1598–1600 editions of Richard Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations* and first editions of the *Influence of Sea Power upon History* that Mahan had inscribed to Admiral Luce and to Theodore Roosevelt in 1890.[7]

From 1969, Nicolosi began to bring the rare books together in a properly controlled facility. He then scoured the shelves of the main library collection, where many more previously unidentified rare and valuable items had stood on open shelves. Some of the books, with the ownership signatures and marginalia by famous officers associated with the College, even had letters from famous individuals tucked within the pages. Concurrently, Nicolosi searched the country for the College's records, finding them in such scattered places as a warehouse at Quonset Point and in the Federal Records Centers at Waltham, Massachusetts; Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; and Garden City, New York. Bringing these records back to the College, he started the long process of reassembling them into a comprehensive archival research collection that could be used by historians. Nicolosi's next challenge was to find a place to store the collection. In this effort, he demonstrated great creativity by placing the collection in an old meat locker (Building 52) that had been used by the Naval Training Station. Nicolosi eventually secured space in Sims Hall, and finally, Mahan Hall. Without any additional trained staff, Nicolosi relied on volunteer assistance. One of several volunteers at this point was Lieutenant John Hattendorf, then a graduate student in history at Brown University. Having had three years of sea and combat experience in destroyers during the Vietnam War, followed by two additional years in the Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Hattendorf had left active duty in 1969 to begin graduate studies in history. Shortly after his arrival at Brown, Hattendorf had reported as engineer officer in the reserve crew of USS *Purdy* (DD 734). At that time, he also took up the opportunity to get permission to audit War College lectures, use the archives and rare books, and borrow books from the library that were relevant to his studies at Brown. Through Anthony Nicolosi

and the E. J. King visiting professors of maritime history, Stephen Ambrose and Thaddeus V. Tuleja, Hattendorf established his first connections with the Naval War College in 1969–1971. Nicolosi enlisted Hattendorf, with some prior experience as the volunteer, undergraduate archivist at Kenyon College, as a graduate assistant.[8] In 1970, after attending the summer graduate program at the Munson Institute of Maritime History at Mystic Seaport, Hattendorf completed three weeks of active duty for training at the Naval War College. During this period, Hattendorf worked under Nicolosi to organize the College's archival records. He also mounted an exhibit from the Naval Historical Collection's rare book collection on "Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages" and the "Eighteenth Century Literature on Naval Tactics."[9] Hattendorf's practical work under Nicolosi's guidance led Brown University's professor of the history of science and technology, A. Hunter Dupree, to suggest to Hattendorf that he write his master's degree thesis on the interrelationship of technology and strategy in Naval War College war gaming during the period 1900–1916.[10]

In monitoring the College's use of reservists, Vice Admiral Richard Colbert invited Hattendorf for an office call to discuss his reserve assignment. During their conversation Colbert mentioned that in fourteen years the College would be celebrating its centennial and would need, at that time, a properly researched history. When Colbert asked Hattendorf whether he would be interested in writing it, Hattendorf replied that it was an intriguing thought, but he still had his doctoral work ahead of him.[11] On the completion of his master's thesis in 1971, Hattendorf was recalled to active duty with a regular commission and assigned to Destroyer School, and then as Operations Officer in USS *Fiske* (DD 842). In 1972, after Hattendorf had served ten months in *Fiske,* Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner requested his immediate assignment to the Naval War College as his research assistant and speechwriter to fill the same position that Ensign Craig L. Symonds had held under Turner's predecessor.

In addition to those duties, Hattendorf taught in the newly established Strategy course and also undertook research in the new Advanced Research Department. In the latter role, he collaborated with retired Rear Admiral John D. Hayes to produce a study on Stephen B. Luce.[12] On 25 September 1972, Norman H. Gibbs, the Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford, came from England and lectured at the Naval War College on "Clausewitz on the Moral Forces of War."[13] For that visit, Turner assigned Hattendorf as Gibbs's escort officer. With Turner's encouragement, Gibbs had several lengthy conversations with Hattendorf and encouraged him to apply to Oxford to study under him for a doctorate in the history of war. In December, after Oxford University had formally accepted Hattendorf's application for graduate work, Turner tried to secure Hattendorf's assignment on active duty at Oxford. Officials in Washington rejected Turner's idea, suggesting that if Hattendorf wanted to do graduate work, he should do something more useful to the Navy, such as nuclear engineering.[14] Given the opportunity at hand, Hattendorf resigned his regular commission and went to Oxford. However, the Naval War College kept watch on Hattendorf's progress at Oxford. He successfully completed his first year of study in 1973–1974, at which time the Naval War College's Advanced Research Department awarded him a contract to fund his further studies. Hattendorf's research on the War of the Spanish Succession was inspired by the model of the War College's historical case studies in strategy that he had observed and taught in 1972–1973.[15] After the funds for that contract ran out in 1977, the Strategy and Policy Department recruited Hattendorf to return to Newport as a visiting associate professor for the academic year 1977–1978. On completing his

Oxford doctorate in 1979, he worked for the College on a contract basis under Nicolosi in the Naval Historical Collection. In 1980, Hattendorf joined the faculty of the Center for Continuing Education as an assistant professor for its Strategy and Policy course. He remained with Continuing Education, often working with materials in the College archives, until the spring of 1981, when the National University of Singapore offered him a two-year position as visiting professor of military and naval history. While in Singapore, one of the projects that Hattendorf completed was his Naval War College edition of the papers of Lieutenant Commander Joseph H. Wellings as Special Naval Observer with the British Home Fleet in 1940–1941, a collection of documents that Hattendorf had been instrumental in obtaining for the College's Naval Historical Collection.[16]

Dr. Evelyn Cherpak Served as the Archivist and Head of the Naval War College Library's Naval Historical Collection, from 1984 to 2014.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Nicolosi continued to recruit young scholars to help improve the organization of the archives and the museum.[17] He hired an assistant curator, Dr. Evelyn Cherpak, who had recently completed her doctorate in Latin American history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. She worked under Nicolosi as assistant curator of the collection for a decade, from 1974 to 1 October 1984, when she succeeded Nicolosi as archivist and head of the library's Naval Historical Collection. She remained in that position for the next three decades before retiring on 2 June 2014, building exponentially on the work that Nicolosi had initiated.

In order to move forward with further research on the College's history, the Advanced Research Department, under Dr. James E. King, financially supported the work of Gerald John Kennedy, a retired lieutenant commander, archivist, and teacher, while he completed his doctoral thesis in history at the University of Minnesota.[18] Kennedy's topic pushed the subject forward chronologically from Ronald Spector's work with a study on the "United States Naval War College, 1919–1941: An Institutional Response to Naval Preparedness." Completed in June 1975, it was deemed not of publishable quality, but it remains a useful reference work. The Advanced Research Department distributed a limited number of photocopies of it and also supplied it to the Defense Documentation Center.[19]

There were some serious critics within the College of these initiatives to support naval history, partly because their academic purpose and role seemed unclear. On the other hand, College Presidents such as Admirals Colbert, Turner, and LeBourgeois instinctively valued and understood the value of these initiatives. These forward-thinking leaders encouraged the recruitment of young historians to help realize that vision. However, the creation in 1967 of the Military History Research Institute, co-located with the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, had deeply disturbed the Naval War College Library's senior leadership. The Naval War College's librarian, Earl Schwass, knew that the creation of this new institute had involved the transfer of 20,000 volumes from the Army War College Library with the additional transfer of another 30,000 older volumes that had once been part of the Army War College Library, when it had been in Washington, D.C., but after its departure had been incorporated into the National War College Library.

Both the librarian and the senior academic advisor, Professor Fred Hartmann, were adamant that everything possible should be done to prevent a similar initiative arising in the Navy. The issue played out over a seven-year period beginning on 1 January 1977, when the library removed the rare book collection from the Historical Collection and brought it under the direct purview of the librarian. This left Nicolosi as curator of a Naval Historical Collection that consisted only of the College's archives, manuscripts, and oral histories. To sever the relationship further, Nicolosi and his organization were transferred from the academic side of the College to the administrative support side. They moved from the library, which reported to the dean of academics, to the director of support services, who reported to the dean of administration.[20]

At this point, Nicolosi was becoming increasingly involved with the renovation of the first floor of Founders Hall (Building 10) and his plans for reviving the long-moribund Naval War College Museum, which had originally been established in 1952 and whose collections were still to be found in scattered locations around the College. In doing this, the museum was established as a separate activity that reported directly to the chief of staff and deputy President, while Nicolosi simultaneously served as curator of the Naval Historical Collection under the dean of administration.[21] Between its establishment in 1978 and 1983, annual attendance at the museum increased to ten thousand visitors. In preparation for the centennial a comprehensive renovation of the building was begun in November 1983 that doubled the size of the exhibit area with the use of an additional four thousand square feet of exhibit space on the second floor, while the third floor was transformed into museum offices. The changes to the building also included air conditioning and a small addition at the back that added an elevator and stairways. The renovated building with the new exhibit opened in the summer of 1984, well-timed for the centennial events.[22]



Rear Admiral John R. Wadleigh in 1983. The son of a Marine Corps officer and grandson of two admirals, Wadleigh grew up in Newport during the Sims-Laning era at the Naval War College. Graduating from St. George's School in 1933, he received his bachelor's degree from the Naval Academy in 1937. During World War II, he survived the sinking of the carrier *Yorktown* (CV 5) at Midway and saw action in Pacific Fleet cruisers from the Solomon Islands to the western Pacific. Postwar service afloat was in destroyers and cruisers with assignments in naval communications ashore. Selected for Rear Admiral in 1965, he served as Director of Operations, Defense Communications Agency, and commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Flotillas Four and Twelve. He returned home to Newport after retiring from active duty in 1971 as Commander, Training Command, Atlantic Fleet. Active with many community organizations, he died in an accident in 1993.
Naval War College Museum Collection

When Vice Admiral Stockdale was the President of the College, the issue of having a complete College history available for the College's centennial arose again. Among others in the College community, he discussed the issue with John Hattendorf. In their conversation, Hattendorf told Stockdale that he would be interested in the project, but only if the College wanted a carefully researched academic history. Stockdale replied that he did not think an academic history would be appropriate and that a volume with a lighter touch with no footnotes and many photographs was what would be wanted.[23]

At the annual meeting of the Naval War College Foundation in 1978, Vice Admiral Stockdale mentioned in his address to members that the College was looking for an historian to write the College's history. Rear Admiral John R. Wadleigh responded to his general call. In a letter to Stockdale, Wadleigh offered his services along

with those of Dr. B. Mitchell Simpson, III, the former editor of the *Naval War College Review*. Wadleigh had published several articles in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* and had contributed three chapters to Paolo E. Coletta's *American Secretaries of the Navy*.[24] Simpson, who held a master's degree and a doctorate in diplomatic history from Tufts University, was also writing a biography of Admiral Harold R. Stark.[25] Working together, Simpson and Wadleigh created a partnership for the project, calling themselves "Quarterdeck Associates." They proposed to undertake the type of history that Stockdale desired over a five-year period with the final product submitted no later than 1 September 1983 at the cost of $51,000.[26] Stockdale approved the proposal and offered Quarterdeck Associates a contract, seeing the proposed cost as a savings of $12,000 over the cost of paying comparable, experienced faculty for the same period of time.[27] Over the next five years, Quarterdeck Associates followed the agreed-on plan in its contract with the Naval War College. Professor Hartmann monitored the project as the authors drafted and revised their chapters, proceeding along the scheduled plan. The first phase was completed in August 1982, with eight chapters in finished form.

Meanwhile, plans continued to develop for the centennial events in 1983–1984. To coordinate the many planned activities, including the historical project, the Naval War College Centennial Planning Committee was established in February 1983, composed of key College leaders.[28] Quarterdeck Associates completed its work ahead of schedule, leaving the College time to arrange to have the typescript professionally copy-edited. Then, on 10 May 1983, Rear Admiral James Service formally sent the manuscript to the U.S. Naval Institute.

Explaining that the book would be part of the upcoming centennial events, Service noted that the Naval War College would be willing to provide the funds to pay for the cost of printing.[29] Eleven weeks later, Richard R. Hobbs, the acquisitions editor at the Naval Institute Press, responded with a letter explaining that the Naval Institute had reviewed the draft and declined to publish. Without going into great detail about the readers' reports, he summarized them by saying that it was based "too much on secondary as opposed to primary source materials" and termed it "a bland treatment that will not sustain reader interest."[30] Taken aback by this entirely unexpected reaction, particularly since both Wadleigh and Simpson had made extensive use of original documents, Service directed Hartmann to seek other available options. During a telephone conversation, Hartmann learned from Hobbs that "if we had a professional historian like John Hattendorf revising the manuscript, they [the Naval Institute] would reconsider a second draft,"[31] but at this point Service decided that the Naval War College Press would publish the book. In April 1983 the College had already arranged for Hattendorf to return to the College following his two years in the Department of History at the National University of Singapore. He reported on 1 August to the newly created position of professor of naval history in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, a post devoted primarily to research and writing in general and contemporary naval history and U.S. naval history.[32]

Upon Hattendorf's return, Service directed him to review the typescript by Quarterdeck Associates and consider how to transform it from the popular approach that Stockdale had preferred into an academic history. This was a daunting task, given the requirement to produce a history of the College that would be completed, printed, and bound in time for the centennial convocation on 6 October 1984. Initially, it was thought that Hattendorf could just suggest changes to the original authors, but this soon proved to

be impractical, as he needed to go back to the archives to produce insights that could be cited by archival reference and to rewrite the manuscript to meet the criticisms that had been made. As a result, Service made Hattendorf the primary author with full academic freedom to produce the volume as he saw fit. In doing this, Hattendorf worked collegially with Simpson and Wadleigh to take advantage of their extensive knowledge. In turn, they provided constructive criticism on Hattendorf's drafts.

Rear Admiral Service Purchasing the First Copy of the Student Yearbook, *The Trident*. Naval War College students published an annual student yearbook for four successive classes, between 1983 and 1986. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Administrative Aftermath

As work on the College history continued, Rear Admiral Service directed the senior academic advisor, Professor Hartmann, to establish and to chair a committee in October 1983, to examine the question as to the best administrative location for the College's museum and archives in light of the College's mission. The basic problem was that the Naval Historical Collection and the museum defined their collections in the same way, with the museum collecting art, photographs, and three-dimensional objects, while the Naval Historical Collection was collecting archival material, personal papers, oral histories, manuscripts, and printed materials, but both defined these as historical materials relating to naval history, the art and science of naval warfare, and the history of the navies in the Narragansett Bay region. The faculty committee completed its work in February 1984 and recommended that the archives function be placed under the administrative control of the dean of academics, who also oversaw the library. In addition, the committee reported that the College should improve its historical collections in a number of ways, acquiring, building, and focusing historical collections in areas that supported the College's academic and research missions and placing them where researchers could more effectively use them in a proper study environment.[33] As the follow-on to this recommendation, the committee chair set about to try to define the separate collecting areas of the two organizations, but no clear resolution was reached. While this played out in terms of what seemed to be a very local administrative territorial dispute and clash of personalities, it had much larger consequences. A major point in Professor Hartmann's report made this clear when he underscored that his resolution of this matter would "rule out specifically any imitation of the Carlisle model."[34] By this, the committee's action specifically stopped any suggestion that the Naval War College emulate the U.S. Army Military Research Collection at the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, as a means to promote and to improve scholarship on naval history within the Navy. It was an action that placed the Naval War College out of step with developments for service history in the Army, the Air Force, and later the Marine Corps, each of which either co-located service historical activities on its campuses or maintained such activities as part of a senior service college.

With the centennial history completed and at the printer, Admiral Service appointed Hattendorf the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History on 11 August 1984, a post he held until 2016.[35] From 1



The First Edition of *Sailors and Scholars*, as Published in October 1984, Shown Here in the Leather-Bound, Limited Presentation Edition (Right) and the Clothbound Edition with Paper Dust Jacket (Left).
Naval War College Museum Collection

October 1984, Nicolosi retained the directorship of the museum for another eighteen years until his retirement in December 2002.

As a coda to the story to preserve and to support historical scholarship at the Naval War College, Hartmann put the finishing touch on the centennial by arranging for a special limited edition of *Sailors and Scholars*. Using $5,875 in Naval War College Foundation gift funds, Hartmann arranged for the bindery I Libri D'Oro di G. Poggiolesi & C., in Florence, Italy, to have ninety-eight unbound copies to bind in navy-blue leather with marbled endpapers, the seal of the College stamped in gold on the front and back boards, surrounded by "1884—Centennial History—1984," with "Sailors and Scholars" and "United States Naval War College" stamped in gold lettering on the spine. A number of years earlier, the same bindery had done similar leather-bound copies of Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783,* to be used as gifts for visiting dignitaries. To be used for similar purposes, the ninety-eight copies of *Sailors and Scholars* were each numbered and a register was to be kept of their disposition.[36] A decade after the book's first appearance, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of China translated it into Chinese and printed four hundred copies of it in Taipei in 1994.[37] The last remaining stock of the original printing of the book was exhausted by 2014.

Naval War College Centennial and Navy Day Cake, 1984.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The preferences for a popular approach to naval heritage and commemoration versus an academic approach to naval historical scholarship, along with bureaucratic resistance to the innovation of more modern professional approaches to archival, historical, museum, and historical conservation activities, reflected the range of attitudes within the broader naval service that continued to exist for several decades. In the broad picture, the situation culminated in what the Naval Inspector General in 2011 termed "the disenfranchisement of the professional historian, curator, archivist and librarian workforce."[38] In the decades that followed the College's centenary, the Naval War College, with its many faculty historians, became a leading advocate within the naval service to try to reverse that situation.

NOTES

1. Frank M. Snyder, "The Centennial Academic Year," in "Centennial Issue, 1884–1984," special issue, *Naval War College Review* 37, no. 5 (September–October 1984), pp. 14–20.
2. "Centennial Issue, 1884–1984."
3. Austin M. Knight and William D. Puleston, "History of the United States Naval War College," unpublished typescript, 1916, in Naval War College Library.
4. "Outline History of the United States Naval War College 1884 to date" [1930, with amendments to 1937], NWC Library shelf number V420.L1 U5 1937.
5. Ronald Harvey Spector, "'Professors of War': The Naval War College and the Modern American Navy" (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1967). Naval War College Library shelf number V420.L1 S7. A decade after its completion, the Naval War College Press published a revised version of this dissertation under the title *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977).
6. Spector, "'Professors of War,'" pp. 308–10.
7. The latter item was stolen from the College after it was placed on exhibit in 1984. As of 2014, it had not been recovered.
8. Thomas Boardman Greenslade, *Kenyon College: Its Third Half Century* (Gambier, Ohio: Kenyon College, 1975), pp. 188–89, 202.
9. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 34 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers], series I, Publications, 1970: "Mahan Library Exhibit Flyer."
10. Published as John B. Hattendorf, "Technology and Strategy: A Study in the Professional Thought of the U.S. Navy, 1900–1916," *Naval War College Review* 24, no. 3 (November 1971), pp. 25–48; reprinted in *War, Strategy, and Maritime Power,* ed. B. M. Simpson (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 111–38, and revised and reprinted in *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays* (Malabar, Fla.: Robert Krieger, 2000), pp. 29–57.
11. Hattendorf's recollection.
12. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, eds., *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce,* Historical Monograph, no. 1 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1975).
13. Gibbs gave this lecture a second time in 1974, after which it was published in *Naval War College Review* 27, no. 4 (January–February 1975), pp. 15–22.
14. Hattendorf's recollection of the conversation with VADM Turner in January 1973.
15. Eventually published as John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702–1712,* Outstanding Dissertations in Modern European History Series, ed. William H. McNeill and Peter Stansky (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987).
16. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *On His Majesty's Service: Observations of the British Home Fleet from the Diary, Reports, and Letters of Joseph H. Wellings, Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché, London, 1940–41,* Historical Monograph, no. 5 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1983). Reprinted 1993.
17. For a description of the collections at this point, see David F. Trask and Thomas H. Etzold, "The Archives and Manuscripts of the United States Naval War College," *The Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter,* vol. 7 (June 1975), pp. 11–16.
18. For Kennedy's background, see "Obituary: Gerald J. Kennedy (1917–2009)," *Charlottesville (Va.) Daily Progress,* 7–8 January 2009. After serving in the Navy 1941–1972, Kennedy went on to earn three bachelor's degrees, four master's degrees, and two doctorates from various institutions.
19. Gerald John Kennedy, "United States Naval War College, 1919–1941: An Institutional Response to Naval Preparedness" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, June 1975). Naval War College Library shelf number V420.K4; DTIC number ADB007269.
20. Naval War College Instruction 5722.1A of 8 April 1977.
21. Naval War College Instruction 5722.2A of 23 August 1979.
22. Hattendorf Papers, series II D: Personal Correspondence: Nicolosi to Hattendorf, [undated, ca. spring 1984].
23. Hattendorf's recollections of the conversation.
24. John R. Wadleigh, "Charles Sparks Thomas," "Thomas Sovereign Gates," and "William Birrell Franke," in *American Secretaries of the Navy*, ed. Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 857–92.
25. Later published as B. Mitchell Simpson, III, *Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939–1945* (Columbia, S.C.: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1989).
26. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 78 Papers of Frederick H. Hartmann [hereinafter Hartmann Papers], series 2, box 7, file 5: draft letter from Wadleigh to Stockdale, 29 June 1978; Hartmann Papers, series 2, box 7, file 5: letter from Wadleigh to Stockdale, 1 August 1978.
27. Hartmann Papers, series 2, box 7, file 5: M. Lieberman, memorandum for the Comptroller, 22 August 1978.
28. Naval War College Notice, 9 February 1983.
29. Hartmann Papers: Rear Admiral Service, letter to U.S. Naval Institute, 10 May 1983, serial 1238.
30. Hartmann Papers: Richard R. Hobbs, letter to F. H. Hartmann, 27 July 1983.
31. Hartmann Papers: F. H. Hartmann, memorandum for the record, 29 July 1983. At that point, Admiral Service decided that the College would not pursue publication with the institute, but that the book would be published by the College if no other commercial publisher were interested.
32. Hattendorf Papers, series II A: Correspondence with organizations: Naval War College, 1983–1988: Rear Admiral James E. Service to Hattendorf, 1 April 1983. On Hattendorf's view of the role of NWC in naval history, see Hattendorf Papers, series II A: Correspondence with organizations: Naval War College, 1983–1988: memorandum for Professor Wood, Subj: Naval History, 20 December 1983.
33. Hattendorf Papers, series II D: Personal Correspondence: Nicolosi file: Senior Academic Advisor, memorandum for the President, 17 February 1984; Hattendorf Papers, series II D: Personal Correspondence: Nicolosi file: memorandum, Library Director to Professor Hartmann, 22 March 1984, Lib. File no. 66-84; Hattendorf Papers, series II D: Personal Correspondence: Nicolosi file: Final Report on Placement of Naval Historical Collection/Museum, 5 April 1984.
34. Final Report on Placement of Naval Historical Collection/Museum, 5 April 1984.
35. Hattendorf Papers, series II D: Personal Correspondence: James E. Service file: Rear Admiral Service to Hattendorf, 11 August 1984.

36. Hartmann Papers: Hartmann to I Libri D'Oro, 9 July 1985.

37. Hattendorf Papers, series I, Publications: 1984 *Sailors and Scholars:* copy of letter from Bardon-Chinese Media Agency to Frank Uhlig, editor, Naval War College Press, 5 January 1993. John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Shui shou hsüeh che: Mei-kuo hai chün chan cheng hsüeh yüan chien hsiao i pai nien yüan shih*, trans. Chen Chung-lien ([Taiwan]: Hai chün hsüeh shu yüeh k'an she, min kuo 83 [1994]). NWC Library shelf number V420.H37125 1994.

38. Hattendorf Papers, Subject Files: Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History: History Associates, Inc., "History and Heritage in the U.S. Navy" (Rockville, Md.: History Associates Incorporated, 2000). Hattendorf Papers, series IV, Subject Files, Naval History and Heritage Command: Naval Inspector General letter to Distribution, 5040, ser N3/0911, 1 December 2011, forwarding the report "Command Inspection of the Naval History and Heritage Command."

Ceremony at the Grave of the Naval War College Founder, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce (1827–1917), at St. Mary's Episcopal Church, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, on Veterans Day, 11 November 1984. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The Naval War College's Highest Award for Original Student Research Is the J. William Middendorf II Prize, Named in Honor of the Former Secretary of the Navy, a Rhode Island Resident and Keen Supporter of the College's Work. In this image, at the graduation ceremony on 20 June 1986, Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott and Dean Robert S. Wood present the 1986 awards on behalf of Ambassador Middendorf to Captain Jerome A. Peschka, Jr., USN, College of Naval Warfare, for his student research project "The Manning of the Ready Reserve Force—An Achilles Heel?," and to Major John F. Torsak, USMC, College of Naval Command and Staff, for his project on "Aircraft Battle Damage Repair—A Logistics Approach to Increased Aircraft Readiness in Combat." *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Chapter Fourteen

Beginning the Naval War College's Second Century, 1984–1987

As the Naval War College was preparing to celebrate its centenary, in May 1984, Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins approved for publication in both classified and unclassified versions the Navy's *Maritime Strategy*, which contained an approach that would dominate U.S. naval thinking throughout the rest of the 1980s and in the formulation of which the Naval War College played a role.[1]

The Naval War College and the Maritime Strategy *of the 1980s*

The U.S. Navy's strategic thinking of the 1980s can be traced to the experience, developments, and perceptions that accumulated throughout the 1970s. They were a direct outgrowth and extension of initiatives that Admiral Thomas B. Hayward had begun as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (1977–1978) and Chief of Naval Operations (1978–1982); and the Sea Plan 2000 study undertaken at the Naval War College, commissioned by then–Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor and then–Under Secretary of the Navy James Woolsey.[2] The U.S. Navy's strategic thinking of the 1980s was not a sudden revelation thrust on the naval services by the political leadership of the day, but rather part of an evolution of strategic thinking within the naval services that was facilitated by the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations' policy guidance and objectives. The *Maritime Strategy* was not an orchestrated public relations campaign designed solely to justify a large naval force, but rather the Navy and Marine Corps' initiatives, in the context of the day, to align naval forces within the context of a joint and cooperative national military strategy that made effective use of naval forces to achieve national objectives and aligned all aspects of the naval services, from procurement and force levels to training and operations, with policy and strategic guidance, in order to create realistic and achievable expectations for the naval contribution to national defense.

The work of developing the formal statement of the *Maritime Strategy* was centered in the Strategic Concepts Branch (Op-603) of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which gathered a wide range of contributors across the Navy in that process. The Naval War College was one of the significant contributors to that effort through the related work of the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group and the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. From 1981 to 1985, the Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies was also the Director of the Strategic Studies Group. Robert J. Murray held that dual position from 1981 to 1983, overseeing the work of Strategic Studies Groups I and II, followed by Dr. Robert S. Wood in 1983–1985, with Strategic Studies Groups III and IV.

During the academic year 1981–1982, Strategic Studies Group I began its work by reflecting on the results of the first three games of the global war games, which the Naval War College's Center for Advanced Research had organized between 1979 and 1981. These games reintroduced the concept that had been



Ambassador Nathaniel Davis. As State Department Advisor at the Naval War College for six years, from 1977 to 1983, Davis was a much admired lecturer and teacher. A graduate of Brown University and a former naval officer with a PhD from the Fletcher School, he held four posts as ambassador—Bulgaria, Guatemala, Chile, and Switzerland—and had served as Director General of the Foreign Service and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The substance of a number of his War College lectures was reflected in his 1985 book on his period as the U.S. ambassador to Chile, 1971–1973, during the presidency of Salvador Allende and the coup that deposed him. On his retirement from the Foreign Service in 1983, he went on to become Hixon Professor of Humanities at Harvey Mudd College, in Claremont, California.
Naval War College Museum Collection

developed in the 1930s to game potential enemy forces in scenarios that used projected force levels and equipment that was expected to be in use in the near future. The first series in the global games established a rhythm of "game—study—game," in which independent and separate war games examined problems over time and which allowed the intervening study period to focus on specific issues, the results of which were then brought into the games that followed. The series had started out as a manual war game focused on naval operations, but by 1983 had expanded in both focus and methodology to use the College's Naval Warfare Gaming System (NWGS), the U.S. Army War College's Theater and Corps Operations and Planning Simulation (TACOPS) model, and a number of other gaming models for specific functions and up-to-date intelligence information.[3]

Strategic Studies Group I developed an initial operational concept for combined-arms, antisubmarine warfare networked with U.S. and NATO sea-, air-, and ground-surveillance and command systems. This provided a conceptual basis for the U.S. Navy to fight forward and to overcome the Soviet Navy's defensive position, focusing on the NATO northern theater and Soviet northwestern theaters. As an offshoot from the work on the *Maritime Strategy,* two members of the first Strategic Studies Group, Commanders William A. Owens and Arthur K. Cebrowski, continued to develop from this beginning their own ideas on "systems of systems" and "network-centric warfare" as they rose in rank to become influential flag officers.

Strategic Studies Group II, 1982–1983.

Left to right: Joseph Hurlburt; Edward K. Anderson; Theodore Gatchel; Robert J. Murray, director; Myrl W. Allinder; Clarence E. Armstrong; John H. Maurer; Michael A. McDevitt. Not shown: Ralph E. Beedle. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Under Murray's guidance during the 1982–1983 academic year, the members of Strategic Studies Group II refined some of the ideas of their predecessors. The group was inspired by a tactical concept that a Naval War College student, Captain John P. Kelly, had developed in his advanced research paper on the characteristics of radio wave propagation theory to use mountainous terrain as a means to prevent the Soviet Naval Air Force from attacking a U.S. amphibious force landing area.[4] Kelly, who had come to the College after commanding USS *Cayuga* (LST 1186) in 1979–1981, was a November 1982 graduate of the College. Grounded on the basis of the College's Naval Operations course and its Policy and Strategy course, Kelly

found the catalyst for his study in the great interest that the Strategic Studies Group showed in the subject that he wanted to research.[5] Kelly's paper was awarded the 1983 academic year J. William Middendorf II Award for Student Research and College officials circulated the paper to a high-level audience, noting its potential influence on the future strategic employment of aircraft carrier battle groups and other naval formations.[6] Kelly's work was but one early example of the way that the presence of the Strategic Studies Group helped to stimulate innovative and independent Naval War College student research on important current issues.[7]

Meanwhile, Strategic Studies Group II began to think about how this same concept might be used in other geographical areas. The group's initial concept of using the islands of the eastern Mediterranean was later extended to using the fjords and islands of Norway as havens for a similar purpose.

Strategic Studies Group II's second significant addition to the *Maritime Strategy* was to examine how the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy might collaborate in the Pacific theater, using the U.S. Air Force's models for low-altitude aircraft penetration of Soviet air defenses and B-52s for a mining campaign. As part of this process, Strategic Studies Group II looked at "targets that count" to limit the effectiveness of the Soviet Air Force and the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move large forces along land routes that supported its forces in maritime theaters of operation. This became an early progenitor of the Air-Sea Battle concept.[8]

The staff of the Strategic Concepts Branch in Washington joined these new ideas from Newport to others as they prepared the 1984 version of the *Maritime Strategy*. Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (Op-60), gave the first major briefing of the 1984 version to Admiral Watkins and six former Chiefs of Naval Operations, with other key figures that included selected members of the Strategic Studies Group, on board USCGC *Chase* (WHEC 718), during the America's Cup race off Newport, on 13 September 1983.[9]

Strategic Studies Group III, 1983–1984.

Left to right: Richard L. Martin; Larry Seaquist; Larry R. Marsh; William A. Hesser; Dr. Robert S. Wood, director; Frederick M. Pestorius; Gordon G. Riggle; Edward V. Badolata; Andrew C. A. Jampoler.

Naval War College Museum Collection

During the summer of 1983, Dr. Robert S. Wood succeeded Murray in the dual position of Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and Director of the Strategic Studies Group.[10] Under his direction, Strategic Studies Group III developed strategies for regional crises and dealing with outlying Soviet client states in a period before a major war with the Soviet Union. In this they focused on three case studies: Cuba, Libya, and Southwestern Asia. The Cuban case study dealt with a situation that could have resulted in a war with the Soviet Union, while the other two were regional situations. These case studies became highly relevant some years later in Operation El Dorado Canyon, when U.S. forces struck at Libya in 1986 to try to stop support for terrorist activities, and in 1987 during Operation Earnest Will, when U.S. naval forces protected tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf. Under Wood's direction, Strategic Studies Group IV took up a new theme by looking at the deterrence issues involved in

Strategic Studies Group IV, 1984–1985.

Left to right: Jesse J. Hernandez, James R. Lynch, Thomas Murphy, George O'Brien, Will Rogers, Hal Sexton, Robert A. Browning, Lawrence R. Medlin, Edward J. Lloyd, with Dr. Robert S. Wood and Admiral James Watkins.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Strategic Studies Group V, 1985–1986.

Left to right: Robin Battaglini; Stephen E. Lindblom; Dennis Carroll; Ambassador Marshall Brement, director; Irve C. Lemoyne; Bertie D. Lynch; Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations; Thomas Bowditch; Philip A. Boyer III; John B. LaPlante; Leighton W. Smith, Jr.
Naval War College Museum Collection

the Navy's *Maritime Strategy,* while examining what forces would be required to create the prospect of a prolonged conventional war.[11]

By 1985, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies had become a much larger organization during the four years since its establishment. In addition to the Strategic Studies Group, it had grown to include several different research functions: student advanced research, international law, strategic research, war gaming, global war games, and decision support as well as the professor of maritime history and the Naval War College Press. In view of this growth, Wood recommended to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, with strong agreement and support of the President of the Naval War College, that the functions of dean and of Director of the Strategic Studies Group be separated. By coincidence, Secretary of the Navy Lehman was interested in finding a position for his friend, Marshall Brement, a career Foreign Service officer. Earlier in his career, Brement had been an advisor on Soviet affairs and a member of the National Security Council under President Jimmy Carter and deputy to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, and had just retired after serving as ambassador to Iceland, 1981–1985.[12]

In August 1985, Dr. Wood continued as dean, while Marshall Brement became the third Director of the Strategic Studies Group. Although the positions of dean and director separated, the Strategic Studies Group budget remained part of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies' budget and was administratively supported by the Naval War College through the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. From this point, the Strategic Studies Group was no longer the centerpiece for research within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, although it did attempt to keep close relations, particularly with war gaming. Meanwhile, Marshall Brement developed a strong relationship with the College's Strategy Department, chaired by Dr. Alvin Bernstein, who set up a weeklong seminar on strategy for incoming members of the Strategic Studies Group. Brement, however, sought to emphasize the intellectual separation of the Strategic Studies Group from the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.[13]

War Games

Building on the first series of global war games, held between 1979 and 1983, a second series was begun in 1984 and continued on until 1988. Building on the insights of the first series, this new series examined the possible nature of a future war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that broke out in 1990 and looked for insights into how naval campaigns might be conducted within that broad context. The new series emphasized strategy more than operations, as the game book for the 1984 game stated:

> The Global War Game is a research game designed to explore US global war fighting capabilities. The main emphasis is placed on identifying issues that require attention in planning global strategy. Particular attention is given to where and how naval forces can make the greatest contribution to combined arms strategy. . . . The Global War Game (GWG) is a test bed of current strategic wisdom. It is a forum to assess the state of what we have and design the shape of what we want.[14]

Orville E. "Bud" Hay. A retired lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps, Bud Hay served as Director of Advanced Concepts in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and director of the first two series of global war games, between 1979 and 1999.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The series was directed within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies by O. E. "Bud" Hay and comprised more than 600 players at any one time, representing academia, business, and industry as well as military commands and government agencies. The first game of the series, in 1984, was designed to set the tone for the subsequent games by testing several new gaming concepts and establishing realistic orders of battle for the scenario set in the 1990s. The 1985 game launched a game that lasted over four summers, but was, in fact, a single game with each subsequent game picking up where the previous one had left off. The 1988 game was the last one played that focused on the possibility of war between the two superpowers. Overall, the series continued to make a contribution to the *Maritime Strategy* as it developed further during the 1980s, testing the feasibility of a protracted conventional war between two nuclear powers.[15]

In this period, the global war game was the largest and most prominent of the games at the Naval War College, but not the only one. At the same time, naval war games became the exception rather than the rule, as gaming focused more on joint and combined arms. For example, in the year from July 1985 to August 1986, the War Gaming Department conducted forty-six games or seminar games, nine of which were away from Newport. Among these were games played between the other U.S. service colleges and an inter-American game, using video and telecommunications links, as well as eleven games sponsored by fleet commanders. Thirteen games were played as part of the War College's student curriculum. The Plans, Policy, and Operations section (Op-06) of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations sponsored bilateral games with other navies, while the Logistics section (Op-04) and Resources and Readiness Appraisal Branch (Op-914) held games of their own at the College.[16]

A Global War Game in Progress in the 1980s. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 14 January 1987, the director of the War Gaming Department, Captain J. L. Hurlburt, a member of Strategic Studies Group II, stated:

> When I hear the phrase, "we proved in a war game that," I wince, because war games do not prove things. They are not reality and cannot be duplicated, as can laboratory tests.
>
> On an individual basis, they serve to educate, provide insights, and generate issues for further work. They are best used to investigate processes. They can help commanders and staff practice decision-making under conditions that are difficult or impossible to reproduce in peacetime—massed battle group operations, high intensity air attacks, or full scale mobilization, for example.
>
> War games impose a strict discipline that forces participants to organize separate bits of technical facts into operationally coherent packages and help them explore the feasibility and implications of plan, concepts, or new technologies.
>
> War gaming also provides a forum for communicating ideas in vivid and memorable ways. Groups of games exploring the same set of ideas or set in the same theater begin to give you trends or inferences that are useful and enable players to understand the sequence of actions that lead to success, and over time, they provide confidence and strategy development through exploration of options for both sides.[17]

War gaming at the College had long benefited from having support from the Office of Naval Intelligence. A memorandum of understanding for that purpose was signed in April 1976 and a team of analysts had been operating in Sims Hall since August 1976 as the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office Detachment (NFOIO Det). The Secretary of the Navy formally approved its establishment on 2 May 1979. At the outset, the detachment had billets for three naval officers with a civilian analyst and an intelligence clerk, who served as the permanent, in-residence, opposition team in war games. Following the establishment of the Strategic Studies Group, one intelligence officer was dedicated to its support from 1982.[18]

The Navy's first African American female intelligence officer, Captain Gail Harris, had recently received her master's degree in international studies at the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies when she was assigned to duty in Newport in 1984 to play on the Red team in the global war game. She recalled that this assignment gave her "the equivalent of a PhD in naval intelligence."[19] Mentored by long-serving ONI detachment staff member Dennis Callan, among others, she was eventually chosen twice to play the Soviet Union's theater military commander in the global war game. She recalled that her playing of this role temporarily stopped the game, when her tactics put most of the Blue aircraft carriers out of action.[20] Reflecting on her experience, she commented,

> I believe the purpose of a war game is to provide a laboratory where we can explore different war plans or crisis scenarios. The only casualties are to egos. War plans are complex and sometimes don't cover everything but should expose what's good and bad in a plan and allow us to modify it before we involve the lives of our military personnel.[21]

Naval Staff College, Class 28, Graduated in June 1986.

Top row (left to right): Lieutenant Commander Yassin Ibrahim Essa, Somali Navy; Lieutenant Commander John W. Bolyard, USN; Lieutenant Commander Alvaro R. Gaspar, Portuguese Navy; Captain Ooi Teik Chai, Republic of Singapore Navy; Major Diallo Mamadou Alimou, Guinean Navy; Lieutenant Commander S. Pradeep, Indian Navy; Lieutenant Commander Pongsak Jittayanonth, Royal Thai Navy.
Third row (left to right): Lieutenant Commander Miguel Posadas Perez, Guatemalan Navy; Captain Gaby T. Moukarzel, Lebanese Navy; Lieutenant Commander George T. Uy, Philippine Navy; Commander Juan L. Benavente Sierra, Spanish Navy; Lieutenant Commander Yosuke Shiga, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force; Lieutenant Commander Lee Jae Heun, Republic of Korea Navy; Commander Ahmad A. M. Al-Karimi, Royal Saudi Naval Forces.
Second row (left to right): Major Edi Suyadi, Indonesian Navy; Lieutenant Commander Amir Hamzah Bin Bakri, Royal Malaysian Navy; Lieutenant Commander Rafael L. Monson Brea, Dominican Navy; Lieutenant Commander Asaf Humayun, Pakistan Navy; Lieutenant Richard K. White, Royal Australian Navy; Lieutenant Commander Shaikh M. Muniruzzaman, Bangladesh Navy; Mr. Chao Chung-hang, Taiwan Navy.
Front row (staff) (left to right): Lieutenant Commander Gregg Sutton, USN; Ms. Lucille Ouellette; Lieutenant Colonel Joel Cooley, USMC; Rear Admiral Ronald Marryott, President, Naval War College; Captain Curtis Borchardt, Director, Naval Staff College; Commander Jack Moody, USN; Ms. Chris Anderson; Lieutenant Commander Michael Josef, USN.
Not pictured: Major El-Badri El-Rayah Yousif, Sudanese Navy; Lieutenant Francis Weekes, Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard.

Naval War College Museum Collection

The Beginnings of the Department of Defense Reform Movement

On the national scene, the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 had brought forward his proposed initiatives to increase defense spending in order to restore U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union. At the same time, political groups formed to either support or oppose these plans, while others began to focus on improving other aspects of the defense establishment to make it more effective. In February 1982, General David Jones, USAF, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had testified to Congress that the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff needed to be thoroughly reorganized and that some aspects of this would require legislative authority.[22] In the last months of his tenure, as chairman, Jones advocated a much stronger and more effective structure for the JCS that placed military efficiency as a priority over the traditional democratic checks and balances that had previously characterized the system.[23] He advocated not only a stronger role for the chairman but also broadened training, experience, and rewards for joint duty. This included the expansion and improvement of the joint educational system, with all newly appointed admirals and generals attending a common course of joint education. Paraphrasing Mahan, Jones noted that such changes can never come easily: "no Service could agree to give up sovereignty, but would have to have reorganization forced upon it from outside the organization."[24]

From this beginning, congressmen and senators began a series of legislative initiatives to reorganize the Department of Defense. In 1983, Representative Ike Skelton, a Democrat from Missouri, authored the first bill introduced in the House of Representatives that offered the radical solution of abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It, like a number of others, failed to gain widespread approval in Congress, but the discussion about such reform became widespread as various groups coalesced into proreform and antireform advocates. Among the key leaders of the antireform group were Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and staff members of the Navy's secretariat. Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy Seth Cropsey played a key role in organizing antireform lobby efforts within government agencies, Washington think-tanks, and professional military educational institutions. In June 1984, Secretary Lehman wrote an article that was published in the *Washington Post* that was titled "Let's Stop Trying to Be Prussians: An Old Bad Idea Surfaces Again" in which he suggested that the proreformers were trying to establish "a Prussian-style general staff reporting to a strengthened chairman."[25] Nearly every admiral and Marine Corps general on active duty was opposed to the reform effort.[26]

Conference on Joint Chiefs of Staff Reform, 6–7 May 1985. One of the discussion panels at the conference, left to right: Professor David K. Hall, Professor James Kurth, General Bruce Palmer, Professor Steven T. Ross, Hon. Robert J. Murray, Dr. Williamson Murray. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

For its part, the Naval War College organized a conference to consider the broad topic of JCS reform and published the proceedings of it. In the preface to the volume of proceedings, Strategy and Policy faculty member Dr. Steven T. Ross explained that the purpose of the conference was not to provide easy or simple solutions but to contribute to an informed discussion of the current proposals. The conference that met on 6–7 May 1985 was a mix of academics and former officials with firsthand experience, with papers divided into two groups. As Ross characterized it, "While the conference came to no conclusions that military reform was neither required nor unnecessary, the participants did provide thoughtful papers and comments which may assist others—concerned with this important topic—in gaining a fuller appreciation of the complexities of the issue."[27] The first set of papers dealt with current proposals for reform. The conference opened with a paper by Robert J. Murray, a former Under Secretary of the Navy and founding dean of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies, who was then the director of National Security Programs at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He was followed by former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway III; General Bruce Palmer, U.S. Army (Ret.); Professor David K. Hall of the College's Defense Economics and Decision Making Department; and Dr. Jeffrey G. Barlow, an historian with National Security Research, Inc., and the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. These speakers expressed a wide range of views. Some thought that the problems arose from systemic issues, while others saw them as arising from personalities within the system. The first type was susceptible of organizational reform, but the other was not.[28] The second part of the conference explored the topic in terms of four quite different historical case studies. Dr. John Gooch of the University of Lancaster discussed the British Chiefs of Staff from 1904 to 1984; Dr. Steven Ross discussed the example of France's defense structure since 1958; Dr. Williamson Murray of the Ohio State University discussed the German example up to 1945; and Dr. Arie Ofrie with Major General Matan Vilnai examined the Israeli General Staff from 1948 to 1985. While these cases provided background and related information, it was clear that "each nation had adopted national military command structures that were suited to their particular situation and the American situation may not in fact be analogous."[29] Among those studies, Williamson Murray's "JCS Reform: The German Example?" struck a chord with those who opposed a stronger Joint Chiefs of Staff structure. Reprinted in the *Naval War College Review*, Murray's paper memorably concludes that "what we have to learn from the Germans will *not* help us resolve our problems at the level of high command organization."[30]

Graduation Ceremony on Colbert Plaza, June 1986. This image shows the student body, families, and spectators on the uncovered plaza, exposed to the vagaries of the weather as well as vulnerable to aerial assault from gulls disturbed by the usual gun salutes or merely using the pavement to crack open clamshells.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Meanwhile, several key people took office in Washington who wanted defense reform. Senator Barry Goldwater, a Republican from Arizona, became the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 January 1985 and decided to make defense reorganization his primary goal. Six months later, on 15 July, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12526, which created the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, chaired by David Packard, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense and the co-founder of the Hewlett-Packard Corporation. And finally on 1 October 1985, Admiral William J. Crowe became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. A key figure for the Navy, Crowe played the role of mediator and conciliator on the issue of Defense Department reorganization.[31] With these three key appointments filled by proreform individuals the likelihood increased that some sort of organizational reform would take place. The political atmosphere that included both rising defense budgets and public criticism of wasteful government spending added to the likelihood.

The view of the Navy's senior leadership toward Defense Department reform is, perhaps, best encapsulated in an anecdote that Admiral Crowe told. As feeling about the proposed Goldwater-Nichols bill heightened in 1986, Admiral Crowe invited Representative Nichols and the House Armed Services Committee to the Pentagon for breakfast with the members of the Joint Chiefs. Crowe had hoped that the meeting might lead to persuading the members of the congressional committee to ameliorate some of the more onerous elements that he saw, particularly the proposed Joint Officers Corps.

> As the breakfast proceeded, CNO Jim Watkins was expressing his objections. He started off moderately enough, but as he warmed to his subject he threw caution to the winds. Finally in an emotional burst, he said, "You know, this piece of legislation is so bad it's, it's . . . in some respects it's just un-American." Nichols's face went rigid; it was obvious he was profoundly offended. Whatever progress we might have made up to then went up in smoke. Nichols never said another word, and at the first opportunity he got up and walked out. A few weeks later, Watkins retired on schedule as CNO, but I spend the next three months apologizing to Nichols, trying to coax him back into a reasonable frame of mind.[32]

Watkins's heartfelt view and that expressed by Secretary Lehman, Deputy Under Secretary Cropsey, and some of the panel members at the Naval War College's JCS reform conference and other naval thinkers reflected the long-standing philosophical differences that naval officers had with military theory. As expressed in the Navy's approach to the military planning process in the first half of the century, and most notably in the Naval War College's 1942 publication *Sound Military Decision,* naval officers thought that

Rear Admiral Service with the Well-Known Author and Journalist Tom Wolfe, at the Naval War College President's House, 11 October 1984. The author of the 1979 book *The Right Stuff,* on which the 1983 film of the same name was based, Wolfe gave the College's 1984 Spruance Lecture.

Naval War College Museum Collection

the approach formed around the principles of war was too rigid. It was very difficult for American naval officers to accept ideas associated with the military command structures of National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union.[33]

Change in College Presidents

Rear Admiral Service left the Naval War College presidency on 12 July 1985 with orders to become Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, and promotion to vice admiral. Looking back on his time in Newport, he recalled two major difficulties that the College faced: "I had to do what you'd call a hard sell on finding interested people" to come to the Naval War College as students. "It was incredible the number of people that thought that going to War College was really a kind of sidestep in their career that they could ill afford and it made them not more competitive but less competitive."[34] The second issue involved correspondence courses. In the light of the number of enrollments, the percentage of courses that naval officers completed was low. As Service noted, "a lot of guys would sign up for the course, but then they never got any command backing to get the time off available to actually complete the course satisfactorily and therefore get some recognition. Part of the problem was that those people were never given a degree."[35] Naval officers thought that Air Force and the Army officers seemed to find it easier to get an advanced degree, while naval officers found it more difficult to do so since the discontinuation of the George Washington University's cooperative degree program at the Naval War College in 1973. A number of students had turned to nearby Salve Regina College for that purpose.

Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott. As the forty-third President of the Naval War College, Marryott served just over one year, from 8 August 1985 to 12 August 1986, before going on to become Superintendent of the Naval Academy.

Naval War College Museum Collection

With Admiral Service's departure, the deputy and chief of staff, Captain Robert B. Watts, served as acting President until 8 August, when Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott took command. Marryott had attended a year at the Wyoming Seminary, a college preparatory school in Pennsylvania, before going on to Annapolis and graduating with the Naval Academy class of 1957. Unusually for a flag officer, he had taught courses in naval history and international relations at the Naval Academy in 1964, before going on to serve in the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and then to become executive assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. He graduated from both the Armed Forces Staff College, in Norfolk, Virginia, and the National War College, in Washington, D.C. He was commanding officer of Patrol

Sculptor Felix de Weldon (Far Left) Presents the $1,000 Past Presidents' Prize in Honor of Admiral Stansfield Turner (Second from Left) to Lieutenant Commander Christopher B. Yates, U.S. Naval Reserve (Far Right), for the Best Student Essay on a Professional Naval Topic. Rear Admiral Marryott (second from right) looks on. Mr. de Weldon established the prize in 1979. It was awarded for eight years until 1987, when funding ended, honoring a different past President each year it was awarded.

Naval War College Museum Collection



Rear Admiral Marryott and the Oversized, First Ticket to the Student Variety Show, the Gaieties, June 1986. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Squadron Nine and Moffett Field Naval Air Station, before becoming Commander, Iceland Defense Force, as a rear admiral. His subsequent assignments as a flag officer were as Director of and then Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, before becoming President of the Naval War College.

Six months after taking command at Newport, Marryott wrote to Admiral Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations, giving his view of the Naval War College. "My overall impression is that the institution has a remarkable vitality and momentum, manifested by the enthusiasm of the faculty and students, and a remarkable relevance to the key strategic issues of the day."[36] Marryott pointed to progress in the development of a dynamic operations curriculum at both the senior and intermediate levels, a strong civilian faculty, and an Integrated Warfare Course that was providing a coherent and relevant post-command course, separate from the main curriculum, as well as linking the Center for Naval Warfare Studies to the teaching faculty and to the research work by students. However, the College faced a serious budget problem with the way the Navy was planning to implement the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James B. Busey IV, had been able to provide some relief, when College leaders first complained about the issue, but even with that additional support the College faced a fiscal deficit of $1.496 million that translated into a budget cut of 16 percent. "These are fiscal circumstances which place in jeopardy all that has been accomplished here in the last four years," Marryott wrote. "Unless relief is obtained quickly, the quality of the faculty, the substantial commitment to gaming for the fleet and bilateral needs, the improvement in fidelity of our gaming capability and the pursuit of studies directly related to the development of the maritime strategy are placed in jeopardy."[37] By May 1986, Admiral Watkins had been able to provide further fiscal relief that could sustain the College's quality, while bringing the annual budget level to just under $12 million, for an 8 percent reduction under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that still made it difficult to retain all faculty and staff members.[38]

With a year and four days in office, Rear Admiral Marryott turned over his duties to his deputy, Captain Robert Watts, on 12 August 1986, who became for the second time acting President of the College. Marryott went on to become Superintendent of the Naval Academy from 1986 to 1988, when he retired. On 2 September, three weeks after Marryott's departure, Rear Admiral John A. Baldwin, Jr., took command as the

Captain Robert Watts Served as Deputy to the President and Chief of Staff from 1983 to 1988. Additionally, he twice served as the acting President of the Naval War College, before Admiral Marryott's term, from 12 July to 8 August 1985, and following it, from 12 August to 2 September 1986.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral John A. Baldwin, Jr. As the forty-fourth President of the Naval War College, Baldwin served for just under a year, from 2 September 1986 to 11 August 1987. Selected for promotion to vice admiral, he went on to serve as Director of the Strategic Plans and Policy Division (J5) on the Joint Staff, and then President, National Defense University.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Captain Wright H. Ellis Served as the Director, Naval Command College, 1984–1987.
Naval War College Museum Collection

forty-fourth President of the College. Baldwin's tenure would be even shorter, at eleven months and nine days.

A surface warfare officer, Rear Admiral Baldwin graduated from the Naval Academy in 1955. He served in two destroyers and a tank landing ship before taking command of USS *Marysville* (E-PCER 857). Next, he commanded USS *John R. Perry* (DE 1034), then became the first commanding officer of USS *Meyerkord* (DE 1058), and later Commander, Destroyer Squadron Thirty-Three. Reaching flag rank in 1964, he commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three, with additional duty as Commander, USS *Kitty Hawk* Battle Group on a deployment in the North Arabian Sea off the Persian Gulf. Ashore, he served in the Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy and did postgraduate studies in oceanography at the University of Washington; served as senior advisor to the Vietnamese Navy in Military Region II; served in the sea control forces group in the Systems Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and served as Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.[39]

The Henry E. Eccles Library—Fire and Recovery

The College library had moved from Mahan Hall, where it had been located since 1904, to the newly constructed Hewitt Hall in April 1976. From 1935, when the building was named Mahan Hall, until 1976, the library was often referred to colloquially as the Mahan Library, but the library itself had never been formally named, only the building. On 10 June 1985, as Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles and his wife were leaving Newport to enter a retirement home in Needham, Massachusetts, the College formally named the library in honor of Eccles. A 1943 graduate of the College, he had won the Navy Cross at the battle of the Java Sea and had spent thirty-eight years in close association with the Naval War College, from 1947 to 1985. For the dedication, the portrait of Eccles that Tony Sarro, the head of the College's Graphic Arts Department, had painted in 1970 as one of the first two portraits commissioned of faculty members, was hung near the library's circulation desk.[40]

During his four decades in Newport, Eccles had become an iconic figure at the Naval War College. In his active-duty career up to 1952, Eccles had been the Navy's and the College's leading expert on logistics. In addition, he had served, on occasion, as acting chief of staff. He continued the interest in logistics after retirement as a consultant to the College, teaching elective courses on logistics as well as on international relations and military theory. His teaching provided a basis for his two major books, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (1965) and *Military Power in a Free Society* (1979). Both Eccles and his wife, Isabel, were active



Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles. One of the most widely known and highly regarded individuals associated with the Naval War College between 1947 and 1985, the College library was named in his honor in 1985. He died 14 May 1986.
Naval War College Museum Collection

members of the Newport community. Working with Mrs. Margaret Spruance and Mrs. Margaret Smith, Isabel Eccles had taken the initiative to strengthen the interests of War College wives' in the community and she was active with the Red Cross's Gray Ladies, the Navy–Marine Corps Relief Society Thrift Shop, Trinity Church, the Norman Bird Sanctuary, the Newport Garden Club, and the Point Association.

Informally, Admiral Eccles was a mentor to many members of the faculty and staff who shared his abiding interest in military theory, clearly and concisely stated. Typically, Eccles would seize on some aspect of a current strategic issue, analyze it, and then write a thoughtful reflective piece in the evening and have his typist prepare it. He would then distribute it around the College the next day for further comment and discussion. Among themselves, the recipients of these thought-provoking papers affectionately referred to them as "Ecclesiana," making a pun by pronouncing the word as a variant of the Greek word *ekklēsia* and Latin word *ecclesia*.[41]

In their 101 Washington Street home, Isabel and Henry Eccles were most gracious hosts. Faculty and visiting scholars were treated to delicious formal dinners with Isabel Eccles's distinctive Southern hospitality. With a style that was disappearing from the American scene, after dinner the ladies retreated to Mrs. Eccles's spacious bedroom upstairs, where the ladies reviewed the latest progress in Mrs. Eccles's quilt making. Meanwhile, the men moved to the living room for brandy, cigars, and serious discussion. On at least one occasion, such distinguished figures as Professor Norman Gibbs of Oxford University, Marine Corps Major General Samuel B. Griffith, and Admiral Eccles were all on their hands and knees together on the carpet as they graphically worked out the details of a campaign they were discussing, using various books, bits of furniture, and decorative items to represent the forces involved.[42]

In his remarks at the dedication of the library, Eccles expressed his gratitude that "this great military library" should bear his name and went on to reaffirm the importance of the College, adding his admonitions. The Naval War College, he said, "is an institution of selected men whose common purpose is to generate and develop ideas associated with maritime power and naval warfare, in all their aspects."[43] Stressing the words "generate" and "develop," he noted that it was far too easy to parrot the common wisdom of higher authority without the critical rigor that he believed was the essential characteristic for the College. "It is not sufficient merely to have this vision of greatness and these ideas contained in books and papers on shelves and in catalog indexes.

"Two more forces which have been hitherto neglected by the staff of the Naval War College must be brought to bear to give life: One, the discipline of a coherent military theory, the other, an active institutional memory."[44]


AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION IS A COMBINATION OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS...THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IS AN INSTITUTION OF SELECTED MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE COMMON PURPOSE IS TO GENERATE AND DEVELOP IDEAS ASSOCIATED WITH MARITIME POWER AND NAVAL WARFARE, IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS...THEREFORE, I TAKE SPECIAL SATISFACTION THAT IN HAVING THIS LIBRARY NAMED FOR ME, I BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH GREAT MEN SUCH AS LUCE, MAHAN, SIMS, PRINGLE, SPRUANCE, CONNOLLY AND HEWITT. EACH OF THESE IN HIS SPECIAL WAY WAS A GREAT MAN IN THE NAVAL PROFESSION. EACH GENERATED AND DEVELOPED IDEAS RELATIVE TO SEA AND MARITIME POWERS, NAVAL WARFARE AND NAVAL EDUCATION. THEY SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND DEDICATION TO WHICH WE ALL CAN ASPIRE... THE LIBRARY IS THE HEART AND FOCUS OF THIS VISION OF GREATNESS AND THIS GENERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS.
FROM ADMIRAL ECCLES REMARKS AT THE DEDICATION OF THE LIBRARY

Eccles Library Plaque. After an arsonist set a fire in the library, the College rededicated the newly renovated library to Rear Admiral Henry Eccles on 9 December 1987.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Five months after the library's dedication, in the early morning hours of 5 October 1986, an enlisted watch stander, who was generally dissatisfied with the Navy, started a fire with cleaning chemicals in the photocopying room of the library. The fire spread into the area near the library circulation desk, and destroyed two photocopy machines and all the magazines and newspapers in the area as well as a truck of new books. In addition, Tony Sarro's portrait of Admiral Eccles was damaged beyond repair. Several windows were damaged and some firemen were injured in the incident. The heating and air conditioning system carried soot and smoke into the library card catalogue and into the open shelving area where the bound serial publications were stored.

The fire occurred just a month after Admiral Baldwin took over the College presidency at a time of fiscal stress, but he was determined to restore the library by the beginning of the next academic year. "I have to tell you that it didn't come easy," Baldwin recalled. "Fortunately, perseverance and a modicum of pull" got it done.[45] Despite the severe fiscal constraints on the Navy and the College, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was able to find the funding and the Naval Facilities Command was able to execute the repairs to the library in 1987.

In the cleaning process for the library that followed, the chemicals used to remove the soot also removed the spine labels of some 2,000 volumes. To repair this collateral damage, the College temporarily hired Elizabeth Morse, a preservation specialist, who devised the plan to create new spine labels and paste them

Captain Howard F. Burdick, Jr., Served as Dean of Academics, 1985–1986. To his right is Mary Guimond Estabrooks, and to his left, MaryAnn Salesi. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

on the spines to make the books usable again for faculty and students. Fortunately the 500,000 books in the stack area were not seriously damaged.[46] Following an investigation, the enlisted watch stander was charged with arson and convicted at a general court-martial.

With the repair and conservation work completed, the library was rededicated in honor of Admiral Eccles on 9 December 1987 in the presence of Mrs. Isabel Eccles and their son, Frank McCord Eccles. Artist Tony Sarro, having already retired, was recalled to paint a new version of the portrait that he had completed in 1970 and it was hung prominently in the same place as its predecessor at the entrance to the library, along with a display of artifacts and photographs relating to Eccles's career.[47] After the library staff returned to their work after the fire, librarian Robert Schnare named the library's new digital catalogue "Phoenix" to mark the library's recovery.

The Beginning of Academic Accreditation for the Naval War College

In 1987, Admiral Baldwin took the initiative to establish an Institute for Strategic Studies at the Naval War College. Although short-lived, it had two purposes. First, it was a means to emphasize that the Naval War College was a thriving center for strategic thought as the College faculty began to think about academic accreditation. Second, it was a means for the College to try to retain some of its young, high-quality faculty members—particularly, at that time, Steven J. Rosen and Eliot A. Cohen, who had been teaching strategy—and to attract others like them to the College.[48] In connection with this institute, over a period of three years between 1987 and 1991, the Olin Foundation awarded an annual grant of $500,000 to the Naval War College Foundation, mainly for postdoctoral study and an occasional predoctoral fellow. The program was an initiative by Alvin Bernstein, Eliot Cohen, and Steve Rosen and it was administered for the Naval War College Foundation by Captain Robert Watts, after his retirement from active duty. Each of the fellows worked under the tutelage of one of the three organizers. The program introduced a range of scholars to the academic programs at the Naval War College. One of the few predoctoral candidates in the program, Thomas H. Nichols, completed his dissertation at Georgetown University and eventually came back to join the Naval War College faculty, as professor of strategy from 1997 to 2008, and chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department and Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy, 2002–2008. In 2008, he became course director for security, strategy, and forces, in the National Security Decision Making Department.[49]

The largest and most important issue that arose during Rear Admiral Baldwin's tenure was the thought of getting the Naval War College formally accredited so that it could award a master's degree. There were a number of issues involved, both new and old. Among the old issues, the College's students felt the professional need to obtain the academic qualification of a master's degree. Increasingly, they were taking courses at Salve Regina College, and using the credits from the Naval War College, to earn a master's degree there. In Baldwin's view, and that of others at the College, this was "diluting . . . what they should

be deriving from a 'total NWC experience.'"[50] Baldwin was convinced that the College's curriculum was already equivalent in course content to that of the institutions that were already granting degrees in the national security studies area, such as Harvard's John F. Kennedy School master's degree in public policy.

At the same time, Congress was beginning to put pressure on the service colleges in two ways. First, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act placed fiscal constraints that academics at the Naval War College saw required some measurable, external standards to define and to defend what the College needed in order to maintain its high-quality academic curriculum. Meanwhile, Representative Ike Skelton, member of the House Armed Services Committee and keen supporter of military reorganization efforts that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, began to promote reform of professional military education at the senior service colleges.[51] At this point, Dr. Williamson Murray, a professor of history at the Ohio State University and former faculty member at West Point, the Naval War College, and the Air War College, published an article on "Grading the War Colleges" that drew widespread attention. "The purpose of America's war colleges is embedded in their name: they exist to study war," Murray wrote. "If they fail in that task, the consequences cannot be overstated: Not only will the lessons of past wars go unlearned; not only will our military leaders be unprepared for future wars; they will not even be capable of recognizing their lack of education, and hence will be in no position to rectify their shortcoming."[52]

Providing an overview of all five colleges in the country, Murray declared that "the best of the war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by which other colleges should be measured."[53] While its students were motivated, the College was not immune to his criticism. Although he found that the strategy and policy trimester was thorough and intellectually challenging, the operations curriculum was the least satisfactory, lacking a sense of direction and purpose. Noting that Congress had mandated reform in the administrative structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he pointed out those reforms did not address the problem of the intellectual orientation of the great majority of flag and general officers. The war colleges, he said, were the only available means to change that situation.

As a reaction to Murray's article and the general evolving situation, Rear Admiral Baldwin wanted "to set NWC apart from the rest—*i.e.*, a degree granting institution recognized as such by academia."[54] In order for the Naval War College to obtain permission to grant a graduate academic degree a number of steps were necessary. Under federal policy, the Secretary of Education has final authority to grant or to deny a federal agency's request to award an academic degree, but it is a relatively rare occurrence for such a request to be made. The first step was for the College to obtain the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to allow the U.S. Navy to apply on behalf of the Naval War College to the Department of Education. The Department of Education would then assign this request to the appropriate nationally recognized accrediting agency for review, which in this case would be the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education (CIHE) of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC). In 1987, only two federal agencies had made such a request during the previous dozen years. The second step required the Navy to obtain statutory authorization from Congress for awarding the degree. In this, a recent example was the 1982 statute authorizing the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College to offer the degree of master of military art and science.[55] As the Naval War College started its investigation into the procedure involved, the Army's Judge Advocate General School was also seeking authority to confer a master of laws degree.[56] With this

information in hand, Baldwin sent a memorandum on 3 April 1987 to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, requesting that he initiate the process to obtain degree-granting authority.[57]

Naval War College Foundation Board of Directors, June 1987.

Top row (left to right): not identified, Rear Admiral John R. Wadleigh, Ambassador Thomas S. Estes, not identified, Townsend Horner, S. E. Freund, Vice Admiral John T. Hayward.
Middle row (left to right): Robert Akin; Richard Sheffield; Captain Robert Watts; John Dalton; Prudence Colbert Mackall; John Slocum; not identified; Chauncey Schmidt; Captain James D. Brush, Jr.; Walter "Bud" Woodson, Executive Director.
Front row (left to right): Charlie Stetson, Paul B. Fay, Nils Anderson, B. Franklin Reinauer, Rear Admiral John Baldwin, Robert Bateman, Seymour Knee. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

In making the request to Admiral Trost, Baldwin pointed out that the American Council on Education currently granted up to twenty-one graduate degree credits toward a master's degree for the College's courses. With marginal additional effort by Naval War College students, he felt that it was possible to earn the additional credits to meet the required thirty credits for a master's degree. Baldwin pointed out such a degree would provide appropriate recognition for the rigor and depth of the intellectual effort expected from the College's graduates and it would increase the already high respect that the College had in the academic community. It would also provide students, particularly naval officer students, the opportunity to earn a professionally focused degree in national security affairs and provide an identifiable reservoir of officers for designation as strategic planners who can fill major staff planning and operations billets, while also diminishing the current diversion of Naval War College students to the courses at Salve Regina College. The College anticipated that there might be opposition within the Department of Defense to support a single-service degree program, if the other services were not interested. Objections might also be made that it would decrease funding for other educational programs, or there might possibly be difficulty in demonstrating a need for this degree if the Bureau of Personnel felt that the current supply of officers with political-military specialty codes in strategic planning was sufficient to meet current needs.[58]

With the first step toward academic accreditation in place, attention turned to the simultaneous, but separate, discussion of the joint professional military education requirements that followed from the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This act was primarily designed to strengthen the role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and his staff along with that of the regional combatant commanders and their joint staffs. A major factor involved in this reform was to improve the approach for managing officers assigned to joint service duty by establishing promotion criteria with educational standards and requirements. The act required, among other things, that officers assigned to joint duty complete a course on joint professional military education (JPME) that met required standards established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Up until the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the country's war colleges and command and staff colleges had been entirely the responsibility of the individual services; while this remained the case, the newly required joint element in each college's curriculum was to be controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To carry out this responsibility, a new section was created within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J7) to monitor joint education. Eventually, this office came to certify and to accredit each service college's curriculum insofar as it dealt with joint matters. In order to do this, it established learning objectives and standards for evaluation, requiring reviews and reports on the curriculum.[59]

It took time and considerable effort to create a workable process to implement the intentions of Congress. At the outset, a Senior Service Schools Review Board had been established to review and make recommendations on how to proceed. Reacting to the initial report, Admiral Baldwin pointed out that the board's report was thoughtful and straightforward, agreeing that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs should accredit the senior and intermediate courses at Newport, but there were a number of aspects of concern in the report. First, joint perceptions and competence were something that was already ingrained in the Naval War College's curriculum, although it was presented "with emphasis on the maritime aspects of joint warfighting."[60] Additionally, he noted that the Naval War College already taught all the subjects that were listed in the proposed joint curriculum. The main issue that the College saw with the proposal was that it focused on staff processes and procedures rather than on the type of education appropriate to the service colleges, dealing with the higher issues involved in joint warfare.[61]

The next major step in the process took place at the annual Military Education Coordinating Conference that met at Fort Lesley J. McNair on 3 December 1986 with each of the senior and intermediate service school leaders represented, chaired by Lieutenant General Bradley Hosmer, president of the National Defense University. The main topic of discussion was the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and its implications for the curricula of the service colleges. One Naval War College observer commented, "Frankly, my impression of the MECC Conference was that many of the participants were looking at the problem through the wrong end of the telescope."[62] The object should be successful prosecution of joint warfare with all the planning and coordination required, structuring curricula organically to produce such officers, but instead many participants used a very narrow definition of joint warfare and wanted to designate mechanically a certain number of hours as joint. This seemed to avoid the central intent of the legislation to "improve officer education so as to plan and conduct effective military operations."[63] In Admiral Baldwin's formal response to General Hosmer on the meeting's draft report, he stressed:

> There is no effective "jointness" unless each of the parts is highly competent in its specialized role and the parts are joined together in a common national vision and task. "Jointness" can have no meaning as a separate discipline. An artificial separation of service specific education and joint education will produce officers whose specialized competence will be degraded without improving effectiveness in joint operations.[64]

While the College's faculty and leadership were focused on maintaining the high quality of the curriculum for its accreditation in both the joint and academic spheres, a continuing problem remained with the Navy's assignment of naval officers to the student body. In June 1987, former War College President Vice Admiral James Service, then Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, attended the Current Strategy Forum and graduation, as did another former President, Admiral Huntington Hardisty, who as Vice Chief

of Naval Operations was the graduation speaker. With Baldwin's and Hardisty's encouragement, Service wrote directly to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost. "At lunch with Jack Baldwin, I pointed out to Hunt [Hardisty] what I believe to be a serious concern. That is the quality of naval officers being sent to our senior and junior courses has eroded and may be approaching the unsatisfactory levels of the '70s and early '80s."[65] Enclosing his marked-up graduation program, he complained that only 25 percent of the naval students in the senior course received highest distinction and there were only six naval officers among the twenty-four who received distinction. A number of those who did well were staff, not line, officers. "It seems such a waste to send middle-grade officers to Newport who will never have the opportunity to make flag. Similarly, it's a shame to deny our future flag officers the benefits of a superb education in the very best of all senior service colleges."[66]

In Admiral Baldwin's end-of-tour report to the Chief of Naval Operations, he echoed those same thoughts, adding the need also to get good-quality naval officers as faculty members when he commented, "We need to work harder at creating the perception within the detailing world that duty here is a good thing."[67] Going further, Baldwin pointed out to Admiral Trost that another necessity was the need to maintain the perception of an "independent" status for the College. "My people know full well that they are part of the Navy team," he wrote; "there is somewhat more freedom for us in exploring issues and, for instance, war games, if we are perceived as academic vice an institutional entity."[68] A detached status fosters innovative thinking and open discourse. Freedom to publish is essential to attract and to maintain a high-quality faculty, "though they fully recognize the need to be circumspect as to how and where to do so."[69]

NOTES

1. For a detailed study of the *Maritime Strategy*, see John B. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986*, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), supplemented by the related documents published in John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents*, Newport Paper 33 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2008).
2. See Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy*, and John B. Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents*, Newport Paper 30 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007).
3. Bud Hay and Bob Gile, *Global War Game: The First Five Years*, Newport Paper 4 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993), pp. 1–3.
4. Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Papers: RG 37, subseries 7 CAR/ARP Classified Papers, box 13: Captain John P. Kelly, "Tactical Implications of Mountainous Terrain on the Air Defense of the Amphibious Objective Area (U)," 24 November 1982, with a supporting computer analysis by Guy Carrier, LCDR, USN. Also published as Classified Newport Paper, no. 5. (The Classified Newport Papers are unrelated to the Naval War College Press Newport Paper series.)
5. Captain John P. Kelly, introduction to ibid.
6. Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Papers: RG 3, subseries 7 CAR/ARP Classified Papers, box 13: Robert S. Wood, cover letter for distribution of Kelly, "Tactical Implications."
7. Frederick H. Hartmann, *Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 1980s* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 186.
8. John T. Hanley, Jr., "Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today," *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 19–20.
9. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy*, p. 79; Hattendorf, *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s*, pp. 44–104.
10. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy*, pp. 37–81.
11. Ibid., pp. 61–63.
12. Robert S. Wood, e-mail to Hattendorf, 16 June 2014.
13. John T. Hanley, Jr., e-mail to Hattendorf, 16 June 2014.
14. Quoted in Robert H. Gile, *Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988*, Newport Paper 20 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), p. 17.
15. Ibid., pp. xiii–xiv, 127–30.
16. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 3, file 1986: enclosure 1, appendix D, *Annual Report: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1985–1986;* Hartmann, *Naval Renaissance*, p. 184.
17. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *National Security Strategy: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate*, 100th Congress, 1st sess., 1987, p. 265.
18. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers], Subject Files: Naval War College History, 1984–2014, ONI, "Brief History of ONI Detachment, Newport, February 2010."

19. Gail Harris, with Pam McLaughlin, *A Woman's War: The Professional and Personal Journey of the Navy's First African American Female Intelligence Officer* (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2010), p. 151.
20. Ibid., pp. 155–66.
21. Ibid., p. 164.
22. James R. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M Press, 2002), p. 36.
23. General David Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs Must Change," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 138–49.
24. Ibid., pp. 148–49.
25. John Lehman, "Let's Stop Trying to Be Prussians: An Old Bad Idea Surfaces Again," *Washington Post,* 10 June 1984, quoted in Steven T. Wills, "Navy and Marine Corps Opposition to the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986" (M.A. thesis in history, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, 2012), p. 64–65.
26. Wills, "Navy and Marine Corps Opposition," p. 71.
27. Steven T. Ross, foreword to *JCS Reform: Proceedings of the Conference* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1985), p. iii. See also Locher, *Victory on the Potomac,* pp. 179–80.
28. *JCS Reform,* p. 1.
29. Ibid., p. 59.
30. Williamson Murray, "JCS Reform: A German Example?," *Naval War College Review* 38, no. 6 (November–December 1985), pp. 28–41; quotation at p. 40.
31. Wills, "Navy and Marine Corps Opposition," p. 99; William J. Crowe, Jr., with David Chanoff, *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 147–49.
32. Crowe, *The Line of Fire,* p. 159.
33. For a related discussion on the situation in Britain, see Alaric Searle, "Inter-service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture: The 'Principles of War' in the British Armed Forces, 1919–1939," *War in History* 21, no. 1 (January 2014), pp. 4–32.
34. Hattendorf Papers, Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates' Naval War College Oral History Project, Telephone Interview with Vice Admiral James Service, Conducted on October 23, 2009 by James Rife. These quotations appear on the third page of this unpaginated document.
35. Ibid. This quotation appears on the fourth page of this unpaginated document.
36. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File, box 3, Marryott: Rear Admiral R. F. Marryott to Admiral James D. Watkins, 15 January 1986.
37. Ibid.
38. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File, box 3, Marryott: Point Paper for Chief of Naval Operations, 13 May 1986.
39. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 3, file 1986: enclosure 1, appendix A, official biography; Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: "A Wharf Rat's Domain," *Nantucket (Mass.) Inquirer and Mirror,* 20 November 1986.
40. John B. Hattendorf, *Faces of the Naval War College: An Illustrated Catalogue of the U.S. Naval War College's Collection of Portrait Paintings and Busts* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009), pp. 48, 52.
41. These memoranda may be found among the 112 boxes in the Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 52 Papers of Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles.
42. Hattendorf's recollection.
43. Henry E. Eccles, "Remarks at Dedication of Eccles Library at Naval War College," *Naval War College Review* 38, no. 6 (November–December 1985), p. 96.
44. Ibid., p. 97.
45. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: VADM John A. Baldwin, e-mail to Hattendorf, 30 July 2002.
46. Hattendorf Papers, Correspondence: Robert Schnare, e-mail to Hattendorf, 25 June 2014; Robert Schnare and Marilyn Curtis, "Fire Aftermath and the Recovery Process," *Conservation Administration News* 35 (1989), pp. 1–2, 22; Robert Schnare, "Incendiary Gilt: When Your Labels Go Up in Smoke," *Conservation Administration News* 36 (1989), pp. 1–2.
47. "Naval War College Library Rededicated," *Newport Navalog,* 18 December 1987, p. 5; Hattendorf, *Faces of the Naval War College,* p. 52.
48. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: VADM John A. Baldwin, e-mail to Hattendorf, 30 July 2002.
49. Hattendorf Papers, Correspondence: Bob Watts, e-mail to Hattendorf, 5 January 2010; Hattendorf Papers, Correspondence: Thomas Nichols, e-mail to Hattendorf, 11 January 2010.
50. Watts, e-mail to Hattendorf; Nichols, e-mail to Hattendorf.
51. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac,* pp. 37, 97–98, 99, 102, 104.
52. Williamson Murray, "Grading the War Colleges," *National Interest,* no. 6 (Winter 1986–1987), p. 12.
53. Ibid., p. 14.
54. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: VADM John A. Baldwin, e-mail to Hattendorf, 30 July 2002. See also Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, box 380, 1520 Training and Education 1986: RADM Baldwin letter to Williamson Murray, ser 3193, 12 November 1986.
55. 10 U.S.C. § 4314 (1982).
56. Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, box 380, 1520 Training and Education 1987: T. D. Keating, Memorandum 13/224/7, From: 13, To: 002, 11 March 1987.
57. Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, box 380, 1520 Training and Education 1987: J. A. Baldwin, memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, ser 613, 3 April 1987.
58. Ibid.
59. Thomas E. Kearney, "The War Colleges and Joint Education in the United States," in *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future,* ed. Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), pp. 149–65.
60. Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, box 380, 1520 Training and Education 1987: J. A. Baldwin letter to Chief of Naval Operations, 5 June 1987.
61. Ibid., enclosure 1.
62. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers [hereinafter Ms. Coll. 196], box 6, PME 1983–1986: Memorandum for the President, 12 December 1986.
63. Ibid.
64. Ms. Coll. 196, box 6, PME 1983–1986: President, Naval War College letter to President, National Defense University, ser 3574, 18 December 1986.

65. Ms. Coll. 196, box 4, file Current Strategy Forum, 1988: VADM James E. Service letter to ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost, 30 June 1987.

66. Ibid.

67. Ms. Coll. 196, box 9, file CNO Correspondence 1987–88: RADM Baldwin letter to ADM Trost, 1 August 1987.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

The Naval War College Awarded Its First Master of Arts Degrees at Its 107th Graduation on 21 June 1991. Naval War College President Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, with former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins (seated) and former College President Rear Admiral Ronald Kurth, participated in the degree ceremony. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Chapter Fifteen

The Long Process for Joint and Academic Accreditation, 1987–1991

In July 1987, the College community learned that Admiral Baldwin had been selected for promotion to vice admiral and assignment as Director, Strategic Plans and Policy Division (J5) on the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, then serving as the U.S. defense attaché in Moscow, was assigned as his successor.

Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth. As the forty-fifth President of the Naval War College, Kurth served from 11 August 1987 to 17 July 1990. An aviator with extensive operational experience as well as a master's degree and a PhD from Harvard University, Kurth had served in Washington and in Moscow as naval attaché and defense attaché before coming to Newport. Highly qualified to face the critical challenges to the College during his three-year tenure as President, Kurth successfully led the institution through a key period as it dealt with the rigorous process to become the first war college in the country to gain academic accreditation to award a master's degree and, at the same time, dealt with the newly evolving process in the Department of Defense for certification in joint professional military education.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Born in Madison, Wisconsin, Kurth graduated from the Naval Academy in 1954, after which he entered flight training and was designated a naval aviator. After serving in airborne early warning, hurricane hunter, and anti-submarine patrol squadrons, he returned to the Naval Academy, where he taught Russian. In 1961, he was assigned to Harvard University, where he earned a master's degree in government, then returned to five years of aviation assignments. He returned again to Harvard, where he became a teaching fellow in American national government and completed his PhD in government with a thesis on "The Politics of Technological Innovation in the United States Navy." On leaving Harvard with his doctorate in 1970, he was assigned to the Politico-Military Policy Section (Op-61) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. During that tour of duty, he was sent to Moscow in 1971 to negotiate the Incidents at Sea Agreement with the Soviet Navy. Later, he became desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia before being ordered to Moscow as U.S. naval attaché. On his return from Moscow, he commanded Naval Air Station, Memphis, and had a year as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In 1980, he became executive assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (Op-06). Selected for rear admiral in 1981, his

first flag assignment was Director of Politico-Military Policy (Op-61), followed by Director of Long Range Planning (Op-09X). In 1986, he returned to Moscow as defense attaché.[1]

Rear Admiral Kurth Lecturing to a Naval War College Class about the Soviet Union in 1988. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

On taking command at the Naval War College on 11 August 1987 as the first President of the Naval War College to hold a PhD, Kurth was immediately faced with the two main issues of academic accreditation and the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. "I had to come up to speed pretty fast on my own judgment of the nature of the curriculum and possible changes to accommodate Goldwater-Nichols," Kurth recalled.[2] After a careful look at the curriculum, Kurth was convinced that the educational growth of War College students in this curriculum was equal to any kind of master's degree program with which he was familiar. The students, he felt, recognized this by their desire to build on the War College's course to get the additional credits for a master's degree at Salve Regina, but he thought the situation was "a little bit skewed" when students took their War College credits out in town to Salve Regina and took the additional credits, often with Naval War College professors, who were teaching night courses on their own time at Salve Regina.[3]

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff established the standards for joint military education on 24 November 1987 and requested reports on the statuses of the current programs that were in place, directing that they should be available for accreditation by 21 December.[4] On 10 December 1987, Kurth provided a detailed report, noting that the College's program satisfied the Joint Chiefs' learning objectives, even going beyond them in certain aspects. From the College's perspective, only one area was lacking: the Defense Planning System, which had been covered in a conceptual way, but would be taught in a ten-week elective during the current academic year. The Joint Staff's initial certification group indicated that the Naval War College's original plan would not be approved. The College had designed it to provide a viable joint and service-specific education to all students, but its plan did not meet all the criteria for faculty and student mix and also allow 51 percent of its graduates to be sent to joint duty. The College felt that the approved approach that other colleges were adopting created a class of "2nd class citizen[s]" for those outside the joint track. Despite these reservations, Kurth submitted an alternative plan for certification, which was approved in due course.[5]

While the curriculum was not the major issue at the Naval War College, the requirements for joint professional military education required dedicated time in a career path. This posed a specific problem for naval officers.[6] As Kurth put it, "if you're a naval officer, and you are always in the sort of musical chairs game of sea duty / shore duty, you have limited opportunity, compared to the other services, in my opinion, to engage in education to match principally the Army and the Air Force."[7] Under such circumstances, the main issue was "to qualify naval officers to compete fairly in joint duty under Goldwater-Nichols."[8]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also raised opportunities for others to try to influence the College's curriculum. For example, the Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division (Op-60) in Washington provided a draft plan to incorporate the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) into the curricula of the professional military education schools. Requiring 160 hours of classroom time, this meant either a drastic reduction of the current curriculum or an extension to it. Neither of these was an option that was acceptable to the College. Admiral Kurth replied firmly, "I consider familiarization with JOPES to be training and not education. I would not want to turn this fine university into a training establishment where modules of instruction are added and subtracted as training requirements pop up and then disappear."[9]

Captain Clyde J. Vanarsdall III Was Deputy and Chief of Staff of the Naval War College from 1988 to 1991. A graduate of the Naval Academy and Navy Nuclear Power School, Vanarsdall had served as main propulsion assistant and later executive officer of USS *Long Beach* (CGN 9) and commanded USS *Truxton* (CGN 35).
Naval War College Museum Collection

On the other hand, there were new elements that needed to be brought into the curriculum. One of these was the issue of professional ethics, a subject that Vice Admiral Stockdale and Professor Joseph G. Brennan had raised in their elective course in the 1970s on moral philosophy and which Brennan continued to teach. In March 1987, Admiral Baldwin had replaced the regular Military-Media Conference that had been held in the break between trimesters with a half-day Professional Ethics Conference.[10] In the following year, Kurth picked up this initiative and expanded it into a two-day-long event on 7–8 November 1988 on the topic of "Ethics and the Use of Force" and in the following year, "Ethics in Military Leadership," on 20–21 November 1989. Earlier, Kurth had experienced a sad lesson on the absence of ethics near the end of his tour in Moscow and felt this was a subject that should be elevated in the College's curriculum. In doing this, the College chaplain, Commander Arnold E. Resnicoff, CHC, USN, played a key role as a thinker and speaker.[11]

The Naval War College Review

The continuing budget issues also posed threats in other areas. In trying to cope with a directive from the Secretary of the Navy to reduce the Fiscal Year 1988 budget for periodicals by 55 percent, the *Naval War College Review* was targeted for the third time in two years. After being cut from ten issues a year to a bimonthly in 1972, it was reduced again in 1986 to a quarterly. This new budget initiative threatened to kill the *Review* entirely. Kurth responded with a personal naval message to Admiral Hardisty as the Vice Chief of Naval Operations that pointed out that the *Review* was respected at Harvard and Colonel Harry Summers had recently credited it "as one of the leaders of the renaissance of intellectual thought which helped the military recover from its post-Vietnam depression."[12] Kurth said that he understood the financial constraints on "trade publication in [the Defense Department]. However, the last publication to go should be one which keeps open our intellectual doors to the immense and influential constituency we have among those who shape opinion and, through their opinions, influence policy."[13] Kurth went on to point out that without the *Review,* ideas in Newport are either exiled to Newport, or communicated only within the Navy.

As a result of Kurth's effective plea, the *Review* remained funded. With its future secure, Kurth used the *Review* to inform readers about the current controversy over professional military education. In the first of his "President's Notes," he pointed out that he had just come from Moscow, where he witnessed fascinating political reform and acute controversy. Now, in Newport, he had plunged into a controversy over educational reform. "As we reorganize the curriculum to increase the amount of joint instruction it will offer, a process under way since well before the Goldwater-Nichols bill took effect, we are finding a broad area of disagreement," Kurth declared. The Naval War College believed strongly that joint matters should be an integral aspect of the curriculum, while others in Washington and elsewhere insisted that the joint portion of the curriculum should be separate from other portions.

> Jointness, we think, should not be taught separately because it is not a separate form of warfare. If we treated it as though it were distinct from its service-oriented components, we would build an artificial fence between it and the numerous service-specific issues on which it depends. For the past few years we have independently recognized the need to address joint issues and strengthen their presentation at the Naval War College. Accordingly, our operations course focuses primarily on joint warfighting, and each seminar has all-service representation, using wargaming as a device to integrate joint concepts. Joint force alternatives similarly dominate our force planning course. The sound integration of land, sea, and air power constitutes one of the five major themes examined in every one of the historical case studies that make up the strategy segment of our curriculum. Throughout the academic year, in every seminar in all three parts of our curriculum, we draw upon the specialized competence of our multiservice student body, which is truly joint—only 54 percent of our students are Navy officers.[14]

Kurth went on to point out that it was ironic that while an independent working group at the Pentagon found that the Naval War College had more joint warfare content in its curriculum than any of the other colleges, the Navy itself was being perceived as unwilling "to get on board the jointness bandwagon."[15] This larger institutional problem was that the Navy deployed a larger percentage of its officer corps in peacetime than the other services and during their careers it could spare relatively fewer of them to attend both an intermediate and a senior service college. The only remedy that Kurth saw for this dilemma was to increase the total number of officers in the Navy, something that was unlikely to happen. The suggestion that was being made at the time to take a major segment of the intermediate course and to devote it entirely to joint matters would detract from the overall curriculum, when the Navy could not spare officers to come to both an intermediate- and a senior-level course.

With the publication of the *Review* containing Kurth's comments, retired Naval War College professor Philip A. Crowl wrote privately to Kurth to express his exasperation:

> My first reaction is "Not Again!" In the eight years I served as Chairman of the Strategy Department at Newport we were repeatedly bombarded with pressures from various segments of the Washington bureaucracy to distort the curriculum in favor of somebody's pet project or some agency's special interest. At one point it was the international lawyers' lobby who wanted more of their subject crammed into the course of study; then the Marine Corps, which naturally thought that we neglected amphibious warfare; then the Maritime Commission which complained of the lack of emphasis on the merchant marine; then Under Secretary Clements who insisted on greater uniformity among all the war colleges; then the various people wanting us to "teach" ethics; and finally the Navy Department which decided we weren't parochial enough and should color everything blue and gold. Now apparently the War College is too parochial. What next?[16]

Crowl found it particularly distressing to see "the persistence of the naïve belief that the way to improve a curriculum is to pile on another discrete course of study. This tendency to incrementalism is the curse of all military education in this country. It is an entirely fallacious idea as experienced educators will testify."[17] In replying to Crowl's well-thought-out letter, Kurth emphasized that he wholeheartedly supported the spirit and goals of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, but was convinced that the method of weaving jointness into the overall fabric of the curriculum was the best way to achieve this, thereby preserving and strengthening the core curriculum. If the Department of Defense insisted on a discrete segment of training, Kurth would limit it to a mandatory elective course for intermediate-level students.[18]

On 16 May 1988, the Subcommittee on Professional Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee visited Newport and held hearings in Mahan Hall. Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri chaired the panel, which included Representatives Jack Davis of Illinois, Owen Pickett of Virginia, and John Rowland of Connecticut.[19] As Admiral Kurth recalled, "Ike became very impressed with the quality of the curriculum of the Naval War College and the demands that the curriculum placed on its students. . . . He was openly critical of the other war colleges at the same time as he publically praised the Naval War College for its rigor."[20]

Rear Admiral Kurth Testifying before the Skelton Panel on Professional Military Education, in Mahan Hall, 16 May 1988. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

On 21 June 1988, Congressman Skelton's committee made a preliminary report on its progress in examining whether the military education system was producing professional military strategists and officers competent in the operational employment of joint military forces. The report noted that the subcommittee had visited all ten U.S. senior- and intermediate-level schools for professional military education; held hearings with thirty-nine current and former senior military leaders, civilian educators, and military school officials; talked with faculty and student groups; and conducted ninety interviews. Skelton commented:

> We've found that military schools are increasing the content and quality of their joint education courses. Each service is now providing more students and faculty to sister service colleges, so that now about half of each service's senior students go to a sister service or joint war college. This richer mix of service officers in our schools will break down barriers to inter-service cooperation.[21]

Despite the positive tone, the committee was finding some problem areas. Most importantly, it found uncertainty in defining and educating the new category of Joint Service Officer (JSO). Members of Congress believed that the Joint Service Officer was part of the answer to recent failures in joint military operations, such as the Grenada invasion and the Iran hostage rescue effort. In addition, the members of the subcommittee found a widespread controversy over the need for rigor in evaluating academic performance. Some service school leaders, notably those at the Naval War College, believed that officer students, regardless of their age, perform best only under the pressure of grading, while others thought grades were unnecessary.

Representative Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), Chairman of the Panel on Professional Military Education, Listening to Testimony at the Naval War College, 16 May 1988.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The next step in the subcommittee's investigation was to hear from the service chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, then move on to hear from a range of other experienced officials and educators. Two days after Skelton's interim report was released, Admiral Trost was the first service chief to testify before the committee in Washington. Welcoming Trost to the hearing, Congressman Skelton referred to the panel's recent trip to the Naval War College and said that "they do an excellent job."[22] In his testimony, Trost emphasized the high value that the Navy placed on graduate-level education for its officers at the war colleges, at the Naval Postgraduate School, and in civilian universities. At the same time, he stressed that extensive operational experience as well as graduate education was required for a naval officer's success. Additionally, Trost cautioned against overlooking operational expertise and pointed out the need for flexibility to account for differences among the services. The Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs reported that Trost's testimony was very effective and well received.

Nevertheless, there were aspects of the Navy's policy on professional military education that Skelton and his subcommittee did not like. Initially, they did not agree with the Naval War College having both its senior and intermediate schools co-located in Newport. Congressman Skelton, in particular, thought that the Army's example of having separate schools, with one school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the other at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, was the better model. More importantly, Skelton wanted top-performing officers to be graduates of both the intermediate and senior schools. Subcommittee members did not agree that officer rotation between sea and shore duty made the Navy different from the other services. While Kurth and Skelton developed a friendship that carried on into Kurth's retirement years, Kurth repeatedly engaged him on the uniqueness of a naval career, but could never successfully persuade Skelton, although he thought he got Skelton's attention on the matter. Whether in command of a carrier, cruiser, or submarine, Kurth argued, a naval officer "doesn't sit on the bridge without knowing what is going on in the engineering spaces. The biggest piece of equipment an army [officer] must master is a tank; in the Air Force, an airplane."[23]

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Visited the Naval War College on 30 March 1988 to Speak to the Students. This image shows Rear Admiral Kurth and Admiral Crowe in the President's House.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Preparing for a Dinner at the President's House, 1988. MS1 Goodspeed, the cook at the President's House in the latter half of Kurth's tenure, prepares plates for a formal dinner to be served by Deborah Tavares, the admiral's secretary, and the multitasked second-class petty officer who was also the admiral's driver and a yeoman in the admiral's office.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Another major issue arose for the Navy with the Skelton panel's views regarding the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. This college had had its origin in the wartime Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL), a four-month course in joint matters. Based in Washington, D.C., the students in each course between 1943 and 1945 had traveled to spend several weeks of instruction at the Naval War College and then at Fort Leavenworth. In 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established it as a permanent college under the name of the Armed Forces Staff College. It moved to its permanent home in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1947 and, in 1981, the college was placed under the administrative direction of the President, National Defense University.

The Skelton panel desired that officers sent on joint duty assignments should be graduates of the Armed Forces Staff College in addition to intermediate and senior war college courses. This requirement was very difficult for the Navy to meet, given its officer assignment policies and operational commitments. The issue was "a real donnybrook," in Kurth's words.[24] For the Navy, this additional requirement created havoc with permanent change of station costs and career progression, disruption on the staff of a joint commander, and pressure on officers with families and children in school. This problem was eventually resolved by the time that the Skelton committee issued its report in November 1988. This report announced the creation of two levels of professional military education for the JSO to be taught in different institutions. The individual service colleges would provide Phase I of the required joint military education curriculum to all U.S. students during their one-year course. In 1988, the Naval War College was authorized to grant both Phase I and Phase II certification to senior-level students in the College of Naval Warfare and its intermediate-level students in the College of Naval Command and Staff. From 1989, however, the Armed Forces Staff College provided Phase II of the qualifying course over a length of time that did not constitute a permanent change of station for officers or require families to move to new locations. At this time, a determination was made that allowed the Naval War College to grant retroactively Phase I certification to full-time resident U.S. students who had graduated between 1986 and 1988.[25]

Since the Armed Forces Staff College's curriculum fell under the control of the National Defense University, its president, General Bradley Hosmer, made an ambitious move, suggesting that the curricula of all service colleges should also fall under its control. This added to the anxiety among heads of the other colleges, some of whom were also beginning to doubt that the Armed Forces Staff College made a contribution of such importance when the requirements were so difficult to meet. In long discussions about the issue, the proponents of the course stressed the "bonding" that occurred among Armed Forces Staff College students from the various services. As Kurth recalled, "Among experienced Army and Navy school commanders, the subject was met occasionally with a shared opinion, which descended into derisive humor about the fact and importance of 'bonding.'"[26] As National Defense University made its apparent move to

control the curricula of the individual service colleges, the heads of the service colleges began to fear that the specific service orientation of their curricula would be lost, something that they felt would be a potentially enormous loss to the development of the fighting skills in the individual services. At the same time, both the Navy and the Army felt that the curricula of their service colleges were superior to that of the National Defense University. As a result, the Army and the Navy worked together to maintain successfully the independence of their own service college curricula.[27]

On 21–24 February 1989, the initial on-site certification group for joint professional military education came to assess the Naval War College's curriculum and revalidate the previously awarded certification as required by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. St. Laurent, U.S. Army, the Frederick J. Horne Professor of Military Logistics in the Operations Department, was the College's project and escort officer for this effort. The certification group was headed by General Thomas R. Morgan, USMC (Ret.), with co-vice-chairmen Brigadier General Malcolm B. Armstrong, USAF, and Dr. John E. Endicott of National Defense University. There were five other members of the team, including the Dean of Academics, Captain Elizabeth "Betsy" Wylie.

Other Courses

In February 1983, on the initiative of Admiral Watkins as Chief of Naval Operations, the College had begun teaching a six-, then an eight-, week-long course for post-command naval officers that eventually became known as the Integrated Warfare Course. The idea behind it was to bring more post-command naval officers to the Naval War College for a short and intensive course to develop a cadre of professional naval officers who could plan and execute the employment of naval forces in support of national objectives. In four and a half years, between 1983 and 1988, the College conducted twenty-two courses and graduated 345 students from it. While the course had been designed principally to meet the needs of commanders and captains in the Navy, the attendees also included five civilians, one Army officer, and one U.S. Coast Guard officer. With the Navy's success in assigning more post-command officers to the College's senior, yearlong course, the Integrated Warfare Course was discontinued on 1 August 1988.[28]

In early 1987, the Army War College and Air University had started to conduct a Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course (JFOWC) for all services with eighteen to twenty one-star- and two-star-level officers as students. In 1988, the Army War College requested the Naval War College supply war-gaming support and a uniformed faculty advisor. Late that same year, it appeared that the Army and Air Force wanted to make the Naval War College a full partner in the course, implying that the Naval War College would need to supply additional faculty members. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Trost, told Kurth that he heard a good deal about the course and "all who have attended it have nothing but rave reviews."[29] To increase naval flag officer attendance, Trost directed that information would be included in the flag officer newsletter and available through the flag assignment desk. However, the Navy could not create any additional faculty billets and the Naval War College was directed to support the course using existing faculty members.[30]

The Continuing Quest for Academic Accreditation

Unaware that Admiral Baldwin had already begun to think about seeking academic accreditation for the College, Kurth's interest in the subject came from his observation of War College students wanting the Salve Regina master's degree. In the context of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Kurth wanted to provide a means for naval officers to compete with their counterparts in other services, who were able to get advanced degrees in much larger numbers than naval officers. He felt it was a great sign of the Air Force's respect for the Naval War College that the officers it sent to Newport were required to have a master's degree before attending.[31] At the same time, this illustrated a great disparity between the educational policies of the two services.

Kurth started by discussing the issue of accreditation with Admiral Trost. The Chief of Naval Operations was proud of the College's achievements, but he initially opposed the idea of accreditation and made no mention of Baldwin's earlier request. Kurth recalled, "He took some persuasion," thinking that accreditation meant relinquishing control of the curriculum to the accrediting authorities.[32] Kurth and the College's academic leaders soon convinced him that the academic accreditation process did not interfere with an institution's mission and goals and that the curriculum remained in the Navy's hands.[33] In May 1989, Trost issued his "Service College Education Policy," which focused particularly on the Naval War College's role. "A service college education is an essential part of the professional military development of our officer corps," Trost declared.

> Although the Navy uses other U.S. military and allied service colleges to broaden the professional knowledge of our officers, I expect the NWC to be the institution which plays the primary role in the development of our future leaders. The number and quality of the students, the faculty, and academic programs must always reflect the key role which the NWC must play in determining the course of the Navy and the nation. At the intermediate and senior levels, the NWC must provide an education that will aid officers in meeting the intellectual demands and challenges of their future careers. It must encourage students to explore alternative courses of action, to be intellectually flexible, to understand the fundamentals of sea power, and to obtain the analytical skills and perspective needed for allocating and wisely using available resources. Although the course should and does focus on maritime issues, a balanced course of study should prepare naval officers for joint assignments. Toward this end, all Professional Joint Military Education Phase I goals and objectives will be rigorously met.[34]

Trost also underscored the College's need for an exceptionally well-qualified faculty, directing that military faculty must be highly successful professionals, carefully selected to meet stringent requirements of the academic departments. At the same time, civilian faculty should be selected with care "to ensure a balance between visiting and permanent scholars of the most astute and innovative thinking in their respective fields."[35]

Kurth's second step was to discuss the matter with Sister Lucille McKillop of the Religious Sisters of Mercy. She had been president of Salve Regina College since 1973, when Salve Regina had first become a co-educational college. Kurth explained to her that if his ambition to have the Naval War College accredited was successful, it would likely interfere with the revenue that Salve Regina was accruing, largely from the loss of Naval War College students spending their Veterans Administration educational benefits for Salve's master's degree. Sister Lucille was gracious and supportive, mentioning to Kurth that a recent

Luce Hall in Winter. Rear Admiral Kurth had a passion for photography and was often seen around campus with his camera. Kurth took this iconic and much admired image that captured the feel of Newport and the Naval War College in the depth of winter.

Naval War College Museum Collection

faculty council had discussed the same issue. She had observed that the Naval War College's curriculum and faculty were strong. She concluded by encouraging Kurth to proceed, saying that Salve Regina would not stand in the way of the Naval War College.[36]

The third step was to approach the New England Association of Schools and Colleges. Kurth and his team had some qualms about this, since university and college campuses had earned a reputation during the Vietnam War era of being the home of anti-military attitudes. Nevertheless, the association agreed to initiate the process and provided the necessary guidance on procedures. The College faculty had begun to work on a self-study as early as May 1988, and began work on it in earnest by November 1988. A faculty and staff steering committee was established for the self-study under the direct supervision of the dean of academics, Captain Elizabeth G. Wylie, and chaired by Professor Richmond Lloyd. Dr. Charles M. Cook, director of NEASC's Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, visited the Naval War College for a preliminary visit on 18 January 1989 to review the College's initial progress on the self-study. By the time the self-study was completed in June 1989, it had involved one hundred individuals from the faculty, staff, and students, who collectively made recommendations in twelve major areas.[37] The full accreditation team visited the College on 17–20 September 1989 for its on-site review and on 1 March 1990, Kurth appeared before a full meeting of the NEASC commission at the Clarion Hotel in Nashua, New Hampshire.

As part of the fourth step in the accreditation process, an institution needed to provide evidence that the body that held fiduciary responsibility was in support of an application for accreditation. For most academic institutions, this would be a board of regents or a board of trustees. The Naval War College had nothing exactly comparable. The Naval War College's Board of Advisors that the Secretary of the Navy had established in 1967 was, as its name suggested, an advisory body with no fiduciary responsibility. Representative Skelton had repeatedly pointed out during his professional military education hearings that the Naval War College's "board of directors" was Congress.[38]

With the academic self-study started, the fourth step in the process—getting congressional approval—proved to be daunting. In January 1989, the Senior Executive Service Assistant for Educational Resources in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, former Naval War College faculty member and retired U.S.

Army colonel J. A. Richard Guertin, visited the College to discuss the issue. In early March, he followed up and reported that he and his staff had investigated the process for congressional authorization and they had "progressed in the mire of what we envisioned as tangled problems."[39] Guertin outlined in five pages the bureaucratic way forward, with an initial application to the National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility (NACAIE) in the U.S. Department of Education to be submitted through Guertin's office.

While this application was in preparation, the newly elected Republican member of Congress for Rhode Island's First District, Ronald K. Machtley, a 1970 graduate of the Naval Academy, wrote to Admiral Kurth, inquiring about progress toward accreditation and noting that he had just been appointed the ranking Republican on Congressman Skelton's Panel on Military Education. After leaving active duty in 1975, Machtley had gone on to Suffolk Law School for his Juris Doctor degree and remained in the Naval Reserve until 1995, a period that included his entire three-term tenure in the House of Representatives. With an ideal background to understand the needs of the Navy and the Naval War College, Machtley proved to be a great asset.

Rear Admiral Kurth Congratulating Lieutenant Colonel William Spain, USMC, on His Appointment to the Holland M. Smith Chair of Marine Expeditionary Warfare. Spain held this position from 1989 to 1992 and again from 1998 to 2001. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Captain Robert Anson Served as Director of the Naval Staff College in 1989–1991. Prior to this appointment, he had been U.S. naval attaché in Bonn, Germany. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

On 10 April 1989, Kurth met with Machtley and discussed with him the idea that he might introduce the bill that would authorize the Naval War College to confer a master of science degree in national security and strategic studies. Machtley produced a first draft of the bill for Kurth's review within a day after their meeting. The complex bureaucratic procedures slowed the process, but as Kurth noted in a handwritten personal note to Congressman Machtley, "we can cope and are coping well. . . . I do not want the sand in my shoes to deter me from the march toward our goal. We will make it."[40]

On 14–17 May 1989, representatives of the National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility visited the Naval War College, prior to the full meeting of that committee on 27 June. Immediately after what the College believed was a successful visit, Kurth sent a formal letter to Secretary of Education Lauro F. Cavazos, requesting that he recommend to Congress that the Naval War College be granted the authority to offer a master of science degree in national security and strategic studies.[41] Following this, Kurth sent the College's formal request for authority to award the degree to Dr. H. Reed Saunders, Director, Higher Education Management Services, at the U.S. Department of Education.[42]

Kurth traveled to Washington for the formal meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility on 27 June 1989, "unsuspecting, but unworried," as he recalled. "I was in the dark."[43] It was an intimidating courtroom-like scene. The members of the accrediting council were seated behind a horseshoe-shaped desk on a raised dais, while Kurth was ushered to a small table facing them. "To my astonishment, the proposed accreditation of the NWC was being

challenged and vigorously opposed by the American Council on Education (ACE)," the nation's most respected and influential association in higher education, representing all the accredited institutions in the country.[44] The president of the American Council on Education spoke first and laid out his case in opposition to the Naval War College and the precedent it would set. He argued that since the Naval War College was supported entirely by federal funding, its accreditation—and the accreditation of similar military colleges—would diminish the income of independent educational institutions and would represent government competition in the free market of education. In the process, he backed up his argument by producing a letter from Sister Lucille McKillop, the president of Salve Regina College, which while not opposing the War College's accreditation, appeared unenthusiastic toward the idea.[45] Kurth saw Sister Lucille as "a real lady" who had definitely encouraged him to launch the War College's accreditation process. Reflecting long afterward, Kurth presumed that the American Council on Education had made her "cool her support, but she did not abandon us."[46]

Noted Strategic Thinker Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie Addressing the Naval War College's Conference Marking the Centenary of the Publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783.* Forty-eight naval historians and strategists gathered in Mahan Hall for the conference, held between 29 April and 1 May 1990. Wylie was the conference dinner speaker at the Viking Hotel in Newport, with an address, "Mahan: Then and Now." *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Completely unprepared for this attack, Kurth reacted vigorously and felt he "had been sandbagged by the Department of Education and its central accrediting body."

> I argued that there were no other institutions that could supply the curriculum we offered. It was unique. The course of study was aimed at the peculiar professional development of naval and military professionals. The curriculum was taught by a sector of the academy that could not teach nor conduct its research elsewhere. We were competing with no one for educational revenue. Even Salve Regina awarded our curriculum 20 credits in its master's program because that fine institution had no hopes of duplicating it. Nearly forty other foreign, blue-water navies sent us their officers for education because there was nowhere else they could get it, and because they regarded our course and our faculty with the greatest respect.[47]

Rear Admiral Kurth and Felix de Weldon Examine de Weldon's New Bust of Kurth in the Artist's Studio at His Home, Beacon Rock, in Newport. This bust was the last of the dozen portrait busts of Naval War College presidents that de Weldon created in the years between 1948 and 1990. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

When the cases had been presented, the members of the National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility took a vote and the majority voted in favor of accrediting the Naval War College.

While academic accreditation was a separate issue from joint professional military education, Congressman Skelton's panel also took an interest in the Naval War College's pioneer work in this area. In a hearing on 2 August 1989, Skelton told his panel members, "It is important for the Panel to signal its general approach to degree-granting applications because schools other than the Naval War College are expected to seek similar authority. I'm sure that's coming down the pike as sure as God made little green apples."[48]

Congressman Machtley introduced Admiral Kurth, who was accompanied by Colonel Steve Staley, USAF, a graduate of the Naval War College with highest distinction and a professor of strategy; Professor Alvin Bernstein, chairman of the Strategy Department; and Professor Richmond Lloyd, coordinator of the Force Planning course in the National Security Decision Making Department. In a response to Kurth's testimony, Skelton noted, "In my opinion, you all are knocking a home-run academically. We have said that in print; you do well."[49] Skelton repeated his concern about the Navy not making good use of the College as well as the Navy's general failure to send officers to both intermediate- and senior-level courses. Skelton's panel delved into all sorts of aspects of military education. One of the other matters they investigated was how the current issues of low- and mid-intensity conflict were dealt with in each college's curriculum. For that subject, Captain Elizabeth "Betsy" Wylie, the dean of academics, testified on 6 September 1990. She was accompanied by Dr. William Fuller, Chairman, Strategy Department; Dr. Richmond Lloyd, acting Chairman, National Security Decision Making Department; and Colonel Theodore Gatchel, USMC, chairman of the Operations Department.[50] Congressman Machtley followed through and introduced the legislation in the House of Representatives.[51] Kurth and the College's senior academic leaders hoped that accreditation could be completed in time for graduation in June 1990, but that was not to be. Congress first needed to authorize the granting of the degree before the New England Association of Schools and Colleges would give the formal approval for accreditation.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Rear Admiral Kurth Congratulate Army Major Stanley A. McChrystal on His Graduation from the Naval War College, 22 June 1990. Cheney was the graduation speaker. McChrystal also earned a master of science degree in international relations from Salve Regina College while at the Naval War College. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Eventually his bill was appended to the larger Defense Appropriations Bill for 1991 and was involved in a range of political delays. Among them, U.S. Senator John H. Glenn, Jr. (D-Ohio), put a hold on the legislation because of a disagreement he was having with the Superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point over another issue that was in the bill. Kurth recalled, "We waited in limbo for months and months. June graduation came and went. . . . Three years had not been enough to complete the process. I left Newport disappointed."[52]

Finally, on 5 November 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the act of the 101st Congress that approved Department of Defense appropriations for 1991 and included the long-awaited section that authorized the Naval War College to award a master's degree:

> (a) AUTHORITY.—Upon the recommendation of the faculty of the Naval War College, the President of the college may confer the degree of master of arts in national security and strategic studies upon graduates of the college who fulfill the requirements for the degree.
>
> (b) REGULATIONS.—The authority provided by subsection (a) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy.

> (c) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE DEFINED.—In this section, the term "Naval War College" means the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff.[53]

Shortly after Congress acted to authorize the award of the degree, the new President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso, to start consideration of an issue that had been raised during the accreditation process. It had been noted that the College's curriculum had not substantially changed since the 1985 academic year. Up until that time, the American Council on Education had not recommended graduate academic credit for the curriculum taught in the Naval Operations Department. The American Council on Education awarded graduate credit from 1985, after Captain Tim Somes and his faculty had completely revised their curriculum to be focused on joint arms. With the introduction of this new curriculum, the Naval Operations Department was renamed the Operations Department. The degree program that the New England Association of Schools and Colleges was expected to sanction in 1991 had been in place since 1985. Thus, the question arose whether the College could retroactively award degrees to those who had completed the course since 1985. The legislation provided that regulations for granting the War College's prospective degree must be exercised by the Secretary of the Navy, so Strasser sought Kelso's initial approval. At first, Kelso was cautious and sought more information, but by early March, Kelso sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy requesting approval for the Naval War College to grant degrees retroactively, noting that there was a precedent for this. When the Naval Academy had been granted authority to award a bachelor of science degree in 1930, it had retroactively granted the degree to all living alumni.[54]

On 8 March 1991, the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education recommended to the Executive Committee of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges that it grant initial accreditation to the Naval War College. In making this recommendation the commission noted:

> We commend the College for its many strengths. Included among them are the institution's clearly defined and worthy mission and its long tradition of striving for excellence in meeting that mission. The College enjoys dynamic and competent leadership. Its faculty are devoted and effective teachers. Students are motivated, determined, and able and enthusiastic about the program. The program of studies is clearly academic in content and coherent in a manner appropriate to an institution of higher learning.[55]

While praising the College, the commission pointed out that there were some weaknesses that needed attention. Three main points stood out: (1) The Board of Advisors needed to be activated to ensure appropriate and effective participation in War College affairs. (2) The College needed to use systematic, advertised national searches to fill civilian faculty positions and to increase the number of women and minorities throughout the faculty. (3) An effective means was needed to validate the instructional program through the assessment of student learning outcomes. An interim report was required in the spring of 1993, with a comprehensive evaluation to follow in the fall of 1994.[56]

On 20 March 1991, the president of the New England Association informed the College that the Executive Committee had voted on 13 March to grant the Naval War College accreditation retroactively effective to 20 September 1989.[57] With this authority, the Naval War College awarded its first degrees at its 107th graduation ceremony, on Colbert Plaza on 21 June 1991. Significantly, the Naval War College awarded a master of arts degree in national security and strategic studies, rather than the master of science degree,

for which the College had originally applied to award. The academic criteria to earn the degree for students in the College of Naval Warfare and in the College of Naval Command and Staff were to receive at least a B-minus grade in all three courses in the core curriculum and to have passed three electives. In addition to the members of the 1991 class, master's degrees were authorized for previous classes, initially back to 1989, but this was soon extended to the nearly two thousand alumni of the Naval War College who had graduated under the same curriculum since June 1985.[58]

In March 1991, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell certified that the Naval War College students in academic year 1990–1991 who had satisfactorily completed the intermediate-level, nonresident course were accredited for Phase I. Subsequently, at the College's request, the Joint Staff authorized the retroactive award of Phase I credit to students who had completed the Joint Maritime Operations course in the previous academic year, 1989–1990, as that course was substantially the same as the 1991 course.[59]

This particular course had been based on the academic year 1987–1988 resident course. As the resident Operations course was constantly being revised and updated, the distant education course needed to be revised to match the resident course. To meet this need, the College of Continuing Education's Operations faculty developed a new "Update Correspondence Course" for the 490 students who had been enrolled in its Joint Maritime Operations course during the period between 15 July 1987 and 14 June 1989. Before this could be approved, another revision of the resident curriculum in 1991 made the proposed update outdated. In 1992, a newly revised course incorporating the most recent changes in the resident course was put in place for the Continuing Education program and an adaptation of it was used to update the Phase I certification of about forty students. The last student who requested the update course completed work in March 1994, after which the update course was no longer needed. Meanwhile, in March 1993, the Joint Staff accredited both the Naval War College's resident and the nonresident operations courses for Phase I certification. As the resident Operations course underwent significant curriculum change each year to remain up-to-date, the faculty teaching the distant education equivalent followed suit with annual revisions to mirror the resident course.[60]

Joint professional military accreditation was a new and evolving process, while academic accreditation was a long-standing procedure that had been used widely in the academic community. The two separate processes interacted at the Naval War College, even though they involved different agencies, different criteria, and different self-study teams, but the two processes were major events in the history of the College and in the history of professional military education. With successful completion of both accreditation processes, the Naval War College became the first institution for senior- and intermediate-level professional military education in the United States to award an academic degree.

NOTES

1. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 4, file 1988: enclosure 1, appendix A, Biography of RADM Ronald J. Kurth.
2. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Naval War College Oral History Project, Interview with Rear Admiral Ronald Kurth conducted on October 29, 2009, by James Rife [hereinafter Kurth interview], p. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum CM-1053-87, dated 24 November 1987, as referenced in Naval War College Archives, RG

3 Central Files, box 393, 1520 Training and Education 1987: RADM Kurth to Deputy CNO for Personnel and Training, ser 2489, 10 December 1987.

5. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 6, file Professional Military Education 3 Oct–10 Nov 1988: President, Naval War College, to Chairman, Initial Certification Group on Joint Professional Military Education, signed 4/11/88.
6. Kurth to Deputy CNO for Personnel and Training.
7. Kurth interview, p. 2.
8. Ibid.
9. Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, box 380, 1520 Training and Education 1987: Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (Op-60) letter to President, Naval War College, ser 6050/70410273 with enclosure, 20 August 1987; RADM Ronald J. Kurth letter to RADM Ronald W. Eytchison, ser 2451, 8 December 1987.
10. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 3, file 1986: enclosure 1, appendix 3, Program for 12th Military Media Conference, 13–14 November 1986; Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 3, file 1987: enclosure 1, appendix H: Program 1987 Professional Ethics Conference, 7–8 November 1988.
11. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence, RADM Kurth to Hattendorf, comments on draft, 29 July 2014 [hereinafter Kurth comments].
12. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 5, file Naval War College Review issue: NAVWARCOL message to CNO, Personal for ADM Hardisty from RADM Kurth, 031700Z 87.
13. Ibid.
14. Ronald J. Kurth, "President's Notes," *Naval War College Review* 41, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 1–2.
15. Ibid., p. 2.
16. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 5, file Naval War College Review: Philip A. Crowl letter to RADM Kurth, 28 January 1988.
17. Ibid.
18. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 5, file Naval War College Review: RADM Ronald J. Kurth letter to Philip A. Crowl, 25 February 1988.
19. The full subcommittee consisted of Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), chairman; Solomon P. Ortiz (D-Tex.); George (Buddy) Darden (D-Ga.); Joseph E. Brennan (D-Maine); Owen B. Pickett (D-Va.); ranking minority member Jack Davis (R-Ill.); John G. Rowland (R-Conn.); Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.).
20. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Ronald J. Kurth, PhD, RADM, USN (ret), to Hattendorf, 9 January 2003 [hereinafter Kurth to Hattendorf].
21. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 2, folder Accreditation: House Armed Services Committee, news release, 21 June 1988.
22. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 2, folder Accreditation: Summary of Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Education, 23 Jun 1988, by LCDR Allen, OLA Rep.
23. Kurth comments.
24. Ibid.
25. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: NWC Accreditation: House Committee on Armed Services, Panel on Military Education, *Executive Summary [of the] Report of the Panel on Military Education of the Committee on Armed Services,* 100th Congress, 2nd sess., 1988, Committee Print 27; Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Subject Files, Accreditation: Paul J. St. Laurent Files: Memorandum for Director, CCE from P. J. St. Laurent, Subject Phase One Certification, 11 February 1996.
26. Kurth to Hattendorf, p. 3.
27. Ibid.
28. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 4, file 1988: enclosure 1, appendix F, Integrated Warfare Course: A Brief History; Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 4, file 1988: enclosure 1, appendix F, Integrated Warfare Course—A Chronology of Events (With Documenting Tabs).
29. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 4, file Joint and Administrative Training: ADM C. A. H. Trost to RADM Kurth, 7 December 1988.
30. Ibid.; President, Naval War College letter to CNO, ser 1799, 15 September 1988.
31. Kurth comments.
32. Ibid.
33. Kurth to Hattendorf, p. 4.
34. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 8, file Training and Education: CNO to Distribution List, "Service College Education Policy," ser 00/90500181, 19 May 1989.
35. Ibid.
36. Kurth to Hattendorf, p. 4.
37. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: NWC Accreditation: Memorandum for Distribution from Dean of Academics, Subj: Status of Master's Degree, 23 August 1989.
38. Kurth to Hattendorf, p. 4.
39. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 2, file Accreditation: J. A. Richard Guertin to RADM Kurth, 2 March 1989.
40. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 2, file Accreditation: RADM Kurth to Ron [Machtley], 19 May 1989, cover note to formal letter RADM Kurth to Machtley, 19 May 1989. See also, in the same location, Machtley to Kurth, 28 March 1989; Machtley to Kurth, 11 April 1989; Kurth to Machtley, 19 April 1989.
41. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 2, file Accreditation: RADM Kurth to Lauro F. Cavazos, 19 May 1989.
42. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 196 RADM Ronald J. Kurth Papers, box 2, file Accreditation: RADM Kurth to Dr. H. Reed Saunders, ser 4103, 9 June 1989.
43. Kurth to Hattendorf, p. 7.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Kurth comments.
47. Kurth to Hattendorf, p. 7.

48. House Committee on Armed Services, *Oversight Hearings: Hearings before the Panel on Military Education of the Committee on Armed Services*, HASC No. 101-81, 100th Congress, 1st and 2nd sess., 1989–1990, p. 2.

49. Ibid., p. 17

50. Ibid., pp. 182–197.

51. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Ronald Machtley to Hattendorf, e-mail, 17 June 2014.

52. Kurth to Hattendorf, p. 8.

53. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991*, Public Law 101-510, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 104 (1990), p. 1627.

54. Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, boxes 426–427, 1540 Education and Training 1990–91: RADM Strasser letter to CNO, 28 November 1990, with note from Kelso, 29 January 1991; Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, boxes 426–427, 1540 Education and Training 1990–91: CNO Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, ser 00/1U50092, 8 March 1991.

55. Dean of Academics Office: Files: Barbara E. Brittingham, chair, Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, letter to RADM Joseph C. Strasser, 27 March 1991.

56. Ibid.

57. Dean of Academics Office: Files: Vincent L. Ferrandino, President, NEASC, to RADM Joseph C. Strasser, 20 March 1991.

58. Naval War College Archives, RG 3 Central Files, boxes 426–427, 1540 Education and Training 1990–91: see, for example, President, Naval War College, letters to CDR F. R. Pocock, ser 4124, 20 June 1991, and to CDR Eric Lofquist, ser 4409, 1 August 1991.

59. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Subject Files, Accreditation: Paul J. St. Laurent Files: General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, CM814-91, Subj: CJCS Initial Certification—Naval War College Intermediate-Level Nonresident Program, 29 March 1991; Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Subject Files, Accreditation: Paul J. St. Laurent Files: RADM Joseph C. Strasser, President, Naval War College letter to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-7), ser 1520 G/1203, 1 May 1991; Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Subject Files, Accreditation: Paul J. St. Laurent Files: Brigadier General Kenneth W. Simpson, Deputy Director, Joint Staff for Military Education, Memorandum for President, Naval War College, Subject: CJCS Initial Certification—Naval War College—Intermediate Level Non-Resident Program, 4 June 1991.

60. Memorandum for Director, CCE from P. J. St. Laurent; Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Subject Files, Accreditation: Paul J. St. Laurent Files: President Naval War College letter to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-7), Subj: Request for Approval—PJE Update Correspondence Course, n.d. [ca. 1991].

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser. As the forty-sixth President of the Naval War College, Strasser served from 17 July 1990 to 29 June 1995, the longest single term of any person who has served in the post. After his retirement from active duty, Strasser later returned to Newport to serve as executive director of the Naval War College Foundation from 2000 to 2006. In 2007, the College awarded him an honorary master of arts degree.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Chapter Sixteen

The Teaching Curriculum in the 1990s

Rear Admiral Kurth's appointment as President of the Naval War College in 1987 had established a pattern that would last just over a decade, with a series of three consecutive Presidents of the College who had each earned a doctor of philosophy degree in academic fields relating to national security affairs, political science, and international relations. Under the collective leadership of Rear Admirals Ronald J. Kurth, Joseph C. Strasser, and James R. Stark, the College settled into a stable period of incremental development and improvement under a series of flag officers whose educational backgrounds allowed them to relate readily to the academic departments. Each championed faculty and student academic freedom as the most effective means to nurture insight with the essential skills for critical thinking.

One of the constructive criticisms that the New England Association of Schools and Colleges had made during its initial accreditation review of the Naval War College was that its recent leaders had rotated too quickly. The example of the two, successive one-year terms of Rear Admirals Marryott and Baldwin made the College appear to lack stability and continuity at the top. Rear Admiral Strasser's term of office from 1990 to 1995 eventually answered the association's criticism by being the longest single term for a President in the history of the Naval War College with his tenure of 1,809 days, or nearly five years. Strasser broke the record previously held by Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, who was President in 1960–1964 for 1,492 days, or just over four years. Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus exceeded Strasser's record as an individual, but only by adding together his two separate terms. Kalbfus's first term, in 1934–1936 was 912 days, and the second, in 1939–1942, lasted 1,221 days. When added together, Kalbfus's two terms made a grand total of 2,133 days or about 5 years and 10 months.[1]



ARA *Libertad* (Q 2). The Argentine Navy's 340-foot sail training ship *Libertad*, in which Admiral Strasser had served as a midshipman, as seen from Dewey Field in front of Luce Hall. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

A 1963 graduate of the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral Strasser was a surface warfare officer. While at the Naval Academy, he participated in an exchange program with the Chilean Navy. After graduation, his initial assignment was as an exchange officer on board the Argentine Navy's 340-foot sail training ship ARA *Libertad* (Q 2). After serving in USS *Buck* (DD 761), he became aide and flag lieutenant to Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Nine

and Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Seventh Fleet. In July 1968, he entered the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he served until June 1971, earning two master's degrees, one in international relations and another in international law, then completing his PhD with a dissertation entitled "Uncooperative Neighbors Become Close Allies: United States–Mexican Relations, 1941–1945." Returning to sea duty in 1972–1974, he served as executive officer of USS *Meyerkord* (FF 1058) before going on to duty in Washington, D.C., on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations as a member of the Strategic Action Group in the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division. In 1977–1979, he returned to sea in command of the frigate USS *O'Callahan* (FF 1051). On completion of his first command tour, he served as Fifth Battalion Officer at the Naval Academy and Officer in Charge of the Fourth Class Regiment. In September 1983, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., selected Strasser to be his executive assistant and senior aide, when Crowe was the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Following this duty assignment, Strasser commanded Destroyer Squadron Thirty-Five from May 1985 until September 1986, when Admiral Crowe again requested his assignment as his executive assistant while Crowe was the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. While serving with Crowe, Strasser was selected for promotion to rear admiral (lower half).[2] In September 1988, his first flag command was Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three, during which time he also commanded the USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65) Battle Group.[3] He took command of the Naval War College in Newport in July 1990 as a one star, his promotion to a two-star rear admiral (upper half) following quickly thereafter.

Captain Elizabeth G. "Betsy" Wylie on Her Retirement in 1991. She is shown here with her parents, Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie and Mrs. Harriette Bahney Wylie, in Admiral Strasser's office. With a PhD from the Fletcher School at Tufts University, Captain Wylie had served as dean of academics during the entire process for the Naval War College's joint and academic accreditation between 1988 and 1991. She went on to serve as executive director of the Naval War College Foundation from 1993 to 1999. As a lieutenant in 1967, she had been the first woman to serve in Vietnam. Among her other assignments, she served as Head, Strategic Concepts Branch (Op-601) and Commander, Military Sealift Command, Atlantic. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Curriculum Revision

As the College was completing the process of academic accreditation, the global structure of international relations that the College was educating future leaders to understand suddenly changed with the end of the Cold War and required a major reworking of the curriculum.[4] Writing in the *New York Times,* Bernard E. Trainor described the situation of faculty leaders at the Naval War College sitting in a conference room puzzling over the changes that were necessary for the next year's curriculum while fifty generals and admirals from NATO commands were playing a war game next door.

> For the senior NATO officers, it was business as usual. In their eyes the enemy threat was undiminished as they sought . . . to defeat a hypothetical Soviet attack on Norway.
>
> One British officer watching the scene said, "When military men don't know what to do, they do what they know."
>
> But for the senior officers who serve as instructors at the nation's top-level military schools, teaching what they know is no longer enough.[5]

Rear Admiral Strasser with His Aide, Lieutenant Commander Townsend G. "Tim" Alexander, a 1992 Graduate of the Naval War College. Serving as aide to the President of the Naval War College is a family tradition. Tim's father, Richard G. Alexander, was a 1955 College graduate who served as aide to Vice Admiral Bernard Austin in 1960–1962. Tim's sister, Katherine, married Tylor Field II, a 1971 graduate who served as aide to Vice Admiral B. J. Semmes in 1971–1972. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The *New York Times* quoted Captain John H. Heidt of the Naval War College as saying, "The threat is no longer the Russians. . . . The threat is uncertainty."[6] In the same article, Robert B. Pirie, Jr., the director of the Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College, said, "Developing a course of instruction in the face of such dramatic changes is like trying to paint a moving train."[7] A Marine Corps student at the Naval War College, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Pugh, added, "The Russians are 'out' and the third world is 'in.'"[8]

Admiral Strasser underscored this challenge as he reflected on his years as President of the College: "The biggest thing for the Naval War College at that time was the demise of the Soviet Union."[9] As executive assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strasser had been involved when Admiral Crowe's Soviet counterpart, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, visited the United States and was given a tour around the country in 1989. Strasser recalled,

> We saw him [Akhromeyev] at the time that the Soviet Union was disintegrating and the Wall was coming down. It had a dramatic impact on him. So those events that took place in the Soviet Union had a tremendous impact on our curriculum. Up until that time, our curriculum, as my Naval career, was built around defeating the Soviet Union, particularly in war at sea. . . . [W]hen the Soviet Union disappeared, we didn't have a major adversary at sea, and so . . . a good part of our curriculum was revised.[10]

Admiral Vitaliy Ivanov, Commandant of the Kuznetsov Academy in Saint Petersburg, Russia, Meets with Rear Admiral Strasser in the Naval War College President's Office. Four officers from the Kuznetsov Academy received briefings and participated in war gaming, 7–11 December 1991. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Admiral Vitaliy Ivanov Greets Mrs. Barbara Strasser on Entering the President's House. The Strassers hosted a formal dinner for the visitors from the Kuznetsov Academy. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Of the three core courses in the College's curriculum—Strategy and Policy, National Security Decision Making, and Joint Military Operations—the National Security Decision Making course was affected the most. Strasser estimated that 75 percent to 80 percent of that curriculum was revised to take into account the new realities in world politics. The curriculum in the Joint Military Operations course was also substantially changed, while the Strategy and Policy course was affected the least of the three.[11] For most of the College's history the President made the key final decisions on the curriculum, and certainly since the days of Admiral Stansfield Turner, the admirals allowed each individual department head great freedom and generous resources. The dean of academics, a position created in 1973, acted as general

spokesman and coordinator, but left each department head to operate in his own sphere. As one long-serving department chairman, Dr. William E. Turcotte, put it,

> We drew a great faculty, who prospered in the environment of academic freedom. Presidents, for many years, met weekly with academic Department heads. We had a minimum of bureaucratic structure. Access to the President was easy. In many cases, decisions would not be made until the President understood potential impacts on academic programs. Department heads were given extensive freedom to hire and choose curriculum. At the same time, they were held accountable and trusted. You could experiment. You could make important decisions.[12]

A Formal Dinner at the President's House in December 1991. During his tenure as President of the Naval War College, Admiral and Mrs. Strasser entertained more than 16,000 people either in the President's House or on the admiral's barge.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Professor William Turcotte with Defense Economics and Decision Making Department Faculty Members in 1986. Left to right: Professor Mel Chaloupka, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Horton, and Professor William Turcotte. Turcotte was chairman of the successively named Management Department, 1975–1981; Defense Economics and Decision Making Department, 1981–1986; and National Security Decision Making Department, 1986–2002. A 1955 graduate of the Naval Academy, he served as a Supply Corps officer in uniform and held a doctorate and a master of business administration from the Harvard Business School.
Naval War College Museum Collection

By the 1990s, the enduring academic teaching mission of the College had subtly changed, but continued to be the education for the enhancement of the professional capabilities of its graduates in making sound decisions in command, staff, and management positions in naval, joint, and combined environments. In updated terms, the College now stressed that it provided students with a sound understanding of military strategy and operational art, instilling in them joint attitudes and perspectives.[13]

The National Security Decision Making Department

Dr. William Turcotte had relieved Dr. Warren F. Rogers as chairman of what was then called the Management Department in July 1975, when Rogers, a retired naval officer and Stanford University PhD, had accepted an appointment as chairman of the Department of Management Science at the University of Rhode Island. Turcotte remained chairman of the department until his retirement in 2002. During the Rogers period in 1973–1975, this department's curriculum had been dominated by a technical systems analysis approach with a great deal of quantitative content. This approach had been highly influenced by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's introduction in 1963 of the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS).[14] A Naval Academy graduate and former Supply Corps officer, Turcotte held a doctorate and a master of business administration from the Harvard Business School. On taking charge, he began a long-term effort to develop his department's curriculum along the lines of the framework suggested by the Harvard Business School model. While not copying it, Turcotte's department

used the Harvard example as a guide to curriculum design and execution with a national security perspective focused on the professional environment in which Naval War College graduates were likely to be involved. The purpose of the curriculum was to have students leave with a senior, executive point of view for a large national security organization, rather than the typical short-term operating view of mid-level officers who arrived at the College oriented toward combat or combat support operations, ships, and squadrons. Most senior military officers heartily disliked the McNamara approach, but felt a practical need to understand it in order to contend with those they called the "Whiz Kids," when important resource allocation decisions were being made for key programs involving future force allocation.[15]

By the late 1970s, the Management course was heavily criticized for its quantitative emphasis and for being a micro approach that omitted a strategic view that could become a guide for future resource allocation decisions. The faculty realized that it was not teaching management, which many felt was inappropriate to the curriculum anyway, and that the curriculum needed to be focused more clearly on global security and its relationship to military force planning. Over several years, the course curriculum changed and the emphasis on quantitative factors was substantially reduced. In 1981, as a result of these changes, the course and the department were renamed Defense Economics and Decision Making (DEDM) and in 1986, they were renamed again National Security Decision Making (NSDM). By the early 1980s, the course had developed into an integrated curriculum with three component sub-courses that supported each other and were taught in parallel:

- *Policy Making and Implementation*. This sub-course emphasized individual, organizational, cognitive, and bureaucratic influences on decision making in large bureaucratic organizations. The faculty for this sub-course developed a series of case studies that offered alternative views for impending action or conduct of limited warfare. In 1994, the faculty published the first volume in an ongoing multivolume series initially entitled *National Security Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation*.

- *Resource Allocation*. Through various versions, this sub-course focused on rational approaches to major resource allocation decisions. The faculty for this sub-course wrote *An Executive Level Text in Resource Allocation*. This textbook was often reported to have found its way from Naval War College classrooms to become a handy reference on the desks of officers in Washington, D.C., who were involved with making daily decisions in that area.

- *Force Planning*. This sub-course focused on the thought that one cannot fight effectively in a future conflict unless the appropriate force structure and training emphasis had been developed and implemented. It examined alternative views of national security strategy and international security trends, and developed points of view that could suggest different future force structures, depending on what strategies were put into place. The faculty for this sub-course published its first textbook, *Force Planning*, in 1986. In 1990, the sub-course and its text were renamed *Strategy and Force Planning,* recognizing a significant shift in focus to link the future force planning process to the context of national security strategy.

The overall course concluded with student teams analyzing the expected global international environment and then each team developing its own future national security strategy. Using the context that they developed, the students were required to describe a future force structure that matched their strategy and the likely economic resources available to support the force structure. Once established the organizing framework of the course remained in place, but the course content could change dramatically from year to year in order to provide the most up-to-date opinions from academics, practitioners, and commentators. From

the 1980s onward, experts from Washington, D.C., were brought in annually for a weekend to critique the student projects and to provide viewpoints that simulated the environment in which actual decision makers worked. Held in Washington, these meetings drew up to three hundred people, including active duty, reservists, and key officials. Both the faculty and the students gained from this interchange with serving officials in their areas of expertise.[16]

Professor Kevin P. Kelley Teaching a Seminar on Colbert Plaza. Professor Kelley was well known for taking his fall trimester seminar out for a different setting in their educational experience. He joined the National Security Decision Making Department in July 1986 and served as the department's executive assistant for twenty-three years until August 2010. Remaining on the faculty, he taught the Senior Leadership seminar and Leading Organizations. An economics graduate from the College of the Holy Cross, he earned a master's degree in business administration at New Hampshire College. As a naval officer, he served as a logistician and was a 1984 distinguished graduate of the Naval War College.

Naval War College Museum Collection

In implementing and teaching its curriculum, the National Security Decision Making Department also developed methods to evaluate its curriculum and faculty. The evaluation had many performance variables, but it measured its two main features, the quality of the teaching and the student's judgment of the future professional value of each curriculum element, on a Likert scale. Over a period of time, this allowed the department to see where improvement in the faculty and curriculum was needed. Paralleling this, the department chairman required each individual faculty member to submit a personal goal statement for his or her teaching and research. This was then followed at the end of the year with the faculty member's self-evaluation on how the goals had been met. The combination of faculty self-examinations and student critiques was designed to keep the department focused on its objectives as well as provide faculty the opportunity to suggest major changes.[17]

In addition to its main course, the faculty of the National Security Decision Making Department was also required to teach an elective and directed the portion of the joint professional military education curriculum for Phase I certification in off-campus programs. In addition, the department engaged in several external activities. From the early 1990s, the department engaged in international outreach, particularly in Latin America. From 1992 to 1994, Ambassador Paul D. Taylor was the State Department Advisor at the Naval War College, having come to the College directly after serving as ambassador to the Dominican Republic for more than three years. Since 1973, all of Taylor's predecessors as the State Department Advisor at the Naval War College had taught in the Strategy Department, but after teaching in Strategy for a year, Taylor found that the National Security Decision Making Department was a better fit for the State Department Advisor. All his successors have continued with that faculty.[18] In Europe, the department had a great deal to do with curriculum development for the George C. Marshall European Center for Security

Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, in cooperation with a former Naval War College professor, Alvin H. Bernstein, who became its founding director in 1993–1996.[19] Professor Bill Turcotte served as its quasi–academic dean in its first six months and other Naval War College faculty members, such as Kevin Kelley, Charles Bartlett, and Paul Holman, served for varying periods of time on the Marshall Center's faculty. In addition, under the auspices of the Marshall Center, the National Security Decision Making Department undertook a variety of teaching programs involving both civilian and military leaders in former Warsaw Pact countries.[20]

From the mid-1990s, the National Security Decision Making Department initiated a series of weekend national security symposia sponsored by the Naval Reserve Readiness Command. Typically, three or four faculty members presented the two-day programs, which had a different theme each year. The audiences for this were usually made up of about three hundred Naval Reserve officers, local politicians, and invited civilian guests. Until 2001, four or five symposia were held a year, but after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, when reserve funding was diverted to other issues, only one or two symposia were organized each year. The department often sent faculty members to teach in off-campus seminars as well as to train and evaluate off-site instructors. Locally in Newport, the department taught large sections of the course at the Senior Enlisted Academy, in the years after its first establishment in Sims Hall in 1981 and later when it moved to Tomich Hall in 1989. In addition, the Naval Chaplains School in Newport requested that the department develop and teach seminars on "Planning and Control" and "Power and Influence."[21]

The Joint Military Operations Department

When Vice Admiral Turner established the trimester approach to the teaching of the three core courses at the Naval War College in 1972, this department was initially named the Tactics Department. In 1975, the department was renamed the Department of Naval Operations; in 1985, the Operations Department; and then in 1996, the Joint Military Operations Department. For many years, the students were more critical of this course than the other two core courses. It took a long time to find the right course content as well as the right faculty. When it had started out in 1972, it was a naval tactics course, reflecting the naval doctrinal structure of the time. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers had no background in the subject and were not particularly interested in tactical ship maneuvering, the sonar equation, the velocity of sound in the water, and other such issues that naval officers typically dealt with in the antisubmarine warfare of that day. In order to try to get this subject across, the subject had to be approached on a relatively basic level. This, in turn, dissatisfied many naval officer students who were already well acquainted with the subject and wanted something more substantial out of the course. Many students chose to opt out of the course and, instead, took up the research opportunities offered by the Center for Naval Warfare Studies to do the equivalent of an individual master of arts thesis in the Advanced Research Department or to work on one of the student teams preparing for the global war game, called Global Advanced Research. In order to meet the required elements of the Joint Professional Military qualification, students took a required elective course that covered that curriculum. Some of the most capable and highly motivated students took this option, and some boasted of how they avoided the pain of the Operations course.[22] Another issue was a massive turnover in the faculty. Most of the faculty were active-duty naval officers and were at the College for a maximum of three years. Many stayed only two years, and some for just one, if their sponsors in



Professor Frank M. Snyder. Captain Frank Snyder graduated from the Naval Academy in 1947 and had a master's degree from Stanford University. He served on active duty for twenty-nine years in surface warfare with a subspecialty in command and control. He joined the Naval War College's Operations faculty in 1981 and for five years was head of the Operations Department's Planning and Decision-Making Division. He retired in 1990 after having held the Raymond Spruance Chair of Command and Control since 1987. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Captain Hugh F. Lynch. A graduate of the Naval War College in the senior class in 1970 with highest honors, Hugh Lynch returned to Newport to become chairman of the Department of Naval Operations from 1981 to 1983. After his retirement from active duty in 1983—shown here with Admiral Service and his wife, Madeline—Lynch returned as a researcher in the Strategy and Campaign Department, and its successor, the Strategic Research Department, in the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. In 2001, he returned to the Joint Military Operations Department faculty and taught from 2001 to 2006. A naval aviator, he had seen combat and held three commands before spending a total of twenty-six years at the Naval War College.
Naval War College Museum Collection

the Bureau of Naval Personnel needed them for other assignments. Some went on to other duty, but others had the option to retire if they wished. Compared with the other two departments with half their faculties having experienced civilian educators with PhDs, some of whom had long-term appointments, the Tactics Department and the Naval Operations Department looked relatively weak from the institutional and pedagogical points of view. The Department of Naval Operations made the first step toward faculty stability with Vice Admiral Weschler's appointment of Captain Frank M. Snyder in 1981.

One person who observed the challenges and changes in this department over a long period was Captain Hugh F. Lynch, a 1970 graduate of the College with highest honors. Lynch's War College student research paper as a commander on "Presidential Control of Nuclear Weapons in Limited War Situations" was selected for publication by the *Naval War College Review* and appeared when he was attached to Attack Squadron One Hundred Twenty-Two (VA-122) at Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California. Lynch returned to the College as a captain to become chairman of the Department of Naval Operations in 1981 to 1983. After his retirement from active duty in April 1983, he became a researcher in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and then went back to the Joint Military Operations Department briefly in 1996, and then as a full-time faculty member for five and a half years from 2001 to 2006. Lynch recalled, "In retrospect, the course had been improved, almost immeasurably in the intervening years from 1981 until I returned to teach myself [in 1996] when the Operations Department ran short of faculty. . . . Even the change in the name of the department, from Naval Operations to Joint Military Operations, that and the . . . subject matter which was being taught, was precisely what was needed for the 50% of the class that was non-navy."[23] In 1981, the syllabus needed revision. "I would not claim to have made great strides, but I would claim to have started the process," Lynch said. "There was also an attempt to increase the quality of the faculty. And I say that reservedly, because as professional naval officers and experts within their own field of endeavor, especially within the Navy, be it multi-engine land based aviation or destroyers, they knew their business."[24] But "trying to teach the broader spectrum of warfare was difficult."[25] Lynch knew that curriculum development was a time-consuming and meticulous process that had to be done with great insight and care. "You can only revise so much in a period of summer months, and come back into sessions in the fall, you don't want to bite off more than you can handle or you induce confusion, and disorder, particularly with the faculty," he reflected.

A significant step in future faculty improvement in Operations can be traced to September 1981, with the entrance of the Naval War College class of 1982. The beginning of this class paralleled the establishment of the Strategic Studies Group in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. At that time, two of the five students in the class of 1982 who received highest honors began their longer connections with the Naval War College: Captain Timothy E. Somes and Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Gatchel. The Commandant of the Marine Corps chose Gatchel to become a member of Strategic Studies Group II in 1982–1983, immediately after his graduation. He returned to the Operations faculty, twice serving as chairman of the department.



Captain Timothy E. Somes Served as Chairman of the Operations Department, 1985–1989. He was one of five members of the Naval War College class of 1982 who graduated with highest distinction. A nuclear submarine officer, Somes was the College's Charles E. Lockwood Military Professor of Undersea Warfare in 1983–1985. After his retirement from active duty, Somes returned to the Naval War College faculty in the National Security Decision Making Department from 1990 to 2003.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The senior class of 1982 contained two nuclear submarine officers, Captain Tim Somes and Captain Lawrence S. Wigley. In that year, the Submarine Force had declined to send another of its senior captains to the Strategic Studies Group, so the Chief of Naval Operations chose a more junior officer from the submarine community, Captain William A. Owens, who was ordered to the Naval War College at the same time and from the same submarine squadron as Somes. Owens and Somes were in regular contact, as each followed their different assignments at the War College. At the same time, John Hanley, another former nuclear submarine officer, had been hired by the Naval War College to support the Strategic Studies Group. For part of his student year, Somes commuted from New London to Newport with Hanley. Through these contacts, Somes learned the general nature of what the Strategic Studies Group was doing. He concluded that the Strategic Studies Group's focus on political-military issues was also what the Operations course's focus should be. In addition, he concluded that students in the course needed to hear from the four-star Army and Air Force generals as well as the admirals who served as joint unified commanders. Somes made these comments in his student course critique and when he initially joined the Operations faculty. Hugh Lynch gave him the task of revising the senior course curriculum. Although much needed, the major curriculum revision work that Lynch and Somes envisaged for the Operations course was temporarily interrupted when Somes was diverted to teach and to help improve the Integrated Warfare Course for post-command students under its first director, Larry Wigley.[26]

In the meantime, the combination of the short eight-week Integrated Warfare Course and the full resident course had become important to Admiral Watkins as a means by which future leaders could learn about the *Maritime Strategy*. After Somes succeeded Wigley as director of the Integrated Warfare Course, he reorganized the course to better reflect the continuity and the essence of the three resident courses. The Integrated Warfare Course also included a series of lectures from senior officials from Washington and elsewhere, who spoke to the students at higher security levels. Somes attended all the classes, by both resident and visiting lecturers, to try to better understand what sessions were successful and what needed to be replaced as well as what the senior officials felt was important that students should know about their areas of expertise. Somes was also making contacts with a small number of senior officers at the Army War College

and the National War College about how "theater operational art," a term borrowed from the Soviet armed forces, might be better understood within U.S. forces.[27]

In June 1985, Somes was persuaded to forgo his promised major command to stay at the College for his last four years of active duty, succeeding Captain Jerry Watson as Operations Department head. On taking charge of the department, Somes changed its name from Naval Operations to Operations and put to work his experience with the Integrated Warfare Course along with his observations and extensive discussions over the past few years with Bill Owens and John Hanley of the Strategic Studies Group, Frank Snyder and other War College faculty members, and officers from the joint and naval staffs.

Operations Department Faculty Members, 1986.

Left to right: Professor Bob Reilly, Captain Bob Prehn, Professor Frank Snyder, and Captain Don Gerrish. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Somes acted immediately to implement organizational changes. The Naval Operations Department that Somes knew as a student had been taught sequentially by a two-man faculty team in each seminar throughout a trimester. This approach had been intended to provide two faculty members participating together, but, in looking across the three departments, Somes had observed that it had often degenerated into a system in which either the two faculty members divided the labor and took turns in preparing and delivering portions of the subject matter or one of the two became the dominant teacher while the other was relatively silent. Faced with the need to introduce a large amount of new material into the curriculum, Somes concluded that, in order to develop the substantive expertise needed in the faculty, the model developed by the Defense Economics and Decision Making Department was the better one to follow. He therefore established three sub-courses, and appointed a head for each sub-course: Professor Frank Snyder for Planning and Gaming; Captain Robert Lowenthal for Strategy and Operations; and Captain Keith A. Stewart for Warfighting Equipment and Tactics. This foursome spent considerable time deciding exactly what the sub-courses would cover and how they would adapt the current course to these new approaches:[28]

- *Planning and Gaming.* This sub-course focused on major operational planning and ended with a war game played in the College's war-gaming facility that pitted one seminar against another. This was a major shift away from the end-of-course game that had divided the class into two large halves. The new approach allowed more students to play decision-making roles. Frank Snyder also took the initiative to reintroduce the commander's estimate of the decision, an approach in the military planning process that had dominated the College's teaching in the first half of the twentieth century, but had fallen out of use since the mid-1940s. The problem for the teachers in this sub-course was that this approach was rudimentary to Army and Marine Corps officers, who were taught it at the captain level (O-3), but current naval officers had no knowledge of it. On implementation, it was found that the officers from other services became tutors of the process for naval officers.

- *Strategy and Operations.* This sub-course was predicated on the idea that the Strategy and Policy course taught at the level of grand strategy, but little focus was given to the methods by which generals and admirals converted grand strategy into operational plans for a theater. In dealing with this subject, Somes initially named the senior course in the Operations Department the Joint Military Operations course, and the junior course, Joint Maritime Operations, thus allowing for some difference between the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff, for the small percentage of naval officers who attended both. Initially, this sub-course included consideration of General Douglas MacArthur's "triphibious" operational approach, Eisenhower's campaign in Europe, World War II air bombing campaigns, Nimitz's Central Pacific campaign, and the recent Falklands/Malvinas War. In addition, the *Maritime Strategy* of the 1980s became a key element in this sub-course.

- *Warfighting Equipment and Tactics.* This course was designed to familiarize students with the differing organization and major fighting equipment of all the services. The idea was to draw on the expertise of the students in a seminar as well as the faculty. They were to focus at the level of a major theater commander planning an operation in which he would need to know the key capabilities of the different forces under his command. Somes had anticipated that this would be the easiest sub-course to plan and execute, but, in fact, it proved the hardest as it quickly appeared that students in the late 1980s had not yet learned to appreciate the professional value of understanding other services.[29]

In implementing these courses, Somes also took the initiative to begin to rebalance the uniformed faculty by having the senior officers at the College in all services be part of the Operations Department faculty. At the same time, Somes requested that the best active-duty naval officers be assigned to the department. In these ways, Somes recruited some of the best talent for his teaching faculty, including Army Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel William Spain, and Navy Captains James Giblin and Robert "Barney" Rubel. As the course progressed under his chairmanship, Somes took advantage of insights gained in the global war games and other war games, incorporating insights from them into the curriculum. He implemented a rigorous system of faculty and student critiques, similar to that used in the Defense Economics and Decision Making Department; implemented more stringent grading; increased requirements for student papers; and required students in each of the three sub-courses to do a comprehensive essay-type examination.[30] In 1991, when the New England Association of Schools and Colleges accredited the Naval War College to grant a master's degree for the first time, it also authorized the retroactive award of the degree only as far back as 1986, basing its decision on the implementation of the academic improvements in the operations curriculum that had been made under Captain Somes that brought it up to the same academic level as the other two departments.

Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin. The last commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, 1985–1991, and the first commander in chief of the Russian Navy, 1991–1992, Chernavin visited the Naval War College on 8–9 November 1991. The first chief of the Soviet or Russian Navy to visit the College, he addressed faculty and students in Spruance Auditorium and participated in a faculty round table in the Mahan Conference Center.

U.S. Naval Institute Photo Collection

The larger problem of getting officers to appreciate and to understand the complementary capabilities and approaches of the other armed services took a number of years to resolve. When the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command published a new version of its Field Manual 100-5, *Operations,* in 1985, it had widened the scope of the previous version by directly bringing in the concept of operational art and the operational level of war. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the fall of the Soviet Union and

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989–1991, and the success of Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM in the Gulf War of 1990–1991 all combined to provide the impetus to raise awareness about joint operations as well as to raise the conceptual level of the Operations course at the Naval War College to a focus on the operational level of war.



Colonel Theodore Gatchel, USMC, Chairman of the Operations Department, Congratulates Captain John R. Dolquist on His Promotion in 1990. A College graduate in 1990, Dolquist was an Operations Department faculty member before serving as dean of students in 1992. Gatchel served as department chairman in 1989–1991. One of five members of the Naval War College class of 1982 who graduated with highest distinction, Gatchel was selected as a fellow of Strategic Studies Group II in 1982–1983, and then served as an instructor in the Operations Department in 1983–1985. After serving as special assistant to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, 1985–1989, he returned to the Naval War College faculty. His tour there influenced his approach to teaching the Operations curriculum. He was also involved with responses from the United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as it was being constructed, giving him later insight that was useful when the War College was weaving the joint approach into the curriculum. Gatchel returned to the College as a civilian faculty member in the Joint Military Operations Department from 1998 to 2008. During that period, in 2002–2003, he served as acting chairman of the department.
Naval War College Museum Collection

In searching for faculty members who understood the concepts of the operational level of war, Colonel Theodore Gatchel, USMC, who had succeeded Captain Somes as head of the department for 1989–1991, hired Dr. Milan Vego on the strong recommendation of Frank Uhlig, the editor of the Naval War College Press. At that point, Gatchel did not know Vego well, but trusted Uhlig's judgment and his appreciation for Vego's scholarship.[31]

With Vego's background and experience in the Yugoslav Navy and his knowledge of Soviet operational art as well as his academic credentials as a military and naval historian, Vego became a key faculty member in changing the Operations curriculum to focus on the operational level of war. Not surprisingly, given the earlier discussion over Department of Defense reform in the mid-1980s, faculty members with naval backgrounds were uncomfortable with concepts that had originally developed in land-oriented approaches to warfare. The subject was first formally introduced to the Naval War College faculty in 1994, by the Planning and Decision-Making Division of the Operations Department, headed at the time by Colonel Thomas D. Stouffer, USMC, who was followed in 1995 by Professor Douglas Hime. Much work was involved in preparing a curriculum for it. Milan Vego formally proposed these changes in the curriculum at the department's faculty retreat in late June 1994. Before coming to the Naval War College, Vego had taught a course on Soviet naval operational art at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington, D.C., and in 1994, he was teaching an elective on naval operational art. Vego wrote the syllabus for the entire seven-session course as well as produced an introductory lecture on operational art for all the students, prepared seminar moderator guides, and designed the PowerPoint slides in support of all sessions. He also conducted a mini-course on operational art for all the instructors in September–October 1994. The new course on operational art was taught to Naval War College students for the first time in the seminars of the spring trimester in 1995. Initially, all the department's instructors taught the first iteration of the course, but since so many faculty members



Professor Milan Vego. Professor Vego joined the Naval War College faculty in 1991 and was named Richmond Kelly Turner Professor of Operational Art. Born in Capljina, Herzegovina, Vego graduated from the Yugoslav Naval Academy in 1961 and served as a line officer in the Yugoslav Navy between 1961 and 1973. At the University of Belgrade, he earned a BA in 1970 and an MA in modern U.S. and Latin American history. After leaving the Yugoslav Navy, he earned a Master Mariner's License in 1973 and served as a third and second mate on board West German ships from 1973 to 1976, before seeking political asylum in February 1976 in the United States. He earned a PhD in European history at the George Washington University in 1981. After becoming an American citizen in 1984, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses in 1985–1987; research fellow at the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, in 1987–1989; and adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College, 1985–1991.
Naval War College Museum Collection

were unfamiliar with the subject, the faculty of the Planning and Decision-Making Division temporarily taught this course until the remainder of the faculty was fully prepared to do so in 1996. By September 1998, Vego had written three editions of *On Operational Art* (NWC 1035). The third edition, NWC 1035B, was published in September 1998 and contained some 360 pages used as the required reading for the operational art segment of the curriculum. Dr. Vego also developed for classroom use an innovative study that used the 1944 battle of Leyte Gulf as an example of how the concept of the operational level of war applied to a maritime theater. The idea was to study a major naval and joint operation in great detail, rather than illustrating various aspects of operational art with examples from many different major operations and campaigns. Another rationale for using the example of the battle of Leyte Gulf was that each instructor should have full knowledge and understanding of at least one major case study in teaching the course segment on the operational art.[32]

Initially, a number of instructors were opposed to changing the department's curriculum in order to teach the theory of operational warfare. Other members of the faculty remained skeptical about using a fifty-year-old, World War II, major naval, joint operation for teaching modern approaches to warfare. Over time, and with the additional expertise of Professors Hugh Lynch, Douglas N. Hime (a retired Air Force colonel), and David Goodrich, this case study became a central means for the faculty to use in explaining the foundation of operational art.[33] Making effective use of a wide range of original sources, including the materials that Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates had accumulated at the Naval War College for his studies of the battle between 1948 and 1958, Vego emphasized in his later, book-length, study of the subject:

> The planning, preparation, and execution of the Leyte operation on both sides was extremely complex. This operation, conducted by multi-service forces, illustrates as no other case study can all the aspects of operational warfare at sea, on land, and in the air. The operation also showed the intricate web of relationships among policy, strategy, operational art, and tactics. It demonstrated how the decisions made by tactical commanders can have momentous impact on the course of events across all levels of war, from the tactical all the way up to strategic.[34]

To complement the Leyte Gulf study and to see operational art in the context of an entirely different and more recent example, the faculty further developed the case study on the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982. In this, the successive serving officers in the Royal Navy who were assigned as faculty members in the

department were particularly important in providing insight from the British perspective in the period before the detailed official history became available. In the late 1980s and 1990s, these faculty members were Commanders Graham Rhys-Jones, Michael Codner, Jonathan Scoles, Sinclair Armitage, and Angus Ross.

The end of the Cold War also emphasized the need to think about the lower spectrum of warfare in aspects that were termed at the time "low-intensity warfare" or "military operations other than war." In 1990, the Operations Department hired Professor John D. Waghelstein, a retired colonel in the U.S. Army. Waghelstein had commanded the U.S. Army Element, Military Group, El Salvador in 1982–1983 and just before coming to Newport had completed his PhD at Temple University with a thesis entitled "Preparing for the Wrong War: The United States Army and Low Intensity Conflict, 1755–1890."[35] From 1990 until his retirement in 2003, Waghelstein was chief of the department's Strategy and Operations Division, often referring to his special interest as "all that other unpleasantness." In 1991, the department also hired retired Rear Admiral (lower half) David F. Chandler. Early in his career, Chandler had commanded USS *Mahan* (DLG 11) and later rose to be Deputy Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic Fleet; Commander, South Atlantic Force, Atlantic Fleet; and then deputy and acting Commander, Southern Command, during much of the turmoil of the late 1980s.

In contrast to other departments, the faculty for Operations was made up of active-duty officers, with civilian academics and retired officers making up only a small percentage. In 1993–1994, for example, there were twenty-eight active-duty faculty members and only three civilians. It was always an issue for the department to maintain the right balance of faculty members for a seminar team, avoiding having two from the same service or two civilians at the same time, while also dealing with officer rotation policies. During the period when Captain George Jackson was chairman, 1996–1999, he obtained the assignment of the first female line officer for the department's faculty, Captain Dorothy K. N. Grant, USN. She was a 1992 graduate of the Naval War College and had served as naval attaché in South Africa before returning to the College.[36]

During the 1990s, the department retained its three sub-course divisions, by then named Strategy and Operations, Professional, and Warfighting Requirements. Faculty members taught two different seminars in their own division. This led to a situation in which the department was not well integrated and faculty members were sometimes unaware of how their division fit into the larger whole of the department. When Colonel Bill Spain became chairman of the department in 1999, this changed so that each faculty member was part of a two-man team that taught one seminar for the entire trimester course from beginning to end. This increased the faculty teaching load by 50 percent, but made the course flow more logically and led to greater faculty integration within the department.[37]

Strategy and Policy Department

Between 1972 and 1974, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner had devoted much of his time and energy to the creation of this department and its curriculum, believing strongly that this department covered an area in which mid-career naval officers had the least understanding and background. It was for this department that he had most effectively used his academic connections to Rhodes Scholars and to academics at and associated with the University of Oxford. In creating the first syllabus, Turner had directed the Strategy faculty to stress the value of historical study, and in this was certainly reinvigorating the thoughts of the

founders of the College: Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan. In 1973, the syllabus for the Strategy and Policy course had focused on three themes: (a) military strategy in practice and theory; (b) foreign policy, i.e., the conduct of relations between nations by means other than war; and (c) the role of the military professional in society and the nature of civil-military relations.[38] In twelve weeks, the course had covered nine historical case studies: the Peloponnesian War, Clausewitz and Corbett, the Napoleonic era, Prince Metternich and balance-of-power diplomacy, Bismarck and the strategy of limited war, militarism and navalism and the coming of World War I, the disarmament treaties between the wars, the strategy of coalition war in World War II, and containment and Cold War up to 1952. The penultimate week was devoted to understanding the tension between the military profession and a democratic liberal society, a major issue of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The final week was devoted to a discussion of recent events in the relationship between American policy and strategy with special attention to the role of the U.S. military in the formulation of both.[39] For Turner, the central purpose behind the course was to improve students' abilities to handle complex evidence while assessing and understanding conflicting points of views. The emphasis was on the intensity of thought, not on degrees, grades, or the quantity of the subject matter that was covered.[40] He stressed in-depth engagement with a particular case study that had benefited from wide-ranging scholarly analysis and that had a resonance with current issues. Thirty years later, in October 2002, in a speech to the thirty-six newly selected American Rhodes Scholars who were just leaving to begin their own Oxford experience, Turner looked back to his time at the Naval War College, when his Oxford years had enriched his own life as well as enhanced that of the Naval War College. Explaining how he had found a superficial curriculum in Newport and replaced it with an Oxford model, Turner pointed out:

> The basis for the course . . . was historical case studies, beginning with the Peloponnesian Wars of the Fifth century B.C. Mind you, I was not trying to teach these officers how to fight with hoplites or triremes! I was trying to draw parallels between a major military expedition Athens sent to Sicily, while engaged in a cold war with Sparta, and the U.S. expedition to Vietnam. The Athenian expedition got bogged down and year after year the commanders called for more money and for more ships and for more troops. The people of Athens became disaffected in due course. Athens lost the expedition and the conflict with Sparta. This was 1972, remember, and we were still engaged in Vietnam.[41]

In guiding the faculty's formulation of the first syllabi for the Strategy and Policy course, Turner had correctly perceived that his successors would want to focus on more recent examples. He clearly understood the common superficial tendency in American naval culture to ignore the serious study of history and to focus instead on more current issues. For this reason, he and the faculty under him focused the course during his tenure on the older historical cases, in the hope that the fundamental approach would survive in successive years. The Strategy and Policy curriculum changed incrementally over the years, as expected, but it endured in its basic concept. At the same time, the course gradually became more sophisticated in its approach, drawing on the academic disciplines of history, political science, and international relations and adding additional military factors, such as doctrine, technological change, and logistics.

Dr. William C. Fuller, Jr., became chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department in 1990. A 1980 Harvard PhD and a specialist in Russian history, Fuller was the author of *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914,* an important survey of imperial Russian strategy that appeared in 1992, just at the point that Fuller stepped down as chairman to remain teaching on the faculty until his appointment as a professor emeritus

in 2006.[42] This volume, with its analysis of the interplay between strategy, diplomacy, and military power, clearly reflected the department's distinctive approach to that important subject. In his acknowledgments, he thanked a number of his colleagues for their support and advice. Notably, he thanked the three admirals under whom he had served up to that point, Rear Admirals Baldwin, Kurth, and Strasser, for their roles in "fostering and sustaining an intellectual environment so conducive to scholarship."[43]



Professor George W. Baer. Professor Baer joined the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy faculty in 1981. He served as chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department and was Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Maritime Strategy from 1992 to 2002. From 2006 to 2011, he taught in the Naval War College at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. While chairman of the department in Newport, he published his prize-winning book *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The United States Navy, 1890–1990*. A 1957 graduate of Stanford University, he was a Rhodes Scholar at Magdalen College, Oxford, where he earned a BA and MA. In 1965, he received his PhD from Harvard University, having completed a thesis on "The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War." Prior to coming to the Naval War College, he taught at Harvard, Dartmouth College, and the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he was twice chair of the History Department.
Naval War College Museum Collection

In 1992, Professor George W. Baer succeeded Fuller as chairman of the department and was appointed Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Maritime Strategy, serving for a decade in that post until 2002. In 1994, Stanford University Press published his important book, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The United States Navy, 1890–1990*. This major work on American naval history was a significant contribution to the literature that raised the academic standards for this field of study by showing how, over a century, the U.S. Navy responded to major changes in politics and technology in order to meet changing national needs and expectations. With his focus on the interplay between doctrine, strategy, operations, preparedness, self-awareness, and force structure, his well-written book became a model in moving the subject beyond battle narratives to a higher level of understanding that was as valuable to the general public as it was to students at the Naval War College. In his introduction to the volume, he wrote:

> As the Cold War wound down, reconstitution of the American military establishment chipped away at the autonomy of all the services. The Navy, still the most versatile, responded by reaffirming its value in support missions and expeditionary warfare. A Navy White Paper in 1992 described the new turn of sea power as a "fundamental shift away from the open-ocean warfighting *on* the sea toward joint operations conducted *from* the sea. . . . Naval forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea." After one hundred years, the Navy retired Mahan's doctrine that defeat of the enemy battle fleet was the primary objective. Sea-power theory, and Navy practice, had again taken a new form.[44]

Baer's book aptly placed the U.S. Navy of the early 1990s in the context of the emerging post–Cold War world, but he was equally sensitive to the long view of how the roles of navies change within the context of the changing structure of international relations. Baer expressed this in the final lines of his book, when he wrote that "the U.S. Navy, after one hundred years, closed its book on sea power doctrine in the image of Mahan. For how long remained to be seen."[45]

During Baer's tenure as chairman, the department's goal was "to keep, enhance, and perpetuate the vision laid out by Turner in 1972." Baer explained,

> That [convocation] speech[46] to this day identifies what I think is the purpose of the NWC, and certainly of S&P [Strategy and Policy], and now of superior PME [professional military education]. That is the ability to think independently and analytically about the nature of war and the profession of warfare. So continuity was our aim, PME based on, as Turner hoped, the highest and most rigorous academic standards.[47]

Baer experienced the gradual movement to increase the study of more contemporary issues within the College, but Baer carefully maintained the basic Turner framework using a series of case studies based on an expanded set of themes that are applicable to all conflict. The themes, which were posed as questions to stimulate open-ended inquiry, informed the syllabus, lectures, analyses, and seminars as a guide for strategic analysis. As Baer put it, "There was no school solution, and there could not be, given the interactive and unpredictable nature of warfare. . . . Questions, not answers; that was our method."[48]

A typical syllabus of the 1990s laid out the course curriculum with two core components: a study of theories of war and a study of historical cases. The works of Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu provided the foundation on which an analysis could proceed. The historical cases were the means to evaluate and to debate the ways in which political leaders successfully or unsuccessfully used armed force to achieve their political ends. The earlier historical cases on distant events in the past laid the groundwork for more dispassionate analysis, since students were less likely to have strong personal opinions about the issues in those periods. Students could carry forward this dispassionate approach to more recent events and, later in their careers, to future scenarios. The course had seven recurring themes that were the useful points of departure for analysis and discussion. The syllabus listed six to nine questions for each theme as examples of the types of inquiry. The following abbreviated list uses just one as an example:

a. *The Policy and Strategy Match*. Were the military means chosen by soldiers/sailors and statesmen appropriate to the political objectives?

b. *The Adequacy of Strategy*. Did the military leaders and statesmen understand the nature of the war on which they were embarking?

c. *Coalitions*. What determined the distribution of influence within a coalition and what caused coalitions to fall apart?

d. *Prewar Plans and Wartime Realities*. Did prewar planning provide good groundwork for wartime strategy?

e. *Civil-Military Relations*. Were the relations between military leaders and statesmen effective or not, for what reasons, and with what consequences?

f. *Social Dimensions of Strategy*. How was strategy shaped by the nature of a state's political, economic, and social orders, and by its moral values?

g. *War Termination and Postwar Settlement*. In taking the first steps into war, and during its progress, did strategists consider what the last steps would, or might, be?[49]

In dealing with these themes, the course did develop new case studies on topics in Asian history, including studies on the theorist Sun Tzu, the Russo-Japanese War, the Pacific in World War II, the Chinese Civil War, Korea, and Vietnam. This was done, not for the purpose of expanding coverage of a historical era, or because of an interest in regional studies, or even thoughts about possible future wars in Asia. These topics



Bob Hobbs/Naval War College Illustration
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE students will stage their annual War College Gaieties on June 15 at 7 p.m. in Spruance Hall auditorium. The spoof is based on C³, the teachings of Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), an 18th century Prussian military theorist. Proceeds from the production will go to Navy Relief. Tickets will be sold at the door.

The Annual Student Variety Show, *The Gaieties*, Was Held on 15 June in 1990. As usual, it was a humorous take on Naval War College life. The event was discontinued after the 1991 production. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Dr. Charles Chadbourn, Professor of Strategy, Who Established in Washington, D.C., the First Off-Campus Program of the College in 1974, Presents a Writing Award at the Pentagon to College of Continuing Education Student Lieutenant Commander William J. Toti, USN, for His Essay "A Naval Regional Strategy Based on Sea-Air-Land Battle Doctrine," June 1992.
Naval War College Museum Collection

were added because of the wealth of the material they added for useful analysis of strategy and policy. Although everything in the course was designed to enhance the analytical skills and understanding and effectiveness of future leaders, it was not a current-events course. The course highlighted the constant interaction of challenge and response in war, as students probed deeply into the case studies to understand the nature of war, the national objectives involved, and the relationship between strategy and operations in pondering how to win wars. "Our belief," Baer explained, "was always that the present is best served in stressing enduring values."[50]

Since the essential qualities of the course were of value to all officer ranks as an understanding that was applicable to all types of armed conflicts, the Strategy and Policy faculty actively encouraged the teaching of extramural courses derived from its resident course in Newport. Faculty members increasingly cooperated with the College's continuing education program in their curriculum development and fleet seminars.

Continuing Education

The College of Continuing Education offered all three of the resident core courses through off-site seminars as well as through correspondence. The program began to expand greatly in the 1990s as a computer network became available. During the first four years of the 1990s the program had a 250 percent increase in student productivity and a 263 percent increase in the number of graduates. In the same period, the average time to complete a correspondence course fell from sixty-five months to forty-seven months, while the average enrollment in correspondence courses increased by 10 percent to 524. The nonresident seminars that had begun in Washington, D.C., with just two seminars and thirty-four graduates had expanded by the mid-1990s to an average of 138 nonresident seminar students in forty-three individual seminars at fourteen locations in the United States. Among them, the Washington, D.C., seminars, in particular, gained a reputation for their notable guest speakers, which included former and serving officials and members of Congress.[51]

One U.S. Army Reserve officer student wrote a letter to the College, saying, "The Navy has the superior structure for conducting nonresident War College studies. I am writing not only to thank you

and your staff for the demanding and rigorous program, but to suggest that the Naval War College Seminar Program be considered both the model and the nucleus around which all armed services export their curriculum."[52]

Electives

While students were taking each of the core courses separately in sequential trimesters during the year, they also continued to take one elective course in each of those trimesters. During the 1990s, approximately thirty volunteers from the resident faculty offered a wide range of courses each trimester. The idea behind them was to expand the breadth and depth of the curriculum by providing students with the opportunity either to explore professional subjects of interest or to investigate specific topics in more detail.

International Programs

Captain Marvin Rice Was Director of the Naval Command College, 1990–1992.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Captain Carter Nute Was Director of the Naval Command College, 1992–1994.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The international programs at the Naval War College continued to be a source for educating the leaders of many navies around the world (see appendix D). With the end of the Cold War, the Chief of Naval Operations expanded the invitation list for participation to countries with emerging democracies. This resulted in the early 1990s in the immediate addition of naval officers coming to the senior-level Naval Command Course from Bulgaria, Congo, Poland, and the Russian Federation, with additional countries joining in later years. In the 1990s, the College began to improve the management of its international alumni, creating a database for the Naval Command College with over 1,100 names in seventy-three countries. This innovation helped to facilitate the professional bonds that many Naval Command College graduates felt that helped to strengthen political-military cooperation, interoperability, and global stability. As one flag officer graduate commented:

> The international bonds of professional friendship developed with my NCC classmates during our year in Newport have served me well. Many of my classmates share the same feeling and they also have used the personal relationship formed in Newport to provide a mutual benefit to our respective navies. NCC provides the right forum to develop understanding and trust on a truly global scale.[53]

Similarly, the intermediate-level international course in the Naval Staff College grew and developed. Separate from the other resident international courses, it remained an intensive five-month course with its own curriculum adopted from the resident courses, but its students were not integrated with the resident U.S. students, as were the students in the Naval Command College. Adjusting to its student clientele, the Naval Staff College refocused its operations course from major blue-water naval operations to a course that accentuated peacekeeping, peacemaking, and enforcing operations that were then becoming the most frequent types of naval operations for smaller navies. Other aspects of the

course shifted to better support U.S. foreign policy through a discussion of democratization and cooperative engagement. As a result, one graduate in the early 1990s commented that, for the first time, he had "a good understanding of human rights, democracy, and freedom of speech."[54] The staff for the international courses worked with their highly diverse student body to create an atmosphere of professional growth and camaraderie that also dealt with a wide range for their students' physical, intellectual, and interpersonal needs.

The Henry E. Eccles Library

The Naval War College library worked in close cooperation with the academic and research departments to support the curriculum as well as to support individual student and faculty research. During the 1990s, the library worked to keep up to date with the emerging research technology appropriate for the College's use. It greatly expanded the College's reference department with access to online databases and CD-ROMs that provided a wide range of up-to-date information. In addition, it established online bibliographic linkages so that all the library holdings were reflected in the public online catalogue as well as made plans for an improved online system. In addition, plans were made to implement a local area network for some 75,000 items in the library's classified collection.

Captain Vanarsdall Congratulating Professor Robert Schnare, Library Director. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Beginning in 1993, the Eccles Library participated as one of seven institutional members of the Military Education Coordinating Committee (MECC) Library Working Group, representing the libraries at the nation's senior professional military education colleges and universities that were all beginning to work together to promote interconnectivity with their library resources to develop a Joint Knowledge Network. In support of this, the Naval War College's librarian, Robert Schnare, coordinated the development of its first effort, a *Union List* of microform collections, CD-ROMs, and research databases.[55]

The College's Curriculum in Perspective

The College's many academic achievements had faced many practical challenges that were overcome in implementation. Remarkably, between 1990 and 1994, the overall student body had increased by 42 percent, but there was only a 12 percent increase in faculty and no increase in staff. When looked at as a whole, the College's curriculum was designed to educate its students at the graduate level for the remainder of their careers by nurturing the intellectual discipline and insights appropriate for highly responsible individuals working within the framework of complementary national security organizations. The College's administration and faculty believed that this education is not to be found in broad surveys of current international issues or in detailed questions of defense acquisitions, but rather from intellectual insight into the fundamentals of national security affairs in peace and in war. In this, the development in a student's mind of a historical perspective is an essential part of the Naval War College's education, particularly for

understanding the range of relationships between national policy and strategy. In addition, the curriculum developed in its students the analytical skills needed to manage and to use wisely, in the context of a democratic environment, the nation's resources and capabilities. In short, the fundamental products of a Naval War College education in the 1990s were intellectual analysis, strategic judgment, and a feel for history. One Naval War College graduate reflected on his own War College experience in a way that captured exactly what the College believed it was doing:

> I was amazed at how much the Naval War College broadened my perspective on the range of issues which affect decision making at the highest levels. More important, it taught me how to think with a new complexity about how a variety of issues interact to effect outcomes. I now feel very confident about my ability to make a real contribution to policy making and execution.[56]

NOTES

1. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Naval War College Oral History Project, Interview with Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, 10 August 2009, by James Rife [hereinafter Strasser interview], p. 5.
2. Strasser's role is mentioned in William J. Crowe, Jr., with David Chanoff, *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 24, 101, 276.
3. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 5, file 1992: Appendix A: Official Biography Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser.
4. Richard Pyle, "War Colleges Compelled to Change Course," *Free Lance-Star,* 3 April 1990, p. 8, reported that 98 of the 148 course readings were changed for the fall trimester in 1989.
5. Bernard E. Trainor, "Study for War Changes with Europe," *New York Times,* 16 January 1990, p. A20.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Strasser interview, p. 2.
10. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
11. Ibid.
12. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Dr. William Turcotte to Hattendorf, e-mail, 11 January 2010, p. 5.
13. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: NMUC 1994: President, Naval War College to Chief of Naval Operations, ser. 0669, 28 April 1994, Subj: Recommendation for Nomination of NWC for Navy Unit Commendation Award, Encl. (1) [hereinafter NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation], p. 2.
14. On this subject, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,* vol. 5, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961–1965* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), pp. 3, 14, 72–95, 476, 539, 540, 548–49.
15. Turcotte to Hattendorf, p. 1.
16. Ibid., pp. 2–4; Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Kevin Kelley to Hattendorf, e-mail, 8 January 2010.
17. Turcotte to Hattendorf, p. 6.
18. Hattendorf conversations with Ambassador Paul D. Taylor, 20–21 October 2014.
19. Eliot C. Cohen, "A Teacher among Bureaucrats—the Legacy of Alvin H. Bernstein—Commentary—Obituary," Cornell University Class of 1961 website, http://www.cornell61.org/bernstein.htm.
20. Turcotte to Hattendorf, pp. 3–4.
21. Ibid.
22. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Fred B. Horne to Hattendorf, 7 January 2010, with attachment: Jeff Barker, "Some Thoughts on the Evolution of JMO" [hereinafter Horne to Hattendorf with Barker attachment].
23. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Oral History No. 393, Vietnam War Veterans, 2007: Captain Hugh F. Lynch, USN (ret), p. 176.
24. Ibid., p. 177.
25. Ibid.
26. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Captain Timothy Somes to Hattendorf, e-mail, 21 August 2014, enclosing "Reflections on the Development of the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College from 1981 to 1989. By Captain Tim Somes. Memo prepared 19–21 August 2014," pp. 1–2.
27. Ibid., p. 3.
28. Ibid., p. 4.
29. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
30. Ibid., p. 8.
31. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Ted Gatchel to Hattendorf, e-mail, 11 August 2014.
32. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Milan Vego to Hattendorf, e-mail, 13 August 2014, with copies of memos, 12 September 1994–25 October 1994, documenting the process of course development.
33. Horne to Hattendorf with Barker attachment.

34. Milan Vego, *The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. xiv.

35. For El Salvador, see, for example, Lydia Chavez, "The Odds in El Salvador," *New York Times Sunday Magazine,* 24 July 1983, p. SM 14; John D. Waghelstein, "El Salvador and the Press," *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College* 15, no. 3 (1985), pp. 66–70; John D. Waghelstein, interviewed by Charles A. Carlton, Jr., *El Salvador,* Senior Officers Oral History Program (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1985).

36. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: George W. Jackson to Hattendorf, 2 September 2014.

37. Horne to Hattendorf with Barker attachment.

38. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College—Strategy Course Syllabus: College of Naval Warfare–Naval Command College, Syllabus for Strategy and Policy, 5 September–12 December 1973, p. 1.

39. Ibid., pp. C-28, C-31.

40. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: President, Naval War College Memorandum for John Hattendorf, 20 November 1972.

41. Stansfield Turner, "Learning to Look at All Sides: Reflections on an Oxford Education," *The American Oxonian* 90, no. 2 (Spring 2003).

42. William C. Fuller, Jr., *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

43. Ibid., pp. xi–xii.

44. George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The United States Navy, 1890–1990* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 6. The quote within the quotation was taken from Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe, CNO Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, and Commandant of the Marine Corps General C. E. Munday, Jr., . . . *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1992), pp. 2, 10.

45. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power,* p. 451.

46. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Challenge! A New Approach to a Professional Education at the Naval War College," *Naval War College Review* 25, no. 2 (November–December 1972), pp. 1–9, reprinted as Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Convocation Address," *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 72–80.

47. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Baer to Hattendorf, 17 December 2009.

48. Ibid.

49. Naval War College Archives, RG 11, Syllabi, box 17, file 3: College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College, November 1994–March 1995, pp. 1–3.

50. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Baer to Hattendorf, 15 August 2014.

51. NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation, p. 8.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., quoted on p. 9.

54. Ibid., quoted on p. 10.

55. Robert E. Schnare and Naval War College Library, *Union List of Military Education Coordinating Committee (MECC) Library Research Materials: A. Major Microform Collections, B. CD-ROMs, C. Research Databases,* Publication No. 1 of the MECC Library Working Group (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Library, 1994).

56. NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation, quoted on p. 2.



The Faculty and Staff of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Christmas 1988: A Caricature by "Slick." Commander Thomas C. "Slick" Vance served in the Strategy and Campaign Department of the center from 1986 to 1990. Many appreciated his amusing drawings. This one, which includes a number of long-serving faculty and staff members, and another from 1989 were displayed on the wall in the dean's secretary's office during the 1990s. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Chapter Seventeen

Research in the 1990s

The College's institutional research functions came under the responsibility of the dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. This was a separate deanery within the College from its teaching and classroom curricula, which came under the responsibility of the College's dean of academics and the chairmen of the three main teaching departments. While individual faculty members in both deaneries undertook a range of their own personal, professional research as they contributed to their separate academic fields, the center focused on official, institutional research projects.

Dr. Robert S. Wood became the second dean of the center in 1983 and served additionally as the senior academic advisor to the President of the Naval War College. Having previously served as chairman of the Strategy Department, Dr. Wood began to develop the center in ways that would complement the curriculum of the College. The aim was to provide a place for researching professional problems that, in turn, informed and stimulated the students and faculty. Echoing the founder's view that the Naval War College was "a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war,"[1] Wood wrote in November 1986, "The interaction between these two areas of the Naval War College [teaching and research] has, over the past five years, provided the basis for the College's ability to meet the challenge designed by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce at its founding more than a century ago."

Dean Robert S. Wood with a Group of Center for Naval Warfare Studies Employees Who Had Just Received Service Awards.

Left to right: Karen Costa, Nancy Williams, Jean Cottrell, Dr. Wood, Nancy Bigos, Norma Campbell, Jeanne Van Vleck.

Naval War College Museum Collection

All of the research work done in the center was characterized as being the independent evaluation of problems by the Naval War College and not research produced on request to argue for a particular conclusion. Under Wood's leadership, the center positioned itself so that it could act as a neutral conduit between the Navy and the academic work that was of interest to the Naval War College and the Navy at large, even touching on issues that the Navy did not want to be seen to endorse or in which it did not wish to appear to have a formal, official interest. Although many other commands and agencies requested, funded, or sponsored research work in the center, the Naval War College's researchers would always decline requests to validate a particular viewpoint or to advance a particular agenda promoted from a staff office. Instead, researchers ensured that

it brought to bear all of the College's intellectual resources to reach independent conclusions about whatever problem or issue they examined.

During the 1990s, the center continued to develop the College's research work and war gaming to a position with leadership roles in the advancement of naval, joint, strategic, and campaign thinking. The 1990s were a time when American naval doctrinal thinking was undergoing more dramatic change than it had since the early decades of the College's history. The center became intimately involved in various aspects of the development, analysis, and refinement of the progressive series of capstone strategic statements that the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was developing.[2] Typical of the broad conceptual work the center undertook in support of such work was the examination of the trends within the nation and their relationships with naval power undertaken by a panel of distinguished experts convened by Dean Wood. The proceedings of this workshop were published by the College under the title *Strategic Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st Century.*[3]



Mrs. Shirley Wilkins Receives a Performance Award from Dean Alberto Coll, December 2001, in Recognition of Her Service as Secretary to Deans Wood and Coll in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
Naval War College Museum Collection

To undertake such work during Wood's sixteen-year tenure as dean from 1983 to 1999, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies was organized around a number of departments, with the immediate office of the dean housing a range of special advisors, including liaison officers seconded from agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. During Wood's tenure, the center had eight departments: Strategic Studies Group, War Gaming, Global and Advanced Concepts, Strategy and Campaign, Oceans Law and Policy, Advanced Research, Decision Support, and the Naval War College Press.

Strategic Studies Group

The Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies served additionally as Director, Strategic Studies Group, established by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1981 to provide innovative thinking that had direct access to the Chief of Naval Operations and major commanders, from 1981 to 1985, and again briefly in 1988. From its establishment in 1981 until 1995, the Strategic Studies Group was funded as a department administratively supported within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. As the host for the Strategic Studies Group, the center provided essential intellectual, gaming, and resource support. The group's reports were of major importance in anticipating the possibility of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and foreseeing the development of the security environment of the 1990s. The group also provided useful advice for the reorganization of the naval staff in Washington, D.C., and the recapitalization of the Navy. The cumulative impact of the Strategic Studies Group was shown by the fact that in 1994 its former fellows made up 10 percent of the Navy's active-duty flag officers.[4]

With the separation of dean and director in 1985, the Strategic Studies Group was no longer the centerpiece of the center, but relations between the two remained close, particularly with the War Gaming and Strategic Research Departments. Under Ambassador Marshall Brement, the Strategic Studies Group began to emphasize its intellectual separation from the center. For the period 1995 through 2014, the Strategic Studies

Strategic Studies Group XV (October 1995–July 1996). The new administrative arrangement for the Strategic Studies Group, moving from a department within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies to a tenant command, began with the appointment of Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.), as its director in 1995. Admiral Hogg led Group XV in 1995 through Group XXXII in 2013.

Front row (left to right): Bill Glenney; Vince Goulding; Bert Kinghorn; Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.), Director; Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations; Jim Schleining; Tracee Glass.

Back row (left to right): Tom Otterbein; Mark Luoma; Dave Ellison; Jay Munninghoff; Chuck Munns; John Hanley, Deputy Director; Gene Kendall.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral Strasser with Rhode Island Congressman Ronald Machtley. A graduate of the Naval Academy, Machtley remained a strong supporter of the Naval War College while serving as representative in Rhode Island's First Congressional District. In the 1990s, Machtley played a key role in introducing the legislation for the College's new building, initially called the Strategic Maritime Research Center, to house the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The building was eventually named McCarty Little Hall. The groundbreaking took place on 20 October 1997.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Group was a tenant command with full program, administrative, budgetary, and information technology support from the Naval War College in accordance with the Strategic Studies Group Charter signed by the Chief of Naval Operations.[5]

War Gaming Department

The global war game, as described in chapter 14, which continued annually until 2001, became the world's largest and most comprehensive research game. It typically had more than one thousand players joining in annually and included representatives from all major government agencies and departments, the regional commanders in chief, the armed services, and allied nations. The Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, Robert McFarlane, called the series "a valuable tool for investigating new approaches to national security in our changing world environment."[6] In 1994, the fourth, five-year-long series of these games shifted to a "Constellation-of-Games" approach that integrated the global game with other games, including those sponsored by the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the regional commanders in chief. This approach included an outreach from the Naval War College that allowed the regional commanders to identify major issues in their areas and to play from their own headquarters. The initial game in 1994 quickly won praise from the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Charles Larson, who thanked the President of the Naval War College for the "outstanding work developing and supporting the CINC's Pacific road to Global 94 War Game. This game accomplished all our objectives and more. . . . The scenarios and issues examined were both timely and critical to the Pacific theater. . . . Please convey my personal 'well done' to your team for their superb extra efforts on my behalf."[7]

The War Gaming Department conducted a wide variety of other games. In 1985–1986, for example, forty-six games or seminars were conducted, nine of which were held in such far-flung places

as London, Rio de Janeiro, Pearl Harbor, Subic Bay, and New London, Connecticut. Others were played through voice, visual, and data communication connections with other war colleges in the United States. All of these were designed to educate military and civilian decision makers in maritime, joint, and combined arms warfare. They were also used as an analytical tool to evaluate current war plans and to examine sensitivities of a potential enemy. War game sponsors fell into four main categories: (a) the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, (b) other Naval War College departments, (c) fleet commanders, and (d) the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Among these, a number of games were held each year to support the curriculum in several of the College's departments and were played by students. In addition, the Inter-American War Game was an annual game organized each year by a different war college on a rotating basis in North or South America. Beginning in 1986, the Enhanced Naval War Gaming System (ENWGS) was introduced to provide improved computer system support and in 1994, new hardware for the system was installed. Over the decade of the 1990s, the department was headed by an active-duty naval captain. The number of games increased incrementally, while total manning decreased from 120 in 1990 to 90 in 1994.[8]

Global War Game and Advanced Concepts Department

Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel Was Milton E. Miles Professor of International Relations and Director of the Strategy and Campaign Department, Later the Strategic Research Department, from 1985 to 1999. A 1966 political science graduate of the College of the Holy Cross with a 1971 PhD in international relations from Georgetown University, Daniel served as an officer in the engineering department of the combat stores ship USS *Sylvania* (AFS 2) in 1971–1973, before becoming a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1973–1985. After leaving the Naval War College he served as special assistant to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and later a faculty member at Georgetown University.
Photo Courtesy of Dr. Daniel

In addition to organizing the global war game, this department, headed by O. E. Hay, developed a program to support the global war game by providing a means to study the synergism between developing new technology and strategy. In the process, it developed into an approach to study strategic and operational campaign issues set in future scenarios with future forces. This program involved an extensive network within the Naval Laboratory System and the Department of Energy's National Laboratory System, which together created the Advanced Technology Cell. Another initiative was aimed at advancing the art of war gaming by experimental methods and applications.[9]

Notably, the Technology Initiative Game (TIG) series was designed to link strategic concerns with new developments in technology. These games brought together military operators and technological specialists in the research and development field to shape investment strategies in areas such as command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^4I); space; stealth; and electronic warfare. In response to the work of one set of games, the director of joint warfare in the British Ministry of Defence noted their "perceptive analysis. . . . The games being played are unique and have given us some fascinating insights into our former adversary."[10]

Strategic Research Department

Headed from 1985 to 1999 by Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel, the Milton E. Miles Professor of International Relations, the department was a composite of a number of activities that focused on the development of campaigns within the context of a broad national maritime strategy. The department had been established initially as the Strategy and Campaign Department, and about 1994 was renamed the Strategic Research Department. It consisted of several divisions devoted to Atlantic, Pacific, and European strategies as well as topical projects such as amphibious campaign options and

bilateral and multilateral strategy development. Many of the results of the department's research projects were published as occasional papers of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies in a series called Strategic Research Department Research Memoranda.

The Strategy and Campaign Department also housed the one or two Naval Command College graduates who stayed on following graduation to serve in a research capacity and provided valuable insight from their various national perspectives. One of several talented officers who served in this role was Commander Edmundo González Robles, a 1997 graduate who would later become commander in chief of the Chilean Navy, 2009–2013.[11]

Dr. Daniel and his department were deeply involved in several series of war games. The Secretary of the Navy War Game series was instituted in the period leading up to the 1992 publication of the Navy's capstone strategy document . . . *From the Sea*. In early August 1992, the Secretary of the Navy tasked the College to test the Navy's program objective memorandum requirements against the new strategy and to design and execute a major game for this purpose within the next three weeks. The game began on 9 September 1992 and its results were briefed to the secretary eight days later. The secretary signed the new capstone strategy in late September and it was publicly distributed in early October. As a result of the success in carrying out this game, a series of Secretary of the Navy POM games followed, beginning in February 1993, to evaluate naval force capabilities and force levels in the light of budgetary constraints. As the importance of these games increased, so did the participation of flag-level officers, which nearly doubled in the first few years. In some games, flag officers from the Army and Air Force were also invited to participate.[12]

In order to introduce a broader perspective into games and simulations conducted at the Naval War College, and specifically into the global game series, it was decided in 1994 to sponsor a game, International Game '94, involving academics, diplomats, practitioners, and journalists from around the world. The success of that event led to the decision to make the International Game an annual event. The first International Global Game took place at the Naval War College in July 1994. It featured participants from sixteen foreign countries simulating UN Security Council sessions for six different international crises. This series of war games supported the Department of Defense, State Department, and the intelligence community.[13]

The Strategy and Campaign Department provided a maritime strategy enhancement program that produced a variety of reports that were briefed to other navies abroad as well as in presentations at the International Seapower and Current Strategy symposia in Newport. The Milton E. Miles strategy series supported the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and brought together the strategy and operations officers from all the regional commanders in Europe and the Pacific.

With the end of the Cold War, one of the most significant initiatives that the Strategy and Campaign Department became involved in during the 1990s was the Russia–United Kingdom–United States (RUKUS) discussions. In 1988, Eric Grove, a naval historian and defense analyst who at that time was a freelance academic researcher in Britain associated with the Foundation for International Security and its project on Maritime Power and European Security, was instrumental in initiating and chairing a series of informal and unofficial talks with Soviet naval officers. Their goal was to promote East-West understanding through a discussion of naval activities as the naval Cold War thawed. Initially known as the Adderbury

Conversations, they were named for the small village in northern Oxfordshire where the first and third talks were held on 30–31 July 1988 and 17–19 November 1989. The second discussion had taken place in Moscow and Sevastopol in February 1989.[14] In 1994, Commander Leslie Sim, Royal Navy, then a research fellow at the Naval War College, described the talks as "characterized by cool, though frank, interchanges, [but] each succeeding meeting has seen the mistrust developed during the Cold War fall away like chunks of glacier into the sea."[15] Dr. Daniel and the Naval War College began to participate starting with the third session, held at Adderbury, in November 1989, along with a number of retired Soviet and American admirals.

In 1990, Grove's sponsors no longer funded the continuation of the talks and he asked whether the Naval War College could take the lead. Dr. Daniel and Captain Richard Diamond in the Strategic Concepts Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations were closely involved in organizing the fourth set of talks and the first to be held in the United States. Officials in Washington directed that the talks were not to take place at any U.S. military facility, were to be kept at a low level with no flag officer participation, and were to involve no expenditure of appropriated naval funds.[16] To avoid the appearance of any direct U.S. naval involvement in the 1990 talks, now known as RUKUS, Daniel made an arrangement with Dr. Howard R. Swearer, the former president of nearby Brown University, who was then director of the university's Watson Institute for International Studies, to sponsor the event. Funding for the meeting was obtained from the Rockefeller Foundation. In 1991, the talks were renewed at Brown, but by this time the official position had softened somewhat, allowing flag officer participation, but still avoiding having the discussions in government facilities. The 1991 sessions included the President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, and Rear Admiral Edward B. "Ted" Baker, Jr., from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Although the talks were in Providence, Rhode Island, Admiral Strasser was able to host a lunch for participants at the Naval War College President's House, but they were not shown other parts of the College. In 1992, the sixth session was held at the Kuznetsov Academy in Russia. Admiral Strasser, Dean Wood, and Dr. Daniel were among the U.S. participants. Another participant was future War College faculty member Captain Thomas Fedyszyn, who was the newly assigned U.S. naval attaché in Moscow. During this event, Admiral Strasser was amazed by the turn in history that found him, as an American admiral, being put up in flag guest quarters that had originally been built as a dacha for the use of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov.[17] During this visit, Captain Victor L. Potvorov, Russian Navy, served as Strasser's escort. Potvorov became the first officer from the Russian Navy to attend the Naval War College, when he joined the Naval Command College's class of 1994.

The seventh of the RUKUS discussions was held in 1993 at the Maritime Tactical School, HMS *Dryad*, near Portsmouth, England. By this time, formal contacts were taking place between the three navies, allowing them to develop these conversations into an openly sponsored event. The meeting at *Dryad* was the first to involve a war game. Entitled "Triple Thrust," the game was designed to explore elementary concepts in multilateral naval operations.

The eighth meeting was held in Newport at the Naval War College in 1994. Following on from the meeting at *Dryad*, this one was also centered on a war game with a scenario that was considered the most likely situation in which nonallied navies would be cooperating together, when multinational naval operations were supporting United Nations resolutions. For this, the game book was produced in both Russian and

Russia–United Kingdom–United States Talks at the Naval War College, 1994.

1. Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, USN; 2. Vice Admiral Youri Kaisin, Russian Federation Navy; 3. Rear Admiral John Trewby, Royal Navy; 4. Captain First Rank N. I. Vlasov, Russian Federation Navy, Head, Naval Operations Directorate, Russian Federation Naval Staff; 5. Captain Peter Galbraith, USN, U.S. Naval Attaché, Moscow; 6. Stan Carlson, Director, UN Situation Center; 7. Captain J. M. Dobson, Royal Navy, British Naval Attaché, Moscow; 8. Marcel Savard, Field Operations Division, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 9. Colonel Ed Pusey, USA, Joint Staff J8, Force Structure Resources Assessment; 10. Commander S. V. Mackay, Royal Navy, Office of the Director, Naval Operations; 11. Commander Zdzislaw Jamka, Polish Navy, Standby Forces Planning Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 12. Commander Thomas Gorman, USN, U.S. Naval War College; 13. Commander J. Gass, Royal Navy, Office of the Commander in Chief Fleet; 14. Captain Jerry Schill, USN, Plans and Policy N5, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; 15. Eric Grove, Foundation for International Security; 16. Captain Thomas R. Fedyszyn, USN, Commanding Officer, USS *Normandy* (CG 60); 17. Professor Geoffrey Till, Royal Naval Staff College; 18. Captain Christopher L. W. Page, Royal Navy, Head of Defence Studies (Navy); 19. Ms. Jean Callaghan, interpreter; 20. Major Simon Milner, Royal Marines, Headquarters, Royal Marines; 21. Captain First Rank A. I. Popov, Russian Federation Navy, Senior Lecturer, Naval Academy, St. Petersburg; 22. Not identified; 23. Captain Second Rank N. R. Borisov, Russian Federation Navy, Senior Officer, Main Operations Directorate, General Staff; 24. Colonel Gennady P. Kostylev, Russian Federation Naval Infantry; 25. R. Avery, lead UK interpreter; 26. Commander A. Forsyth, Royal Navy, Deputy Director, Maritime Tactical School; 27. Nick Ivanov, interpreter; 28. Captain James W. "Wes" Moreland III, USN, Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College; 29. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Bourgeois, USMC, Assistant Plans Officer (Caribbean/Southern Command N523), Staff, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; 30. Commander D. Leslie W. Sim, Royal Navy, Research Fellow, U.S. Naval War College; 31. Captain Paul Dahlquist, USN, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement); 32. Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel, Director, Strategic Research Department, U.S. Naval War College; 33. Captain Sam Prather, USN, Fleet Plans and Policy N50, Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; 34. Commander Tim Concannon, USN, Joint and Combined Doctrine Division, Naval Doctrine Command; 35. Commander Bruce McKenzie, USN, Warfare Policy N512, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; 36. Professor Richard J. Grunawalt, Director, Oceans Law and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College; 37. George Federov, lead U.S. interpreter; 38. Commander Barry Coombs, USN, Game Coordinator, Strategic Research Department; 39. Dr. Robert S. Wood, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College. *Naval War College Archives*

English. The three national teams consisted of five to ten participants, each headed by a flag officer. The Russian team was headed by Vice Admiral Youri Kaisin, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Russian Federation Navy; the British team by Rear Admiral John A. Trewby, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff–Operational Requirements (Sea), from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence; and the U.S. team by President of the Naval War College Rear Admiral Strasser.[18] These discussions continued at intervals over a number of years and later included the French Navy.[19] Not only did the discussions enhance confidence among navies; they are credited with contributing to the confidence that allowed navies to remove tactical nuclear weapons from ships.[20]

In the late 1990s, Dr. Daniel and his deputy department head, Captain Bradd C. Hayes, focused much of the department's research efforts on peacekeeping, complex emergencies, and issues of how to deal with the numerous conflicts that were raging in the developing world in the immediate post–Cold War era.[21] As part of this focus, many different studies and reports were undertaken. One prominent study was undertaken for the White House on obstructionist leaders.[22] Others supported the United Nations, in collaboration with Professor Paul M. Kennedy's International Security Studies at Yale University and Secretary-General Kofi Annan's office. The latter study explored a term that had been suggested by Kofi Annan: coercive inducement. Daniel and Hayes produced a book on the subject that was published

by the United States Institute of Peace. This volume was short-listed in the competition for the University of Louisville's Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order.[23] While the Strategy and Campaign Department dealt with broad current issues of war and peace, the subject of future naval strategy and operations was always evident in a variety of other studies.[24]



Professor Richard J. Grunawalt. A retired captain in the Navy's Judge Advocate General Corps, Jack Grunawalt served as the founding director of the Oceans Law and Policy Department, 1988–1998 and had three assignments as the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, 1986–1989, 1993–1994, and 2008–2009.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Oceans Law and Policy Department

In 1986, the College invited Captain Richard J. Grunawalt, USN (Ret.), to take up the visiting position of Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law for the academic year.

A graduate of the University of Michigan in 1956 and the University of Michigan Law School in 1959, he went to Naval Officer Candidate School, where he was commissioned as a restricted line law specialist. Grunawalt went on for a twenty-five-year career in the Navy. During his career in uniform, he served as Deputy Director, U.S. Naval Law Center in Da Nang, Vietnam, U.S. Seventh Fleet Judge Advocate, Special Counsel to the Chief of Naval Operations, Staff Judge Advocate for the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.[25]

During his career, Grunawalt had become interested in issues of operational naval law, a subject that was not widely understood outside the realm of the Navy's international law specialists. The subject began to come to the fore in the years following the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, when this new legal regime involved a fundamental restructuring of the legal environment at sea. With it came the need for commanders at sea to have a much deeper understanding of international law. In 1984, while serving as special assistant to Rear Admiral Bruce Harlow, Grunawalt was given the assignment to replace the Navy's outdated 1955 publication on *The Law of Naval Warfare* (Naval Warfare Information Publication 10-2). Two other officers in that office, J. Ashley Roach and James Terry, had already begun the drafting. Harlow directed Grunawalt to carry on with their work for the project. When Grunawalt retired from active duty in July 1985, Harlow arranged for him to continue the project, initially on a contract basis. Grunawalt was continuing work on the project when he arrived at the Naval War College to take up the Stockton professorship in August 1986. Grunawalt's vision for the project was to provide a readable and concise statement that operational commanders at sea could easily use. As Grunawalt recalled,

> Many of our operational commanders are out there at sea without benefit of a judge advocate to assist them, and may be deployed for months at a time. We thought that it was important that we have something on the bridge of a ship that they could turn to for a basic understanding . . . of what can they legally do in those waters.[26]

At the same time, legal specialists in the Navy also needed an accompanying document with precise citations and other details that international law specialists could use. After extensive staffing through the services, this eventually resulted in two complementary publications that were developed by the Naval War College under the direction of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* (Naval Warfare Publication 9) replaced *Law of Naval Warfare* (NWIP 10-2) and first appeared in 1987.

NWP 9 was a major achievement for the Navy and in Grunawalt's career. Knowledgeable colleagues readily recognized his Jeep in the College parking lot or on the road with its "NWP 9" Rhode Island license plate number mounted in a Naval War College license plate holder and accompanied by a large United States Navy seal on the Jeep's spare tire cover. With NWP 9's Revision A in 1989, it was adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps as Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-10. In October 1989, the first version of *The Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook* appeared. Captain J. Ashley Roach had been the main author and with this work set the stage for the series. Grunawalt led the team that published a revised version of part 1 of the *Annotated Supplement* on peacetime naval operations in 1997, with the complete version appearing in the Naval War College International Law blue book series in 1999.[27]

Grunawalt had these projects in hand during what turned out to be a three-year term as Stockton Professor from August 1986 to August 1989. Grunawalt's appointment to the Stockton chair was unusual in that this position was typically offered to senior and very distinguished civilian academics for a one-year visiting professorship away from their home universities. These scholars were leading academic experts in the field of international law and typically lectured in the National Security Decision Making Department, in its Policy Making and Implementation division.[28] Grunawalt had the experience and insight to perceive that while the academic law professor's lectures were very good and interesting, they were not then serving the direct needs of Naval War College students. As Grunawalt put it, "They needed to know how the law applies to them. How does it translate into operational reality?"[29] Early on in his assignment, Grunawalt began talking to Dean Robert Wood about how this problem could be solved. By his second year those ideas were beginning to crystallize: "What was needed was a new department within the Naval War College that could provide that kind of instruction for the students. I thought it very, very necessary that we do that," Grunawalt recalled.[30] During his third year as Stockton Professor, Wood and Grunawalt discussed the idea with a range of others at the Naval War College and in Washington.

These discussions culminated on 11 February 1988, when Rear Admiral Kurth signed a formal recommendation to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, pointing out the inadequacy of the existing ocean law and policy research at the Naval War College to support the development of maritime strategy, war gaming, and curriculum development. Referring to the Iran-Iraq tanker war of 1984–1988 and the 1987 attack on USS *Stark* (FFG 31), Kurth noted:

> Events in the Persian Gulf dramatically illustrate the increasingly complex ocean law and policy environment in which today's naval commander must carry out his deterrence missions and, if necessary, fight his forces in the execution of the national maritime strategy. The range of international law issues currently at play in the Gulf encompasses such diverse yet critically important areas as the law of the sea and the law of armed conflict as the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, innocent passage of the territorial

> sea, transit passage of straits, neutral and belligerent rights, naval targeting, mine and counter-mine warfare, the inherent right of self-defense and flag national authority and responsibility over merchant shipping. Each of these oceans law and policy concepts impact upon and are reflected in the rules of engagement provided to the operating forces by the National Command Authorities.[31]

Kurth also noted that the recent promulgation of the *Commander's Handbook,* completed at the Naval War College with partial funding support from the College, was an excellent vehicle to maintain continuing active collaboration between the College and the Office of the Judge Advocate General through the regular updates it would need in the future. With the strong approval of Rear Admiral H. D. Campbell, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins approved the general concept on 28 March 1988, but demurred for a time at Admiral Campbell's accompanying recommendation for the appointment of a particular active-duty captain as the department's deputy director. Eventually Captain A. Ralph Thomas, USN, took that position. Legal specialists from other services soon joined the department, including Colonel John King of the U.S. Army.

With Admiral Watkins's approval, the College immediately moved forward to establish the Oceans Law and Policy Department in July 1988 within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and with Grunawalt as the founding department chairman, initially serving additionally as the Stockton Professor for one more year. As the department developed, Grunawalt put into practice what he called "the road show," a three-day program of instruction on the legal issues in operational rules of engagement. The department had no travel budget, but there was a high demand for the department's expertise, not only at the Naval War College, but also at a variety of fleet training commands. Other commands provided the travel funding for Oceans Law faculty members to travel to them and make their presentations. At the Naval War College, Grunawalt had initially worked closely with Captain J. Ashley Roach, who had been assigned to the College's Operations Department faculty in 1986–1988, to get these ideas circulated within the Operations curriculum. Later, the Oceans Law and Policy faculty provided the instruction directly. Additionally, Grunawalt provided this presentation to the State Department, where a gap had developed between Washington and various embassy staffs over what the armed forces were doing in this area. This "road show" was presented at naval commands in Charleston, Norfolk, San Diego, Long Beach, and Pearl Harbor within the United States, and at numerous war colleges in Latin America and at Germany's Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr.[32]

The Oceans Law and Policy Department hosted a variety of conferences, workshops, and symposia. Among the topics were the freedom of navigation, the law of naval warfare, and the peacetime rules of engagement. In January 1994, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. D. Shalikashvili, wrote in a letter: "According to all reports the recently concluded Joint Staff/J-3 Rules of Engagement Conference hosted by the Naval War College . . . was an overwhelming success. . . . I would like to thank you . . . for the superb support—without which the conference would not have been possible."[33] This particularly important conference brought together a group of key people to revise the rules in light of recent experience, changes in military missions in the post–Cold War era, and new changes in technology and capabilities.



Professor Howard S. Levie. One of the country's foremost experts on the law of war, Levie served as Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War College in 1971–1972. An attorney educated at Cornell, Levie had joined the U.S. Army in 1942 as an artillery officer. In 1946, he was commissioned in the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General Corps and eventually did further studies at the George Washington University, the Sorbonne, and the Hague Academy of International Law. At the end of the Korean War, he was the principal drafter of the armistice agreement. On his retirement as a colonel from the Army in 1966, he joined the faculty of the Saint Louis University School of Law, where he remained until becoming professor emeritus in 1976. In 1977, he and his wife moved to Newport, where he resumed teaching at the Naval War College, on a pro bono basis for twenty years until 1997 in the intermediate-level international course at the Naval Staff College. In 1991, he was appointed an adjunct professor. In October 1994, the College established the Howard S. Levie Military Chair of Operational Law in his honor. Remaining active with close ties to the College, Howard Levie died at the age of 101 in 2009.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Another objective that Grunawalt implemented was to revitalize the College's International Law blue book series. The College had not published a volume in this series since 1980, when Richard B. Lillich and John Norton Moore had edited the second volume of collected articles on international law taken from the *Naval War College Review*.[34] Alfred P. Rubin of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy had served as the Stockton Professor in 1981–1982 and at that time he had returned to the subject of the history of international law relating to piracy, a topic he had temporarily laid aside some years earlier. It had been eight years since Lillich and Moore's volume had appeared when the Naval War College Press published Rubin's study as the next volume in the series in 1988.[35] This was followed three years later with Professor Horace B. Robertson Jr.'s edited collection of essays on the *Law of Naval Operations*.[36] By 1993, the series was back on an annual production basis, with two volumes in 1998 edited by Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green, *Levie on the Law of War*[37] and *The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millennium,*[38] and a third volume, Michael Schmitt's *The Law of Military Operations: Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt*.[39] The latter volume was the tenth produced since Grunawalt had revived the series in 1988 and marked his retirement as department chairman. In 1998, Dennis L. Mandsager, a former staff judge advocate at the College, succeeded Grunawalt as department chairman shortly after Mandsager had retired as a captain in the Judge Advocate General Corps.

Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment

Established in 1976 as the Naval Field Operational Intelligence Office Detachment with spaces in Sims Hall, it remained in that location until 1999, continuing its original function of supporting the War Gaming Department with a permanent, in-residence, opposition team for war games and as a resource for research. From its establishment, it contained three officers, a civilian analyst, and a civilian intelligence clerk. In 1981, it expanded its work to support the Strategic Studies Group, dedicating one officer billet for that purpose. In 1993, it was renamed the Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment. In the following year, its manning was increased to include seven officers, three enlisted, and three civilians. In 1997, the Naval War College signed a new memorandum of agreement to establish the appropriate security procedures for the detachment to maintain a facility for the use of special compartmented information.[40]

Advanced Research Department

Rear Admiral Service Makes a Service Award to Barbara Prisk, ca. 1984. Barbara Prisk was the secretary for the Advanced Research Department from 1985 until her death in 2000. She served at the Naval War College for twenty-six years, starting as an assistant in the library in 1974, subsequently working in the College's administrative services office, housing office, and the senior Army advisor's office.

Naval War College Museum Collection

The Advanced Research Department had two functions. Its primary role was to oversee selected Naval War College students in either the College of Naval Warfare or the College of Naval Command and Staff who did an individual or group research project in lieu of one of the core courses as part of the resident master's degree program. This was, in effect, a master's degree thesis. The department also coordinated the College's Sponsored Research, in which visiting researchers came to the College with independent funding to undertake research. From 1986 until 2003, Professor John Hattendorf was director of the department, with an active-duty naval officer as assistant director and a civilian secretary.

Student participation in this program was relatively high in the 1980s, with up to fifty students, but gradually and steadily declined to about fifteen in the 1990s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the independent research program catered to highly motivated students who had original professional ideas that they wished to develop further or wanted to explore before entering a new career phase, and had the academic skills to undertake such work. Among the students who took this research opportunity were three future presidents of the Naval War College, Captain Rodney Rempt,[41] Commander Jacob L. Shuford,[42] and Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey A. Harley;[43] future strategic policy analyst Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMC; future professor of international law and chairman of the College's Stockton Center for the Study of International Law Lieutenant Colonel Michael N. Schmitt, USAF; and future Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs and ambassador to four different countries Christopher R. Hill.

The advanced research program was also attractive to the small percentage of officers who were coming to the College for a second time as students, when the senior and intermediate courses were quite similar, or for students who were already fully qualified for one of the core courses through an off-campus program or other academic studies. For the latter, the program provided a useful research opportunity for the West Point Scholars, who were faculty members at the U.S. Military Academy sent to the Naval War College for a year to teach in a core course that was compatible with their specialty and also to obtain the Naval War College degree. A number of these U.S. Army officers came from West Point's History Department and taught the Strategy and Policy course at the Naval War College, took one of the three core courses, then did a term of advanced research. Among them were Colonels Cole C. Kingseed, James M. Johnson, and James Scott Wheeler.

The individual, independent advanced research projects contributed to what civilian academics and the New England Association of Schools and Colleges felt was a truly graduate-level educational experience at the Naval War College. However, this approach sat uneasily with the military services' natural preference

for team research projects and, at the same time, created tensions with the three core teaching departments. With the implementation of the requirements from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for joint professional military education, the advanced research option caused serious problems by drawing away some of the best student officers from a core course. This became a particular problem when these requirements demanded a percentage of the different uniformed services to be represented in each seminar for purposes of joint education as well as the requirement for students to attend lectures on certain joint topics in a core course. The situation was compounded by student preferences to opt out of the Operations trimester, where many of the joint professional military education requirements were fulfilled. To deal with one aspect of this issue, the Operations Department and the Defense Economics and Decision Making Department provided research students with a special course in lieu of an elective to cover the joint educational requirements that the research students would otherwise have missed. In 1985, this situation had created some faculty resentment about the program that led to faculty criticism of student selection and the standards that were being used for grading.[44] The latter issues were resolved by establishing a strict screening process. This involved a rigorous research proposal to the Advanced Research Council, chaired by the Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, in which both the student and the academic mentor were interviewed; the creation of guidelines for faculty mentors; the institution of critiqued midterm oral presentations; the establishment of common grading standards; and the use of three separate faculty graders for each student's final written work. For students who were not yet ready to begin their research, the department provided an optional elective course during which prospective students could hone a research proposal.

In addition to teaching research methodology and overseeing student research work at the master's degree level, the department administratively coordinated, through the dean of academics and the dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the participation of faculty members, College-wide, in the program either as members of the Advanced Research Council, as mentors for students, or as graders of student research work. Student projects covered a wide range of current political-military and policy-related issues as well as historical and broader philosophical subjects. On completion, copies of the student research papers were deposited in the library and archives, and submitted for wider distribution to the Defense Technical Information Center. The top students each year were eligible to compete for the one-thousand-dollar J. William Middendorf II Award for Student Research, which recognized a significant contribution in a field relating to strategic or tactical concepts, logistics, or readiness.

In addition, the department helped to coordinate the responsibilities of the Advanced Research Council's oversight of War College students' participation in the directed group research projects managed by other research departments: the Global War Game Advanced Research Project, a team effort within the Advanced Concepts Department, and the Strategic Studies Group Associate Fellows Program with the CNO Strategic Studies Group. Supporting the dean's responsibilities for research at the College, the department also coordinated the work of visiting scholars and researchers participating in the College's Sponsored Research program. This program, as mentioned, provided the avenue by which scholars and officers who had their own funding and support could come to the College to use its resources or to collaborate with its experts on mutually agreed-on topics. It also dealt with scholars who were being supported directly by the College. These experts were normally paired with a resident faculty member who was familiar with the subject being researched and could be located in one of the departments of the Center for Naval Warfare

Captain Dr. Werner Rahn, German Navy, Paying His Respects at the Grave of an Unknown German Seaman Who Died in the Sinking of *U-853*. While on exchange at the Naval War College from the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Military History Research Office) of the German Armed Forces in Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, where he was then the head of the naval history section, Dr. Rahn brought to Newport for the first time the observance of Volkstrauertag. The German national day of remembrance of all those who have died in armed conflict or were victims of oppression is held annually two Sundays before the first Sunday in Advent. Rahn was the first to place the traditional wreaths on the graves in Newport's Island Cemetery Annex off Van Zandt Avenue. The graves are those of Günther Heder, a German seaman who died after being brought to Newport following the sinking of his submarine, *U-550*, off Long Island on 16 April 1944, and an unknown German seaman from *U-853*, sunk off Block Island on 5 May 1945, whose body was brought up in 1960 and buried with full military honors. In 1991, the deputy chief of staff of the German Navy, Rear Admiral Hans-Rudolf Boehmer, attended International Seapower Symposium XI and directed that Dr. Rahn conduct the first ceremony on 17 November 1991. Since that time, the German government has charged the German officer in the Naval Command Course to continue the practice.
Courtesy of the Newport Daily News

Grave of the Unknown German Seaman Who Died in the Sinking of *U-853*. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Studies or in another department in the College. Among a wide variety of scholars who came to the College under these auspices was Dr. Robert S. Jordan, a political scientist and expert on NATO. During Jordan's tenure in the center as Distinguished Visiting Professor of Strategy in 1985–1986, he began work on his study *Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension*, a volume that was eventually dedicated to Dean Wood, when it was published four years later.[45] Others included Commander James Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy, who began research for his study on the post–World War II history of South Asian navies;[46] Captain Dr. Werner Rahn, Federal German Navy; Dr. Nicholas Tracy; and Professor Holger Herwig.

This department organized a conference in September 1992 to consider the naval theories of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, which was attended by fifty historians and naval thinkers from around the world.[47] In addition, the department jointly sponsored a lecture series with the Newport Historical Society on "Newport and the Navy" that contributed to local community relations. The department also initiated collaboration with Professor Paul Kennedy's International Security Studies program at Yale University, which resulted in three joint conferences. The first was held in June 1993 on the current state of naval and maritime history.[48] The second conference, held a year later, in June 1994, was a collaboration between political scientists and naval historians to consider ways to improve the quality of naval history.[49] Three years later, in June 1997, the third conference was convened in Malta to consider the broad subject of past, present, and future naval policies and strategies in the Mediterranean Sea.[50]

From a Decision Support Center to a Decision Strategies Department

In early 1994, Admiral William Owens, the incoming Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Charles Krulak, the incoming Commandant of the Marine Corps, visited the Naval War College. In separate discussions with Dr. Wood, they each shared a vision of a forum where senior flag and general



Attendees at the Corbett-Richmond Conference, 28–29 September 1992.

1. Commander James Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy; 2. Dr. Colin Gray; 3. Eric Grove; 4. Lieutenant Commander W. J. R. Gardner, Royal Navy; 5. Dr. David Zimmerman; 6. Dr. Jon. T. Sumida; 7. Dr. Robert S. Wood; 8. Professor John Hattendorf; 9. Professor Daniel A. Baugh; 10. Professor Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.; 11. Professor Paul Halpern; 12. Dr. G. A. H. Gordon; 13. Dr. Nicholas A. Lambert; 14. Frank Uhlig, Jr.; 15. Dr. Paul Guinn; 16. A. W. H. Pearsall; 17. Professor Gerald Jordan; 18. Commander J. A. A. McCoy, Royal Navy; 19. Professor Donald M. Schurman; 20. Professor Geoffrey Till; 21. Dr. Nicholas Tracy; 22. J. David Brown; 23. Rear Admiral J. R. Hill, Royal Navy; 24. Captain Gordon Wilson, Royal Navy; 25. Dr. J. Marc Milner; 26. Vice Admiral Daniel N. Mainguy, Canadian Forces; 27. Captain Guillermo Montenegro, Argentine Navy; 28. Dr. Dean C. Allard; 29. Edward S. Miller; 30. Professor Robert S. Jordan; 31. Dr. N. A. M. Rodger; 32. Dr. Paul van Royen; 33. Captain Spencer Johnson, USN; 34. Dr. Jeffrey Barlow; 35. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie; 36. Professor George Baer; 37. Dr. Andrew Lambert; 38. Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN; 39. Professor Jan Bremmer; 40. Rear Admiral Guy F. Liardet, Royal Navy; 41. Dr. C. D. Coulthard-Clark; 42. Dr. Richard Harding; 43. Commander John W. Kennedy, USN; 44. Dr. Mark Shulman; 45. Dr. Roger J. B. Knight; 46. Captain A. B. Sainsbury, Royal Naval Reserve; 47. Dr. W. A. B. Douglas; 48. Dr. David C. Evans; 49. Lieutenant Commander William R. Glover, Canadian Forces; 50. Dr. Mark R. Peattie; 51. Dr. H. P. Wilmott; 52. Commander Allan D. Zimm, USN.

Naval War College Museum Collection


DO YOU
RECOGNIZE
THESE MEN?
YOU SHOULD.
THE
CORBETT-RICHMOND
CONFERENCE
To examine the influence and the contemporary relevance
of the naval historians and strategists Sir Julian Corbett
(1854-1922) and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond(1871-1946)
SPEAKERS INCLUDE:
Professor Daniel Baugh * Professor Don Schurman * Professor Barry Hunt
Dr. Jon Sumida * Professor David Rosenberg * Professor Geoffrey Till * Eric Grove
MONDAY 28 SEPTEMBER - TUESDAY 29 SEPTEMBER 1992
For more information contact:
Professor John Hattendorf (2101)
CMDR John Kennedy (2101)
CMDR James Goldrick (2435)
REMEMBER - MAHAN IS NOT ENOUGH.

Conference Poster, Signed by All Participants.

Naval War College Archives

officers could meet and resolve issues in a location away from the daily press of business, yet with immediate access to databases, modeling tools, videoconferencing, and decision support computer programs that could help to create an environment that facilitated the candid exchange of ideas.[51] Following these conversations, Dr. Wood was in Washington for discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso, and suggested that such a forum be established at the Naval War College.

With Kelso's general approval, Wood discussed the idea further with others in Newport. Among them was Dr. Lawrence E. Modisett, who had been assigned to the Center for Naval Warfare Studies between 1991 and 1994 to provide liaison with the intelligence community. In early 1994, shortly before Modisett's departure, Wood asked Modisett to develop an initial concept for the role and mission of the proposed center.[52]

On Modisett's return to the Central Intelligence Agency, Dean Wood established a program office in November 1994 to coordinate projects connected with the future Naval Decision Making Support Center. This office was headed by Bradley S. Drasbek, who was assisted by Commander Paul W. Schmidle. The program office was responsible for the initial implementation of the concept. The goal in establishing the Decision Support Center was to provide an innovative environment for decision making. The Naval War College's long tradition of providing support to the Navy's senior leadership in making wide-ranging decisions could now be enhanced by the use of advanced communication technologies that allowed electronic access to naval laboratories, academia, and other government agencies. In combination with the unique skills present at the Naval War College in war gaming and research, the new center was viewed as a means to better focus these resources on key issues, while at the same time improving war-gaming simulation techniques and developing synergy between the War Gaming Department and the Decision Support Center.[53]

The Decision Support Center in Sims Hall, ca. 1998.
Naval War College Museum Collection

By the autumn of 1995, the Decision Support Center had advanced beyond the theoretical and concept stages. The McHugh Conference Room in Sims Hall was converted for its use at a total cost, including equipment, estimated at $4.6 million.[54] The "grand opening" for the Decision Support Center was the Strait of Hormuz workshop that was sponsored by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations between 31 October and 1 November 1995. This workshop investigated the range of economic, military, and political contingencies that could result in the event that Iran would attempt to close or control the Strait of Hormuz. The participants in the workshop included flag officers and representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of State, Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval War College Oceans Law and Policy Department, regional experts, war-game modelers, faculty, and staff. A second event on 12–13 December 1995 continued the workshop with a simulation exercise exploring the doctrinal and technical issues involved in expeditionary warfare in the Persian Gulf area. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations' Expeditionary Warfare Directorate (N85) sponsored the second workshop to develop a strategy for investment in the development of advanced technology for expeditionary warfare. Participants included representatives from Headquarters, Marine Corps; Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren; Naval Research and Development; U.S. Naval Research Laboratory; and the Naval War College.[55] Another project in 1995 was a Naval Expeditionary Warfare Simulation exercise.[56]

In the autumn of 1996, the Naval War College advertised for a permanent director of the Decision Support Center. From this competition, Dr. Lawrence Modisett was appointed in July 1996 and served as department head until 2008. Captain Bradd Hayes, who had been on active duty in the Strategic Research Department, retired from the Navy and joined the Decision Support Center in August 1996. Other members

Decision Support Department Faculty and Staff, ca. 1998.

Left to right: Avon Teague, Bradd Hayes, Theo Gemelas, Gregory Hoffman, Lawrence Modisett, Hank Kamradt, Commander Paul Schmidle, Stuart Johnson, Jeffrey Sands.
Naval War College Museum Collection

of the early staff included Drasbek, Schmidle, Theophilos C. Gemelas, Gregory Hoffman, Stuart E. Johnson, Henry "Hank" Kamradt, and Jeffrey I. Sands. About a year and a half after the center's establishment, Dean Wood decided to change its name to Decision Support Department to give it equal status with the other research departments subsumed under the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. After the department was established, it soon became clear that senior leaders were reluctant to come to Newport, as had originally been envisaged, so the department shifted its focus to using its technology for research projects. As a result in 2000, this led to another name change to the Decision Strategies Department.

One of the early projects in 1997 that the department facilitated was to use its "groupware" equipment to get the perspectives of senior enlisted sonarmen on the state of undersea warfare in the U.S. Navy during a meeting at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport.[57] Another major project in 1997 was undertaken by faculty members Bradd Hayes and Jeffrey Sands. Responding to a request from the Joint Warfare Analysis Center on peacekeeping operations, they produced the book-length report *Doing Windows: Non-traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies*.[58] Bradd Hayes and Jeff Sands were also project leaders for other projects dealing with peacekeeping and development.[59]

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 specified that every four years the Secretary of Defense should

> conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a "Quadrennial Defense Review") of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.[60]

In response to this, the Decision Support Department designed and executed a capabilities-based planning framework, briefing the results to key decision makers in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Marine Corps Headquarters staff.

Also in 1997, the senior managing director of the financial services firm of Cantor Fitzgerald, retired Admiral William J. Flanagan, Jr., and Rear Admiral James R. Stark, the President of the Naval War College, developed a partnership for the College to hold a series of economic security exercises to explore the link between maritime security issues and global financial markets. This series was an unprecedented exploration of the implications of future security crises, including issues for decision making, cost of responses, and examination of economic issues as proxies for larger questions. Between 1998 and 2001, Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett was a faculty member in the department and served as the project leader for a "New Rule Sets" project that carried the initial exercise forward. The subject of this project later figured in Barnett's widely

read book, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century.* Initially planned for a series of five events, the exercises with Cantor Fitzgerald were terminated after the third event due to the events of 11 September 2001, when Cantor Fitzgerald lost 658 of its 960 New York office employees in the attacks on the World Trade Center.[61]

In May 1998, when Pakistan and India held nuclear tests, the Decision Support Department began a series of simulations to examine the range of potential consequences of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Retired Ambassador Paul D. Taylor initiated a research project on India-Pakistan nuclear proliferation with Professor Andres Vaart, which they conducted through a series of decision events with the Intelligence Community, international participants through the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard, policy makers in Washington, economists and business professionals at Salve Regina University's Pell Center, and military and diplomatic practitioners as part of the global game sponsored by the Naval War College.[62] This work raised a host of questions dealing with a post–nuclear war environment that had not been considered since the Cold War and brought interest from the Defense Special Weapons Agency. Another research series, co-sponsored with Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies, brought international financiers, policy makers, and UN officials to Newport to examine economic sanctions and develop modalities for implementing targeted sanctions.[63]

Other subjects that the department dealt with in the late 1990s included naval transformation and cooperative peacetime engagement.[64] As the 1990s drew to a close, much thought was given to the potential implications of the so-called Y2K or Year 2000 Problem, anticipating that computer data linked to the common two-digit year dates that assumed a date in the twentieth century would go awry when faced with twenty-first-century dates and thereby create a chaotic situation. A series of workshops were held, starting in December 1998 and concluding in May 1999. This work focused on the possible scenario dynamics that the Defense Department could face if it were tasked by the national leadership to engage in crisis response activities abroad during the millennial date-change event.[65]

Throughout all this work on strategic considerations, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and this department had excellent connections to national intelligence analytical sources in Washington through faculty members such as Brad Drasbek, Lawrence Modisett, and Andy Vaart. This advantage made it possible for the most up-to-date intelligence assessments to be factored into the decision support exercises.[66]

Naval War College Press

The Naval War College Press was the College's main outlet for the publication of scholarship, research, and commentary on subjects of interest to the maritime services, senior policy makers, and commanders. The range of its publications covered subjects that included strategy, operations, general domestic and foreign political-military matters, doctrine, force planning, international law, ethics, joint warfare, naval and military history, technology, defense economics, and war gaming.

Frank Uhlig remained editor of the press until 1993, when he retired and became the first person at the College to be awarded the title of Editor Emeritus. The *Naval War College Review* continued the regular quarterly publication that had begun with its Autumn 1986 issue. In 1993, *Educational Ranking Annual*



Dr. Thomas B. Grassey Was Director of the Naval War College Press and Editor of the *Naval War College Review* for Eight Years from 1994 until 2002. From 2002 to 2008, he served as the first James Bond Stockdale Professor of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval War College. A 1967 NROTC graduate of Villanova University, he served three years in the U.S. Navy, becoming an intelligence specialist. On leaving active duty, he went on to earn his master's degree in 1971 and his PhD in philosophy at the University of Chicago. He was Ford Foundation Fellow in Philosophy, 1972–1975; Coordinator, Professional Ethics, at San José State University, 1983–1986; and Director of Intelligence Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1987–1993.

Naval War College Museum Collection

listed the journal as "the government publication most frequently cited in the area of foreign affairs."[67] Dr. Thomas B. Grassey succeeded Uhlig and served as the editor until mid-2002. The managing editor, Pelham G. Boyer, first came to the press while on active duty as a lieutenant commander in 1991. After his retirement and a short hiatus, he returned as a civilian and remained in that post into 2015. Phyllis Winkler, who had first come to the College in 1986 to work in the museum, became an editorial assistant at the press in 1988, then was promoted to assistant editor in 1989. She served as the *Review*'s book review editor for twenty years from 1994 through the Spring 2015 issue.

In 1991, the press added a new series to its publications named the "Newport Papers." The name came from the center's earlier series of classified papers from the 1980s that were circulated to a very small group of senior leaders. Replacing the old approach, the new unclassified series was designed to publish longer research papers that were lengthier than the articles that appeared in the quarterly *Naval War College Review* and would be of particular interest to a wide range of policy makers and scholars. The first two titles in the new series were *"Are We Beasts?" Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II "Area Bombing,"* by Christopher C. Harmon (December 1991), and *Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for the 1990s,* by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, USMC (April 1992). A total of fourteen Newport Papers appeared in the 1990s.

In addition, the press published seven volumes in the Naval War College Historical Monograph series and three volumes in its occasional book series. Notable among the occasional books was Joseph G. Brennan's *Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stockdale Course,* which reproduced Professor Brennan's lectures in his very popular elective course on Western ethics and philosophy that Vice Admiral James Stockdale had started.

In 1997–1998, the Naval War College Press reprinted four volumes for the Logistics Leadership Series, a collection of the key, classic works on the subject of naval logistics, published in a limited number for official use. The purpose of the series was to increase awareness of the importance of sound logistical planning to all military operations. The series comprised George C. Thorpe, *Pure Logistics* (1917); Henry E. Eccles, *Logistics in the National Defense* (1959); Worrall Reed Carter, *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War II* (1953); and Duncan S. Ballantine, *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War* (1947). Each volume had a preface from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) with an introduction by Professor John E. Jackson.

The Naval War College's Curriculum and Research Recognized

On 13 June 1994, Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton recognized the Naval War College's significant achievements during the 1990s in both research and teaching by awarding it the Navy's Meritorious Unit Commendation, authorizing the College to fly the distinctive pennant of the award from its command flagpole. Approximately 400 military assigned to the College and 250 civilians, listed by name, qualified to participate in the award, as set forth in the following citation:

> For meritorious service in accomplishing the assigned missions of enhancing the professional capabilities of its students and serving as a center of research and gaming from 1 March 1990 to 1 April 1994. The United States Naval War College faculty and staff demonstrated extraordinary dedication in developing an innovative academic curriculum in the face of continually changing national defense policy, exercised strong leadership in advancing naval and joint strategic and campaign thinking, and served as the intellectual leader in the national security environment. While achieving accreditation to award a Master's degree and Phase I Joint Professional Military Education, the academic course became the model for other services to emulate and the curriculum was especially noteworthy for the rigorous academic environment it achieves. As a center for research and gaming, the College plays a pivotal role in linking strategic concerns with technological development, evaluating strategic campaign concepts through war gaming methodologies, and building strategic consensus in a period when naval doctrine has undergone more dramatic changes than at any time since the Mahan revolution a century ago. By their truly distinctive achievements, scholarship, enthusiasm, and unfailing devotion to duty, the officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees of the United States Naval War College reflected great credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.[68]

This award was the first time in the entire history of the Naval War College that its entire staff was formally recognized with a naval unit award.

NOTES

1. Stephen B. Luce, "An Address Delivered at the United States Naval War College, Narragansett Bay, R.I., June 2, 1903," in *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce*, ed. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1975), pp. 39–40.
2. For the texts and history of these various documents, see John B. Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents*, Newport Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2006).
3. Pelham G. Boyer and Robert S. Wood, eds., *Strategic Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st Century* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1998).
4. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers]: Subject Files: NMUC 1994: President, Naval War College to Chief of Naval Operations, ser. 0669, 28 April 1994, Subj: Recommendation for Nomination of NWC for Navy Unit Commendation Award, Encl. (1) [hereinafter NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation], p. 15.
5. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: John Hanley and William Glenney to Hattendorf, e-mails, 16 June 2014.
6. NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation, p. 13.
7. Ibid.
8. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 3, file 1986: enclosure (1), appendix D, *Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Annual Report, 1985–86*, pp. 6–8; Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 6, file 1994: War Gaming Department Annual Report 1994.
9. *Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Annual Report, 1985–86*, p. 8.
10. NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation, p. 13.
11. See also the interview with Admiral Edmundo González Robles in David F. Manning, with Joel J. Sokolsky, *Global Arms of Sea Power: The Newport Connection* (n.p.: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), pp. 143–59.
12. The following documents discuss the findings of some of the Secretary of the Navy series of war games: *Issues Raised in the Secretary of the Navy Strategy-POM Game 92, 10–17 September 1992*, Strategy and Campaign Department Memorandum 5-92 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1992); Gregory A. Engel, Bradd C. Hayes, Albert C. Myers, and James S. O'Brasky, *Issues Raised in the Secretary of the Navy Wargame 1993*, Strategic Research Department Memorandum 3-93 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1993); Bradd C. Hayes, *Issues Raised in the Secretary of the Navy Wargame 1994*, Strategic Research Department Memorandum 1-94 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1994).
13. The following documents discuss the findings of some of the International war games: Stanley E. Spangler, *Report of the Lateral International Global Game '94*, Strategic Research Department Report 6-94 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1994); Bradd C. Hayes, *Report of*

International Game '95, Strategic Research Department Memorandum 8-95 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1995); Bradd C. Hayes, *Report of International Game '96,* Strategic Research Department Memorandum 2-96 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1996); Bradd C. Hayes and Wayne K. McAuliffe, *International Game '98: Exploring Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 27–30 April 1998,* Strategic Research Department Report 4-98 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1998); Bradd C. Hayes, *International Game '99: Crisis in South Asia,* Strategic Research Department Report 99-1 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1999).

14. Eric Grove, *Maritime Strategy and European Security,* Common Security Studies, no. 2 (London: Brassey's / Putnam Aeronautical, 1990). Note in particular appendixes 1–3, which summarize the discussions.

15. Commander D. Leslie W. Sim, *The 1994 Russian-UK-US Naval War Game (RUKUS 94): Important Considerations for Multinational Naval Operations,* Strategic Research Department Research Memorandum 7-94 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1994) [hereinafter *Important Considerations for Multinational Naval Operations*], p. 1.

16. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Naval War College Oral History Project, Interview with Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, 10 August 2009, by James Rife, Continuation of Interview by Telephone, 6 October 2009, pp. 25–27.

17. Ibid., p. 29.

18. Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies: RG 37, subgroup 12, box 1: RUKUS, 1991–1995; Sim, *Important Considerations for Multinational Naval Operations,* p. 2; LTCOL Arthur Adkins, USMC, CDR Barry Coombs, USN, CDR Thomas Gorman, USNR, CDR Les Sim, RN, *Russian–United Kingdom–United States Naval War Game 1994 (RUKUS 94),* Strategic Research Department Research Memorandum 5-94 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1994); *Russian, United Kingdom, United States War Game 1994: Game Book (Final)* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, War Gaming Department, 1994).

19. Wayne K. McAuliffe, *Russia–United Kingdom–United States (RUKUS): Naval Planning Simulation 1997* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, Strategic Research Department, 1997).

20. Donald Daniel, comment on draft, 24 October 2014.

21. Documents produced by this research include Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates through the Employment of Military Force," in "The UN, Peace and Force," special issue, *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 105–25; Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, "Securing Observance of U.N. Mandates through the Employment of Military Forces," Occasional Paper Series 9:OP:3 (Notre Dame, Ind.: Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 1995); Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, *Recalcitrance and Realpolitik in Complex Emergencies,* Strategic Research Department Report 6-99 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1999); Jean Krasno, Donald C. F. Daniel, and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations* (New York: Praeger, 2004).

22. Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, "Dealing with Obstructionist Leaders," *Civil Wars* 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 65–94.

23. Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999).

24. Studies in the naval strategy and operations area include the following: Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, *The Future of U.S. Sea Power,* Strategy and Campaign Department Report 2-93 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, February 1993); Bradd C. Hayes and Douglas V. Smith, eds., *The Politics of Naval Innovation,* Strategic Research Department Report 4-94 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1994); Bradd C. Hayes, *Toward a Doctrine of Constraint: Bridging the Gap between Self-defense and Retaliation,* Strategic Research Department Memorandum 9-94 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1994); Bradd C. Hayes and Arthur A. Adkins, *Issues Raised in the 1995 Department of the Navy Warfighting Requirements Conference, 21–23 February 1995,* Strategic Research Department Memorandum 3-95 (Newport, R.I.: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1996); Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, "Towards a West European Navy: Organizational and Operational Issues," in *The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War,* ed. Gert de Nooy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International / Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael," 1996); Bradd C. Hayes, *Report of the Naval Expeditionary Warfare Simulation Exercise II,* Strategic Research Department Research Memorandum 10-95 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, [1995]).

25. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 114 Richard J. Grunawalt Papers, box 1, file 2: Biography.

26. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Grunawalt Oral History by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Kramer, USMC, 12 May 2008, p. 311.

27. *Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 1989), p. 1; *Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Part I: Law of Peacetime Naval Operations* (Newport, R.I.: 1997), p. 1; A. R. Thomas and James C. Duncan, eds., *Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,* International Law Studies, vol. 73 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1999), p. 1.

28. Grunawalt Oral History, pp. 321–23.

29. Ibid., p. 319.

30. Ibid., p. 320.

31. Ibid., pp. 337–38; Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 114 Richard J. Grunawalt Papers, series 8, box 4, folder 2: President, Naval War College, letter to Chief of Naval Operations, via the Judge Advocate General, serial 222, 11 February 1988.

32. Grunawalt Oral History, pp. 332–34.

33. NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation, quoted on p. 17.

34. Richard B. Lillich and John Norton Moore, eds., *Readings in International Law from the* Naval War College Review, *1947–1977,* vol. 2, *The Use of Force, Human Rights and General International Legal Issues,* Naval War College International Law Studies, vol. 62 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1980).

35. Alfred P. Rubin, *The Law of Piracy,* Naval War College International Law Studies, vol. 63 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1988).

36. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., ed., *The Law of Naval Operations,* Naval War College International Law Studies, vol. 64 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1991).

37. Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green, eds., *Levie on the Law of War,* Naval War College International Law Studies, vol. 70 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1998).

38. Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green, eds., *The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millennium,* Naval War College International Law Studies, vol. 71 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1998).

39. Michael N. Schmitt, ed., *The Law of Military Operations: Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt,* Naval War College International Law Studies, vol. 72 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1998).

40. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College—ONI, "Brief History of ONI Detachment, February 2010."

41. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Records, Center for Advanced Research and Advanced Research Project Papers: RG 37, subgroup 6, box 30, folder 7: Captain Rodney P. Rempt, "Effective Battle Group Command and Control," Advanced Research Project 1986.

42. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Records, Center for Advanced Research and Advanced Research Project Papers: RG 37, subgroup 6, box 39, folder 2: Commander Jacob L. Shuford, "Strategic Sealift in the Context of Operation Desert Shield," Advanced Research Project, November 1990.

43. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Records, Center for Advanced Research and Advanced Research Project Papers: RG 37, subgroup 6, box 50: Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey A. Harley, "Information, Technology, and the Center of Gravity,"Advanced Research Project, 14 June 1996.

44. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Captain Timothy Somes to Hattendorf, e-mail, 21 August 2014, enclosing "Reflections on the Development of the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College from 1981 to 1989. By Captain Tim Somes. Memo prepared 19–21 August 2014," p. 7.

45. Robert S. Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990). See also references to the Naval War College in Robert Smith Jordan, *A Diasporan Mormon's Life: Essays of Remembrance* (New York and Bloomington: iUniverse, Inc., 2009), pp. 84, 116, 157, 228, 248, 288, 293–94, 300, 328.

46. James Goldrick, *No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, 1945–1996,* Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 2 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997).

47. Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies: RG 37, subgroup 2, box 6, folder 12: Corbett-Richmond Conference; James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf, eds., *Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993).

48. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Ubi Sumus? The State of Naval and Maritime History* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1994).

49. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Doing Naval History: Essays toward Improvement* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1995).

50. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future* (London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1999).

51. Conversation: Hattendorf–Robert S. Wood, 10 November 2014; Hattendorf Papers: Dr. Lawrence Modisett, "WAR Dept. History Input," undated.

52. Telephone conversation, Hattendorf–Lawrence Modisett, 23 October 2014.

53. Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies: RG 37, subgroup 1, box 20, file 10: Records of the Director, Reading Files, 1993–1997: Memorandum, From 3 to President, Subj: Simulation, 30 September 1994; Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies: RG 37, subgroup 1, box 20, file 10: Records of the Director, Reading Files, 1993–1997: Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Memorandum for Distribution, Subj: Naval Decision Making Support Center (NDMSC), 22 November 1994.

54. Information from Paul W. Schmidle.

55. Bradd C. Hayes to Hattendorf, e-mail, 12 November 2014, enclosing "Strait of Hormuz Project" and list of "Decision Support Department Documents" 1995–2002.

56. Hayes, *Report of the Naval Expeditionary Warfare Simulation Exercise II*.

57. Henry D. Kamradt, *1997 Senior Sonarmen's Conference: Comments of 1997 ASW Assessment,* DSD Research Memorandum 97-1 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Support Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, 1997).

58. Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, *Doing Windows: Non-traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies,* Report 97-1 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Support Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, 1997). In February 1999, the Department of Defense C^{4}ISR Cooperative Research Board's Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology reproduced this report and distributed it widely.

59. Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, "Promoting Relief with Development: What the Military Can Do during a Peace Operation—*Quo Desiderat Pacem, Praeparet Pacem*" (Decision Support Department paper presented at Cornwallis II: Analysis for and of the Resolution of Conflict, Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada, 8–10 April 1997); Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, *Sources of Instability: A Sampling from the United Nations Secretariat,* DSD Research Memorandum 97-2 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Support Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1997).

60. 10 U.S.C. § 118(a).

61. Modisett, "WAR Dept. History Input"; Andres Vaart to Hattendorf, e-mail, 12 November 2014; Bradd C. Hayes, *The Critical Link: Financial Implications of National Security Threats—Exercise Report: Economic Security Exercise II,* Decision Support Department Report 98-1 (Newport, R.I.: June 1998). Also, Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett, with Bradd C. Hayes, *Asian Energy Futures,* Decision Strategies Department Report 00-6, rev. ed., with updated Department of Energy projections (April 2001); Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett, with Bradd C. Hayes, *Foreign Direct Investment,* Decision Strategies Department Report 01-2 (May 2001); originally posted 29 June 2000 at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/AEFreport.htm and 9 April 2001 at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/FDIreport.htm, respectively.

62. Paul D. Taylor and Andres Vaart, *Economic Security Exercise (U): South Asia Proliferation Project,* DSD Research Memorandum 99-1 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Support Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1999).

63. Bradd C. Hayes, *International Game '99: Crisis in South Asia,* DSD Research Report 99-1 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Support Department, 1999).

64. Bradd C. Hayes, with Dr. Lawrence Modisett, Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel, and Hank Kamradt, *Transforming the Navy: A Strategy for the Secretary of the Navy,* DSD Report 99-4 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Strategies Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1999); this document was also provided as reading material for participants at the "Strategic Change, Transformation and Military Innovation" conference held at the Naval War College in March 2000. Bradd C. Hayes and Theophilos C. Gemelas, *Formative Peacetime Engagement Workshop Report,* DSD Report 99-3 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Support Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1999); Bradd C. Hayes and Theophilos C. Gemelas, *Managing Instability: A Pre-crisis Approach Conference Report,* DSD Report 00-4 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Strategies Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 2000).

65. Vaart to Hattendorf, 12 November 2014; Thomas P. M. Barnett, with Henry D. Kamradt, *Year 2000 International Security Dimension Project Final Report,* Decision Strategies Department Report 00-5 (Newport, R.I.: Decision Strategies Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1999).

66. Vaart to Hattendorf, 12 November 2014.

67. NWC Navy Unit Commendation Award Recommendation, p. 16.

68. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: NMUC 1994: Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton letter to Chief of Naval Operations, 13 June 1994; Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: NMUC 1994: John H. Dalton signed citation.



Rear Admiral James R. Stark. As the forty-seventh President of the Naval War College, Admiral Stark served from 29 June 1995 to 24 July 1998. A surface warfare officer, Stark had been a Fulbright Scholar in Vienna, Austria, and held a master's degree in political science and a doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Before coming to the Naval War College in 1995, he had been Commander, NATO Standing Naval Force, Atlantic. This candid shot was taken on Colbert Plaza. *Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark*

Chapter Eighteen

Changes in the Wind, 1995–2001

On 29 June 1995, Rear Admiral James R. Stark relieved Admiral Strasser to become the forty-seventh President of the Naval War College. Stark had graduated from the Naval Academy in June 1965 and had a short initial tour of duty at sea in USS *Brownson* (DD 868), before being sent for a year to the University of Vienna in Austria as a Fulbright Scholar. Returning to the United States, he served in USS *Wilkinson* (DL 5), followed by tours of duty in Southeast Asian waters on board USS *Jenkins* (DD 447) and USS *Higbee* (DD 806). In 1970, he began studies in foreign policy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he graduated in 1973 with a PhD in political science, having written his dissertation on "The United States and Postwar Scandinavian Security."[1] Returning to sea duty, he served as executive officer in USS *Myles C. Fox* (DD 829) and USS *Richmond K. Turner* (CG 20). He then went on to command USS *Julius A. Furer* (FFG 6) in 1981–1983 and USS *Leahy* (CG 16) in 1987–1989. Ashore, he had assignments in the Navy staff in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the National Security Council, and served as executive director of the CNO Executive Panel. Selected for promotion to rear admiral (lower half) in December 1991, he served as Commander, Training Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet from June 1992 until March 1994 and subsequently as Commander, NATO Standing Naval Force, Atlantic. While serving in the latter post, Stark was selected for promotion to rear admiral (upper half) in December 1994.[2]

The Naval War College Hosted the Russia-UK-US (RUKUS) Meeting in May 1997. This photograph taken in Mahan Hall shows, left to right, Vice Admiral Viktor Patruschev, heading the Russian Federal Navy's delegation; Captain Sergei Yonov, USN (Ret.), former U.S. naval attaché in Moscow and War College faculty member; Rear Admiral Stark; Rear Admiral Peter Franklyn, RN, heading the UK delegation; and Rear Admiral Vladimir Bessonov, deputy head of the Russian delegation, joining in a toast on the fifty-second anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. *Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark*

The Presidency

Stark was pleased to learn that he would be relieving his good friend Joe Strasser, who had been a few years ahead of him at the Fletcher School and had been his sponsor. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, told Stark: "Well, Jim, you know the reason you're going there is because you have a doctorate, and for the New England Association of Schools and Colleges that authorizes the War College to grant master's degrees, the president has to have a PhD."[3] That reason sounded odd to Stark, who knew of a number of college presidents who did not have doctorates. After he was in the job, he checked with the New England Association and was told that having a president with a PhD had "absolutely nothing to do with accreditation." Stark thought that

Rear Admiral Stark at His Desk in Conolly Hall.
Courtesy of Margaret H. Sargent

Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton (Center) Shakes Hands with Admiral Stark (Left) While Visiting the Naval War College with Congressman Patrick Kennedy (Right).
Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark

Rear Admiral Stark Leads the Platform Party Departing the Stage on Colbert Plaza at Graduation on 14 June 1996. The graduation speaker, Congressman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), is immediately followed by Chaplain J. William Hines and Dean of Academics William Calhoun. The College continued to have a very strong relationship with Skelton, who chaired the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Military Education. It awarded him an honorary degree four years later, in 2000. Skelton became ranking member of the full committee in 1998 and served as its chairman 2007–2011.
Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark

> if the Navy continued along that line they were going to limit the candidate base to a very small number of people, and would exclude some people who would probably be wonderful commanders. But, you know, the academics is one thing, the actual command itself is something different, and the reason you're there is to provide leadership and oversight and external relations, and I didn't teach classes while I was there nor did I need to.[4]

The series of three Naval War College Presidents with PhDs that had started in 1987 ended with Stark's term in 1998. From 1998 to 2014, no subsequent President of the Naval War College had a doctorate.

Plans for a New Building

One of the first major issues that Stark faced in taking up the presidency of the College was the long-standing problem of providing a new building. The 1968 plan for new buildings that was brought to fruition in the 1970s included Spruance, Conolly, and Hewitt Halls. That plan had originally provided for two additional buildings, one for the library and another for war gaming. With tightening budgets, the plans for these additional buildings had been cancelled. War gaming was left in Sims Hall and the library reading and reference room was placed in a part of Hewitt Hall that had originally been designed for offices, with the book stacks below it in what was originally to have been part of a multistory parking garage. Fifteen years later, during Rear Admiral Kurth's presidency, the same issues arose again with the additional idea that a facility was needed as a conference center. The dean of administration, Captain Joseph "Pete" Marnane, who led the effort in the late 1980s, developed concept plans, and worked with Representative Machtley's office in an attempt to optimize chances of getting congressional authorization for construction. At that point, however, the Navy had higher priorities in its military construction plans and there was little support among the Navy's senior leaders for it. Finding that officials in Washington were not yet ready to support the plan, Admiral Kurth "kept the project at a simmer," while the College focused on finishing the academic accreditation process.[5]

During Admiral Strasser's tenure, the College renewed the effort. With the help of Congressman Machtley, Congress made



ABC Television News Anchor Peter Jennings Spoke at the Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum in June 1995. Jennings (right) is shown in this photograph taken in the lobby of Spruance Auditorium talking with Admiral Ronald J. Zlatoper, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Rear Admiral Stark. *Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark*

an initial appropriation of $10 million for the new building.[6] About 1994, an additional $8 million was approved, but this fell $6 million short of the full $24 million that was needed to carry out the full construction project.[7] At the end of Strasser's term, he told the Chief of Naval Operations in his transfer of command report that the need for the new building to house the library and war gaming was one of the three specific concerns facing the College. "Support for this facility is critical and is most strongly requested," Strasser wrote.[8]

Admiral Stark immediately took up the cause and pushed ahead to obtain the additional funds needed to construct the building. Admiral Boorda wrote him, "On a 'concrete' issue (pun intended), I share your views on the new building. It is needed and it is also a symbol of commitment. We need to go with it."[9] Despite Boorda's statement, it did not happen. The Navy never added the College's request for this funding to its program objective memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. Without the additional $6 million, it was clear that the building had to be redesigned from a structure with four floors, housing war gaming and the library, to a three-floor building that would be only for the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and its war-gaming facility. In doing this redesign, College leaders hoped that funding for a separate library building would come in a subsequent appropriation.[10]

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Rhode Island's Congressional Delegation Visited the Naval War College for Briefings on the Latest War Games and Plans for the New War-Gaming Center, 26 September 1997. In this photograph, Rear Admiral Stark is shown welcoming Secretary Cohen (far left) at the President's House with (left to right) Senator John H. Chafee, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond, Congressman Patrick J. Kennedy, Senator Jack Reed, and Congressman Robert Weygand. *Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark*

With the revised plans made, groundbreaking for the new building took place on 20 October 1997, although the College had to plead for additional funds from the Chief of Naval Operations to cover the cost of the building's infrastructure for information technology.[11] The library remained in a serious situation with its book stacks filled to 95 percent capacity. The New England Association had noted in its 1995 accreditation report that the Naval War College library was in "a state of virtual gridlock."[12] This remained the situation through 2014.

War Gaming Department Staff and Faculty, 1996. The staff and faculty of the War Gaming Department depicted in this picture were responsible for the transition from Sims Hall to McCarty Little Hall. The physical move commenced in the spring of 1999 and the department stayed operational in Sims Hall, holding scheduled war games through April 1999. The first major war game held in McCarty Little Hall was the Global War Game, June 1999. Shown here (first row, center) are Captain Fred Orchard, deputy director of the War Gaming Department, and Captain Terry Pudas, director of the War Gaming Department. Captain Pudas became the chief of staff for Vice Admiral Cebrowski (1997) and Captain Orchard became the director of the War Gaming Department (1997–1998).

Naval War College Archives

Naval Officers as Students and Faculty

Like many Naval War College presidents both before and after him, Stark also faced the continuing problem of the number and quality of naval students and faculty. There had been a significant reduction in the number of students attending the senior College of Naval Warfare course and the overall quality, which had risen between 1990 and 1993, had recently dropped. At the same time, the number and the quality of military faculty had also declined. Fewer line and more staff officers were being sent. At the same time naval officers were underrepresented in academic standing in the top 20 percent of the class and overrepresented in the bottom 20 percent.[13] Some of the officers nominated to fill faculty vacancies were not qualified to teach at the graduate level and had neither command experience, nor a master's degree, nor a war college diploma.[14] The problem remained the fundamental issue that naval officers had less time in their

Captain John E. Jackson Served as Director, College of Continuing Education from 1996 to 2002. Jackson first came to the Naval War College as a lieutenant commander in 1980, when he served as a professor of Defense Economics and Decision Making in the College of Continuing Education (CCE). Following sea duty and other assignments he returned to the College in 1994 to teach on the resident faculty, to hold the Frederick J. Horne Military Chair of Logistics and Sustainability, and to serve as the last active-duty director of the CCE. After his retirement from active duty in 1998, he joined the faculty in a newly created position as the civilian director of the CCE, renamed College of Distance Education in 2002. He became very well-known in the College community as a master of ceremonies at a variety of the College's public events, and also served as speechwriter and project officer for many Naval War College presidents.
Courtesy of Professor John E. Jackson

Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court Antonin Scalia Spoke Twice during Stark's Presidency at the Naval War College, on 20 May 1997 and 19 May 1998. Justice Scalia is shown here entering Spruance Auditorium. *Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark*

careers to attend a war college than those from other services. As Stark put it, "The sea is a very unforgiving environment, and experience counts for an enormous amount whether you can operate a submarine, or a surface ship, or fly an aircraft safely."[15] While naval officers spent three or four years in operational seagoing billets, officers in other services might only spend a year or a year and a half in comparable assignments. Because of this, naval officers have more operational assignments by the time they get to be a captain in the Navy than those who become colonels in other services. This led to a situation in which fewer naval officers attended a war college and fewer officers who were selected for promotion to flag rank attended a war college. As a result, the successfully rising senior officers who were the mentors for younger naval officers had not set an example by attending a war college. "The old saying is that you want to be selected for the War College, but you don't want to actually go."[16]

The difficulty that naval officers had in finding enough time during their careers to undertake further studies in higher-level professional military education led Stark to think about the College's correspondence courses and how the College of Continuing Education, then headed by Captain John E. Jackson, could more effectively deliver its products to naval officers who were unable to get to Newport. He saw that officers were normally too busy at sea and that the only available time was the eighteen- to twenty-four-month periods in which officers were on shore assignments. The College's correspondence courses and off-campus seminars all took years to complete and had a very low graduation rate. Those who did complete them took five to six years. As Stark recalled, students who were trying to get through those courses called them "a five year root canal." As an alternative, many naval officers were opting to take Air Force correspondence courses, because they were shorter and easier. To improve

the Naval War College's approach, Stark directed that a faculty committee pare down the courses so that they could be completed in the time that most naval officers had available, while still retaining the intellectual essence and educational value of the course. In obtaining this goal and making them more attractive and useful for younger naval officers, the faculty in the College of Continuing Education developed a series of "critical thinking, multiple choice questions," based on work done at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The new format had questions written in such a manner that one needed to recall the facts from each lesson and how they applied to the question at hand. This new approach resulted in a more manageable level of effort for both students and faculty, yet still maintained the academic rigor needed for accreditation.[17] By the end of Stark's tour of duty at the Naval War College, both enrollments had gone up and there had been a 44 percent increase in the number of students graduating from these nondegree programs. In June 1997, successful implementation of an accelerated summer session in the Washington, D.C., area enabled many students to complete the full three-trimester course in less than two years.[18] In June 1998, over 250 students graduated from the Naval War College's new, innovative distance-learning programs. This was the largest group of nonresident graduates in the history of the College to that time.[19] "I call that service to the fleet," Admiral Jay Johnson declared in his speech at Stark's retirement.[20] With this momentum in moving forward, the nonresident programs continued to expand. In September that same year, with the new nonresident programs given academic accreditation, more than one thousand students began classes in fifty-four seminars on nineteen satellite campuses. For the first time, classes were offered at Naples, Italy; Kings Bay, Georgia; and Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.[21]

The Naval Doctrine Command and the Navy Warfare Development Command

Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak with Rear Admiral Stark and an Enlisted Marine in Spruance Hall. General Krulak gave an address to students on 27 October 1998. *Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark*

An important development during Stark's presidency was the first formal step toward the creation of closer working relations between the College and the Naval Doctrine Command. In the autumn of 1992, the Navy's capstone strategy document, . . . *From the Sea,* had announced the imminent establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command, commanded alternately by a Marine Corps major general and a rear admiral. The purpose of this new organization was to be a key element for the implementation of joint doctrinal thinking and to provide the Department of the Navy's counterpart to similar organizations in the Norfolk area: the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), established in 1973 at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and the Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC) that opened in July 1993 at the adjoining Langley Air Force Base.

General John M. D. Shalikashvili and Admiral Stark at the Entrance of Spruance Hall. A 1970 graduate of the Naval War College's Command and Staff course, Shalikashvili served as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997. In 1996, he was the first recipient of the Naval War College's Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award. He addressed the students, staff, and faculty on 29 April 1997. *Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark*

Admiral Frank B. Kelso, who was the Chief of Naval Operations at the time that the Naval Doctrine Command was established, was well aware that "doctrine has somewhat been a word that many naval officers don't like, because they have traditionally operated at sea. Being a ship captain is probably one of the most independent jobs in the world."[22] Kelso had a different idea in mind from what the other services were doing in the area of doctrine. "I did not want to create a doctrine for the Navy," he recalled. "I wanted a joint doctrine for the Navy in a joint arena."[23] Specifically, the Naval Doctrine Command was to "provide for smooth integration of Naval Forces into joint operations at any level, close the gap between the air-land battle and amphibious operations, and translate 'operational maneuver from the sea' into naval doctrine."[24]

From the time that the Naval Doctrine Command was established in March 1993, it worked with the Naval War College in many areas of mutual interest, including naval concept development, war gaming, curricular development, education, and the writing as well as the evaluating and editing of doctrinal publications. Kelso's successor, Admiral Boorda, encouraged Stark and Rear Admiral Michael L. Bowman, the second Commander of the Naval Doctrine Command, to begin to discuss ways in which they could work together even more effectively. In March 1996, the two signed a memorandum of understanding that was to be reviewed annually spelling out how the two organizations could mutually support one another. Among the initial ideas were to have College faculty review draft concepts and drafts of suitable articles on doctrine for publication in the *Naval War College Review* and war-gaming doctrinal concepts, and encourage War College students to undertake research projects on topics of interest to the Naval Doctrine Command. In addition, the College had a representative on the Naval Doctrine Command's Academic Advisory Group.[25]

In the eyes of Naval War College leaders, this arrangement between the College and the Doctrine Command seemed to be going well. However, in mid-1997, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Donald L. Pilling, on behalf of Admiral Jay L. Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations who had succeeded Boorda, directed Stark to begin to think about how to incorporate the work of the Fleet Battle Experiments and the Naval Doctrine Command into the organization of the Naval War College. There were several reasons for this: first, the need to rationalize the structure for doctrinal thinking within the Department of the Navy; second, the perceived disadvantages of having the Naval Doctrine Command at Norfolk, Virginia; and third, a desire to make better use of the Navy's intellectual capital in Newport.[26] To this end, a lower-level working group was also exploring how to institutionalize experimental doctrine.[27]

The Portrait Artist Margaret H. Sargent with Three of Her Four Portraits of Rear Admiral Stark. *Courtesy of Margaret H. Sargent*



Admiral Jay Johnson Speaking at Retirement and Change of Command Ceremony, 24 July 1998. At the point recorded in this photograph, Admiral Johnson mentioned that he and Rear Admiral Stark had been in the same Naval Academy battalion: "As some of you may recall, my initial exposure to his caring and sensitive leadership was during my plebe year at the Naval Academy, where Jim had achieved the lofty status of a First-Class Midshipman. His personal concern for my performance—especially my diligent aspirations to achieve the perfect push-up—helped make my plebe year a far more satisfying experience."
Courtesy of Rear Admiral Stark

The structural issue for the Navy was that the Marine Corps had its own doctrinal organization, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), which had been established in 1987 at Quantico, Virginia, to be the key organization for developing concepts, plans, doctrine, training, and equipment for the Marine Corps. In 1989, the Marine Corps University was also established at Quantico as the Corps' highest professional military educational establishment and was designed to assist by teaching many of the key doctrinal concepts. Until the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command, the Navy had no organization of its own to produce doctrinal statements, these having previously been contributed by a variety of commands within the Navy.[28] In contrast to the other services, the very idea of doctrine continued to have little attraction for naval officers, although it was clearly becoming a practical necessity in the joint service context. Some even dismissed the products of the Doctrine Command as only those of a paper mill, rudely calling it "the Naval Document Command."[29]

The original conception of the Naval Doctrine Command was for it to provide doctrine both for the Navy and for joint amphibious operations with the Marine Corps. In actual practice between 1993 and 1997, the Navy's leaders gradually became frustrated with the arrangement that required both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to approve the Naval Doctrine Command's work. Senior leaders in the Navy came to see that the Marine Corps was in a position at the Naval Doctrine Command to veto the Navy's views and to force the Navy to adopt operational concepts with which it did not agree. The dual nature of the Naval Doctrine Command was not a problem for the Marine Corps, as its Combat Development Command needed no formal approval process from the Navy's senior leadership. As a result of this issue, the Navy's senior leaders in Washington decided to take the very difficult decision to disestablish the Naval Doctrine Command and to create in its place a new organization. The new command was deliberately established to be a single-service organization that would develop concepts, doctrine, and tactics independently for the Navy. While it remained essential for the Navy and the Marine Corps to share concepts and to provide ideas to each other, the new

organization would develop its doctrinal concepts without being subject to a Marine Corps veto. To emphasize the new command's single-service role, it was an important distinction that it would be named the Navy, not the Naval, Warfare Development Command. At the same time, Rear Admiral Stark was happy to have Marine Corps officers involved, but he specifically turned down an offer from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to provide a Marine colonel as the new command's executive officer and further directed his staff to develop a billet structure that had no more than one or two Marines, none higher in rank than a major.[30]

The location of the Naval Doctrine Command at Norfolk, Virginia, had come to create several problems for the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, wanted the new command to be somewhere other than Norfolk, as the Naval Doctrine Command had been seen to have become too closely involved with the focus of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to the detriment of its broader role for the Navy. Leaders in Washington felt that the Naval Doctrine Command had acquired an Atlantic Fleet outlook and did not adequately reflect Pacific Fleet thinking. Moving the new organization to Newport under the President, Naval War College would eliminate this issue. Additionally, in order to ensure that the new command would remain in touch with fleet thinking around the world, the initial plans deliberately included the establishment of liaison centers in major fleet centers.[31]

Admiral Johnson also wanted the new command to make better use of the intellectual capital located at Newport, making it into the central catalyst for the development of operational concepts and, thereby, improving the Navy's entire concept development process. This vision involved the interaction of the Naval War College's faculty as a key asset that could bring a high level of historical analysis and context into the process along with the war-gaming and research capabilities in its Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and the innovative work of the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group, while sharing a single administrative support base. A key aspect of the new command was to have a concepts division that was designed to maintain and to reflect ideas generated within the Naval War College. Additionally, the Navy Warfare Development Command would coordinate the Fleet Battle Experiment program that was begun in 1997 as a means to examine innovative tactical approaches with emerging new technologies. It was thought that this arrangement, in particular, would also help to move the concepts developed at Newport more quickly into the fleet in a way where they could be evaluated in practice. The underlying intention behind this entire initiative was to forge structural connections between the Naval War College and the Navy Warfare Development Command in a manner that would develop into a more effective use of their collective intellectual resources and ideally return the Naval War College to the central role in naval thinking that it was reputed to have enjoyed in the 1920s and 1930s.[32]

In order to make this into a workable arrangement, Rear Admiral Stark and his staff envisioned that the next President of the Naval War College would need to be a vice admiral, who would oversee and represent both organizations. The initial idea was that under a three-star President of the Naval War College, the commander of the new Navy Warfare Development Command would need to be a two-star rear admiral who had operational experience as a carrier battle group commander. To deal with the academic side of the College, its faculty, curriculum, and research activities, officials in Washington, including the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, recommended that a one- or two-star rear admiral be appointed as provost

to balance the overall organization. Stark, who had enjoyed his interaction with the faculty and involvement with the academic side of the College, was not immediately convinced that this was necessary. In the end, the plan to create the position of provost became an essential part of the Chief of Naval Operations' final decision to bring the Navy Warfare Development Command under the President, Naval War College.[33]

In consultation with the Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Stark and his staff had laid the fundamental ideas and plans for creating the new Navy Warfare Development Command as part of the Naval War College. As Admiral Jay Johnson noted in his speech at the change of command on 24 July 1998, "in perhaps his most important contribution, Jim Stark served as one of the principal architects of the reorganized and reinvigorated Naval War College whose beginning we celebrate today."[34]



Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski. As the forty-eighth President of the Naval War College, Cebrowski served from 24 July 1998 until 22 August 2001. A naval aviator and member of Strategic Studies Group I at the Naval War College in 1981–1982, Cebrowski became most famous for his concept of network-centric warfare. On his retirement from the Navy in 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed him the first director of the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, an appointment he held until he resigned due to illness in 2005. *Courtesy of Margaret H. Sargent*

The Return of a Vice Admiral to the College President's Office

When Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski took command of the Naval War College, there had been a succession of seven rear admirals since the last vice admiral, James Stockdale, had retired in August 1979, nineteen years earlier. Arthur Cebrowski was raised in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, and went on to Villanova University, a Roman Catholic institution founded by the Order of Saint Augustine in suburban Philadelphia. Cebrowski graduated from Villanova in June 1964 with a bachelor of science degree in mathematics and a commission as an ensign from Villanova's Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps.

As a naval aviator, Cebrowski flew many different types of aircraft, but principally fighters, from several carriers deployed to all ocean areas. In addition to two deployments in Vietnam, where he flew 154 combat missions, he was involved in operations supporting the United Nations in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. He commanded Fighter Squadron Forty-One and Carrier Air Wing Eight, both embarked in USS *Nimitz* (CVN 68). He later commanded the assault ship USS *Guam* (LPH 9) and, during Operation DESERT STORM, USS *Midway* (CV 41). Following his promotion to flag rank in 1992, he served as Commander, Carrier Group Six and Commander, USS *America* Battle Group. His tours of duty included an exchange tour with the U.S. Air Force, shore assignments on the staff of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and four assignments on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. He served as Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (J6) on the Joint Staff, followed by duty as the Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control (N6) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. At various points in his career, he extended his education, earning a master of science degree in computer systems management from the Naval Postgraduate School, and served as a Federal Executive Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.[35]

The Origins of the Concept of Network-Centric Warfare

A key point in Cebrowski's education had come in the academic year 1981–1982, when Admiral Thomas Hayward selected him, a commander, to be the youngest and most junior member of Strategic Studies Group I at the Naval War College. Commander William A. Owens was another junior member of that same group who developed a friendship with Cebrowski. The two shared three key beliefs that each carried forward and developed from their time together in Newport: (1) that change in military affairs was essential, (2) that such change would not come easily, and (3) that the logic for change had to be solid and relentless.[36]

Cebrowski's intellectual journey continued as his combat experiences in naval aviation and his first flag command brought him to observe and to fly the F-18 aircraft. For Cebrowski, the capabilities of this aircraft—one "that really flew itself," in his words—provided an epiphany in his understanding that "represented a shift from the physical to the information and cognitive realms."

> The limit on what the pilot could do was no longer a matter of physical strength or reflexes. The real limit was the level of awareness and knowledge the pilot had of both the mission and of the environment in which he operated. That awareness turned on the information flowing from parts of the aircraft, what the pilot could see from the aircraft, and—this was the big change—from what other pilots or sensors could see far beyond. This was the revelation. It was no longer the airplane or its pilot that counted the most; it was what the pilot could do as part of a networked environment.[37]

In addition to this perception from experience, Cebrowski's thinking and approach were marked by personal moral beliefs that derived from his family and his education. He had developed an abiding interest in just-war theory and became deeply influenced by his reading in the works of the early church father Augustine of Hippo, and later thinkers and theologians such as the medieval Dominican friar Thomas Aquinas, and the twentieth-century American Jesuit John Courtney Murray. Cebrowski underscored this issue when he noted that "how to draw the line between the moral and immoral use of military force is a constant companion to those in the military profession; we wrestle with it throughout our careers. Most of us are acutely attuned to the moral need to avoid bringing violence to bear on the innocent."[38]

In 1994, Cebrowski's colleague from Strategic Studies Group I, now Admiral Bill Owens, became Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In May 1995, Owens published his concept of the "Emerging System of Systems."[39] In Cebrowski's role as Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (J6), Joint Staff, he worked with Owens in complementary ways. One of them became well known in July 1996, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John M. Shalikashvili, issued a thirty-four-page booklet titled *Joint Vision 2010*. Owens, who was just retiring from active duty, and Cebrowski played key conceptual roles for this booklet, which was designed to be "the conceptual template for how we channel the vitality of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting."[40] Among the key concepts in this brochure was the idea that the ongoing improvements in sensors, computer processing, precise global positioning, and telecommunications could be harnessed into a system of systems that could be used to allow American forces to gain "dominant battlespace awareness, an interactive 'picture' which will yield much more accurate assessments of friendly and enemy operations within the area of interest."[41] Increasing information to a high degree, Cebrowski and Owens believed, would allow new operational concepts to come into use that emphasized agility and speed at all levels of

conflict. Moving from the older ideas of cumulative and sequential strategies, their approach focused on a new concept of concurrent operations that swept aside much of the thinking behind contemporary war planning and doctrine.[42]

In January 1998, just six months before arriving at the Naval War College, Cebrowski published an important article with John J. Garstka in which they elaborated on a point that Admiral Johnson had made a few months earlier, that American armed forces were in the midst of a revolution in military affairs and "a fundamental shift from what we call platform-centric warfare to something we call network-centric warfare."[43] While some of the ideas involved had been expressed in connection with the 1990 and 1997 versions of the Copernicus vision for a "warfighter-centric" focus, the joint article by Cebrowski and Garstka was the first to explore the term "network-centric warfare" in depth as a concept of warfare.[44] In particular they argued that the cognitive domain provided a new competitive advantage in warfare in place of battle force attrition.

Preparing for the Twenty-first Century

With these ideas developing over the seventeen years since Cebrowski had first come to the Naval War College as a fellow in Strategic Studies Group I, he returned to Newport to take up his sixth command and become the Naval War College's forty-eighth President. The College's chief of staff from 1997 to 2001, Captain Terry J. Pudas, recalled, "He wanted to be an intellectual leader at the War College and to engage the intellectual power there in three great questions: What was the world of the twenty-first century going to be like? What should the Navy of the twenty-first century become to deal with that world? And how was twenty-first-century warfare going to differ from past and present conflict?"[45]

At the change of command ceremony, Admiral Jay Johnson declared, "Now we stand at the dawn of a new century."[46] The political, economic, and military power of the United States was unchallenged, but "for the first time, the world's leading nation has global interests, but no thirst for empire."[47] The new century posed different types of threats, Johnson said, including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and regional instability, which were as challenging as those faced in the years leading up to World War II and those leading up to the Cold War: "the challenges we face in the 21st century caused the Navy leadership to stand back and think about where we could best centralize that kind of strategic inquiry, visionary innovation, and doctrinal analysis necessary to keep our Navy several steps ahead of threats. And the answer was clear—our Naval War College at Newport."[48]

Underscoring the significance of this for the College, Johnson proclaimed: "Today is the first day of that focused effort. It is the start of a new golden age of the Naval War College—a new Naval War College for a new era." Explaining further, he noted:

> We find ourselves in an era where the comfort of perfecting the tried and true must give way to the risks of confronting the unknown. As we reach beyond our grasp, we build on the firm foundation of this college with its inspiring history and track record for excellence. But the challenges are new, and new tools must be brought to bear. The tools of innovation, experimentation, rigorous examination of concepts—the tools of a high speed, networked, information age.[49]

Rear Admiral Bernard J. Smith. The first director of the Navy Warfare Development Command, established as a command reporting to the President, Naval War College in 1998, Smith had enlisted in the Navy in August 1959 and received a fleet appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy in June 1961. Graduating with the class of 1965, he entered flight training in July of that year and was designated a naval aviator on 26 October 1966. He was a 1974 graduate of the Naval War College. In June 2001, Rear Admiral Robert G. Sprigg succeeded Smith in this post.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Annual Battle of Midway Commemoration. This photograph shows Spruance Auditorium decorated as a bunker for the College's first Midway commemoration, in 1999. In 1999, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, directed that the Navy should annually celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Midway, 2–6 June 1942, in addition to celebrating the first act of Congress for the Navy on 13 October 1775. In the tradition of the Royal Navy's celebration of Trafalgar Night dinners, Johnson initiated the practice of Midway Night commemorations across the Navy to celebrate the U.S. Navy's most significant battle. The Naval War College's first Midway Night commemoration was held on Colbert Plaza, 5 June 1999, with the Navy Swing Band providing period dance music and guests enjoying Polynesian-themed hors d'oeuvres.

Naval War College Museum Collection

> With these words, the Chief of Naval Operations expanded the scope, responsibility, and authority of Cebrowski's new position by having the director of the newly established Navy Warfare Development Command, Rear Admiral Bernard J. Smith, report directly to the President, Naval War College. With the parallel appointment of Rear Admiral Peter A. C. Long as the first provost, the College had for the first time since 1974 a rear admiral as second in command. The sudden increase from one to three flag officers, an increase from a total of two to seven stars, was notable. So, too, was the expertise they brought to Newport. As Admiral Johnson succinctly stated, "All three have commanded Carrier Battle Groups, all three have combat experience, and all three have my highest confidence."[50]

The appearance of a provost made a fundamental change in the College's organizational structure. Prior to this, the four deans—academics, administration, students, and research (Center for Naval Warfare Studies)—had made up the second level of command under the admiral and his deputy, a captain. From this point onward, the provost was inserted between the President and the deans, while the deputy and chief of staff functioned as an executive assistant to the President.[51]

One month later, at the convocation opening the academic year on 18 August 1998, Cebrowski laid out in great detail his plan. "We are here to create a new Naval War College—one that will prepare the Navy and the nation for the next century," he proclaimed.[52] Yet it was not his intention to change the well-established and rigorously tested curriculum. He looked beyond the basic teaching mission of helping students to develop strategic thinking and to prepare for high command to think about the College's "ability to adapt its program and its structure to the needs of the Naval Service and to nurture innovation."[53] Remembering the innovative fleet tactics developed during the 1920s and the concept of the effective fleet staff developed in the 1930s and applied with great effect in the 1940s, Cebrowski wanted to foster the same sort of cooperation and interaction with the Navy Warfare Development Command, the College's officer students and faculty, and those who participated in Fleet Battle Experiments. His focus was on the product of this



Rear Admiral Peter A. C. Long. The first provost of the Naval War College, Admiral Long served in this post from August 1998 to August 2000. He is shown here with an enlisted veteran of the battle of Midway who attended the Naval War College commemoration on 5 June 1999. A 1967 graduate of the Naval Academy, Long was a surface warfare officer, with a master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School, had graduated from and served as a faculty member at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and had also attended the National Security Leadership Course at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral Barbara E. McGann Served as the Second Provost of the Naval War College, from 2000 to 2002. A native of Newport, Barbara McGann had earned a bachelor of arts degree in English from the College of Our Lady of the Elms, Chicopee, Massachusetts, and was commissioned through the Officer Candidate School at Newport in March 1970. A graduate of the Naval War College in the November 1983 class, she returned to the Naval War College in 1993–1994 as a fellow in Strategic Studies Group XIII. She held a master of science in business administration from Salve Regina University, in Newport, and a master of arts in foreign affairs from Georgetown University. As a flag officer, she served as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Total Force Programming and Manpower, then as Commander, Navy Recruiting Command.
Naval War College Museum Collection

interaction—new knowledge—not its organizational structure. "To the extent that doctrine tends toward dogma or becomes static, it has no value to the Navy," he counseled.

> We must move naval forces to the habitual practice of experimentation. We *exercise* to hone skills, but we *experiment* to create new knowledge and to develop the inclination for innovation in battle. That is how battles are won. History will not reward an officer for slavish adherence to doctrine. In the knowledge age, doctrine which lacks a real-time, dynamic, innovative character will be seen as the refuge for the uninformed.[54]

In his address, Cebrowski provided direct challenges and specific assignments to the Navy Warfare Development Command and to every major department in the College. He directed that network-centric warfare become the compelling theme in the Joint Military Operations curriculum and that the Center for Naval Warfare Studies examine a new concept for a balanced fleet, emphasize study of the Asia-Pacific and South Asia regions, and explore the proposition that finely tuned global economies indicate an increasing time value for the Navy. "In the Naval War College, the CNO has selected a modest rudder to turn a mighty ship—but I am confident that we are up to the challenge," Cebrowski declared.[55]

It would take two years for the Naval War College's official mission to change on paper, but on 10 July 2000, the Chief of Naval Operations issued the formal statement:

> The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in command, staff and management positions in naval, joint and multinational environments; to provide students with a sound understanding of military strategy and operational art; to promote and instill in them joint attitudes and perspectives; to lead in the development of the Navy's future strategy; to serve as the center for research and gaming leading to the development of advanced operational and warfighting concepts for the future employment of maritime, joint and multinational forces; to investigate emerging concepts and technologies through operational experiments; to serve as the primary Navy institution for the development of operational warfighting concepts, naval doctrine, and joint and multinational doctrine; to ensure naval and joint doctrine are published and incorporated in training and education throughout the fleet; to represent the Navy with joint and other service battle laboratories, facilities, and tactical development commands; and to serve as Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) for the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command; to exercise directive authority to all echelons of Navy command for the development and maintenance of

> doctrine; to coordinate NWC support for concept development; to approve Navy warfare doctrine concepts, as appropriate.[56]

The instruction laid out in detail the Naval War College's status as an echelon II command under the Chief of Naval Operations. Significantly, in a final paragraph the directive noted: "NWC Newport RI serves as an effective instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy by initiating and continuing programs which promote positive relations between the command and international students/faculty members, and which assist personnel and their families to work effectively as positive representatives of the Navy and of the United States."[57]

The Provost, Rear Admiral McGann, Was the Grand Marshal for Newport's Saint Patrick's Day Parade in March 2001.
Naval War College Museum Collection

McCarty Little Hall in 1999. Named in honor of Captain William McCarty Little (1845–1915), the College's pioneer naval war gamer, the building was designed as a state-of-the-art facility for conducting war games, decision support, research, analysis, and conferences. The three-story, steel-framed, precast-concrete-clad 103,000-square-foot building was designed to house 250 staff and students with an auditorium for 168 people and a war-gaming floor.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Over the three years of his presidency, Cebrowski encouraged much new and innovative thinking. He advocated new types of ships for the Navy, including classes of fast logistics support ships with unconventional hull form for speed; small, fast, and stealthy ships that he called "Streetfighter"; and small aircraft carriers that he named "corsairs." All of these involved networked connection, speed, and extended range of operations. As he later recalled, "It was at the Naval War College, during my last active-duty assignment, that network-centric warfare [emerged as], with all apologies to Clausewitz and the legions of military historians, truly a new theory of war."[58]

As Cebrowski used his position to advance the idea of network-centric warfare, one of the first things he did was to direct modifications to the plans for the war-gaming facility then under construction for McCarty Little Hall. Among other things, he obtained funding for an internal computer network that eventually became known as GAMENet for experimentation on issues relating to network-centric warfare, including preparations for the series of four global war games held between 1998 and 2001, which explored the operational potential of forces with the twenty-first-century capabilities described in *Joint Vision 2010* and *Joint Vision 2020*. The objective of Global War Game 2000 was to explore the ways in which network-centric warfare approaches might change the way in which military missions were performed. For this game, the Naval War College in collaboration with the Office of Naval Research, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and the University of Arizona developed a web-based system initially called "Knowledge Wall" to increase what Cebrowski called "shared awareness" among scattered ships and commands. For Global War Game 2000, Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor, the recently appointed commander of Carrier Group Three, played the role

The New Strategic Maritime Research Center Was Named McCarty Little Hall in a Ribbon-Cutting and Dedication Ceremony on 27 September 1999. Admiral Jay L. Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations, was the principal speaker, shown in this photograph at the podium, and seated, left to right, Chaplain Timothy J. Demy, Vice Admiral Cebrowski, and Captain Robert Turpin, USNR (Ret.), Chairman, Naval War College Foundation. As part of the dedication ceremony, the color guard of the College of the Holy Cross Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Unit raised the flag on the new flagpole at the entrance to the building.
Naval War College Museum Collection

of the joint task force commander, the senior position in the game. From his experience in the game with the "Knowledge Wall," Zelibor and his staff took the concept to sea with them in the USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70) battle group. Adapting it to their purposes, they used it in training and in the initial operations during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM when the terrorists' attacks on 11 September 2001 unexpectedly thrust Zelibor into the additional role of Commander, Task Force Fifty. In this position, Zelibor commanded six aircraft carriers and at least fifty-three ships from seven nations executing missions in the Arabian Gulf and Afghanistan, an area that spanned eight hundred miles. This was the first major test of network-centric warfare under actual wartime conditions, proving its great effectiveness as well as suggesting incremental improvements.[59]

By the time of Cebrowski's retirement and change of command on 22 August 2001, much had been accomplished during his watch. Summarizing his years at the Naval War College, Cebrowski noted the things that had interested him the most during his tenure:

Naval Operational Planner Course Class 1999.

First row (left to right): Dean William Calhoun, Lieutenant Commander Fredric Stein, Major Jon Huss, Lieutenant Commander William Doney, Major Brian Day, Major Kristina Young, Rear Admiral Peter Long, Captain Edward Caffrey.
Second row (left to right): Lieutenant Commander Michael Greenwood, Lieutenant Commander Steven Morien, Major Joseph Dill, Lieutenant Commander Michael Wilson, Professor Paul Romanski.
Third row (left to right): Lieutenant Commander Stephen Thompson, Lieutenant Commander Timothy Spratto. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

> Introduced Network-Centric Warfare to the College course work and research, created an information age warfighting environment in the new war gaming center, brought Navy Warfare Development Command to fruition, introduced the concept of transformation to the mainstream of the College making the College an agent of change for Navy leadership, shifted geographic focus of the College to Asia and the Western Pacific, and created for the students, faculty and staff a high quality dining facility and meeting place.[60]

From the Naval Operational Planner Course to the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School

In July 1997, a year before Cebrowski's arrival in Newport, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral H. W. Gehman, Jr., had written to Admiral Stark to say that at a recent morning meeting in Washington, Admiral Johnson had shown interest in an Army education program called the "Jedi

Knights." The name, taken from the fictional monastic order of peacekeepers described in the *Star Wars* series of novels, films, and video games that were popular at the time, was humorously applied to a cadre of Army Command and Staff College students who had been assigned to U.S. Central Command to prepare the ground campaign plan for Operation Desert Storm in 1990–1991. Later, the name was used informally to describe the selected group of Army Command and Staff students who after their graduation attended a follow-on course at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth to study military theory, battle dynamics, campaign planning, future operations, and history. Admirals Johnson and Gehman were interested in seeing whether the Naval War College could develop a similar program that could possibly fill the "strategic void" created when the Strategic Studies Group changed its focus from strategy to innovation. Admiral Stark discussed his initial thoughts with senior officers at the Training Resources Board in September 1997.[61]

In 1998, planning began in Newport under the course's first director, Captain Edward F. Caffrey, Jr., with Colonel William R. Spain and recently retired captain Professor Paul A. Romanski playing major roles. A pilot course took place in 1998–1999. On 12 February 1999, the Chief of Naval Operations released a Navy-wide message announcing that the first formal thirteen-month-long Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) would convene at the Naval War College in August 1999:

> As we move into a new century of complicated threat and opportunity, Navy operational staffs increasingly require officers who are not only expert in their own platforms, but also properly skilled in the planning and execution of joint and naval operations. Such skills will be employed in an environment of exceptional speed and complexity—they must be developed through practical experience layered upon a solid educational foundation. This foundation will be provided at NWC to ensure students have complete access to the past, present, and future in strategic studies, warfare development, doctrine, and experimentation. The NOPC is the educational vehicle for making this happen.[62]

The thirteen-month course had three distinct parts. During the first ten months, students attended the three core College of Naval Command and Staff courses. Instead of having an independent choice of electives in the three trimesters, they were assigned to a specially designed elective in each trimester that focused on combined arms tactics, naval and joint warfare, and operational contexts other than warfare. In the final three months, the students participated "in a detailed exercise where they function as the core of a numbered fleet staff in an unfolding scenario which requires planning and execution of mission-essential tasks. The final two weeks of the exercise will be a two-sided war game."[63]

With a rigorous selection process for students in the grade of lieutenant commander or major, the course was planned as a joint educational course with representatives from each of the five armed services. The initial pilot class that graduated on 10 September 1999 had eleven students, seven from the Navy, one from the Army, two from the Air Force, and one Marine. The course ranged between nine and sixteen students annually until 2007, when it doubled to include from twenty-seven to thirty-five students. The plan to include the Coast Guard did not come to fruition until the first officer arrived in 2006. Renamed in April 2009 the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS), to align its name with similar courses in other services, it has graduated a total of 354 students between its establishment and September 2014. In July 2010, MAWS established the Vice Admiral Charles "Soc" Morris Outstanding Graduate of the Year Award.

The first award was given in that year to Marine Corps Major Matthew J. Palma, who in 2014 returned as a military professor in the school.[64]

Vice Admiral Cebrowski with the Second Group of Mahan Scholars, 2000–2001. There were seven officers in the second group of Mahan Scholars: Commander Michael J. Connor, Commander Dale G. Fuller, Commander William L. Kervahn, Captain Kevin Ketchmark, Commander Alfred Ledsma, Captain Charles W. Martoglio, and Commander Michael A. Walley.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Mahan Scholars Program

While the Naval Operational Planner Course answered an important need that the Navy's senior leadership had identified in 1997, it did not fill the parallel "strategic void" created when the Strategic Studies Group had changed its focus from strategy to technological innovation in 1995. In a conversation in late 1998, Admiral Johnson had mentioned this to Cebrowski. Acting on Johnson's suggestion in February 1999, Cebrowski responded with a proposal to establish in the coming academic year a "Mahan Scholars" program to "identify superior officers and to engage them in the strategic concept development process and to do so in a format that provides them the necessary intellectual tools and is part of a continuous process."[65] Approved by Johnson on 20 May 1999, this program's students were formally identified as "Mahan Scholars" and would follow a thirteen-month curriculum, instead of the normal ten-month curriculum. Johnson replied, "I believe that this program will refortify the reputation of NWC and the National Security Studies program, while also proving their relevance in today's Navy by providing a professional cadre of thinkers involved in sustained strategic concept development."[66] Their program involved taking the Strategy and Policy and the National Security Decision Making trimesters, and then participating as a team in an advanced research project during the Joint Military Operations trimester. The fourth trimester was devoted to preparing a collective product that would be briefed to the President, Naval War College and, possibly, to the Chief of Naval Operations. For their research phases, the scholars were paired with mentors from the Center for Naval Warfare Studies faculty. The Mahan Scholars received an overview of the historical evolution of naval strategy and the process of strategic planning in the Department of Defense and a consideration of changing strategic landscapes, and ended with a project to conceptualize a draft strategy for the U.S. Navy in a network-centric environment in the Asia-Pacific region. An initial group of six officers was selected from nominations made through the same process as used for the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. Flag responses to the solicitation and selections were approved by the Chief of Naval Personnel and given orders. Admiral Cebrowski wrote a personal letter to each of the handpicked students, informing each of selection, providing an outline of the first directed elective, and requiring each to report to Dr. Donald Daniel and Dr. Lawrence Modisett as the program's initial directors. The group was given a designated space, room 232 in McCarty Little Hall, with its first class taking place on 25 August 1999. The first six Mahan Scholars were Captain Duane M. Baker,

Jr., Commander James R. Boorujy, Commander Lee S. Cardwell, Lieutenant Commander Warren A. Coleman III, Commander Robert B. Monroe, and Commander Todd R. Miller.

Accreditation of the Fleet Seminar Program

Another ongoing development when Cebrowski arrived was the work that the College of Continuing Education had been very actively undertaking to make its courses more attractive and useful to busy naval officers. Cebrowski believed that the students in the Fleet Seminar Program, the nonresident seminar that met weekly with the College's professors in various places around the world, should also receive the master's degree for their academic work. Cebrowski decided that the College should seek accreditation from the New England Association of Schools and Colleges for this thirty-four-week course. From an academic point of view, this was a major decision that went against the advice of some of the chairmen of the resident course departments. They felt that the experience in the evening seminars could not match the quality of what the resident students received in the ten-month resident academic program, particularly missing the not-for-attribution lectures from senior commanders. In addition, they felt that if this step were to be taken, it would undermine the rationale for students to come to the resident course and allow the naval officers with the best promotion potential an excuse to avoid coming to Newport. Cebrowski overrode those objections and directed that the faculty apply for accreditation for the Fleet Seminar Program. The faculty undertook a two-year process to that end. The New England Association eventually approved the proposal on 18 May 2001. Fleet Seminar programs in the national capital region, including those at the Naval Academy, Fort Meade, Dahlgren, Patuxent River, and the District of Columbia, as well as the seminar in Newport were the first to be accredited. In the spring of 2002, the Fleet Seminars at Monterey, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor received accreditation, with other sites following the next year.[67]

The accreditation of the Fleet Seminar Program required changes in policy for the permanent faculty. When this idea was first suggested, a number of faculty members had master's degrees, but not doctoral degrees, although they had excellent professional knowledge and teaching skills. In order to meet the accreditation standards, from this point the College required far more of its permanent faculty to obtain PhDs in appropriate academic fields.[68] This decision had a long-term and wide impact on faculty hiring in general. Up to that time, those hired for the permanent faculty for the resident courses had tended to be senior academics who had tenure at other institutions before coming to the Naval War College. At the same time, the faculty members in continuing education were typically paid less since they did not have terminal degrees. From this point, the College changed its recruiting policies and first began to look seriously at also hiring academics who had just completed their doctorates or had only a year or two of teaching experience, but who had the skills useful for the Naval War College.[69]

Cafeteria

When Cebrowski took command of the College in 1998, the only place nearby for students, staff, or faculty to have lunch involved the walk or short drive down the hill to the Officers' Club. For those who wanted to eat close to their desks, one had either to bring a lunch from home, to get something from the vending machine at the coffee mess, or to buy a mass-produced wrapped sandwich from a lunch truck that made a brief stop on Cushing Road every workday. Cebrowski felt that one of the key missing elements at the

Naval War College was collegiality and informal intellectual discussion. There was no meeting place where faculty members and students could regularly and informally congregate or collaborate. Admiral Cebrowski made the observation that members of the College community needed to network among themselves more effectively, thereby sharing knowledge and information, while contributing to the process of developing intellectual capital. As a result he made the decision to dedicate the first floor of the northwest corner of Hewitt Hall to this idea. He directed that a kitchen be installed and an active cafeteria created.[70] Captain Terry Pudas recalled that the order was not an easy one to execute as it involved a complex set of agreements involving the Navy Region Northeast, the Officers' Club, and the Naval Station and even a viability test.[71]

Change in Resource Sponsor

Another important change took place when the decision was made to shift the College's resource sponsor within the Navy from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Education and Training Command. Admiral Cebrowski and his staff fought hard against this change to a long-standing policy. Under the direct sponsorship of the Chief of Naval Operations, the College had operated on a reasonably steady and predictable share of the funds provided to the Chief of Naval Operations, which by this period had reached a budget of approximately $30 million per year. Due to its steady allocation, competing budget issues had not been a major concern to academic department chairmen or even to the deans. When more money was needed, the President of the College typically made a direct request to the Chief of Naval Operations. The shift to the Naval Education and Training Command meant that all the department heads within the Naval War College now had to become much more deeply involved in the very detailed competition for funding through the Navy's program objective memorandum process. While this involved a challenging and distinctive bureaucratic exercise for academics, it had been the normal process for uniformed officers in the naval service since the 1960s. This approach made a dramatic change for the College, allowing it to compete directly for funding, on the basis of documented and anticipated needs. As a result, over the next fifteen years, the College's budget tripled to more than $100 million a year.[72]



The Autumn 2000 Issue of the *Naval War College Review* Introduced the New Design and Format for the College's Journal. The cover image shows the Spanish Navy's sail training ship *Juan Sebastian de Elcano* approaching the Pell Bridge in Narragansett Bay during the Parade of Sail on 2 July 2000. The Naval War College's Hewitt Hall is visible in the background.
Naval War College Press



Dr. Evelyn Cherpak's Edition of *The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt* Was the First Naval War College Press Book Published with the New Format and Design. *Naval War College Press*

Naval War College Press

In the fall of 1999, the new dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Dr. Alberto Coll, directed the *Naval War College Review* staff to begin working on a new image for the *Review,* not only to start the new millennium, but also to raise its sights to try to become one of the nation's finest scholarly journals in the policy arena. After a wide search for designers, the press chose David Chapman

of Chapman and Partners, then of Providence and later based in Warren, Rhode Island. After a period of studies and trials, the new design was launched with the Autumn 2000 issue and a small ceremony attended by Vice Admiral Cebrowski. Over the following years, Chapman produced related designs, still used in 2014, for other Naval War College Press publications. The first Newport Paper with the new design was number 16, *The Third Battle* by Owen Cote, in 2003. The first Historical Monograph was number 15, Dr. Evelyn Cherpak's edition of *The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt,* and the first Policy Studies book was Dr. Jonathan Pollack's *Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century,* both of which came out in March 2004. Chapman also produced a related design for the China Maritime Studies series. Its first volume, Gabriel Collins and Lieutenant Commander Michael C. Grubb's *Comprehensive Survey of China's Dynamic Shipbuilding Industry: Commercial Development and Strategic Implications,* appeared in 2008.[73]



Former President of the United States George H. W. Bush Was the Graduation Speaker on 15 June 2001. Left to right: Vice Admiral Cebrowski; President Bush; Lieutenant Colonel Chng Ho Kiat, Republic of Singapore Navy; and Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, executive director of the Naval War College Foundation. Rear Admiral Strasser presented the Foundation's Captain Walter B. Woodson, Jr., Memorial Academic Prize, a clock and barometer set, to the Naval Command College graduate.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Former President Bush with Rear Admiral McGann and Commander Victoria Turner at the Naval War College President's House Graduation Reception, June 2001.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Change Again

The concept of a current revolution in military affairs that Cebrowski, General Shalikashvili, Admiral Owens, and others had championed soon ran into resistance, or as one writer put it, it ran into a "counterrevolution."[74] As these leaders in the movement retired, the Department of Defense tended to return to its prior approaches. *Joint Vision 2020* replaced *Joint Vision 2010,* moving the goalposts out another decade, even beyond current practical planning and budget cycles.[75] The term "revolution in military affairs" quietly disappeared and the Department of Defense came to promote the vaguer word "transformation."[76] Some were much more explicit in their criticism. In Dr. Norman Friedman's 2009 book *Network-Centric Warfare,* he commented, "When the late Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski coined the phrase something more than a decade ago,

he thought he had invented a totally new way of war that would cure the problems he had experienced in air-strike warfare. Admiral Cebrowski took particular umbrage at suggestions that his child was actually NTDS (the Naval Tactical Data System) on steroids."[77] In his defense, Cebrowski might have retorted that this characterization mistook the architecture of network-centric warfare for its essence rather than the cognitive understanding and control that derived from the architecture.[78]

As this debate was occurring, Admiral Cebrowski continued to make a number of innovative changes that had an enduring effect on the College and the Navy at large, but the combined organization of the Naval War College with the Navy Warfare Development Command did not endure. Just eleven days after Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson signed the new instruction defining the College's mission, functions, and tasks, he retired and Admiral Vern Clark succeeded him on 21 July 2000. In May 2001, Gordon R. England succeeded Richard Danzig and Robert B. Pirie, Jr., as Secretary of the Navy, bringing with him a background in defense industry. With these changes in leadership, the Navy's priorities changed dramatically from broad visions for technological innovation and network-centric warfare to England's and Clark's entirely different focus on a business-inspired realignment of organizations to better support the forward-deployed fleet.[79]

On becoming Chief of Naval Operations, Clark set out five priorities for his tenure: manpower, current readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and Navy-wide alignment. Clark immediately moved to restructure the Navy staff in order to reemphasize the focus of the Navy's senior leadership on fleet matters, adding a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N7) and a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4). Additionally, the fleet type commanders were placed in a "lead-follow" relationship linked to Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, who was designated to become the spokesman for both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets' unified warfare requirements. Just as Cebrowski's term in Newport was drawing to an end in August 2001, Clark took the next series of follow-on steps to unify and to standardize fleet practices. The most significant element in this new change was to establish the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to serve concurrently as the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, responsible for establishing the policies and requirements to standardize fleet-wide practices in both the Atlantic and Pacific. In making this decision, Admiral Clark chose to have Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, because it would be co-located with the Joint Forces Command and located closer to the Pentagon and to the Chief of Naval Operations. A key element in these changes that took effect on 1 October 2001 was the realignment of the Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport away from the President, Naval War College, to report directly to Commander, Fleet Forces Command, in Norfolk, Virginia. This announcement ended the innovation that had begun so optimistically three years before in August 1998.[80] The Navy Warfare Development Command remained in Sims Hall, Newport, until the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission directed that it move to Norfolk. This move was fully completed by 30 September 2010.

From the outset, the relations between the Naval War College and the Navy Warfare Development Command were uneasy. The two organizations did not develop the collaborative synergy that had been expected. Early on, there was tension between the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies and the Navy Warfare Development Command due to a perception that the Development Command was trying to subsume

the center and its war-gaming department under its direct control. In addition, many of the College faculty members objected to the idea that the College might be reduced to becoming merely a training institution to transmit the Navy's doctrinal pronouncements rather than functioning as the educational institution of higher learning that they believed it to be. In addition, both the personal and official accommodation for the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport left something to be desired. At the same time, the Naval War College's administrative department had difficulty meeting all the administrative support needs that the Navy Warfare Development Command desired.

Artist Margaret H. Sargent and Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski View Her Newly Completed Portrait. *Courtesy Margaret H. Sargent*

Within the Naval War College, Cebrowski's tenure had been marked by his relentless effort to incorporate his concepts of network-centric warfare into the academic and research programs, beginning with his change of command and convocation addresses in 1998 through to the major Network Centric Warfare Symposium that took place on 14 August 2001, just eight days before his retirement. During the span of three years in Newport, Cebrowski had a major influence on the Navy and within the College. He had placed a great deal of pressure on the deans and academic department chairmen to think about what they were teaching and was deeply engaged with the entire faculty. In particular, he met with the Joint Military Operations faculty about every two months to discuss some particular idea that was on his mind. This proved to be an extremely stimulating and useful exchange of ideas, but, by and large, the faculty did not share Cebrowski's view that network-centric warfare was a revolution in military affairs that swept aside insights from previous human experience. The faculty imagined that Cebrowski had a limited understanding of history and of historical analysis. While he often requested a historical example to summarize in one of his PowerPoint presentations, he would teasingly say that historians were academics "who think backwards."[81] It became clear to those who engaged with him that his high education in science and technology and his passionate belief in a military revolution did include an appreciation for historical development, but that he tried to focus on the parts of it that could be useful for the future. While intrigued and excited about his insights into present and current professional issues, a number of faculty members objected to what they took to be vaguely defined and arcane terminology of network-centric warfare, along with the quasi-religious manner in which they considered it was being presented. While faculty members did not necessarily disagree with his insights, some concluded that the concept of network-centric warfare was just another stage in the long and continuing history of spiraling technological innovation in warfare. Some took him to be a typical passionate advocate for technological innovation who would never give up his belief that his concepts constituted a revolution in military affairs.[82]

Senior faculty members found that meetings with Admiral Cebrowski were distinctive experiences that took on the characteristics of a wide-ranging seminar. He had an electronic whiteboard on which he made

notes and could push a button to print out what he had written and then clear the board to deal with a new subject. Dean Robert S. Wood met with him at least two or three times a week and concluded that "he was not unmindful of the legacy of the past, but was determined to challenge everyone's preconceptions or disciplinary biases—including his own. He genuinely believed that the convergence of geopolitical shifts and technological developments had opened up new possibilities for the threat and use of force."[83] Cebrowski had read Thomas S. Kuhn's 1962 book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and was aware that innovative thinking led to competing theories, based around what Cebrowski termed "disciplinary priesthoods." Aware that he was himself a product of a particular "priesthood," he was open to challenge and debate, but did not back down from his thinking on network-centric warfare.[84]

At Cebrowski's request, Wood wrote a long, philosophical memo that reflected the thoughts that the two had shared with each other on the role of the new Naval War College. "From its inception, The War College has been seen by its members, not only as a transmission belt for received wisdom, but, in the words of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, as 'a place of original research on all questions relating to war, and to statesmanship, or the prevention of war,'" Wood wrote.

> In 1998 under a new mandate, the Naval War College assumed a number of new roles and acquired additional resources. The creation of a three-star direction to the enterprise, along with a leadership team that included 2 two-star admirals, in themselves signifies a new beginning. But, if by analogy, the Civil War signified a "new birth of freedom," not a rejection of the founding Declaration and Constitution, so the events of 1998 at the Naval War College can best be evaluated by reference to the founding vision. The new charter was intended to renew the discovery in a contemporary context, again in the words of Luce, of "those truths upon which we are to generalize and build a science of naval warfare."[85]

Continuing, Wood went on to make a parallel with John Henry Cardinal Newman's famous treatise *The Idea of a University*. "It strikes me," Wood wrote,

> that the Naval War College has been held in such high esteem because, in some remarkable way, it has exhibited the "idea of a war college." I believe that the foundation of that idea is the ability to hold in creative tandem what Aristotle called "theoretical wisdom" and "practical wisdom." . . . It is that creative dynamic that has produced both exciting teaching and a cauldron of ideas. Whatever we do, we should be reluctant to upset this dynamic or discourage the type of personality who thrives in that environment.[86]

NOTES

1. Tufts University Library Catalogue.
2. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 6, file 1995: Appendix A: Biography of Rear Admiral Stark.
3. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers]: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Rear Admiral James Stark, conducted on 30 October 2009 by James Rife [hereinafter Stark interview], p. 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Kurth to Hattendorf, 9 January 2003, pp. 8–10; quote appears on page 9.
6. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents: Strasser, box 4b: RADM Joseph Strasser to Hattendorf, e-mail, 19 July 2002.
7. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: RADM James R. Stark to Hattendorf, e-mail, 22 December 2014.
8. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 170 Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser Papers, box 23: Official Navy Correspondence: RADM Joseph C. Strasser letter to Chief of Naval Operations, 29 June 1995, Subj: Transfer of Command.
9. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 191 Rear Admiral James R. Stark Papers, Letters Received, box 8: Admiral J. M. Boorda Memorandum for the President, Naval War College, 18 October 1995.
10. Stark to Hattendorf, 22 December 2014.
11. Hattendorf interview with Captain Terry J. Pudas, 22 January 2015 [hereinafter Pudas interview].

12. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 170 Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser Papers, box 24: Report of the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, 1995 Accreditation Report, p. 12.
13. Pudas interview.
14. Strasser letter to CNO, 29 June 1995.
15. Stark interview, p. 6.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., pp. 7–8; Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: RADM Stark to Hattendorf, 2 January 2015; Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: John E. Jackson to Hattendorf, e-mail, 7 January 2015.
18. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 6, 1997: Chronology, June 1997.
19. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 6, 1998: Chronology: June 1998.
20. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Johnson, Admiral Jay L., Chief of Naval Operations, Remarks at the Naval War College Change of Command and the Stand-Up of the Navy Warfare Development Command, 24 July 1998 [hereinafter Johnson remarks, 24 July 1998], p. 2.
21. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command History, box 6, 1998: Chronology, September 1998.
22. Frank B. Kelso II, *The Reminiscences of Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy (Retired), Interviewed by Paul Stillwell* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 2009), p. 695.
23. Ibid., p. 697.
24. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents,* Newport Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2006), p. 97.
25. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 191 Rear Admiral James R. Stark Papers, Letters Sent, 1996, box 2, file 3: Memorandum of Understanding between the Naval War College and the Naval Doctrine Command, signed by RADM Stark, 7 March 1996.
26. Stark to Hattendorf, 22 December 2014; Stark to Hattendorf, 2 January 2015.
27. Pudas interview.
28. Peter D. Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post–Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of a Maritime Strategy, 1989–2007" (Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2013), pp. 157–58.
29. Pudas interview.
30. Stark to Hattendorf, 22 December 2014, para. 3a.
31. Ibid., para. 3b; telephone conversation: Hattendorf–Admiral Jay Johnson, 5 March 2015.
32. Stark to Hattendorf, 22 December 2014; telephone conversation: Hattendorf–Admiral Jay Johnson, 5 March 2015; Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Professor William Spain conducted on September 17, 2009, by James Rife [hereinafter Spain Oral History], pp. 4, 17.
33. Stark to Hattendorf, 22 December 2014, para. 3c.
34. Johnson remarks, 24 July 1998, p. 2.
35. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Cebrowski, biography in change of command and retirement ceremony program, 24 July 1998.
36. James Blaker, "Arthur K. Cebrowski: A Retrospective," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 134.
37. Cebrowski, quoted in ibid.
38. Cebrowski, quoted in ibid., p. 135.
39. William A. Owens, "The Emerging System of Systems," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 121, no. 5 (May 1995), pp. 35–39.
40. *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1996), quote on unnumbered page facing page 1. See also Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post–Cold War Era," pp. 173–75.
41. *Joint Vision 2010,* p. 13.
42. Blaker, "Arthur K. Cebrowski," p. 137.
43. Admiral Jay L. Johnson, "Address to the U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis Seminar and 123rd Annual Meeting," 23 April 1997, quoted in Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare—Its Origin and Future," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 124, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 28–35. See also D. S. Alberts, J. J. Garstka, and F. P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1999).
44. The Navy Department booklet *Copernicus: C4ISR for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C., 1997) was also published in an edited format as "Copernicus: C4ISR for the 21st Century," *Surface Warfare* 22 (July/August 1997), pp. 37–41.
45. Pudas, quoted in Blaker, "Arthur K. Cebrowski," p. 137.
46. Johnson remarks, 24 July 1998, p. 3.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. In this and the following quotation, a dash has replaced the ellipsis used in the original.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 4.
51. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Center for Naval Warfare Studies: Robert M. Rubel to Hattendorf, 14 December 2009, with memorandum on Naval War College history.
52. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Cebrowski, Convocation Speech, 18 August 1998, p. 9; this and subsequent page references are to an unpaginated typescript.
53. Ibid., p. 10.
54. Ibid., p. 15.
55. Ibid., pp. 25–26.
56. OPNAVINST 5450.207C, NWC/N71, of 10 July 2000, para. 3.
57. Ibid., para. 6.
58. Cebrowski, quoted in Blaker, "Arthur K. Cebrowski," p. 138.
59. Rubel to Hattendorf, 14 December 2009, with memorandum on Naval War College history; this material appears on page 3 of this unpaginated typescript. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence Files: RADM Thomas Zelibor to Gary Ohls and Hattendorf, 11 January 2008, inclosing draft 15 of Drs. Mark Adkins and John Kruse, *Case Study: Network Centric Warfare in the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet: Web-Supported Operational Level Command and Control in Operation Enduring Freedom* (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Center for the Management of Information, 3 August 2003), pp. 3–5, 20–21.
60. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Cebrowski: A. S. Nicolosi to Greg Glaros, P. Haeg, and Hattendorf, e-mail, 17 July 2002, forwarding Cebrowski to Glaros, 16 July 2002.
61. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Naval Operational Planners Course file: ADM H. W. Gehman, Jr., letter to RADM Stark, 22 July 1997.

62. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Naval Operational Planners Course file: CNO to NAVADMIN, Naval Message, R 121647Z Feb 99, UNCLAS // N03000, NAVADMIN 041/99, Subj: Naval Operational Planner Course of Instruction.

63. Ibid.

64. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Naval Operational Planners Course file.

65. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Mahan Scholars, 1999–2000; Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Mahan Scholars, 1999–2000: Letter from VADM Cebrowski to ADM Jay Johnson, 27 February 1999, enclosing memorandum from Robert S. Wood to Cebrowski, 10 February 1999.

66. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Mahan Scholars, 1999–2000: ADM Johnson to Cebrowski, 20 May 1999.

67. Naval War College Archives, RG 32 Annual Command Histories, box 6, file 2002: College of Distance Education, Academic Programs, p. 4.

68. Ibid., p. 10.

69. Ibid., pp. 11–12.

70. Spain Oral History, p. 7.

71. Pudas interview.

72. Ibid., pp. 13–14.

73. Alberto R. Coll, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, to subscribers, "Letter to Readers of the Naval War College Review," sent with *Naval War College Review* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 2000); Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Pelham Boyer to Hattendorf, e-mail, 5 February 2015.

74. Blaker, "Arthur K. Cebrowski," p. 137.

75. Peter D. Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post–Cold War Era," pp. 162–66.

76. Ibid.

77. Norman Friedman, *Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three World Wars* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009), p. ix.

78. Pudas interview.

79. Thomas Hone to Hattendorf, e-mail, 19 January 2015. See also Thomas C. Hone, *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (forthcoming, 2015).

80. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Fleet Forces Command: Rear Admiral Paul J. Ryan, "New Fleet Forces Command," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (October 2001), p. 104; Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Fleet Forces Command: E-mail from Mary Lauer, 15 August 2001, Subj: Public Affairs Guidance for Fleet Alignment; Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Fleet Forces Command: "A Brief History of U.S. Fleet Forces Command."

81. Author's recollection of a conversation with VADM Cebrowski in August 1998.

82. Spain Oral History, p. 15; Pudas interview.

83. Wood to Hattendorf, e-mail, 19 January 2015.

84. Ibid.

85. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Subject Files, box 1: Cebrowski: Robert S. Wood Memorandum to VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, undated [ca. 1998], Subj: Thoughts on the Role of the New Naval War College, para. 1.

86. Ibid., para. 2.

OPEN

In Memory of
Naval War College
Students and Alumni
Who Gave Their Lives
While Serving the Nation
CAPT GERALD F. DECUNTO, USN
LCDR ROBERT R. ELSETH, USNR
CAPT LAWRENCE B. GETZFRED, USN
Ms. ANGELA M. HOUTZ, DON
LCDR PATRICK J. MURPHY, USNR
LT JONAS M. PANIK, USNR
CAPT JACK D. PUNCHES, JR., USN (Ret.)
CDR ROBERT A. SCHLEGEL, USN
CDR DAN F. SHANOWER, USN
MAJ KIP P. TAYLOR, USA
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
September 11, 2001
onnel every year.
they believe in.
family, and shipmates
ebrate their devotion
ree!

The 9/11 Patriots Memorial with Wreath on the Day It Was Dedicated, 9 September 2002. In his remarks at the dedication ceremony, the guest speaker, Commander Karl Van Deusen, noted, "In the end, we cannot allow our hearts to become hardened like the rock in this memorial, but rather we must keep alive the hopes and memories of those it honors, through never-ending pursuit of a better tomorrow." *Courtesy of Professor John E. Jackson*

Chapter Nineteen

In the Shadow of 9/11, 2001–2004

With Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt's assumption of command on 22 August 2001, the Naval War College entered a new phase in its history. Not only was the College returning to a two-star President, but the mission, functions, and tasks of the College had markedly changed from those formally approved by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson as recently as 10 July 2000. The Navy Warfare Development Command was now on track to report to Commander, Fleet Forces Command instead of the President, Naval War College. Along with the plan to realign the Navy Warfare Development Command, the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon E. Clark, also wanted to align the College differently as he and the country, in the midsummer of 2001, looked forward to a time of relative peace in the post–Cold War and post–Operation Desert Storm era.

Admiral Vernon Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, at the Naval War College in October 2001. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

With this as the general background, Clark met with Rempt soon after he took command of the College. The two had known each other for many years as both had served together as lieutenants commanding missile-armed patrol gunboats in the Mediterranean with the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the 1970s. During that meeting, Clark told Rempt that it was not clear to him and other key members of his senior leadership team that the Naval War College provided any added value to the naval service. In essence, Clark was questioning one of the fundamental characteristics of any institution, its effectiveness. This evaluation was, to say the least, quite striking given that it was delivered by the federal official who assigned the College its mission, provided financial and manpower resources to it, evaluated its execution of that mission, and was the official charged with governance of the War College. This assessment suggested, at a minimum, that there was a need for the College and the Chief of Naval Operations to reevaluate the College's mission and, perhaps just as important, its relevance and the value of its purpose to the Navy. Clark's assessment signified that he did not accept how the College was executing its mission, functions, and tasks and that the purpose of the College was not accepted and understood by the senior leadership of the Navy.[1]

Clark told Rempt that he had only one major challenge for Rempt in his new position and that was to demonstrate that this costly educational institution was truly making a contribution to the United States Navy. Rempt fully understood the implications of what Clark was saying and countered immediately that he believed that there was tremendous value in the Naval War College to make contributions at the

strategic level and some at the operational level of war. That said, Rempt accepted Clark's challenge head-on, realizing the potential adverse impact of Clark's appraisal of the College's institutional effectiveness on its future, and set to work immediately to prove his case concerning the College's relevance and value.[2] In this regard, Admiral Rempt recalled,

> Network Centric Warfare was focused more at the operational and tactical level. And the question was, what's our strategy and policy to help guide the Navy in its development and focus over the next decade? . . . My tasking was to swing the pendulum back a little bit to the strategy and policy side and make the War College a key component in the discussion at high levels about what path should the country take. . . .[3]

Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt. As the forty-ninth President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Rempt served from 22 August 2001 to 9 July 2003. A 1966 graduate of the Naval Academy and a 1987 graduate of the Naval War College, Admiral Rempt was well known throughout the naval service for his work in ballistic missile defense. He took command of the Naval War College just a few weeks before the 11 September 2001 attacks.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral Rempt came to the presidency of the Naval War College as an experienced surface warfare officer, an expert in missile defense, and a March 1987 graduate of the Naval War College's College of Naval Warfare. Already acquainted with Newport as a student, he had also served for a year as the director of the Prospective Commanding Officer and Prospective Executive Officer Department at the Surface Warfare Officers Schools Command. In addition to his War College degree, he had earned a master's degree in systems analysis from Stanford University. Rempt had grown up in Van Nuys, California, a Los Angeles suburb, and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1966. As a junior officer, he served in USS *Coontz* (DLG 9) and USS *Somers* (DDG 34), and commanded USS *Antelope* (PG 86), one of four missile-carrying patrol gunboats homeported in Naples, Italy. Later, he commanded USS *Callaghan* (DDG 994) during two deployments to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean and USS *Bunker Hill* (CG 52), homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. While in *Bunker Hill,* he served for eighteen months as the antiair warfare commander for Seventh Fleet. Duties ashore included three years in the weapon prototyping office of the Naval Sea Systems Command as the initial project officer for the Mark 41 vertical launch system, and both the program coordinator for the Aegis weapon system and the Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements Division (OP-75) on the Chief of Naval Operations' staff. Admiral Rempt had also served for more than two years as the administrative aide and deputy executive assistant for Admirals James D. Watkins and William N. Small as Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and then served as interim executive assistant for Admiral Watkins as he was relieving as Chief of Naval Operations. In addition, he also worked in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, where he initiated the development of Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. His initial assignment as a flag officer was as Director, Surface Ships and Combat Systems/Theater Air Defense (N865), followed by Program Executive Officer, Theater Air Defense, concurrently serving as the U.S. steering committee member for the NATO Sea Sparrow and Rolling Airframe Missile multinational programs. Just before coming back to Newport, Rempt served as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of

the Navy for Theater Combat Systems and the first Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense. In the latter post, he additionally served as Director, Surface Warfare (N76), responsible for all surface warfare initiatives, ship programs, and combat systems.[4]

The College Responds to the Events of 11 September 2001

In the first few weeks of his presidency, Rempt initiated a review of what the College was doing in the strategy and policy area, in terms of both teaching and research. Only three weeks into that process, on Tuesday morning, 11 September 2001, the radical Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda conducted coordinated attacks against New York City and Washington, D.C., using four hijacked civilian aircraft to kill 2,996 people and cause an estimated $10 billion in property damage.

On 10 September, Admiral Rempt had gone to Washington to chair a meeting with the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel that same evening in Rosslyn, Virginia. He and Captain Richard Suttie had originally planned to have a meeting at the Pentagon on the morning of 11 September in the Navy's Operational Command Center, but had cancelled it. Instead, after spending the night at the visiting officers' quarters in the Washington Navy Yard, in the morning Rempt took an eight o'clock flight from Baltimore-Washington Airport to Providence and had just landed in Rhode Island when the first tower of the World Trade Center was hit, and he had just returned back to the President's House in Newport by the time the second tower and the Pentagon were hit.[5]

In Newport, the morning of 11 September 2001 had dawned as a beautiful, bright, early autumn day. Like others across the country, Naval War College staff, faculty, and students gradually learned of the attacks and followed the unfolding events on the television news, only slowly realizing that what appeared at first to be a terrible aviation accident in New York was in fact a series of deliberate attacks. Following the Federal Aviation Authority's unprecedented order to execute the nation's "Emergency Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids," the quiet skies over Newport were dramatically broken only by the occasional sight or sound of F-15s from nearby Otis Air Force Base on Cape Cod and, later, by F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets from Naval Air Station Oceana, and the aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* (CVN 73). Those at the Naval War College who were able to follow the operational situation at sea soon learned that *George Washington* had sortied from Norfolk on 10 September and was operating in the Navy's Virginia Capes Operating Area. With news of the attack, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet ordered her, with Aegis missile cruisers and destroyers, to take station off New York, where the carrier launched 234 sorties as part of Operation Noble Eagle before returning to Norfolk on 17 September.

Halfway around the globe, the battle group commander on board USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65), acting on his own initiative, knew instinctively what needed to be done—the rudder went over and the ship and her battle group reversed course. As a result of his decision, the *Enterprise* Battle Group was on station the next morning and "ready to answer call-for-fire" from her station off of Southwest Asia. Acting under verbal orders, while mission planning was in progress, and with a small air wing detachment embarked, USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63) surged from Yokosuka, Japan, and steamed some six thousand miles at flank speed to establish a forward operating base for U.S. Joint Special Operations Forces in the Arabian Sea. Closer to home, active-duty and reserve personnel manned USNS *Comfort* (T-AH 20), a hospital ship, and deployed

from her home port of Baltimore, Maryland, to provide much-needed assistance to the rescue work ongoing in New York City.[6]

As the attacks and the nation's response to them were unfolding across the globe in the midst of great uncertainty, Rear Admiral Rempt's primary concern was the physical security and safety of the War College and its students, faculty, and staff. Because the College was the site of a large concentration of relatively senior and skilled military officers and given the fact that it was difficult to defend due to its location in Narragansett Bay on Coasters Harbor Island, the College stood out as a possible target for an attack. Rempt immediately established armed roving patrols ashore and armed boats in the bay. In addition, he marshaled the resources of local commands to increase security awareness among all hands. Eventually security was enhanced to protect the College and ensure that only identified friends entered the area immediately surrounding the College. As part of this, a new security perimeter was established with fencing, bollards linked by chains, and new sentry positions at the corner of Luce Avenue and Cushing Road and at Porter Avenue.[7]

The first consequence of these attacks that directly affected the College's plan for the academic year was the Chief of Naval Operations' decision to cancel the Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium, which had been scheduled to take place in Newport between 28 and 31 October. His decision was based on the uncertain security situation in the United States, particularly in Newport, Rhode Island, and the need for nearly all senior naval commanders from all over the world to travel to Newport. This was the first time since the symposium had been established in 1969 that it had to vary from its regular biennial meeting pattern, but the series continued two years later in 2003.[8]

The al-Qaeda attacks jolted the entire U.S. defense establishment into the need to think differently about current threats and vulnerabilities. Knowing that the Navy's leadership would be consumed by day-to-day decision-making requirements in this context, like the one concerning the International Seapower Symposium, Rempt believed that the significant analytical talent resident in the College's faculty could quickly help the Navy's senior leadership in a time of national crisis and thereby demonstrate its effectiveness in terms of its relevance and value to the Navy. He believed that this core competency of the College could help the Navy and the entire U.S. defense establishment to analyze critically the new set of threats and vulnerabilities facing the United States as a result of these attacks.[9] In this regard, Admiral Rempt recalled,

> We had in fact been addressing things like the Khobar Tower bombing, the [Nairobi and Dar es Salaam] embassy bombings, and the Beirut attack on the Marines and other big events like that as kind of isolated criminal activity. And I think for the first time, 9/11 forced us to put them into a continuum of what was an escalating war. We hadn't recognized it as a war; we had only recognized it as individual things.[10]

Using this as his organizing principle, Rempt established four task groups to support the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at the opening of the "War on Terror," a name for the emerging conflict that President George W. Bush used when he told a joint session of Congress on 20 September that "our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."[11] Rempt conceived and then led the College in the development of a set of papers addressing strategy and policy, operational concepts, doctrine and tactics, and key

national security decisions that would become part of this new war. Each of these groups was assigned one of the topics on which to develop a series of point papers of varying lengths: (1) strategy and policy for the war, (2) operational concepts, (3) doctrine and tactics, and (4) national security decisions. For example, the task group on strategy was led by Captain Brian Lucas and Professor Andrew Ross and drew its members from across the faculty: the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Strategy and Policy Department, Joint Military Operations Department, and National Security Decision Making Department. These task groups produced seventy-one papers in the six months between September 2001 and March 2002 that were distributed directly to senior leaders in Washington, including the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the civilian heads of services. In Rempt's words, "those papers had a pretty significant impact on the leadership and helping them think through what were new issues in a new context."[12] At the same time, they helped to answer the challenge that Admiral Clark had given Rempt at the outset of his assignment to prove the value of the Naval War College to the Navy.[13]

The very first paper of this special series of "Newport Papers" was "Strategy and Policy Concerns: The Terror War," written in the strategy and policy task force by Professor George Baer, Professor Andrew Ross, and Captain Robert McCabe. Among many others, Professors Tom Mahnken, Peter Dombrowski, and Andrew Ross each wrote several pieces on war aims, while Professor Nicholas Rostow and Colonel Fred Borch, USA, examined the question whether a formal declaration of war was needed. Working with the operational concepts task force, Captain Michael Critz, Professor John Ballard, and Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander D. Scott Bauby wrote papers relating to homeland security. With the national security decisions task force, Professor Jim Giblin wrote "Navy Decision Making in the Terror War: 'Home Games' vs. 'Away Games'" and drafted several highly classified papers that addressed force planning and deployment options.[14] The major impact of the task groups' point papers was the establishment of two enduring strategic guiding principles for the conduct of the Global War on Terror. These were subsequently established and confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President and they continue to be a signature feature of the nation's policy beyond 2015. The two principles were that (1) an offensive strategy, one that takes the fight to the enemy rather than waiting and defending against possible further attacks at home, is more in the national interest than a purely defensive strategy; and (2) because it is in the nation's interest not to permit any terrorist sanctuaries, it is vital to have the willingness to engage terrorists anywhere, anytime, regardless of national boundaries.[15]

Admiral Vern Clark Opening the Naval War College's "Setting Our Course" Symposium. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The series of point papers also provided a resource for conferences. The first of these was a three-day conference held on 29–31 October 2001, "Setting Our Course in the Terror War," designed to be a "think session" to develop strategies for fighting the war and dealing with its aftermath. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, opened the conference by pointing out the importance of the conference as well as the value of the College. "This effort is *timely* because our nation is at war. It is *important* because, in times of conflict, our Navy and our nation depend on the tremendous

intellectual capital invested in the Naval War College. This superb institution is composed of some of the best and the brightest—officers and civilians who are both doers and thinkers."[16] He also remarked, "Now is the time for bold and innovative thinking, thinking that will be vital to achieving victory."[17] Clark continued,

> I'm asking you—I can't be more straightforward about this—to challenge every assumption. . . . I'm looking for people who have the courage to challenge the assumptions we've made about the way we package, the way we deploy, the way we structure, the way we do command and control, . . . every piece of it. I want that kind of challenge to the way we do business.[18]

The Symposium "Setting Our Course in the Terror War" Was Held at the Naval War College, 29–31 October 2001. *Naval War College Archives*

Following Clark's opening address, Professor Bradd Hayes of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies moderated a panel discussion on "Strategy over the Next Five Years: Threats and Missions." Associate Dean of Academic Affairs Mackubin T. Owens set the stage for this panel discussion with a presentation on three possible outcomes of the war that he called "the good, the bad, and the ugly."[19] The best outcome, Owens suggested, would be to hold the international coalition together, capture Osama bin Laden, and oust the Taliban without any serious backlash. A bad outcome would be if the war lasted so long that public support faltered, the international coalition broke up, and an already weak economy became weaker. The worst outcome would be the emergence of another superpower that tried to take advantage of the situation. Among other comments from panel members, Dr. Harvey Sapolsky from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology responded by saying, "While I am optimistic about our military capability, I just don't think it will solve the problem. The root causes are something we can't control." Sapolsky went on to say, "The cause of the current conflict lies in the fact that some fundamentalist clerics view the West as decadent and seek its destruction. Eliminating the current terrorists is not going to make the terrorists go away."[20] The remainder of the conference was classified, with each session moderated by a faculty member and featuring a panel of flag officers. Dr. Kenneth Watman moderated the session on the Navy's contribution to homeland defense, Professor Robert "Barney" Rubel moderated the session on naval offensive counterterror operations, and Professor Tom Fedyszyn's panel dealt with naval operations beyond the terror war.[21]

Before the attacks, administrators at Salve Regina University and the Naval War College had been having discussions to strengthen the academic bonds between the two institutions. These discussions reached fruition just a week after the attacks, when a formal signing ceremony took place on 18 September 2001 at Salve Regina's Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy located on the Salve Regina campus at the corner of Bellevue and Ruggles Avenues in Newport. The Naval War College's provost, Rear Admiral Barbara McGann, and its dean of academic affairs, Dr. Charles Neimeyer, signed the document for the College, while Salve Regina University's president, M. Therese Antone, RSM, and its dean of graduate studies, Dr. Theresa Madonna, signed for the university. Referred to as the "articulation agreement"


The Arc of Instability
Challenges for U. S. Policy & Strategy in the Greater Middle East
United States Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island
The Naval War College expresses appreciation to the Naval War College Foundation, through the generosity of the Widgeon Foundation and an anonymous donor for their support in the preparation and presentation of this conference.
6-7 March, 2002
Salve Regina UNIVERSITY

The Intersessional Conference between the Winter and Spring Terms in 2002 Was "The Arc of Instability."
Naval War College Archives

between the two institutions, it strengthened the bonds between them by allowing qualified students to transfer academic credits, sharing library resources for authorized students and faculty, establishing research partnerships, exchanging long-range plans for academic conferences and symposia, and increasing mutual participation in programs sponsored by either institution, including Salve's Pell Center and the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies.[22]

One of the early manifestations of the agreement occurred at the College in March 2002, when Salve Regina was recognized as a co-sponsor for one of the short conferences that, at the time, often took place between trimesters. Typically, these had been focused on themes such as the military and the media, or ethical issues. As a major change to this at the end of the winter trimester and the beginning of the spring trimester in March 2002, the conference was on "The Arc of Instability: Challenges for U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Greater Middle East." Professors Lyle Goldstein and Ahmed Hashim of the Strategic Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, who were the joint directors of the conference, laid out its purpose:

> We have convened this conference at the U.S. Naval War College in order to put the events of September 11th in their fuller context. The Naval War College is one of the premier teaching and research institutions in the world. As the College seeks to further enhance its regional studies programs, we have called up some of the world's leading experts in the region to address key issues of cultural identity, the roots of radicalism, the impact of radicalism and September 11th on pivotal states, and the challenges for U.S. policy in the region as a whole.[23]

The organizers emphasized that the purpose of the conference was to dispel stereotypes about the Middle East and to emphasize that the extent of the effect of religious radicalism on pivotal states in the region varied greatly both within countries and between countries. The organizers asked a series of questions about the sustainability of change and reform in those countries and the effect of these changes and reforms on the geopolitical landscape. To deal with these broad objectives, the first session of the conference, chaired by Dr. Richard Nuccio, of the Pell Center at Salve Regina, dealt with cultural identities of the Greater Middle East; the second, chaired by the Naval War College's Dr. Andrew Ross, dealt with the roots of radicalism; the third, chaired by Dr. Jonathan Pollock of the Naval War College, explored pivotal states; and the fourth panel, chaired by Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher of the Naval War College faculty, examined U.S. policy for the long term. The conference brought a wide range of academics and civilian policy experts to the War College. Complementing the panel discussions, Dr. Geoffrey Kemp of the Nixon Center in Washington, D.C., gave the opening keynote address, followed by an evening address by Ambassador Robert Oakley of the National Defense University, former U.S. ambassador to Zaire, Somalia, and Pakistan. On the following day, the main speaker was Ambassador Edward Djerejian, the founding director of the James A. Baker III Institute of Public Policy at Rice University, former U.S. ambassador to Syria and

Israel, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. The Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Dr. Alberto Coll, provided the closing address.

These and other initiatives that the College undertook in the wake of the September attacks unambiguously confirmed the institutional effectiveness and real value of the Naval War College to the Navy and the nation. The challenge for Rempt and the College was to reinforce that perception in the minds of Admiral Clark and his senior leadership team. At the same time, the initiatives also confirmed Rear Admiral Rempt's suspicion that the College had been an underutilized resource by many naval leaders in the recent past. This insight persuaded Rempt that the Chief of Naval Operations and his senior leadership would call on the College to take a larger and perhaps more diverse role in the years that followed.[24]

Of the attacks on 11 September, perhaps the one that most directly affected the Naval War College was when American Airlines Flight 77 was deliberately crashed into the west wall of the Pentagon, passing through to the far side of the first floor of Wedge 1 of the "E" ring in a swath that included part of the Navy's newly opened Operational Command Center as well as spaces occupied by the Army, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. The crash into the first floor caused the upper floors to collapse. As the wings of the aircraft struck the outer concrete siding of the Pentagon, the fuel tanks detonated, diminishing some of the potential destruction on the inside of the building and, perhaps, helping to limit the total casualties. One hundred twenty-five of the more than twenty thousand occupants of the Pentagon died, along with the additional sixty-four people on board the aircraft. On the following day, 12 September, the Naval War College learned that one of its civilian students in the Fleet Seminar Program in Washington had been killed in the Pentagon. On that same day, a committee was established, chaired by Professor John E. Jackson, the director of the College of Continuing Education, to begin to plan to commemorate her service. Subsequently, the College learned that there were ten other victims who had been associated with the College that had died in the attack on the Pentagon.[25]

Rear Admiral Rempt Speaking at Podium during the Dedication of the Naval War College 9/11 Patriots Memorial.

To his right, left to right, facing camera: Provost James Giblin; the guest speaker for the occasion, Commander Karl Van Deusen, a 1997 Naval War College graduate and prospective commanding officer of USS *Gonzalez* (DDG 66) who had been awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal for his rescue efforts at the Pentagon; and Commander Craig D. Powell, USN, a Navy SEAL who was also at the Pentagon during the attack and was cited for his bravery in assisting others. *Courtesy of Professor John E. Jackson*

In a ceremony marking the first anniversary of the attacks, held on 9 September 2002, the families of seven of the ten victims of which the College was then aware came to Newport. Rear Admiral Rempt and Dean of Academic Affairs James F. Miskel awarded each of those ten victims an honorary master of arts degree in national security and strategic studies. At the same time, the College dedicated a memorial that had been designed by Professor Jackson and his wife, Valerie. The memorial, placed near the entrance to McCarty Little Hall and on the hill across Cushing Road from Conolly Hall, has as its base a pattern of hand-laid bricks in the shape of a pentagon to commemorate the site of the attack. In the center is a five-foot-high section of the

The Naval War College's Monument to Its Graduates Who Died in the 11 September 2001 Attacks. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Unveiling the Bronze Plaque during the Dedication of the 9/11 Patriots Memorial on 9 September 2002. Members of the Naval War College's enlisted honor guard unveil the bronze plaque as Provost James Giblin (far left) and Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt (right) look on. Behind the monument on the left is Commander Craig D. Powell. *Courtesy of Professor John E. Jackson*

The Newport Navy Choristers Singing "The Red, White, and Blue" during the 9/11 Memorial Dedication Ceremony. The Choristers have long been part of the Naval War College scene. Established in 1953, the group was initially made up of wives of War College students and known as the Navy Wives Chorale. In 1956, the group was renamed the Navy Wives Chorus. Performing regularly at naval social events and in concerts at local schools and other locations in Newport, the group gradually grew in size. Husbands added their voices to the group as it expanded from the College to the rest of Naval Station Newport. In 1959, the group became known as the Navy Choristers, and in 1963, the Newport Navy Choristers.
Courtesy of Professor John E. Jackson

Indiana limestone facing from the Pentagon's outer western façade that had been damaged in the attack. Brought to Newport by Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 23 and placed upright in the center of the memorial, it symbolizes "the restored and strengthened Pentagon building with the continued strength of America's armed forces."[26] An additional smaller piece of the same stone was presented to the Naval War College Museum. On the large limestone piece, a bronze plaque lists the eleven victims, while another plaque acknowledges the generous contributions from donors to the Naval War College Foundation that made the memorial possible.[27]

One of those who died, Commander Dan Shanower, was a naval intelligence officer who was serving as officer in charge of the Pentagon's Naval Operations Intelligence Plot at the time of his death. In 1997, he had published an article to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the loss of four of his shipmates in Carrier Air Wing 5, who had been lost during a sortie from USS *Midway* (CV 41) during Operation Earnest Will in November 1987.[28] The opening words that he wrote in his article, "Freedom Isn't Free," serve equally as a memorial to his own service as well as to that of those who died with him at the Pentagon: "The military loses scores of personnel every year in training or operational accidents. Each one risked and lost his or her life for something they believed in, leaving behind friends, family, and shipmates to bear the burden and celebrate their devotion to our country."[29] The Naval War College engraved these

Obverse and Reverse of the Naval War College 9/11 Patriots Memorial Coin. These coins were minted for the fifth-anniversary ceremony of the attacks in September 2006. The Naval War College Foundation funded their manufacture from the balance of the donations remaining after the construction of the memorial. The coins were distributed to the families who attended the ceremony in 2006 as well as to family members who could not be present and to all who donated to build the memorial.

Naval War College Museum Collection

words on a separate stone as part of the memorial. Another stone carries a quotation from President George W. Bush's address to the nation on 11 September 2001: "Terrorist attacks can strike the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America."[30]

Sea Power 21

In early 2002, Admiral Vern Clark directed a member of his staff in Washington to begin to develop a broad statement of his vision for the Navy. The basic idea for this built on the Bush Administration's "1-4-2-1 strategy," a name in which the first number represented homeland defense; the second number, the ability to deter hostilities in four critical areas of the world; the third number, the ability to defeat swiftly two adversaries in near-simultaneous major combat operations; and the final number, the simultaneous capability to defeat one of those two major adversaries decisively.[31] Clark's objectives were to show that the Navy was transforming itself and was far more than an enabling force, being instead a fully integrated part of joint warfare. At the same time, he indirectly wanted to justify his goal of a 375-ship Navy, and link this new vision to his initiatives on better alignment for agencies and functions as well as cross-functional analysis with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.[32]



Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, Announcing the Navy's New Strategic Concept, Sea Power 21, in His Speech to the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, 13 June 2002. As can be seen in the slide the concept's three primary elements of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing were tied together by ForceNet, a network-centric warfare concept.

Naval War College Museum Collection

At the Naval War College's annual Current Strategy Forum on 13 June 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations introduced publicly for the first time his new concept in an address titled "Sea Power 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era." "I want to talk to you today about a new operational vision I call SEA POWER 21," Clark announced.

> I will tell you that this is the first time that I have talked about this in a public forum. But I could not let this conference go by without addressing it. My thoughts on this have been evolving over the last couple of years through my visits to the War College, discussions with the strategic studies group here, talking to the people at NWDC [Navy Warfare Development Command], talking to special groups set up by the president of the Naval War College here, working with groups in Washington, and talking about what our future is about. While I haven't talked about this publicly yet, I just began thinking about this event and I decided we couldn't let this opportunity pass without sharing my growing thoughts on how we need to be transforming our Navy to meet the requirements of the new century.[33]

Toward the end of his speech, Clark mentioned the need for the fleet to develop a culture of innovation and to streamline and integrate an experimental process. Calling this process "Sea Trial," Clark had directed Admiral Robert Natter, Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to take charge of the effort and to make that command the center for innovation and experimentation because it also served as the naval component command for Joint Forces Command. Sea Trial "puts the Fleet at the heart of innovation and provides a mechanism to more readily capture the fruits of their operational excellence and experimentation," Clark noted. "To help him accomplish this mission, I transferred the Navy Warfare Development Command to CFFC [Commander, Fleet Forces Command] last year. At the same time, I left an additional responsibility to the President of the Naval War College to make sure that we were able to integrate the thinking that was going on here at Newport."[34]

Related to this point, Clark pointed out the need to develop the full potential of our officers and men. For this purpose, Clark reported that "the Chief of Naval Personnel, supported by the Chief of Naval Education and Training, will take charge of project *Sea Warrior,* to enhance the assessing, assignment, training, and education of our people."[35] This clear statement of intent by the officer who exercised governance of the College confirmed that graduate education and professional military education were certainly two of its primary mission areas.

Graduate Education in the Navy

The executive leadership of the College recognized that there were other areas in which its institutional effectiveness could be questioned. These challenges caused the College to reexamine how it had been doing business in the context of its mission, functions, and tasks. Not the least of these was its education function. Admiral Rempt had long believed that the Navy, as an organization, had not carefully examined its investment in and approach to graduate and professional military education. Foreshadowing Clark's call for an effort to improve how the Navy educated its people by half a year, the Naval War College hosted a graduate education leadership meeting on 14–15 November 2001 to open the discussions between Rempt and his colleague Rear Admiral David R. Ellison, the president of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, on this issue. During the course of this meeting they agreed to work together over the following months to produce a detailed study of this vulnerability.[36] The purpose of this data-driven analysis was to help the senior leadership of the Navy meet the transformational needs of the service and keep its covenant with its officers concerning their education and professional development.

Since the initiative that began at the Naval War College in 1919 with the Knox-Pye-King Board, there had been some seventy reports from task forces and panels on various aspects of education within the Navy. While many of these reports resulted in new or revised vision statements for organizations, few of them resulted in the implementation of policies that were sustained for any length of time in their execution. In this regard, former Assistant Dean of Academic Affairs for Corporate Affairs Richard Suttie commented, "Zeniths have been reached, mostly due to the vision and charisma of an individual CNO, but the strategic investment in education has been erratic, both in resources and career path management."[37] In 1998, the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel had formed a task force to review the requirements for advanced officer education. Its top two recommendations were to offer the top 10 percent of Naval Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps graduates the opportunity for immediate graduate education and

to create a virtual "University of the Navy" under a chief learning officer, who would report directly to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements (N7). In addition, the 1998 panel recommended that (1) only the top one third of officers should be sent to resident educational programs; (2) all unrestricted line officers should be required to complete two courses in professional military education by the time they reached the rank of captain; (3) the top one third of unrestricted line officers should be sent to two residential professional military education programs or to graduate education and a senior professional military education program; (4) professional military education should be required for promotion to captain and flag officer beginning in fiscal year 2000; and (5) access should be increased to education through distance learning, executive education, and continuing education.[38]

The outcome of Rempt and Ellison's effort was a strategic conversation with the Navy's senior leadership on the subject of the future of graduate and professional military education. Using the 1998 report as a foundation, the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School, with participation from the Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) and the Training and Education Division (N79) of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, conducted additional research and presented a major report, "Transforming Graduate and Professional Military Education," to the Graduate Education Review Board (GERB), chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, on 5 May 2002 at the Pentagon. Seventeen flag officers attended the two-hour PowerPoint briefing that Captain Suttie delivered.[39] What became known as the "GERB Report" clearly showed to the Navy's senior leadership that the recommendations of the 1998 task force had not been implemented. Moreover, it highlighted the acute mismatch between the Navy's policy on graduate education and data on officer assignments, confirming that these policy statements were not substantiated by the execution of the Navy's stated educational policy.[40]

The "GERB Report" also showed that the percentage of the naval officer corps in resident graduate education programs was declining and that the Navy's current manning priorities placed graduate education at the bottom, filling only 79.6 percent of available billets. In the senior classes of 1999–2001 at the service and joint professional military education institutions, the quality of Navy officers was lagging behind that of officers from other services, with 65 percent of Navy officers attending in the bottom 20 percent of their classes. The Navy was not sending its best. At the Naval War College, with more than 400 naval officer students, slightly more than 50 reached the top academic level of distinguished graduates, while the Army with just under 150 students had 50 distinguished graduates. Moreover, only about 35 percent of the Navy's flag officers had graduated from one service or joint college course, with only 4 percent having attended two courses, contrasting with the Army and Air Force with nearly 99 percent of general officers having attended both an intermediate and a senior-level service or joint college.[41] Furthermore, the Navy's budget for graduate education had been declining in the past ten years. In a $10 billion annual training and education budget, the share for graduate education was about 2.4 percent and had declined from a total of $250 million in 1992 to only $236 million in 2000.[42]

The 2002 report recommended, among a number of other things, that the joint professional military education course provided by the Naval War College should also be integrated into and provided to all Navy officers in the Naval Postgraduate School resident curricula as well as increasing the capacity for web-based

and academically accredited instruction at both the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College. In addition, the report proposed the creation of an academic board composed of the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, the Chief of Naval Education and Training, the President of the Naval War College, and the President of the Naval Postgraduate School, who would develop a budget based on educational needs rather than competition with other requirements and be tasked with developing a proposal for graduate education oversight and sponsorship.[43]

The "GERB Report" and the strategic conversation that it generated succeeded in convincing the Navy's senior leadership to take on the issues raised in its analysis. By the time that Rear Admiral Rempt left the College in July 2003 substantial progress had been made in bringing the Navy's educational issues to the fore. The Graduate Education Review Board recommended and Admiral Clark approved a requirement for unrestricted line officers and restricted line and staff officers to complete service and joint professional military education at the intermediate level prior to assignment to commander command and equivalent billets for the restricted line and staff corps. This was a significant change in how the Navy did business. Admiral Clark directed that it be implemented by fiscal year 2009.[44] The board also recommended that the annual number of officer-students in graduate education and professional military education be increased to 1,965 graduates per year and that additional resources be provided to the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School for programs at fleet concentration areas and distance learning.[45] Moreover, it provided the road map for the work on advanced education in the Navy that has been in progress since June 2002.

Professional Military Education and Joint Professional Military Education

Of no less value to the Navy was the work initiated by the College on increasing access to PME and JPME for the Navy's officer corps. Clark and Rempt were keenly aware that Congress was not satisfied with the Navy's implementation of the professional military education and joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.[46] Clark believed that Congress would take action to mitigate this situation, and it soon did so with legislation that required that after 30 September 2007, officers promoted to rear admiral (lower half) must be selected as joint specialty officers (JSOs) prior to their promotion. As a result of the "GERB Report" and wanting to get ahead of the legislation, Clark made it clear to Rempt that he wanted the War College to increase access for all naval officers to professional military education and joint professional military education Phase I. Accordingly, it was no surprise that this wide-ranging challenge was a key issue raised by the College during a command inspection by the Naval Inspector General requested by Rempt for the War College in May 2003.[47] Rear Admiral Rempt led the College in preparing for and completing that inspection. The resulting report was extremely complimentary of procedures and practices at the College and found no significant concerns or issues.[48] It also highlighted a sound method for the College to increase access to professional military education and joint professional military education for the Navy's officer corps.

The "GERB Report" had recommended, among a number of other things, as mentioned above, that the intermediate service college program with joint professional military education Phase I embedded in it that was offered by the Naval War College at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey should be integrated into and provided to all Navy officers in Naval Postgraduate School resident curricula. Rear Admiral

Rempt discussed this recommendation with Admiral Clark and told him that it was the College's intent to change the way the College did business at its Naval War College at Naval Postgraduate School program in Monterey as the opening initiative in a series of actions to increase access to professional military education and joint professional military education for naval officers. Rempt noted, however, that there were several barriers to implementing this recommendation, not the least of which was the competition between the time required by a Naval Postgraduate School student to complete the six-quarter requirement for the Naval War College's Intermediate Service College Phase I requirements and the requirements imposed by various Monterey degree program sponsors. This impediment was largely due to the fact that the War College's program at Monterey had to schedule its courses around those of the various Postgraduate School resident curricula, including the need sometimes to schedule courses in the evening at the conclusion of the normal workday at Monterey. This barrier was instrumental in limiting the number of graduates per year to an average of eighty-two for the years 2000 to 2002.[49] Nonetheless, Rempt decided to focus on the Monterey program because it had demonstrated the highest graduation rate of the College's various distance education programs and had the potential to show a significant return on investment quickly in terms of increasing the number of those graduates.[50]

Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., Served as the Third Provost of the College and Was Simultaneously Dean of Academic Affairs from 2002 to 2007. Giblin had previously been a member of the faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department from 1986 to 1988 and the faculty of the National Security Decision Making Department from 1997 to 2002. A 1966 graduate of the Naval Academy, he served for thirty years in uniform, retiring as a captain in 1996. During the Vietnam War, he was officer in charge of a "Swift Boat" and commanded a detachment of ten Swifts. Later he commanded USS *Defiance* (PG 95), USS *Kirk* (FF 1087), and the Navy's Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Ingleside, Texas. Ashore, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. His last assignment on active duty was as deputy and executive assistant to the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Admiral Dennis Blair. A graduate of the Naval War College Command and Staff course in 1979 and the National War College in 1992, he also earned a master of arts in international relations from Georgetown University, and a master of arts in law and diplomacy as well as a PhD from the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Rempt and Provost Jim Giblin, with the assistance of College of Distance Education director Timothy H. Jackson and Assistant Director Leonard "Walt" Wildemann, proposed the new plan to increase joint professional military education Phase I for naval officers assigned to the Postgraduate School. The College agreed to stop offering its master of arts Fleet Seminar Program at Monterey and, instead, focus on a six-quarter intermediate-level service college program that would meet the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements for joint professional military education Phase I, if the Postgraduate School would include those course requirements as part of as many of its resident courses as suitable and feasible.[51] Using this concept as its model for its program at Monterey, the College demonstrated that it could expand access and thereby graduate an estimated 390 qualified officers per year at Monterey and could do so with only a small increase in its baseline budget to fund a modest growth in the number of War College faculty at Monterey over the next several years. Rear Admiral Ellison agreed to the concept with the understanding that it was ultimately the decision of the various curriculum sponsors as to what was included within their curricula.[52]

The Naval Inspector General, Vice Admiral Albert T. "Tom" Church III, encouraged by the collaboration between the two institutions on a matter of high interest to the Chief of Naval Operations and his senior leadership and acknowledging that this initiative was indicative of the institutional

effectiveness of the War College, brought this concept forward as a recommendation in his report on his inspection of the War College to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. In it, Church noted that this concept offered the Navy a fourfold return on its investment in sending an officer to Monterey. A graduate of the Postgraduate School and the College's program would leave Monterey with (1) the postgraduate degree for which he or she had been ordered there; (2) a subspecialty in the field of that degree; (3) a Naval War College intermediate-level service college diploma; and (4) certification of having completed joint professional military education Phase I. The College began to execute this initiative beginning in 2003. But, as a matter of institutional integrity and in order to comply with the accreditation requirements of the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, the College agreed that it would permit those officers already enrolled in its master's program to complete their degrees.[53] Admiral Clark agreed with Church's recommendation and formally tasked the College and the Postgraduate School to double the number of graduates per year from the College's program at Monterey. Starting in July 2003, the Naval War College phased out the nighttime Fleet Seminar Program and graduate degree program for students at Monterey.[54]

Research, Analysis, and Gaming

The attacks of 11 September had a direct influence on the College's research, analysis, and gaming activities. The College's war-gaming capability, a signature feature of the institution, was swiftly brought to bear on the challenges and critical uncertainties associated with the maritime component of homeland security and homeland defense. By close of business on Monday, 17 September 2001, Rear Admiral Rempt had reported to both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Vice Chief that the College was ready and able to conduct a series of games to support the Navy's leadership as it began to wrestle with the conceptual, operational, and resource implications of the maritime component of homeland security and homeland defense.[55] Partnering with Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command; Commander, Fleet Forces Command; the Warfare Requirements Division (N7) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and selected members of the interagency community, the Naval War College offered games focused on the development of issues confronting the Navy and the nation in the maritime operational domain of homeland security and homeland defense. The games specifically addressed operational concepts; threats; vulnerabilities; command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and tactics, techniques, and procedures pertinent to the operational problem at hand. Six games took place in the period between October 2001 and January 2002. The pace was fast, with one game being executed at the same time the next game was being planned and the preceding game analyzed. The analysis of these six games defined a set of issues as well as a set of operational concepts that enabled the Navy to develop a mission capabilities plan to address the Navy's role in and needs for homeland security and homeland defense. Key to this outcome was the recognition highlighted by the analysis of these games that the Navy and the Coast Guard needed to have an effective concept of operations in order to operate together in the homeland defense environment.[56]

At the same time, the College seized the opportunity to help the nation to address its homeland security concerns by matching its signature war-gaming capability with the needs of the nation's first responders. A number of cities and states began to request gaming assistance on a variety of homeland security issues. After coordinating these requests with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the College undertook

New York Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly (Right) with War Gaming Department Chairman Dr. Ken Watman (Left), 18 June 2002.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Replica of the Memorial Statue to New York Police Department Officers Killed in the Line of Duty, Presented to Rear Admiral Rempt, 17 October 2002, during the War Game for the New York City Office of Emergency Management. The full statue of a police officer watching over the child of a slain police officer stands in New York Police Department Headquarters in Manhattan. The noted Italian sculptor Attilio Piccirilli created the original statue in 1939 after Mayor Fiorello La Guardia advocated a monument honoring New York Police Department officers killed in the line of duty.
Naval War College Museum Collection

them when they did not interfere with the schedule of more-traditional military and educational war games. Typically, these games concentrated on Department of Defense support to civil authorities and interagency coordination with a full range of perspectives from the federal, state, and local levels. Each game focused on the game's sponsor's organizational readiness to deal with terrorist attacks and the sponsor's command and control capabilities in those circumstances. Games of this type were organized for the Fire Department of New York in December 2001; the New York Police Department in June and May 2002 and April 2003; the New York City Office of Emergency Management in October 2002; the State of Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency in October 2002; the Greater New York City Hospital Association in June 2003; the Suffolk County, New York, Police Department in June 2003; the City of Providence, Rhode Island, in July 2003; the Federal Emergency Management Region I in August 2003; and the National Guard Northeast Region in August 2003. Similar games continued for other agencies in later years.[57]

By 2001, the global war game that had been played annually since 1979 had developed a large infrastructure of supporting activities that had become increasingly complex, unwieldy, and expensive to maintain. Over the years, other services had begun to emulate the approach that soon became known as "Title X Games," referring to the section on the armed forces in the United States Code, the consolidated laws of the United States, that gives the responsibility to each of the separate uniformed services to raise, to train, and to equip its forces. These games examined likely future situations in order to plan and assist in budgetary decisions in the process for each service's program objective memoranda. As Global became more expensive and more unwieldy, the College considered moving the games to a biennial cycle rather than doing them annually, but the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bill Fallon, recommended that the Global series be discontinued.

During a discussion of Admiral Fallon's recommendation between Admiral Clark and Rear Admiral Rempt in July 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations, with the concurrence of Rempt, made the decision to cancel the global war game in the form in which it had evolved and directed the College to replace it with a series of smaller, more focused games with emphasis on critical, dispassionate analysis of the issues that emerged in these games. The College continued with planning a smaller and less costly series of games, but

these were soon overshadowed by the new demands for gaming support following the 11 September attacks. Moreover, Admiral Clark's Sea Power 21 and its Sea Trial program had shifted the responsibility for naval innovation to Fleet Forces Command, leaving the College without the authority to initiate a large research war game. For a variety of reasons, neither the College, the Navy Warfare Development Command, nor Fleet Forces Command attempted to revive Title X war gaming until fiscal year 2007, when Commander, Fleet Forces Command tasked the War College to plan for and conduct a revised and more focused series of global games.[58]

Under Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the College had initiated a process of expanding its research capacity in the area of regional security challenges. Dr. Jonathan Pollack had taken the lead of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group and a bilateral research relationship had been established between the College and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's Maritime Staff College in Tokyo. However, with the exception of the longstanding annual Northwest Pacific game with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, the events of 11 September put a temporary end to the international war games and the presence of international research fellows in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.[59] In their place, a number of regional study groups were established over the following years, paralleling a growing demand from the Navy for officers with regional expertise. These groups included the Latin American Regional Studies Group under the leadership of Ambassador Paul Taylor, the Eurasian Regional Studies Group chaired by Dr. Catherine Kelleher, the Greater Middle East Regional Studies Group under Dr. Ahmed Hashim, the African Regional Studies Group under Professor Jonathan Stevenson, and the Indian Ocean Regional Studies group with Dr. Andrew Winner.[60]

International Programs

The Formal Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Research and Education between the Naval War College and the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, May 2002.

Left to right: Professor Thomas M. Nichols, Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department; Rear Admiral Barbara McGann, provost; Dr. Sergei Rogov, Director, Institute of USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. Charles Neimeyer, Dean of Academic Affairs, Naval War College.

Naval War College Museum Collection

In early 2002, Dr. Thomas M. Nichols, the chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department and Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy, had been working with colleagues from the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow on a book project on the history of the Cold War.[61] In the course of that project, Nichols found that, in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, some of his contacts at the Russian Academy of Sciences expressed an interest in working with the Naval War College. This was clearly a change and, on learning this, Rear Admiral McGann directed Nichols to go to Moscow to begin to develop a plan. By May 2002, the director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sergei Rogov, came to Newport and signed a formal memorandum of understanding with the Naval War College on cooperation in research and education. The agreement designated Nichols as the director of the working committee on the American side and Dr. Valery Mazing, the director on the Russian side. In addition, the agreement called for

cooperative research on a range of issues of mutual interest on international security and stability, including the new challenges presented by international terrorism, the problem of the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the dynamics of the trilateral relations between the United States, Europe, and Russia. Although a promising initiative, it was neither funded nor developed further.[62] Nonetheless, this initiative convinced the executive leadership of the College that some form of cooperation with Russia was possible in the future as part of the College's international programs venue.[63]

In the wake of the 11 September attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell issued a joint letter in 2002 that included, among other things, a call for a significant increase in U.S. spending on defense and maritime security cooperation and training of international personnel in the United States. Both Rumsfeld and Powell believed that this was an important strategic initiative that could produce positive short- and long-term results for the United States. Admiral Rempt and Provost Giblin were aware of this joint letter and began to look for ways that the War College could immediately respond. Both realized that expanding the enrollment of international officers in the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College could directly and quickly support the Rumsfeld-Powell initiative.[64] Moreover, Admiral Rempt was a strong proponent of the College's international programs. He and his wife, Pam, were personally engaged very heavily with the Naval Command College. Both of them did their utmost to accompany its students on trips, when they could, and to ensure that they were fully engaged in the College environment. The Rempts felt that this was very important to do following the 11 September attacks, when there was some uncertainty regarding the friendship of various countries that had students at the College.[65]

Captain Vincent Mocini, USN. Vince Mocini joined the Naval War College faculty in October 2000 as a member of the military faculty in the Joint Military Operations Department, after serving as U.S. naval attaché in Rome, Italy. In June 2001, he was appointed director of the Naval Command College and served in that position until his retirement from active duty in June 2003. In December 2003, the Naval War College hired him as a civilian to be the College's first associate dean of academic affairs for international programs. In 2008, due to growing cooperation with foreign naval war colleges, the position was renamed Dean, International Programs and Maritime Security Cooperation. Mocini held this post until January 2012. From June 2011 until he retired in June 2012, he served for the second time as Director, Naval Command College.

Naval War College Museum Collection

In 2003, there were, on average, about 35 international officers attending the Naval Command College and about 26 attending each of the two offerings of the Naval Staff College each year. Admiral Rempt took the initiative and directed Giblin to make plans to double the number of international officers in residence at the College each year. Rempt established a goal of 150 officers per year, with 50 international officers enrolled in the Naval Command College and 50 international officers registered in each of the Naval Staff College's two courses. After consulting with the staff in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Rempt concluded that this initiative was both suitable and feasible and could be executed easily and quickly, provided that the Chief of Naval Operations issued the invitations to his counterparts. In early 2003, Rempt met with Admiral Clark in Newport and discussed the Rumsfeld-Powell initiative and his plan to increase international officer enrollment at the College. Clark immediately approved Rempt's recommendations.[66]

To implement this plan, the College created the new position of associate dean of academic affairs for international programs reporting to the dean

of academic affairs and the provost. Captain Vincent Mocini, who retired from active duty in June 2003 as the Director, Naval Command College, was hired in December 2003 as the first person to fill this position, carrying out those duties until his retirement as a civilian in June 2012. Mocini's primary focus was to exercise oversight of the administration of the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College and the planning and execution of their budget and academic year activities. Rempt, Giblin, and Mocini together worked out a strategy that was carried out in subsequent years. This involved not only doubling the international officer student body but also broadening and enhancing the international program visits, enhancing the exchange between international officers and American officers during their year in Newport, and taking steps to improve the quality of the physical spaces for both programs.[67]

Financial Challenges

Commander Steven L. Smith Was Comptroller of the Naval War College from 2000 to 2004 and Returned to Take Up the Position as a Civilian in 2006. A graduate of the University of California with a master of business administration in 1978, Smith had graduated from both Officer Candidate School and Surface Warfare Division Officers' School in 1983. He went on to specialize by attending Supply Corps School in 1987 and earned a master of science in information technology at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1993. After serving at sea, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Sea Systems Command, he entered the Naval War College and graduated with another master's degree in 2000. From 2004 to 2006, he was comptroller at the Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport.

Courtesy of Steven L. Smith

Rear Admiral Rempt recognized that the College's financial health was vital to sustaining and expanding the College's efforts to demonstrate its institutional effectiveness and relevance to the Chief of Naval Operations. Rempt's initial assessment was that the outlook in terms of financial resources did not look promising. He suspected that this, at least in part, was the result of Admiral Clark's assessment that it was not clear to him and other senior leaders that the Naval War College provided any added value to the naval service. Rempt suspected that Admiral Clark's initial perception had perhaps affected the College's budget. In early June 2002, Rempt tasked Provost Giblin and the College's comptroller, Commander Steven Smith, SC, USN, to examine the current and future fiscal well-being of the College in detail and to determine what the College needed to do to improve its position in the Navy's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).[68]

After about a month of rigorous analysis, Giblin and Smith briefed Rempt that the College's financial resources had diminished in real terms since fiscal year 1996 and were projected to decrease at accelerating rates starting in fiscal year 2004. They estimated that the College would have a budgetary shortfall of between $5.6 million and $6.0 million at the beginning of fiscal year 2005. They attributed this shortfall to what they termed a series of "divots" in the preceding, current, and future fiscal years caused by "taxes" levied by the College's resource sponsor, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements (N7) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the inability or unwillingness of N7 to replace those "divots" in budget execution years. They assessed the net effect of this situation to be so adverse that it would call into question the College's ability to fund faculty, curriculum development, faculty development, research, information technology, books, printing, and copyright costs—the essence of the College's education and research, analysis, and gaming functions—without shifting significant financial resources from other mission areas. They also briefed Rear Admiral Rempt that the financial ability of the College to maintain, repair,

renovate, and modernize its aging physical infrastructure was in jeopardy. Taken together, these conditions represented a substantial vulnerability to the future institutional effectiveness of the College.[69]

Giblin and Smith told Rempt that they judged there were several reasons for this situation, not the least of which was that the resource process, as then structured organizationally, did not provide the most advantageous visibility for the College's resource requirements in the decision-making process in Washington, D.C. In this regard, they stressed their conviction that, because of the broad responsibilities of N7 for "warfare requirements," the College was in effect competing directly with, for example, the acquisition of the next tranche of the F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, the next increment of *Arleigh Burke*–class guided-missile destroyers, and the next *Virginia*-class nuclear attack submarine in the resource decision-making process. They suggested that it might be in the College's interest to find another resource sponsor. They also briefed Rear Admiral Rempt that their frank analysis of the College's "story" and the issue papers that described its unfunded requirements that accompanied its budget submissions revealed several substantive weaknesses that created unintended risk for the College in the resource decision-making process. Principal among these was the fact the College had been basing its budget submissions on an organizational rather than a functional model. This made it difficult for N7's staff, as well as the War College's staff, to link the College's budget requirements with its approved mission, functions, and tasks statement. On the basis of this assessment and the candid discussion that accompanied it, Rear Admiral Rempt concluded that the decisions that generated this shortfall in Washington were another key indicator of the disconnect between the College and what the Chief of Naval Operations expected of it. Rempt immediately directed Giblin and Smith to correct this as their first priority. Rempt realized that, unless the College did so and did so quickly, the College's ability to continue to demonstrate its institutional effectiveness and relevance was in jeopardy.[70]

In the short term, this meant that the College needed to fix its fiscal baseline controls in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and, then, to begin to develop a more rigorous, convincing input to the fiscal year 2006 Future-Years Defense Program. To do this in an effective and efficient way first required Rear Admiral Rempt to make a decision on whether the College should stay with N7's resource sponsorship or it should seek an alternative resource sponsor. Giblin and Smith recommended that the College seek another resource sponsor. Rempt agreed in principle, but wanted to talk personally with Admiral Clark about this important decision. During a telephone conversation with Clark on this subject in July 2002, Rempt learned that the Chief of Naval Operations was already considering a change in resource sponsorship for the College as part of his implementation of Sea Warrior for many of the same reasons that had been briefed to Rempt by Giblin and Smith. Rempt and Clark agreed on a new arrangement, with the President of the War College remaining a second-echelon commander reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations for broad policy guidance, mission assignment and execution, and governance, while reporting to the Commander, Naval Education and Training Command, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (N1) for purposes of budget submission and resource sponsorship, respectively. Clark assured Rempt that this relationship offered Rempt a way to bring the College's resource issues to him if Rempt found that the process was not giving sufficient visibility to the College's needs.[71]

Rempt understood that this decision was not without risk; indeed, it was a matter of trust and confidence. But he believed that this new relationship would give—over time and in light of the Chief of Naval

Operations' commitment to Sea Warrior—the College a strong advocate for educational funding and ensure that funding requirements for education would not be forced to compete for priority against future expenditures for aircraft or warships. As for competition with the Navy's training needs, he had confidence that an appropriate balance of resources between training and graduate and professional military education requirements could be established and maintained. But Rempt was concerned about the College's research funding because the Commander, Naval Education and Training Command was not chartered to address the resource requirements of the research, analysis, and gaming functions of the College. Nonetheless, he trusted that this shortcoming could be mitigated over time by retaining the College's existing close relationship with the Chief of Naval Research and executing an aggressive program to educate the Commander, Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), and his key senior staff, about the College's research, analysis, and gaming function. The outcome of this decision was not without challenges to the College for the first few years as it worked to adapt to this new organizational relationship and to educate its resource sponsor on just what it was that the College does.[72] Expressing the College's frustration at the time, some in Newport joked privately that the *E* in *NETC* was a silent vowel.[73]

Administrative Actions

In 2002, Admiral Rempt initiated a lengthy strategic planning process over a period of twelve months that involved the entire College in looking to the future and carefully considering its role in the ongoing Global War on Terror. The College had first developed a strategic plan in 1993 during Admiral Joe Strasser's administration and it had been updated annually until 1997.[74] The new plan, signed in April 2003, was the first one to be produced in five years. This new plan updated the College's statement of its own mission and established a vision for the future with defined guiding principles to executing the mission and for the workplace. The plan established twelve overall goals, more than fifty objectives, and more than 1,100 steps to accomplish them in motivating the entire College workforce to bring the College into the twenty-first century. Admiral Rempt kept the strategic plan active for the remainder of his tenure. One immediate result of the effort was the local acceptance of a simple abbreviated mission statement for the College: "Educate Tomorrow's Leaders and Help CNO Define the Future Navy."[75] In September 2003, Rempt's successor, Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, reaffirmed the strategic plan just two months into his presidency.

Another significant initiative in this period was the use of zone inspections for all College facilities and support areas. Admiral Rempt conducted nearly weekly inspections of different areas of the College, including classrooms; faculty and staff offices; the library; the electrical, air-conditioning, and heating infrastructures; and support services outside the College. This initiative resulted in a significant improvement in maintenance, cleanliness, and repairs as well as better utilization of space. The results from these zone inspections were also used to defend and to seek an increase in the College's facilities budget. Likewise, the College worked closely with retired Rear Admiral Strasser, former President of the College, who had become the executive director of the Naval War College Foundation in 2000, to develop seminars and discussions for Foundation members that described the College's needs and the opportunities available for improvement. Through Strasser's initiatives this resulted in a significant increase in the Foundation's donations and support for the College.[76]

Organizational Changes within the College

The year 2002 brought a large number of changes among the College's senior leaders. Rear Admiral Barbara McGann retired as provost and was replaced, at first temporarily and then permanently, by Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., after a national search was completed. The dean of academic affairs, Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, left the College to become vice president of academic affairs at Valley Forge Military Academy and College, under its president, Rear Admiral Peter A. C. Long, USN (Ret.). Professor William E. Turcotte retired as the long-standing chairman of the National Security Decision Making Department and was succeeded by the College's first female department head, Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese. Professor George Baer retired as Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department, and later was assigned to the College's program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, where he taught courses for many more years to students at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Thomas Nichols succeeded him as chairman of the department in Newport. The chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department, Captain Michael Felmly, left in 2002. Professor Theodore Gatchel, who had earlier chaired the department in 1989–1991, temporarily filled the position for a year until Captain Anthony Ruoti, Jr., USN, took over in 2003. Also in 2003, Captain Vincent Mocini retired as director of the Naval Command College and was relieved by Captain Bradley Smith, USN, while Captain Fred B. Horne, USN, left as director of the Naval Staff College to be succeeded by Captain Stephen M. Senteio, USN. In other areas of the College, Dr. Thomas Grassey left as editor of the Naval War College Press in 2002, to be succeeded, after a short gap filled by managing editor Pelham Boyer, by Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher. Professor John E. Jackson left as director of the College of Continuing Education in March 2002 to take up the post of Director, Development and Long Range Planning. Professor Timothy Jackson succeeded him under the new title Director, College of Distance Education. In addition, Anthony S. Nicolosi, the founder of the library's Naval Historical Collection in 1969 and since 1978 the first director of the Naval War College Museum, retired at the end of 2002.

Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher Was Editor of the *Naval War College Review* and Press from November 2002 until June 2004. Dr. Kelleher joined the Naval War College faculty in 2001 as professor of strategic studies and was named professor emerita on her retirement in June 2004. A specialist in U.S.-Russian relations, comparative defense studies, arms control, and transatlantic relations, she had served as professor of international relations at the University of Maryland, College Park, 1982–1991; senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1991–1994; the Secretary of Defense's personal representative in Europe and defense advisor to the U.S. ambassador to NATO, 1994–1996; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1996–1998; and director of the Aspen Institute, Berlin, 1998–2001. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

In light of all the new developments in the world and in the Navy at large as well as the unusually large number of changes among key people within the College, Rear Admiral Rempt took the opportunity to make a number of changes as well as a major realignment of staff functions across the College. In a memorandum that was effective on 1 January 2003, he revised a number of key relationships and created new positions. Rempt intended to execute the realignment, meant "to create a more efficient and responsive organization, as well as [to foster] an environment of personal and professional growth," as smoothly as possible to prepare for the significant future challenges the College faced.[77] He believed these changes would

help to develop a renewed cohesiveness among the disparate elements of the College and increase institutional effectiveness and mission accomplishment.[78] As part of this effort, Admiral Rempt directed all chairmen and directors affected by the realignment to develop and submit organizational proposals for internal department organizations for his personal approval.

First, Rempt combined the positions of provost and dean of academic affairs into one, with the occupant of this post, Dr. Jim Giblin, reporting directly to the President of the College. The dean of students, the new associate deans for academic affairs and electives, chairs of academic departments, and the directors



Organizational Chart of the Naval War College, Effective on 1 January 2003. *Naval War College Archives*

of the College of Distance Education, library, Naval Command College, and Naval Staff College all reported directly to the provost/dean of academic affairs. In addition, he designated the provost as the dean of the faculty and the College's senior civilian official who had the authority to act for the President during his absence on all matters with the exception of military discipline. He also tasked the provost with the

responsibility for the effective and efficient functioning of the College to ensure that the College accomplishes its mission, functions, and tasks. Rempt further assigned the provost the responsibility of exercising oversight of the preparation of the College's annual budget as well as its participation in the Department of Defense PPBES. Because of this and in order to link the College's operations that support its mission accomplishment with its financial resource management processes, he likewise made it clear to those other officials who reported directly to him that he expected them to coordinate the execution of their responsibilities directly with the provost. By so doing, Rempt established the provost as the College's chief operating officer and chief financial officer.[79]

Second, the Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Dr. Alberto Coll, reported directly to the President. The chairmen of the Strategic Research, War Gaming, International Law, Warfare Analysis and Research, Advanced Research, and Maritime History Departments, as well as the Officer in Charge, Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment, and the Director, Naval War College Press, all reported directly to the Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Within this arrangement, the Maritime History Department was a new creation that linked the Naval War College Museum with the research and teaching roles of the E. J. King Professor of Maritime History as well as with a maritime history research and writing section, and advisory roles with the library's Naval Historical Collection. Professor John Hattendorf was the first chairman of this department. His former position, as Director, Advanced Research Department, was initially left vacant, but the Warfare Analysis and Research Department gradually absorbed its functions.

Dedication of the Chairmen's Classroom, Conolly Hall Room 138, 21 March 2003. The Naval War College Foundation and the Lockheed Martin Corporation generously funded the new classroom. The concept for the room was for it to be used by the chairs of the academic departments as an attractive and functional space for special meetings and discussions.

Left to right: Rear Admiral Strasser, executive director of the Naval War College Foundation; Admiral Stanley Arthur, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 1992–1995, a member of the Naval War College's advisory board, and President, Missiles and Fire Control, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando; Joseph T. Ducas, the Newport representative of the Lockheed Martin Corporation; and Rear Admiral Rempt. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Third, the position of deputy/chief of staff was established with a range of new functions, although the title of the position dated back to 1972. This position helped to free the academic department heads from responding to every miscellaneous request from the Pentagon and the staff of Commander, Naval Education and Training Command.[80] The occupant of this position, Captain John C. Meyer, reported directly to the President, with the directors of Personnel, Special Events, Facilities, Development and Long Range Planning, and Security, the Operations/Business manager, and chief information officer reporting to the deputy/chief of staff. Under the deputy/chief of staff, Admiral Rempt had created for the first time in the College's history the position of chief information officer. The new post was initially held by Dr. Raymond K. Neff. Additionally, under this reorganization, the Security and Special Events Department was again separated into two departments, with

Commander Carol Elliott as head of the Special Events Department and Commander Donna Dismukes as head of the Security Department. The position of director of Personnel was also created with Commander David J. Destino in the position. One of his roles was to coordinate the administration of naval reserve affairs at the College, although Captain Jack F. Dalrymple, as the reserve affairs coordinator, also reported directly to the President as a staff advisor.

The Effects of Change

The work that the College did in the wake of the September attacks had demonstrated to the Chief of Naval Operations and to other senior Navy leaders that there was value to the Navy and the nation in the Naval War College. The point papers and war games developed after the 11 September attacks helped to set the nation's course in the early years of the Global War on Terror. The definition of issues relating to graduate education and professional military education formed the basis for how the Navy assessed its education posture in the years that followed and demonstrated to Admiral Clark and his senior leaders that the College was listening and was prepared to respond effectively and quickly where it could. The actions taken by the College to expand access to professional military education and joint professional military education for the Navy's officer corps were noted with approval by the Navy's senior leadership. The quick response to the Rumsfeld-Powell letter by expanding the number of international students in residence was also important in demonstrating the institutional effectiveness and relevance of the College. On balance, Rempt's decisions and the actions associated with them were positive in terms of Admiral Clark's assessment of the institutional effectiveness and relevance of the College.

The Naval War College's Board of Advisors Met with Key College Leaders on 21 March 2003 in the President's Room.

Seated around the table (left to right): Captain John Meyer, chief of staff; Michael Bayer, advisory board member; Rear Admiral Rempt; Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, advisory board member; Dr. James Giblin, provost; Linda G. Stevens, advisory board member; back of the head of Paul L. Gaines, advisory board member; profile of Dr. Alberto Coll, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies. **Seated against the wall (left to right):** Professor Leonard "Walt" Wildemann, Acting Director, College of Distance Education; Professor John Jackson, Director, Development and Long Range Planning; Professor Thomas Nichols, Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department; Professor Joan Johnson-Freese, Chairman, National Security Decision Making Department (partially obscured behind Admiral Rempt); Captain Vincent Mocini, Director, Naval Command College; Dr. James F. Miskel, associate dean of academic affairs. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Change is never easy and it is especially difficult in an institution like the Naval War College with such a long history of service to the nation and the Navy. Some members of the academic faculty were apprehensive about what they believed to be change that was being driven by forces external to the College without any compelling purpose for it. Moreover, the perception began to emerge that the Chief of Naval Operations intended the College to play a larger, more varied, role in the years ahead and that this heralded more change in the future. This was unsettling to some. Several academic department chairs found that it became more difficult to deal with such issues coming from outside the College, when there was, at the same time, a proliferation of new administrative

positions that created what they felt were barriers to direct communication between the President and the academic departments.[81] For Professor Tom Nichols, Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department, these developments were very troubling: "the on-going tension between the fact that education is a cumulative, long-term process, and the concurrent fact that the Navy and Defense Department had immediate, short-term needs . . . threatened to erase the important distinction between education and training. This tension nearly reached the breaking point in this period."[82] Another department chair in this environment, Professor Joan Johnson-Freese of the National Security Decision Making Department, agreed and "focused on two issues: the academic rigor of the curriculum and expanding faculty requirements beyond teaching to include research and publication."[83] Other individual faculty members personally told Rear Admiral Rempt that they believed that the organizational changes that he implemented would minimize the need for the faculty to respond to various requests from the Navy and Joint Staffs and allowed them to focus more on curriculum development and research.[84]

Perhaps the issue that generated much of this apprehension was the suggestion that the College's resident courses were "academic fluff" or "gold plated" and could easily be cut down to a more practical length to meet the Navy's needs. A newly promoted flag officer who had not attended the College proposed that the master of arts degree be done away with on the basis of its costs and be replaced with a master of science degree in some newly invented field such as naval operational art.[85] These ideas came from a false assumption that if one removed the academic requirements for the master's degree, the course could be significantly shortened. Johnson-Freese was correct when she explained that "that was only a myth, as when the program was accredited it was accredited based on development in accordance with joint professional military education requirements, without anything additional added."[86]

Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt and Provost James F. Giblin, Jr., Present the Naval War College's Honorary Master of Arts Degree to the Honorable David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, at the Graduation Ceremony Held on 12 March 2003. Secretary Chu gave the principal address to the graduating students. He had generously shared his unique expertise with the College's students in their National Security Decision Making end-of-course strategy and force planning exercise for a number of years. Seated on the Spruance Auditorium stage at the far left is Professor Joan Johnson-Freese, chairman of the National Security Decision Making Department. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Rempt knew of this perception about the College's master's degree and took action to counter it. He sent Provost Jim Giblin to Washington to meet with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bill Fallon, and other flag officers in what was essentially a mini–Graduate Education Review Board. Giblin was able to demonstrate that the College presented an academic program for accreditation that was grounded in the requirements for Navy-specific professional military education and joint professional military education and that there were no additional requirements imposed on the College by NEASC for accreditation. Moreover, he put to rest the contention of some flag officers at that meeting that requirements imposed by the New England Association substantially increased the cost of the College's education program. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations accepted Giblin's explanation that the only additional costs associated with the master of arts program were the annual membership fee the College paid to be a member of the New England Association and the cost associated with the ten-year reaccreditation visit by the New England

Association. Giblin demonstrated that the marginal cost per degree when amortized over a ten-year cycle of accreditation was minimal. Fallon was convinced and decided that the issue was closed from his perspective.[87]

A New President

Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route. As the fiftieth President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Route served from 9 July 2003 until 12 August 2004. For the first eleven weeks of his tenure at the Naval War College, he simultaneously held his previous position as Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command. Although his term as President was short, Route played a major role in leading the continuation of the developments that had started under his predecessor, while developing for the College a realistic fiscal guidance that included risk analysis. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

In the spring of 2003, Admiral Rempt had been fully expecting to retire the following summer, after thirty-seven years of service. In expectation of this, Naval War College staff and faculty had even purchased his retirement gift. Unexpectedly, Admiral Clark advised him that the Superintendent of the Naval Academy was leaving his post early and asked Rempt to take on that position.[88] Relieved as President, Naval War College on 9 July 2003, Rempt was subsequently promoted to vice admiral and assumed duties as the fifty-ninth Superintendent of the Naval Academy on 1 August 2003.

The incoming, fiftieth President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, was very close at hand and had been in Newport since September 2002 as Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command. On relieving Admiral Rempt as President of the Naval War College, Route filled both posts for eleven weeks, from 9 July until 24 September 2003, until Rear Admiral John M. Kelly relieved him as Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command, in a ceremony on Colbert Plaza at the Naval War College.[89]

A native of Denver, Colorado, Route had graduated from the Naval Academy with a bachelor's degree in systems engineering in 1971. His advanced education included a master of science degree in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1976. In 1997, he was selected as a Navy Federal Executive Fellow and assigned to a yearlong prestigious appointment as a military fellow, and later, a member, at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. Additionally, he graduated from the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course and the Joint Force Air Component Commander Courses at the Air War College.[90]

Rear Admiral Route commanded USS *Dewey* (DDG 45), served as surface operations officer for Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two, and the USS *America* (CV 66) Battle Group; chief staff officer for Commander, Destroyer Squadron Four; executive officer in USS *Halsey* (CG 23); weapons officer in USS *Roark*

Rear Admiral Route Pays His Respects to the College's Founder in a Ceremony at Admiral Luce's Grave on the Eighty-Sixth Anniversary of His Death, 28 July 2003.
Naval War College Museum Collection

(FF 1053) and USS *Wainwright* (CG 28); aide and flag lieutenant to Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two; and antisubmarine warfare officer in USS *Barry* (DD 933). He also commanded USS *Lake Erie* (CG 70) in 1994–1996, when the ship earned the Battle Efficiency "E" and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Golden Anchor Award for 1995, as well as deploying to the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf in the USS *Constellation* (CV 64) Battle Group. Ashore in Washington, D.C., Route served as a naval warfare analyst in the Joint Analysis Directorate; a long-range planner and surface ship readiness analyst in the Program Resource Appraisal Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and executive assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). While in that assignment, he served three assistant secretaries during two administrations. Route's first flag officer assignment was as Director, Politico-Military Affairs Division (N52) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. While in this assignment, Route engaged in fourteen navy-to-navy bilateral discussions. In addition, he had his first close association with the Naval War College during the planning and execution of International Seapower Symposium XIV, which took place 2–5 November 1997. He also served as director of Navy Programming in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.[91]

Admiral Route's tenure as President was one year, one month, and three days. While this was short, five of his predecessors and one of his successors had even shorter terms.[92] During his tour of duty, Route accelerated and expanded the initiatives that Admiral Rempt had started to convince the Navy's leadership of the College's institutional effectiveness. In discussions over the course of August and September 2003 with various faculty and staff, he concluded that it was time to take the next step forward by sharpening the College's focus on what all agreed was an evolving mission, functions, and tasks statement. He believed that it was essential, no matter what changes might eventually be made to this statement, that the College maintained the quality and rigor of its academic activities. But he also judged that the Navy's leadership would measure the College's institutional effectiveness by the "relevance" of its Navy and joint professional military education programs and its research, analysis, and gaming accomplishments. He determined that his principal strategic challenge was to ensure that the combination of "quality, rigor and relevance" were the fundamental attributes of everything the College did. If successful, he believed that the Chief of Naval Operations and his senior leadership team would conclude that the Naval War College was acutely relevant to the needs of the Navy.[93]

Graduate and Professional Military Education

Among the challenges discussed by Admiral Clark with Admiral Rempt that still remained on the table at the time of Rempt's detachment was the subject of how the College could help the Chief of Naval

Operations in expanding the number of warfare-qualified officers with competency in the quantitative aspects of the Navy's program planning, program appraisal, policy analysis, force structure, and force level issues.[94] Clark did not want mathematicians; he needed officers who understood and were capable of applying the basics of statistical analyses, simulations, analytical reasoning, and common sense to the understanding and improvement of real-world operations and planning for the future Navy. Rear Admiral Route recognized that the College's curriculum was strong in matters pertaining to strategy and policy. He also knew that the College addressed such diverse topics as risk, net assessment, metrics, analysis of alternatives, and concept generation in a qualitative manner in its National Security Decision Making curricula in the context of an executive education approach to these topics rather than the quantitative aspects of these fundamentals of planning and decision making. Having earned a master of science in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School and having served as a naval warfare analyst in the Joint Analysis Directorate of the Joint Staff as well as a long-range planner and surface ship readiness analyst in the Program Resource Appraisal Division and as director of Navy Programming in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Route fully understood Admiral Clark's needs and willingly took up this challenge almost immediately in his presidency.[95]

After discussions with Provost Jim Giblin in August and early September 2003 in Route's Navy Warfare Development Command office in Sims Hall, the two agreed that it was impossible in either the short term or midterm to modify the existing curricula to include anything meaningful on quantitative analysis. Moreover, they concluded, after a review of the resident faculty's competencies, that there were only a few faculty members who were truly well skilled in quantitative analysis of the sort needed, and those who had such skills did not have a strong background in naval warfare. They also decided that it would also be undesirable, not to mention impractical, to add a requirement to the selection process for the War College that prospective students be skilled in quantitative methods so that the core curriculum could be modified. After some further discussion with key staff members in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Route decided that the most effective way to respond to the Chief of Naval Operations' needs was a set of elective courses that would be offered to selected naval students during the academic year in Newport.[96]

Route and Giblin agreed that the purpose of these electives was to help the leadership of the Navy expand an existing cadre of experienced, warfare-qualified officers in the grades of commander and captain with a basic proficiency in quantitative analysis so that they could direct, participate in, and review analyses to support the Navy's decision making. They believed that the skills required included risk assessment, decision theory, applied probability, data analysis, war gaming, simulation, cost estimation, critical study review, measures of effectiveness, pitfalls in analysis, spreadsheet tools, optimization, and analysis in warfare. Although they were doubtful of the College's ability to address all of these elements in a set of elective courses, Rear Admiral Route decided to approach the president of the Naval Postgraduate School, Rear Admiral Dave Ellison, to see whether it was possible to form a partnership between the two institutions to implement the concept.[97]

Giblin briefed Ellison in September 2003 while Ellison was in Newport and sought his agreement to form the partnership. Ellison agreed. After some additional work with the faculty of the Postgraduate School and its provost, Dr. Richard S. "Dick" Elster, the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School

created a program of three elective courses entitled "Joint Analysis for the Warfare Commander" that would provide ninety hours of graduate-level instruction in the quantitative decision-making techniques previously decided on by Route and Giblin. Elster assigned retired Captain Jeffrey Kline of the Operations Research faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School to develop and to teach the electives in Newport. The College estimated that the program could produce approximately twenty officers per year. Moreover, successful completion of this program would also lead to the assignment of an additional qualification designator (AQD). This designator would create necessary identification to track and identify these graduates in the Navy's personnel system. Route saw this initiative as a key indicator of the College's relevance to the Chief of Naval Operations and his senior leadership.[98]



Cover of the Naval War College's Self-Study for Joint Professional Military Education in 2003.
Naval War College Archives

Less than one month after his decision to bring quantitative methods to the Naval War College and just a little over three months after taking command, Admiral Route led the College through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) review of the College's intermediate resident and nonresident service college programs in October 2003. After reviewing preparations for the visit with Giblin and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs Bill Spain, Route was confident that the College was well prepared. He concluded that the College's self-study, drafted to support the third major external assessment it had undergone since the fall of 2002, and the broader process of self-assessment of which it was a part, had helped the College understand and define its opportunities and challenges and appreciate its strengths and vulnerabilities with more clarity. Route also concluded that it was additionally helpful in apprising a new president of the College's institutional purpose and character as well as its institutional effectiveness as measured against a set of recognized accreditation standards.[99] This joint education accreditation team visit was an extraordinary success by any measure. But perhaps just as important, Route concluded that the College's open and frank assessment of itself and its ability to use the information derived from the process for its improvement were persuasive indicators of the College's institutional effectiveness and institutional integrity. He included these observations in his report of the results of the visit to Admiral Clark. Because of the trust and confidence that he developed in this process, he directed Giblin and Spain to use the self-study prepared for the visit by this joint education accreditation team as the basis for the self-assessment required as part of the forthcoming reaccreditation visit by the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges in the fall of 2004.[100]

The outcome of the very successful joint education assessment accredited the final two Naval War College distance education programs and expanded access to professional military education and joint professional military education Phase I for those officers not able to attend the College in residence. As noted earlier in this chapter, Admiral Rempt, on the completion of the Naval Inspector General's visit to the College in May

2003, had directed Professor Tim Jackson, the director of the College of Distance Education, to discontinue offering the College's master of arts degree program at Monterey immediately and, instead, to establish a six-quarter, intermediate-level service college program that would meet the chairman's requirements for joint professional military education Phase I. Jackson and Professor Fred Drake, the College's program manager at Monterey, responded immediately and, starting in July 2003, phased out the nighttime Fleet Seminar Program and graduate degree program for students at Monterey.[101] In its place, the Naval War College in cooperation with the Naval Postgraduate School shifted to a program of daytime classes scheduled as part of students' Postgraduate School programs of study. The Postgraduate School began to integrate Naval War College course requirements as part of as many as possible of the resident courses taken by unrestricted line, intelligence, and supply corps officer students consistent with the requirements of their curricula sponsors.[102] The accreditation of this initiative, which became known as the Naval War College at the Naval Postgraduate School program (NWC-at-NPS), was part of this visit by the PAJE team.

The team's visit to Monterey resulted in the accreditation of the Naval War College's program there for the intermediate-level professional military education and joint professional military education Phase I nonresident program. This was an important outcome for two reasons. First, Route knew that Admiral Donald L. Pilling, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, had tasked the College to take over responsibility for the Phase I program at Monterey in 1999. Pilling's decision established the College as the single institution in the Navy responsible for all intermediate- and senior-level professional military education programs. This joint education accreditation team visit was the first time that the Monterey program had stood for accreditation since the College had assumed responsibility for it. Success was essential, if for no other reason than the institutional reputation of the Naval War College. Second, it would serve as a way to assess whether this new program was capable of increasing access to professional military education Phase I for the Navy's officers in residence at the Naval Postgraduate School. Given the very favorable findings of the accreditation team, the quality of the College's program at Monterey served as a strong indicator of the Naval War College's relevance as well as a perceptible demonstration of its ability to take quick, effective action to respond to the demands of the Chief of Naval Operations.[103] Because of the College's actions taken to modify its program at Monterey, it was able to report that, by the end of fiscal year 2007, the Naval War College at the Naval Postgraduate School program had achieved a 98 percent graduation rate, had increased its number of graduates to 275 per year, and was well on its way to achieving its projected 390 graduates per year.[104]

The Governor of Rhode Island, Donald L. Carcieri, Made His First Visit to the Naval War College in 2003. As the seventy-third governor of Rhode Island, Carcieri served from January 2003 until January 2011. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The second important outcome of the joint education assessment of the College's intermediate and nonresident service college programs was that it accredited the new CD-ROM-based course. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Provost Giblin had met with what was essentially a mini–Graduate Education

Review Board. During that meeting, several senior flag officers had raised the subject of increasing access to professional military education and joint professional military education Phase I courses in terms of their concern about access for officers assigned to sea duty and for those officers assigned overseas where Internet connectivity might be a challenge. They asked whether it might be in the Navy's interest to field a CD-ROM-based course similar to that offered by the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama that could be completed in less time than the Naval War College's other distance-learning program options. Giblin explained to them that there was a misperception that the Air Command and Staff College course, as then offered, was delivered strictly on CD-ROM and could be completed in less than six months. He made clear to them that the Air Force used a mix of text material on a CD-ROM and required the use of the Air Command and Staff College website to access lectures. He also noted that the advertised time to complete the course was six to eighteen months. However, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bill Fallon, was particularly keen on creating a program of individual study that did not tie officers, such as those assigned to sea duty, to a set schedule that required their presence in seminar in person or on the web. He directed Giblin to examine such an option.[105]

Giblin reported this tasking to Admiral Route and to the appropriate faculty and staff for purposes of information and coordination. There were some honest misgivings on the part of the chairs of the three academic departments because of their concern that such a program would not be as rigorous as the College's other professional military education programs. Indeed, one department chair labeled such an initiative as "a race to the bottom." After further discussion, Route decided that the broad outlines of such an initiative were consistent with the concept of taking the Naval War College's education to where officers lived and worked, as expressed in the Secretary of the Navy's General Order 89 on 1 April 1914, which had originally established the College's correspondence courses, on the condition that the program was rigorous enough to withstand external scrutiny. Route directed Giblin to proceed with the development of such a distance-learning option. The provost's guidance was simple and direct: (1) use the successful web-enabled distance education program as the basis for the CD-ROM initiative;[106] (2) build on the technology lessons learned in fielding the web-enabled course; (3) plan on making the CD-ROM-based program available on a controlled basis to active-duty unrestricted line officers serving on sea duty or those at remote and isolated overseas duty stations; (4) scope the initial version so that it could be completed in sixteen to eighteen months based on four to six hours of work per week; (5) plan on offering it for accreditation during the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff PAJE visit in late 2003.[107]

The College of Distance Education faculty took the lead and produced such a course. Giblin was able to acquire funding from Vice Admiral Alfred G. Harms, Commander, Naval Education and Training Command, in Pensacola, Florida, to support the development of the program. Harms had been present during the mini–Graduate Education Review Board and, as an experienced naval aviator who acknowledged the value of an intermediate service college education that included joint professional military education Phase I, he recognized the inherent challenges the naval aviation community faced in sending officers to Newport. As a result, he was committed to getting such a course online. He directed his staff to provide technology demonstration funds to get the project up and running. Although it was ready for accreditation during the Joint Staff's accreditation team's visit to Newport in October 2003, Rear Admiral Route decided that it would not be presented for accreditation at that point. Though he was satisfied that the new program met his test

of "relevance," he wanted more time to assure himself that it met his tests of "quality and rigor." Route's additional review satisfied him that the CD-ROM program met all his tests and he directed Provost Giblin to move to get it reviewed by the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff accredited the new course in April 2004.[108]

Rear Admiral Route was able to report the return of quantitative methods to the College and the successful PAJE visit to the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel meeting on "Educating the 21st Century Force" in Washington, D.C., in November 2003. Route also took the opportunity to put forward the College's position by underscoring the point that the Graduate Education Review Board and the Advanced Education Summit had produced a positive outcome, but suggested that challenges remain. His message in this regard was that the policy should be to "educate the Navy's officer corps for the unknown" and to avoid becoming trapped in the common "tendency to train for the known."[109] In order to meet the challenge, it was essential for the Navy to match policy with execution of its policy in terms of students, faculty, and funding. A key element in this was to change the common viewpoint in the Navy that saw orders to a war college as filling a quota instead of viewing such an assignment as an investment in human capital. At the same time, it was the responsibility of the Naval War College to "sustain quality, rigor, relevance, and currency" while moving toward affording more access to professional military education and joint professional military education Phase I through an increase in distance learning.[110]

In approaching the implementation of policies and dealing with the arising challenges, Admiral Route brought a distinctive leadership style in his decision-making process that moved beyond the top tier of administrators and reached down to include the department chairmen and even key faculty members within departments. As Associate Dean of Academic Affairs Bill Spain put it, the College accelerated and smoothed the transition that Admiral Rempt had started, because Admiral Route's "leadership style allows people to buy ownership in the change. And they don't see it as threatening. . . ."[111] A notable example of this attribute was Route's decision to establish a policy for the granting of academic rank to civilian faculty members at their initial appointment and on promotion.

Faculty Appointments and Promotions

One of the enduring strengths of the Naval War College has always been its faculty. Just as with any other professional or academic institution, it is imperative to refresh the membership of the faculty and to maintain its quality over the long term. As a matter of practice, the Naval War College has always sought to recruit, develop, promote, and retain faculty members that are best suited to the College's mission, functions, and tasks consistent with existing statutory requirements. Since Admiral Stansfield Turner's establishment of a large and long-term civilian faculty in 1972–1974, virtually all civilian faculty members at the Naval War College have held "excepted" or "administratively determined" (AD) positions as authorized by statute.[112]

However, the Secretary of the Navy, in whom this statutory authority resided, customarily provided very limited direction to the College on the practice of administratively determined appointments and the required faculty qualifications. Over the years, the processes of recruitment, selection, appointment, and promotion were consistent with the Code of Federal Regulations. Moreover, the College had traditionally accorded its faculty an equitable level of contractual security and compensation consistent with the relevant statutes and the Secretary of the Navy's Faculty Salary Schedule.[113] However, the Naval War College

did not offer tenure or tenure-track appointments to civilian faculty members. For the vast majority of the civilian faculty, this meant that they were on limited-term appointments subject to renewal at the end of their terms without a clear College-wide policy on the subject of promotion.[114] In addition, talented young academics who were interested in applying for faculty positions at the Naval War College were quick to note that the College did not have a single source document that set policy for the appointment and promotion of faculty members. Over the years, the various departmental chairs had made recommendations for appointment and promotion based on what they expected of their faculty in terms of their departments' needs and the individual faculty members' professional performance. Taken together, these and several other factors suggested that the College's competitive edge to attract high-quality professors with well-established academic reputations and exceptional younger academics might be vulnerable.[115]

Professor Tom Nichols, then serving as the chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, discussed these and other concerns with Provost Jim Giblin in February 2004.[116] Nichols made his case in a dispassionate, critical, and forthright manner. He acknowledged that it was virtually impossible to do anything about the existing statutory constraints in the short term to midterm and, moreover, that it might not be in the College's interest to yield the flexibility that the administratively determined system gave it in favor of a more centrally controlled policy on such appointments. Nichols persuasively argued that there were, however, policy actions that the College could quickly take to address the issues of faculty appointment and promotion. After some discussion, Giblin agreed in principle. In addition to increasing transparency and regularizing the processes of appointment and promotion on the College's terms, Giblin believed that such a policy initiative could help to move the College closer to linking a set of standards concerning the faculty, possibly in the form of a memorandum of policy, to an input in the form of faculty appointment and a process for faculty promotion that led to a desired outcome for institutional effectiveness and institutional integrity. Giblin believed that such a document, over the signature of the President of the College, combined with more detailed appointment memoranda of understanding with individual faculty members, would make it clear that the institution's executive leadership defined the criteria for faculty appointment and promotion and would preserve the executive leadership's equities with respect to how the Naval War College implemented the system of hiring and promoting its faculty with administratively determined appointments. Moreover, Nichols persuaded Giblin that such a policy document would leave a substantial portion of the process—recommendations for appointment and promotion—where it properly belonged, in the hands of the department chairs. The provost briefed Route on Nichols's concerns and recommendation. After a very short discussion, Rear Admiral Route decided to proceed. In making his decision, Route was very clear that "it was a tough course we are setting but one that needed to be sailed."[117]

He was right. It took three long sessions of the full Academic Policy Committee, with Rear Admiral Route presiding, as well as a substantial amount of give-and-take on the various drafts to work out the details of a policy statement. The President made his intent clear to the Academic Policy Council at the outset: (1) establish a set of uniform guidelines for the use of academic ranks within the College; (2) clarify the criteria by which those ranks are given at appointment or promotion; and (3) ensure that the procedures for granting rank and promotion are consistent and clear across the College.[118] In this regard, Tom Nichols was very effective in working with his fellow department chairs to get this done and, at the same time, overcome some unease on the part of a few faculty members about how this policy would affect them. Route, in turn,

demonstrated his own personal commitment to this process by spending an extraordinary amount of his scarce time in leading the committee through its deliberations. The outcome of this process produced the memorandum of policy signed by Rear Admiral Route on 18 June 2004. This document clearly set forth (1) categories of faculty members (i.e., instructor, assistant professor, associate professor, and professor); (2) the distinction between the academic teaching faculty and the research faculty without prejudice to the research conducted by the academic faculty; (3) the preparation and qualifications of faculty appropriate to their fields and levels of their appointments; and (4) the requirement that qualifications are measured by advanced degrees held, evidence of scholarship, creative activities, teaching abilities, relevant professional experience, and service to the College.[119]

The reaction of the civilian faculty to this memorandum of academic policy was generally favorable. Moreover, during the College's reaccreditation of its master's degree in September 2004, the leader of the team from the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges noted to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, then the President of the College, and Provost Giblin during a private meeting that he was genuinely impressed that the Naval War College had such a clear and simple statement of policy. He also remarked that he considered this policy to be a strong indicator of institutional integrity.[120] Some six years later in 2010, the House of Representatives panel that examined the state of professional military education and joint professional military education was equally impressed and noted that the Naval War College alone among the professional military educational institutions had translated this policy into clear, precise, and very detailed appointment letters in which expectations for faculty members were well defined, while other professional military educational institutions issued very brief letters.[121]

Research, Analysis, and Gaming

In the late spring of 2003, Rear Admiral Rempt had begun a discussion with Provost Giblin about the direct involvement of students in collaborative warfighting analysis of current operational challenges of concern to the Navy component commanders and the numbered fleet commanders. Drawing on his student experience at the College in the late 1980s, Rempt was concerned that the College was missing an opportunity to demonstrate its institutional relevance to the senior leadership of the Navy. Moreover, he sensed that the significant tactical and operational expertise and experience of the College's students were a significant resource that was being underutilized. The net effect of these two conditions was that the College was paying an unnecessary cost of opportunity with respect to its institutional effectiveness. Both Rempt and Giblin agreed that there was an opening here that needed to be developed. However, the press of events generated by the Naval Inspector General's visit and the Joint Staff's accreditation of the College's senior-level program made it difficult to make progress on this challenge before Rempt's detachment. However, the two had agreed that a framework for such an initiative already existed in the College's advanced research program.[122]

Over the course of the summer of 2003, Giblin continued to investigate this idea. After reviewing the College's previous experience with such initiatives, he was convinced that the experience described by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey in *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College* was a model that, in partnership with the College's advanced research program, offered a way forward. Halsey

had written of his time at the College in 1932–1933 thus: "Few years in a naval officer's life are more . . . stimulating because of . . . the chance to test your pet theories on the game board."[123] Based on Giblin's discussions with various students over the period of five years when he was teaching as a faculty member in the National Security Decision Making Department, he sensed that many of the College's students wanted some say when it came to how they spent their time at the Naval War College in terms of what they wanted to learn and how they wanted to learn it. Giblin believed that the most suitable and feasible way to achieve these two goals, given the requirements of that time associated with professional military education and joint professional military education Phase I, was to create a program that selected a small number of well-qualified students to engage in a year-long research, analysis, and gaming effort that focused on one critical operational challenge of importance to a naval component commander or a numbered fleet commander in addition to their participation in the core curriculum. He believed that one such challenge existed and was of concern to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, at Makalapa, Hawaii, and to the Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, based in Yokosuka, Japan. Using the advanced research program framework, Giblin envisioned that members of this small group would be required to complete two academic trimesters and one full-time research trimester while focusing their elective program on the project at hand.[124]

Three Rear Admirals. Rear Admiral Kenichi Kuramoto (center), Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, makes an office call on Rear Admiral Route (left) during the Northwest Pacific war game in 2004 at the Naval War College, with Rear Admiral Frederic R. "Rick" Ruehe (right), Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Giblin briefed Rear Admiral Route on the morning of the day before orientation for new students began in August 2003. He readily admitted that the concept required additional specificity but said that he believed that such refinement could take place in its execution phase. The concept of operations for the Halsey Group envisioned a continuing student/faculty warfighting analysis using war gaming and employing ten to twelve top students from a range of the uniformed services with different specialties. He saw the outcome of this process as being an analysis of a specific challenge of immediate and continuing importance to the Navy's operational commanders and theater operational planners. Giblin also believed that the Halsey initiative could produce a group of students who understood warfighting analysis in a much greater depth than their classmates, and who would return to the Pentagon or to operational assignments with increased skills in critical analysis. To execute this concept, Giblin recommended that Captain Jim Fitzsimonds, a member of the College's War Gaming Department, be put in charge of the initial Halsey Group. Giblin had known Fitzsimonds for about fifteen years and respected him for his intellectual honesty as well as the breadth and depth of his professional knowledge as an intelligence officer. At the conclusion of the discussion, Route enthusiastically approved the initiative and noted that, if successful, it could help demonstrate in a very compelling way the ability of the College to provide direct support to the warfighter

and thereby enhance its institutional relevance. Giblin briefed it to the incoming students the next morning during the first day of their orientation. By the end of that afternoon, some sixty-three officers of the incoming class had requested an appointment with the provost to apply for the program. After selecting the initial group, Giblin turned them over to Fitzsimonds to begin the work of the Halsey Group. Since then, the Halsey Groups have grown in number and proved to be exceptionally productive and of value to Commander, Pacific Fleet, and Commander, Seventh Fleet.[125]

The Decision Support Center as It Appeared in 2004. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

International Programs

One of the first major events that Rear Admiral Route presided over, with the symposium's co-host, the Chief of Naval Operations, was the revival of the International Seapower Symposium, held on 26–29 October 2003. This was the first such meeting of the world's chiefs of navies in four years, as the meeting planned 2001 had been cancelled due to the attacks on 11 September. The renewal of this biennial meeting was an important occasion that brought with it some new perspectives in the light of the 2001 attacks. Previous symposia had introduced a number of important steps to improved international naval cooperation. Much of the work of the symposia in previous years had been done, not through the formal presentations given, but through the personal friendships made or revived between leaders, or the quiet conversations in the corridors or during the breaks from the plenary sessions.[126]

Major international initiatives had come in earlier symposia with the growth of regional symposia beginning with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, which developed out of the Ninth International Seapower Symposium in 1987. Building on discussions at that symposium, the Australian Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Michael W. Hudson, RAN, convened the first Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 1988 in Sydney. The event coincided with an international naval salute in Sydney Harbor as part of the Royal Australian Navy's contribution to Australia's bicentennial year and complemented the International Seapower Symposium at Newport.[127] With the 2003 symposium, the presentations in the plenary sessions became much more important to the symposium participants as they focused on key matters of immediate mutual operational concern: maritime coalition operations, worldwide maritime intelligence, security of merchant shipping, antipiracy, contraband, port security, rules of engagement, and the various challenges posed to communications, command, control, and computer connectivity. For the first time in the history of these symposia, the span of topics brought together navies and coast guards and was not just limited to a naval focus. Among the total of 142 senior delegates from seventy-three countries, there were twenty-four alumni of the Naval War College among the fifty-two chiefs of navies, fifteen war college presidents, and four commandants of coast guards. The presence of the senior coast guard leaders in the 2003 symposium began

a trend that expanded in the decade that followed. Admiral Vern Clark underscored the immediate value of the conference and its relevance to him as the Chief of Naval Operations in his closing remarks to the delegates, when he noted:

> I guess it was the middle of the first day when I turned to [Rear Admiral] Ron [Route] and said, "Ron, we have to get all of these presentations. We must make them all available to everybody here, because we are hearing some very thoughtful pieces, some very thoughtful positions." And I have to go now and spend some time thinking about all of those and see how I am going to make them part of my total perspective.[128]

Unfortunately, Russia had declined Clark's invitation to participate in this International Seapower Symposium. But, as mentioned previously in this chapter, some form of cooperation with Russia was still on the College's agenda. In 2002, the USS *Saratoga* Museum Foundation had purchased the former Soviet Juliett-class submarine *K-77* after she had been used to represent a Soviet Hotel-class nuclear submarine in filming the international co-production *K-19: The Widowmaker,* starring Harrison Ford and Liam Neeson. The foundation's intention was to use her as a floating exhibit to complement the Cold War history of USS *Saratoga* (CVA 60) that the foundation eventually hoped to acquire on loan from the Navy to make into a museum at Quonset Point. In August 2002, the foundation opened the submarine to the public on the Providence, Rhode Island, waterfront at Collins Point Park. Shortly after the opening, Professor Lyle Goldstein of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies visited the boat and thought that the foundation might play a role in an idea that had developed during a visit he had made to the Central Naval Museum in Saint Petersburg in May 2002, to bring a group of former Soviet naval officers to the Naval War College to create a coherent, and yet critical, picture of Soviet naval strategy during the Cold War era. During a subsequent trip to Russia in September 2003, Goldstein developed these thoughts further with historians at the Institute of Universal History in Moscow and the Central Naval Museum, providing them with a copy of Owen Coté's Newport Paper, *The Third Battle,* with the hope that this would stimulate a series of papers from knowledgeable Russian scholars in reaction to it. On the trip he collected a number of detailed Russian studies on asymmetric maritime strategy that a contractor hired by the Naval War College, Yuri M. Zhukov, analyzed for Goldstein's further use.[129] On the basis of this initial work, Goldstein proposed the "Cold War at Sea" conference, which took place 7 and 8 May 2004 in McCarty Little Hall. The event brought together a mix of scholars and retired naval officers.

The Organizers of the "Cold War at Sea" Conference, Held 7–8 May 2004. Professor Lyle J. Goldstein (right) and Yuri M. Zhukov (left) were the key figures who worked together to organize the conference designed to bring senior naval figures together from both sides of the Cold War to think about the naval events of that period as history. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Among the retired American naval flag officers who attended were Admiral Carlisle Trost, former Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral Stansfield Turner, former President of the College, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and Director of Central Intelligence; Admiral William O. Studeman, former Director of Naval Intelligence, director of the National

Dedication of the Turner Conference Room, 7 May 2004. During a break during the "Cold War at Sea" conference, Rear Admiral Route invited a select group to attend a surprise dedication ceremony for Admiral Stansfield Turner to name the President's conference room in his honor. The room had first been furnished and used during Turner's presidency in 1974. During the dedication, the master of ceremonies, Professor John Jackson, passed out cards to those who had served under Turner thirty years before that said, "I was a 'soldier' in Turner's Revolution." Admiral Turner also signed a reaffirmation of his vision for the College. That document and the pen that he used on that occasion were both framed and hung on the wall in the Turner Conference Room, Conolly Hall room 210. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Security Agency, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Vice Admiral J. Michael McConnell, former Director, National Security Agency; Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, former Director of Naval Intelligence; and Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, former U.S. naval and defense attaché to the Soviet Union and Naval War College President.

Dr. Sergei N. Khrushchev, Son of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Taught Elective Courses for Many Years at the Naval War College. After immigrating to the United States, he became Senior Fellow at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies. This snapshot was taken at his home near Providence, where he hosted the delegates to the Naval War College's Cold War symposium in May 2004. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The senior Russian representative was Vice Admiral Yuri Sysuev, chief of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in Saint Petersburg. Other Russian naval officers included retired Rear Admiral Bogdan Malyarchuk and retired Captains First Rank Sergei Chernyavskii and Ryurik A. Ketov. Among the academics were Owen Coté, Jakub Grygiel, Milan Hauner, David A. Rosenberg, and Sergei N. Khrushchev, son of former Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev, senior fellow at Brown University's Watson Institute, and Naval War College adjunct faculty member. The relationship that emerged between Rear Admiral Route and Vice Admiral Sysuev was encouraging and suggested that developing a college-to-college relationship with the Kuznetsov Academy was promising as a way to engage Russia on the broader subject of maritime security cooperation. As a result, Rear Admiral Route and Vice Admiral Sysuev laid the groundwork to sign a future memorandum of understanding between their two institutions. They agreed in principle that there was now a substantive relationship between the two academic institutions concerned with professional military education that was complementary to the navy-to-navy relationship between the United States Navy and the Russian navy. They established between them a set of guiding principles that the exchanges would be conducted on the basis of equality, academic freedom, mutual benefit, and reciprocity, with each institution bearing the costs of participation, which they envisaged would utilize video teleconferencing, normally between small groups of academics, and if time permitted, visits between the two schools.[130]

Rear Admiral Route in Discussions with Vice Admiral Yuri Sysuev (Center), Chief of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in Saint Petersburg, Russia, in May 2005. The translator on the left is George Fedoroff of the Office of Naval Intelligence. These initial talks were followed by others in 2005 and an agreement for cooperation. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Rear Admiral Route (Center) and Vice Admiral Thomas Weschler, USN (Ret.) (Right), Present the Naval War College Diploma to Commander Garry Hatton, Canadian Forces (Left), a Naval Command College Student Who Graduated on 17 June 2004. The 2004 graduation ceremony was also notable for the "streaker" who ran through the tent on Dewey Field. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The *Journal of Strategic Studies* published a wide-ranging selection of papers from the conference in a special issue.[131] The published work underscored the two main themes that emerged during the talks: (1) the Soviets' success in developing a credible challenge for global naval supremacy despite the many constraints on the Soviet Union's full development as a sea power, and (2) the professionalism on both sides during repeated confrontations that had been essential to preventing escalation to global conflict. At the close of the conference, Admiral William O. Studeman observed that this meeting had been only the very first step toward a systematic and complete study of the Cold War at sea and it should be followed by a series of bilateral conferences on each of the key issues, including nuclear weapons, command and control, training and education, antisubmarine warfare, naval aviation, torpedo and mine warfare, logistics, and basing.[132]

Fiscal Guidance and Risk Assessment

Rear Admiral Route's influence on the College's resource challenges was significant and timely. Though noteworthy progress had been made in moving toward smoothing out the financial "divots" in the College's fiscal year 2004 and 2005 budgets, there was still much work to be done as the College addressed the fiscal year 2006 program objective memorandum process. Admiral Route's experience was of immense value to the College at precisely the time it was needed to take the next step forward. He strongly endorsed Admiral Rempt's changes in how the College approached the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. He required, however, that more top-level involvement at the policy level in the form of a "President's Fiscal Guidance" be added to the College's internal planning, programming, and budgeting process. He was convinced that such guidance would help establish a set of practical boundary conditions as part of the development of the College's resource requirements as well as part of the briefing of those requirements to the College's resource sponsor.[133]

Working together, Route and Provost Jim Giblin produced a "President's Fiscal Guidance" in 2003 that established the policy that the College would (1) continue the shift from an organizational-based resource process to a function-based one; (2) live within its means, but accept prudent risk; (3) align its resources, programs, and outcomes to statutory requirements and the vision, policy, and guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (4) portray the College's budget submission in terms of "Major Functional Programs"; (5) align these major functional programs with the evolving mission, functions, and tasks of the College; (6) where possible, leverage capabilities across functions; (7) identify legitimate requirements for additional resources only after determining that they are consistent

with the College's strategic tradition and its mission, functions, and tasks; (8) develop them in detail and pursue them aggressively with the Navy's leadership; (9) use activities-based costing to understand costs and inform risk and trade-offs; (10) better understand the costs of opportunity that come with these trade-offs; (11) execute aggressively and with discipline under the oversight of the provost; (12) reconcile regularly; (13) not count on midyear funding as a basis for execution; and (14) use "other people's money" where suitable and available.[134]

Route's insistence on the College achieving a better, more informed understanding of "risk" was also a key and essential component of this guidance. After considerable work with Giblin, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs Bill Spain, and Deputy Director of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies Captain Richard Suttie, Route settled on using the idea of "what keeps us awake at night in Newport" as a way to convey risk as a function of the College's mission, functions, and tasks as part of its story line in the resource process. The College used this approach for the first time in the fall of 2004 when it presented its budget submission to its resource sponsor. First on this list was the issue of institutional effectiveness and institutional integrity. The essential concern was the expectation that an expanding mission would be executed with the resources to follow in later fiscal years—in short, an imposed "divot." Part and parcel of this "nightmare" was the concern on the part of the College's executive leadership for recruiting, developing, and retaining a quality faculty versus increasing demands on the faculty's time and decreasing financial resources to support faculty development. This competition raised a question in the minds of the College's executive leadership about the College's ability to afford to its faculty sufficient opportunity for meaningful professional development in their respective fields consistent with the College's mission and purpose. This was of direct and immediate concern with respect to the reaccreditation of the College in the fall of 2004 by the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the Northeast Association. Second on the list was the concern for what was expected to be a set of increasing professional military education and joint professional military education requirements. This included the potential to expand the College's responsibility to deliver joint professional military education Phase II as part of its senior-level service college. In essence, "what kept us awake at night in Newport" was the College's ability to manage and find resources for "new missions" versus how much acceptable risk the College could take in terms of institutional effectiveness and institutional integrity. This approach had the distinct advantage of being able to present "risk" in terms of the College's major functional programs and thereby present a quantitative as well as qualitative risk appraisal to the Navy's senior leadership within the horizon of the Navy's program objective memorandum.[135]

Dr. Richard N. Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Was the Naval War College's Graduation Speaker in June 2004. Seated behind him on the platform are Captain Anthony Ruoti, Jr., Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department, and Dr. Kenneth H. Watman, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies.

Naval War College Museum Collection

The Naval War College Foundation's Queen Mary 2 *Cruise*

The Naval War College's academic year came to a close with the annual Current Strategy Forum and the festive graduation ceremony on 18 June 2004 under the tent

Two Naval War College Presidents Visit the Imperial War Museum in London with Foundation Members during the *Queen Mary 2* Cruise in June 2004. At the end of the cruise, Foundation members visited together a number of historic sites in Portsmouth and London.

Left to right: Rear Admiral Route, John Hattendorf, Rear Admiral Strasser, Mrs. Kip Route, Mrs. Barbara Strasser, Mrs. Berit Hattendorf, with unidentified onlooker in background.

Photograph Courtesy of Berit Hattendorf

on Dewey Field, with Dr. Richard N. Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, as the graduation speaker. On the day after the graduation, the Naval War College Foundation had organized an event for Foundation members to sail on board the new Cunard Line *Queen Mary 2* during her maiden season. Plans for this trip, which was only the brand-new liner's fourth eastbound passage during her maiden cruise year, had been in preparation for nearly a year, since mid-July 2003 when VanGuard Tours and Cruises had initially proposed a cruise with speakers on maritime and naval history. A number of organizations and major museums around the country, including Mystic Seaport, the Mariners' Museum, the Herreshoff Marine Museum, the National Maritime Historical Society, and the Naval War College Foundation, joined in organizing a series of lectures and presentations during the seven-day and six-night passage from New York to Southampton. One of the featured speakers on the cruise was Irving S. "Nick" Fellner, a Naval War College Foundation life member who had been awarded the Navy Cross for his heroism in the battle of Leyte Gulf and had scored a direct bomb hit on the Japanese battleship *Yamato* from his SBD Dauntless dive-bomber. The trip also included an additional four nights based in London to visit Portsmouth Historic Dockyard, to see the Royal Naval Museum, HMS *Victory*, HMS *Warrior,* and the *Mary Rose* Museum, as well as the National Maritime Museum and the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, Hampton Court Palace, the Imperial War Museum, and Churchill's underground cabinet war rooms in London. Some participants took the opportunity for an additional few days to visit the D-day landing beaches in Normandy before flying home. Rear Admiral and Mrs. Route and Rear Admiral and Mrs. Strasser were among 108 Foundation members and their guests who took passage in *Queen Mary 2*.[136]

Rear Admiral Route (Right) and Rear Admiral Shuford (Left) Cut the Cake following the Change of Command Ceremony on 12 August 2004.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Change of Command

Just three days before graduation in 2004, senior leaders at the Naval War College learned that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had nominated Rear Admiral Route for promotion to the grade of vice admiral and assignment as Naval Inspector General. The change of command took place on 12 August 2004. As the principal speaker for

the occasion, Admiral Vern Clark noted, "When we talk about Ron Route we talk about Mr. Calm and Mr. Smooth." Elaborating, Clark went on to say, "My interface with him was always about making the difficult decisions and trying to prioritize our commitment to resources in the future. This man was thoughtful, diligent, focused, always working on the waterfront because his heart has always been connected with the Sailors and the fleet. And it was those qualities which led to his selection to be the president of the Naval War College."[137]

Moving to the broader subject of the Naval War College itself, Clark said, "Our Navy's best and brightest minds are here in Newport, Rhode Island; studying, researching, and analyzing—dreaming about our future, and becoming those leaders of change. This institution focuses on operational challenges first, not just intellectual debates."[138] Turning to the audience, Clark used the results of the Joint Staff's accreditation of the College's resident and nonresident intermediate-level service college programs to emphasize the College's relevance:

> Now, I don't know if you are aware or not that the joint staff just recently concluded a cyclical review of the program here at Naval War College. This accreditation is one of the most arduous processes any college or university can undergo. The Naval War College was recognized for the matchless quality and powerful relevance of its resident and non-resident programs; earning 22 of 22 perfect scores. That is called "Acing" the accreditation. Brigadier General Thomas Maffey, United States Army, and Vice Director of J7 on the Joint Staff [Directorate for Joint Force Development][,] said after evaluating the team at Newport, he said this—now, here is a guy on the joint staff, Army[—]"Now I understand why the Naval War College is the premier PME institution in this country." And that is pretty high praise, isn't it?[139]

NOTES

1. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers]: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. Conducted on September 17, 2009 by James Rife [hereinafter Giblin Oral History], p. 13; Giblin to Hattendorf, e-mail, 14 April 2015.
2. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project Interview with William Spain conducted on September 17, 2009, by James Rife [hereinafter Spain Oral History], pp. 19–20; Giblin Oral History, p. 13.
3. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project Interview with Vice Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, Conducted on 1 December 2009, by James Rife [hereinafter Rempt Oral History], p. 4.
4. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Rempt: Vice Admiral Rodney P. Rempt official biography for portrait unveiling, 27 July 2004.
5. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Richard Suttie to Hattendorf, 13 April 2015, forwarding Rempt to Suttie, 12 April 2015.
6. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, September 11, 2001: Patricia D. Jones, *The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S. Air Force* (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History Museums Program, 2011), p. 45; "USS *George Washington* (CNV 73) History," *U.S. Carriers,* accessed 17 February 2015, http://www.uscarriers.net/cvn73history.htm; Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., brief to the Fifth Asia-Pacific Naval Staff College Seminar (JMSDF Maritime Staff College, Tokyo, Japan, 27 January–2 February 2002), in Dr. Giblin's personal papers.
7. VADM Rempt to Hattendorf, e-mail, 3 April 2015, with "Comments on Chapter 19."
8. Admiral Vern Clark, "Keynote Address: Sea Power for Peace, Prosperity, and Security," in *Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 26–29 October 2003,* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2004), pp. 5–6; Naval War College Archives, Academic Memorandum series, Academic Planning Calendars, Calendar for 2001.
9. Giblin Oral History, pp. 15–16.
10. Rempt Oral History, pp. 4–5.
11. President George W. Bush, "Address to Congress," 20 September 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/.
12. Rempt Oral History, p. 5.
13. Spain Oral History, p. 23.
14. A collection of the unclassified papers was published as a CD: *Newport Papers: National Security Strategy after 9/11/01* (Naval War College, 2002), CD-ROM.
15. VADM Rempt to Hattendorf, e-mail, 5 April 2015.
16. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: Conferences: Setting Our Course in the Terror War: Text of Admiral Vern Clark speech, 29 October 2001, p. 1.
17. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: Conferences: Setting Our Course in the Terror War: Joe Baker, "Local Forum Examines All Sides of Current War," *Newport Daily News,* 30 October 2001, pp. A1, A12.

18. Text of Admiral Vern Clark speech, 29 October 2001, p. 6.
19. Baker, "Local Forum Examines All Sides of Current War," pp. A1, A12.
20. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: Conferences: Setting Our Course in the Terror War: Harvey Sapolsky, quoted in Robert A. Hamilton, "Navy Brass: How Do We Win This New Type of War?," *The Day*, 30 October 2001.
21. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: Conferences: Setting Our Course in the Terror War: List of panel participants.
22. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Salve Regina University: Salve Regina University Media Advisory # 22, 18 September 2001.
23. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Subject Files: RG 27, Conferences: Arc of Instability, Conference Directors remarks.
24. Giblin Oral History, pp. 16–17.
25. The College gradually learned in the weeks and months that followed 11 September of those who had been lost in the attack with connections to the War College, including three active Fleet Seminar students—Angela Houtz, Lieutenant Jonas M. Panik, and Commander Dan F. Shanower—and seven alumni—Captain Gerald F. DeConto, resident class of 1998; Lieutenant Robert R. Elseth, an evening seminar student in Newport; Captain Lawrence D. Getzfred, resident class of 1990; Lieutenant Commander Patrick J. Murphy, who had completed his War College program in the off-campus program at Great Lakes, Illinois; Captain Jack D. Punches, resident class of 1985; Commander Robert A. Schlegel, who completed his studies at the off-campus program in Norfolk, Virginia; and Major Kip P. Taylor, resident class of 1998. About 2012, College officials learned that an alumnus from the class of 1967, seventy-seven-year-old Captain John D. Yamnickey, Sr., USN (Ret.), had been one of the passengers on American Airlines Flight 77. In his honor, an additional bronze plaque with his name was subsequently added to the list on the Naval War College's memorial, bringing the total number of victims associated with the Naval War College to eleven.
26. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: John E. Jackson to Hattendorf, e-mail, 20 February 2015.
27. Attachment to ibid., Program for Patriots Memorial Dedication Ceremony, 9 September 2002.
28. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: September 11, 2001: Professor J. E. Jackson, Master of Ceremonies, Remarks at 9/11 Memorial [2010]. See also Alfred Goldberg et al., *Pentagon 9/11* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007), pp. 17–49; on Commander Craig D. Powell, USN, see ibid., pp. 55–57.
29. Dan Shanower, "Freedom Isn't Free," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 123, no. 5 (May 1997), pp. 11–12.
30. "Transcript of President's Address to Nation," 11 September 2001, accessed 18 February 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92530.
31. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Weighs Strategy Change to Deter Terror," *New York Times*, 5 July 2005.
32. Peter D. Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post–Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of a Maritime Strategy, 1989–2007" (Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2013), pp. 233–34.
33. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Clark, Admiral Vernon E., USN: "Sea Power 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era" (remarks as delivered), 13 June 2002, pp. 1–2.
34. Ibid., p. 7.
35. Ibid.
36. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: History Associates: Miscellaneous documents from files of Associate Dean of Academics Richard Suttie [hereinafter miscellaneous Suttie files]: Agenda Graduate Education leadership meeting.
37. Miscellaneous Suttie files: Recurring Recommendations from Boards, Task Forces, and Panels, 24 April 2006.
38. Miscellaneous Suttie files: CEP Advanced Education Task Force (draft, June 1998), PowerPoint file.
39. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Captain Richard Suttie to Hattendorf, e-mail, 9 April 2015.
40. Miscellaneous Suttie files: GERB briefing: "Transforming Graduate and Professional Military Education" (April 2002).
41. Ibid., slides 15–28.
42. Ibid., slides 27, 28.
43. Ibid., slides 120–25.
44. *CNO Professional Military Education Strategy*, 19 August 2004.
45. Quoted in Recurring Recommendations from Boards, Task Forces, and Panels, p. 3.
46. Giblin Oral History, p. 21.
47. Ibid.
48. Rempt to Hattendorf, 3 April 2015, with comments; Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: Inspector General Self-Assessment, 2003.
49. Rempt to Hattendorf, 3 April 2015, with comments; Walt Wildemann to Hattendorf, e-mail, 1 May 2015.
50. Giblin Oral History, p. 22.
51. Ibid., pp. 22–23.
52. Ibid., p. 23.
53. Ibid., pp. 23–24.
54. U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2004: Accelerating Our Advantages* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 4 January 2004).
55. Giblin Oral History, p. 14.
56. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Warren Wiggins to Hattendorf, e-mail, 12 March 2015, with attachment "FLTEC Talking Points"; Giblin Oral History, pp. 14–15.
57. Wiggins to Hattendorf.
58. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Robert Rubel to Hattendorf, e-mail, 14 December 2009, with enclosure "Naval War College History," section 4; Giblin Oral History, pp. 39–40.
59. There was one exception to this situation. Because of the existence of a CNO–Chief of Staff, Maritime Self-Defense Force agreement, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was able to continue the presence of a senior JMSDF officer who served in the Navy Warfare Development Command and reported for additional duty to the President of the War College for the purpose of "College-to-College matters." Giblin Oral History, p. 42.
60. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: History Associates: CNWS: Peter Dombrowski, Strategic Research Department (SRD), Overview and Current Project Summaries as of March 2010, pp. 5–6.
61. Thomas M. Nichols, *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003).
62. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Thomas Nichols file: Photocopy of Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation and Research and Education with Russian Academy of Sciences, May 2002; Tom Nichols to Hattendorf, e-mail, 6 March 2015.
63. Giblin Oral History, p. 27.

64. Ibid., pp. 25–26.

65. Rempt to Hattendorf, 3 April 2015.

66. Giblin Oral History, p. 26.

67. Rempt Oral History, pp. 21–22; Vincent Mocini to Hattendorf, e-mail, 16 March 2015.

68. Giblin Oral History, p. 7.

69. Ibid., pp. 7–8.

70. Ibid., pp. 8–9.

71. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

72. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

73. Suttie to Hattendorf, e-mail, 9 April 2015.

74. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: Strategic Plans 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997.

75. Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: Strategic Plan 2003; Rempt to Hattendorf, 3 April 2015, with comments.

76. Rempt to Hattendorf, 3 April 2015, with comments.

77. Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies: RG 37, subgroup 14 "Maritime History Department," box 1, folder 1: Memorandum for Distribution, Realignment of Staff Functions, 5400, 00, 1 Jan 03.

78. Giblin Oral History, p. 51.

79. Ibid., pp. 3–5. In assigning to the provost the role of chief financial officer, Rempt made it clear that the College's comptroller would continue reporting directly to the President in accordance with requirements imposed by the Secretary of the Navy that required that the "commanding officer or head of an activity that receives allocations or sub-allocations of funds subject to the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) (Title 31 U.S.C. 1341 or 1517) shall have a qualified comptroller who reports directly to the commanding officer." Rempt's intent was not to usurp the authority and autonomy of the comptroller. Indeed, he required that the comptroller continue to meet with the President weekly (schedule permitting). His purpose in assigning Giblin as the chief financial officer was to help to inform and better coordinate the comptroller's actions across the College with respect to planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of the College's financial resources. He took this action because he knew that Giblin had a broader view of the College's requirements and that he was a Proven Subspecialist in Planning and Programming while on active duty in the Navy and had exercised significant fiduciary responsibility while in major command on active duty. Ibid., p. 5.

80. Rempt to Hattendorf, 3 April 2015.

81. Ibid.; Tom Nichols memo to Hattendorf, 8 January 2010, p. 4; Kevin Kelly to Hattendorf, e-mail, 8 January 2010, p. 3.

82. Nichols memo to Hattendorf.

83. Joan Johnson-Freese to Hattendorf, e-mail, 4 January 2010.

84. Ibid.; Rempt to Hattendorf, 3 April 2015.

85. Johnson-Freese to Hattendorf; Nichols memo to Hattendorf.

86. Johnson-Freese to Hattendorf.

87. Giblin to Hattendorf, 14 April 2015.

88. Rempt Oral History, p. 28.

89. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Ronald A. Route: Navy Warfare Development Command, "Navy Warfare Development Command Changes Commanders," news release, story number NNS030930-08, 30 September 2003.

90. This and the following two paragraphs are derived (except where noted) from Route's official biography as it appeared in the program for the Naval War College change of command ceremony, 12 August 2004; Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project Interview with Vice Admiral Route Conducted on October 27, 2009, by James Rife, pp. 1–3.

91. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Route letter to Hattendorf, 24 November 1997; John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Fourteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 2–5 November 1997* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1998), p. 194.

92. See appendix B. The shortest term is Stockton's first in 1893, with six months and three days, followed by Hardisty's six months and twelve days in 1977; Mahan's second term in 1892–1893, with nine months and twenty-two days; Baldwin's eleven months and nine days in 1986–1987; Marryott's one year and four days in 1985–1986; and Carter's one year and six days in 2013–2014.

93. Giblin Oral History, p. 52.

94. Ibid., p. 53.

95. Ibid., pp. 53–54.

96. Ibid., pp. 54–55.

97. Ibid., p. 55.

98. Ibid., pp. 55–56.

99. Ibid., p. 59; Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: NWC Self Study, College of Naval Command & Staff and College of Distance Education for Joint Professional Military Education, October 2003.

100. Giblin Oral History, pp. 59–60; Naval War College Archives, RG 27 Subject Files: NWC Self Study, Self Study submitted to New England Association of Schools and Colleges, Inc., Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, Naval War College, Newport, RI, August 2004.

101. Also as previously noted, Jackson made provisions for those students who had already started the master of arts program to be able to complete it. This was a matter of institutional integrity as well as an issue that would most certainly be considered by the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges during its reaccreditation visit in the fall of 2004. Giblin Oral History, pp. 59–60.

102. Giblin Oral History, p. 60.

103. Ibid., p. 61.

104. Giblin Papers (privately held): *NWC POM 10 Program Review Brief*, 24 October 2007, slide 19.

105. Giblin Oral History, pp. 61–62.

106. The Web-Enabled Program delivers a tailored curriculum taught by College of Distance Education faculty to cohorts of about twenty students using web-based technology. The program began in 2001 and earned the prestigious Crystal Award from the Association for Educational Communications and Technology as the most innovative and outstanding multimedia-based instructional distance-learning project for 2002.

107. Giblin Oral History, p. 63.

108. Ibid., pp. 63–64. With the completion of the development of the CD-ROM course, the College decided to end the College of Distance Education Paper-Based Correspondence Course. See Naval War College Archives, RG 32, Command History 2004, List of Policies, Statement of Academic Policy (SAP) 04-01 of 5 January 2004.

109. Miscellaneous Suttie files: Documents: "Educating the 21st Century Force" (CNO Executive Panel Meeting, 13 November 2003, Washington, D.C.).

110. Ibid.

111. Spain Oral History, pp. 31–32.

112. This entire section is based on information provided by Dr. James Giblin. Giblin to Hattendorf, e-mail, 26 May 2015. On AD appointments, see 10 U.S.C. § 6952 and 10 U.S.C. § 7478. Based on authorities originally established in 1946, these statutes authorize the Secretary of the Navy to, inter alia, "employ as many civilians as professors, instructors, and lecturers at a school of the Naval War College or of the Marine Corps University as the Secretary considers necessary."

113. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, "Civilian Faculty Pay Schedule for the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Marine Corps University," SECNAVINST 12534.1B of 15 November 2001. This document implemented the statutory authority of the Secretary of the Navy to fix the compensation of civilian faculty members at Navy and Marine Corps colleges at the time of the establishment of the policy initiative. Although these faculty members are excluded from coverage under the General Schedule (GS) by statute, their pay is routinely adjusted on a comparative basis with changes authorized for GS federal employees.

114. A very few senior professors—approximately five in 2001–2005—had AD "appointments without term." This type of appointment established a faculty member's eligibility to serve until retirement, assuming that the faculty member continued to perform at or above the expected level.

115. Giblin Oral History, p. 73.

116. Ibid. Some of the other concerns raised by Nichols include the perception among some members of the faculty that the College was less than generous in providing the free time necessary for professional development, research, and scholarly publication. In addition, Nichols argued that the teaching faculty was somewhat apprehensive that considerations of academic excellence may not have the same priority they once had at the College.

117. Ibid.

118. U.S. Naval War College, Office of the President, "Faculty Appointments and Promotion," Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 04-05 of 18 June 2004, p. 1.

119. Ibid.

120. Giblin Oral History, p. 75.

121. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel: Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Comm. on Armed Services*, 111th Congress, 2nd sess., 2010, Committee Print 111-4, p. 120.

122. Giblin Oral History, pp. 50–52.

123. Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., USN, and Lieutenant Commander J. Bryan III, USNR, *Admiral Halsey's Story* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 54, quoted in John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984), p. 139 (chapter 6 of this edition).

124. Giblin Oral History, p. 66.

125. Ibid., pp. 67–68.

126. RADM Ronald A. Route, "Welcoming Remarks," in *Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium*, ed. Hattendorf, p. 2.

127. David Stevens, ed., *The Royal Australian Navy*, Australian Centenary History of Defence 3 (Melbourne, Vic., Austral.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), p. 280.

128. ADM Vern Clark, "Closing Remarks," in *Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium*, ed. Hattendorf, p. 150.

129. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Lyle Goldstein, Trip Report Moscow/St Petersburg 1–10 September 2003, Strategic Research Department, 16 September 2003.

130. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 500.6: Kuznetsov Academy: Draft Memorandum of Understanding between President, U.S. Naval War College, and the Chief, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, 10 May 2004.

131. "Cold War at Sea: An International Appraisal," special issue, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 2 (April 2005).

132. Ibid., p. 156.

133. Giblin Oral History, p. 69.

134. Ibid., p. 70.

135. Ibid., pp. 70–71.

136. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence with Organizations: VanGuard Travel; Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Ships: *Queen Mary 2*.

137. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Admiral Vern Clark: Admiral Vern Clark Edited Remarks, Change of Command, Naval War College, August 12, 2004, p. 4.

138. Ibid., p. 5.

139. Ibid., pp. 4–5.

PRESIDENT
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Quarters AA
RADM and Mrs. Jeffrey Harley, USN

Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford. As the fifty-first President of the Naval War College, Admiral Shuford served from 12 August 2004 until 6 November 2008. Shuford's tenure of four years, two months, and twenty-five days was the second longest in the history of the College, superseding by one month and twenty-four days the previous record held by Vice Admiral Bernard Austin in 1960–1964. Shuford's presidency was marked by a number of innovative changes, including the establishment of the China Maritime Studies Institute, the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, and the Maritime Staff Operators Course; the development of courses for flag and general officers serving as maritime and joint component commanders; and a significant increase in the College's international reach. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Chapter Twenty

Reaffirming Academic Accreditation and Developing Strategic and Operational Leaders

In introducing Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford as the next President of the Naval War College, Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark noted that it would be only fair if he passed on a word of counsel and warning to the College's faculty and staff:

> It's probably a good thing that the Naval War College does not teach engineering or hard sciences here. Because I want to tell you that Jake Shuford will certainly defy the laws of physics in his ability to appear in many places at one time. This is an individual with a unique combination of sheer energy of dedication to service and intellectual prowess. And I want to tell you that . . . [h]e is a sight to behold. . . .[1]

A graduate of the Naval War College with highest distinction in the class of 1990, Admiral Shuford returned to the College in 2004 after serving as Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Three and commander of the *Abraham Lincoln* Carrier Strike Group, based at Everett, Washington.

Born and raised in South Carolina, Shuford received his commission in the Navy from the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps program at the University of South Carolina in 1974, where he graduated as a member of Phi Beta Kappa with a bachelor of arts cum laude. After his commissioning, he was assigned as communications officer, and then operations officer, in USS *Blakeley* (FF 1072) from 1974 to 1977. His second tour of duty was as surface operations and plans officer for the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea, until 1979, when he returned to Newport to attend the Department Head Course at Surface Warfare Officers School. In 1980, Shuford was selected as an Olmsted Scholar studying at the Paris Institute of Political Studies—"Sciences Po." In 1982, while in Paris he worked with such distinguished scholars as Alfred Grosser, Jean-Claude Casanova, and Pierre Hassner under the framework of the *diplôme d'études approfondies* (equivalent to a master of studies) in politics and economics in international relations, completing this course of study with a thesis entitled "Introduction théorique aux transferts d'armements: Les mobiles est-ouest."

Shuford then returned to sea duty as operations officer in USS *Deyo* (DD 989) in 1982–1984, and then in USS *Mahan* (DDG 42) in 1984–1986. Following his tour of duty in *Mahan,* he commanded USS *Aries* (PHM 5), a hydrofoil missile gunboat, based at Key West, Florida. In 1989–1990, he became speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to two consecutive secretaries of the Navy: William L. Ball and Henry L. Garrett III.[2]

On completing his Pentagon assignment, Shuford had orders to attend the John F. Kennedy School of Public Policy at Harvard University, where he earned a master's degree in public administration (finance). His broad academic background in public administration connected to the Navy through his follow-on

assignment at the Naval War College in the fall of 1991. As part of his War College studies, Shuford undertook an advanced research project entitled "Strategic Sealift in the Context of Operation Desert Shield" under the supervision of Andrew E. Gibson, the College's Emory Land Professor of Maritime Affairs, a former Maritime Administrator and U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs. With his research paper completed, Shuford, working with Gibson, published a summary of it in the *Naval War College Review.*[3] Shuford's paper made a strong case for the Navy's need to acquire a class of roll-on, roll-off ships for seaborne lift. The paper circulated in Washington and quickly came to the attention of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and others, who were convinced that such a program should go ahead. Secretary of the Navy Garrett, however, heard about it for the first time from Cheney. The secretary and his staff were not pleased, as Shuford later recalled, "that they had been 'poked in the eye' with that paper that had my name on the bottom of it."[4] Pentagon officials ordered him to fly immediately to Washington to explain himself.

Nevertheless, the paper did what Naval War College student papers should do and presaged what eventually became the large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off class of ships (LMSRs). On graduating from the College, Shuford had orders to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), where he was assigned to the Operational Logistics/Strategic Mobility Division (N442), where he helped to move the LMSR program forward.

Shuford then went on in 1992 to command USS *Rodney M. Davis* (FFG 60), homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. While he was in command, the ship won the Battle Efficiency "E" as part of the USS *Independence* Battle Group operating in the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf. Returning to the Pentagon in 1994, Shuford was first assigned to the Surface Warfare Division (N86), working under Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt, and directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study that established the Navy's requirements in numbers and types of combatant ships.[5] Shuford then moved on to the Plans and Policy Division (N3/N5) as chief of staff for the Navy's roles and missions organization, coordinating and defending the Navy's positions in response to the report of the national-level Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.[6] On completion of that project, he transferred to the Joint Staff as the division head for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments (J8) in 1995–1997. During this assignment to the Joint Staff, Shuford recognized the absence of a requirements process that could respond to the inherently joint nature of the air and missile defense mission. Shuford proceeded to develop an answer to that deficiency, conceptualizing and winning support across all the services for the establishment of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization.[7]

In January 1998, Shuford took command of USS *Gettysburg* (CG 64). Deploying in her to serve with the Fifth and Sixth Fleets, Shuford served as air warfare commander for the USS *Enterprise* Battle Group. His ship played a significant role in the Adriatic during the Kosovo crisis, and in the Persian Gulf in Operation DESERT FOX, when *Gettysburg* was air warfare commander for dual carrier battle group operations and fired all sixty-nine of her Tomahawk missiles during strike operations. Under Shuford's command, *Gettysburg* won the Battle Efficiency "E" for Cruiser Destroyer Group Twelve. Returning to the Pentagon in 1999, Shuford became principal deputy for Senate liaison in the Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs, before moving in 2001

to be Assistant Commander, Naval Personnel Distribution (PERS 4) at Millington, Tennessee. He remained in that post until 2003, when he returned to sea for a year as Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Three.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, Congratulates Rear Admiral Shuford on Relieving Rear Admiral Route as President of the Naval War College, on the Stage in Spruance Auditorium on 12 August 2004. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

On Taking Charge

Almost immediately after the change of command ceremony at the Naval War College in 2004, Rear Admiral Shuford made it clear to the executive leadership of the Naval War College that his instincts told him that the senior leadership of the Navy had underutilized the College as a resource in the recent past. The Chief of Naval Operations and other senior leaders would, in his view, likely call on the College to take a larger and, perhaps, more diverse role in the years to come. He also affirmed how much he valued the effect that the purposeful leadership of his two predecessors had produced in restoring the trust and confidence of the Navy's senior leadership in the College. Moreover, Shuford avowed the importance of maintaining and, where possible, furthering the College's reputation for quality, rigor, and relevance in its curricula and its research, analysis, and gaming work. The events during the four years of his presidency validated these instincts.[8]

In this situation, Shuford made it clear from the outset that his intent was to bring the considerable intellectual capital of the Naval War College—what he liked to call the College's "capacity"—to bear on issues that mattered to the U.S. Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations had implied in his remarks at the change of command that this was to be Shuford's point of main effort. Indeed, Admiral Clark stressed that

> this institution focuses on operational challenges first, not just intellectual debates. I was so impressed with the Halsey Group[,] . . . [which was focusing on] subjects near and dear to my heart; two real world operational challenges at the top of the list of things . . . [:] theater [antisubmarine warfare]; and Sea Based, theater Ballistic Missile Defense. And I will tell you that these individuals in this process pushed the envelope of operational art, developing real concepts of operations for maritime joint forces. . . . It is this kind of thinking and real world application that our Navy must possess.[9]

Shuford's challenge was how to do this and what stance would best serve the Naval War College.[10] Having known Provost Giblin for a number of years, Shuford turned to him to discuss ways to confront these challenges. Both agreed that the definition of the College's mission, functions, and tasks was unclear. Shuford agreed that the College was responsible for education and research as well as analysis and gaming, but he suggested that there was a set of additional plausible missions and functions, with their respective tasks, that could become a basis for planning and action. Ultimately, they could become part of a new statement of the College's mission, functions, and tasks to replace the outdated document from the year 2000.

Dr. Peter J. Dombrowski Was Chairman of the Strategy and Campaign Department in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 2004–2013, and Edited the Four Issues of the *Naval War College Review* in 2005. He graduated from Williams College and earned his master's and doctorate at the University of Maryland. Before coming to Newport, he was associate professor of political science at Iowa State University and defense analyst at ANSER, Inc. He has also been affiliated with research institutions such as the East-West Center, the Brookings Institution, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, among others. Dombrowski is the author of over sixty books, monographs, articles, book chapters, and government reports. Awards include a Chancellor's Scholarship for Prospective Leaders from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, and the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Medal.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Shuford also became aware that the decision to put the research, analysis, and gaming function of the College on an equal footing with its more traditional education function had generated some internal tension among the teaching faculty. Shuford understood this perspective, but firmly believed that using the "capacity" available at Newport to help the Navy resolve near- and long-term strategic and operational challenges was entirely consistent with the College's strategic tradition and had been the hallmark of the College for much of its history. He believed that the increased emphasis on the function of research, analysis, and gaming and other, as yet undefined but comparable, functions did not need to come at the expense of educational excellence, provided each function was properly resourced. He acknowledged that finding the resources in terms of funding and people was a significant challenge. In the same manner that Admirals Rempt and Route had done, Shuford promptly made this a priority tasking for the provost.[11]

After discussing the situation with Giblin, Shuford decisively endorsed Route's decision to delay the further development and submission of a revised mission, functions, and tasks statement. More importantly, Shuford concluded that he had three options. He could (1) shape the future of the College and its role within the Navy, (2) adjust the actions of the College and its role within the Navy as its future became clearer, or (3) keep the options of the College open to contribute when an opportunity presented itself.[12]

Although options 2 and 3 would allow the expectations of the Navy's senior leadership with respect to the Naval War College and its mission, functions, and tasks to develop more clearly over time, they were fundamentally reactive in nature. This was not in Shuford's makeup, as Clark had warned the College in his change of command address. Shuford decided very early on to take an aggressive strategic posture to shape the future of the College; its mission, functions, and tasks; and what the College did for the Navy. In this, Shuford recognized that it was essential for his success in this effort to have an acute awareness of what the Navy's senior leaders were thinking and what challenges they faced and, where suitable and feasible, to let them understand how the Naval War College could help meet and overcome those challenges.

Reaffirmation of the College's Accreditation

Shortly after Shuford relieved Route, an evaluation team representing the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges visited the College from 26 to 29 September 2004. This visit was part of the ten-year cycle to determine whether the College was sufficiently in compliance with the academic standards so that the commission could once again reaffirm the College's accreditation to award a master of arts degree in national security and strategic studies, first granted in 1989 and reaccredited in 1994.[13] The extensive level of effort required for over a year to achieve a favorable report from the evaluation team involved the entire College. The first phase of the process was the submission of a detailed self-study by the College that served as the College's application. The College staff was already prepared for such an appraisal. It had painstakingly followed Route's direction to use the self-study prepared for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of the College's intermediate resident and nonresident service college programs as the basis for the evaluation required by the New England Association.[14]

The College formally initiated its preparation for the reaccreditation process in August 2003 when Route met with the College's faculty and staff to emphasize the significance of reaccreditation to the institution and its students and to solicit their assistance to carry out this vital undertaking as part of their service to the College. On 23 September 2003, the provost issued detailed guidance and appointed members of the eleven standards task forces from each teaching department, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and selected staff members. He also established a schedule of deliverables for the task forces and the overall reaccreditation process and designated an experienced faculty or staff member as the leader of each task force.[15] Each group focused on appraising the level of the College's compliance with the commission's standards for (1) mission and purpose; (2) planning and evaluation; (3) organization and governance; (4) programs, instruction, scholarship, and research; (5) faculty; (6) student services; (7) library and information resources; (8) physical resources; (9) financial resources; (10) public disclosure; and (11) integrity.

Thanks to the meticulous work of the faculty and staff task force members and their leaders, the College submitted a rigorous, complete, and dispassionate assessment on time.[16] The executive leadership of the College was satisfied that the self-study was, more importantly, open, honest, and frank and identified those areas where the accreditation evaluation team might question whether the College was in full compliance with the New England Association's standards.

The second phase was the visit of the evaluation team to Newport.[17] Led by Dr. Richard M. Freeland, president of Northeastern University, in Boston, its function was that of peer review based on the association's standards and informed by the College's self-study as well as what the team discovered during its visit.[18] The benchmarks of that peer review were the institutional effectiveness and institutional integrity of the College. The fast-paced visit included meetings of the evaluation team with members of the College's Board of Advisors, faculty, staff, and students. From discussions with the team's members, it was clear to the College's executive leadership that the team had exercised an extraordinary level of due diligence in its review of the Naval War College's self-study. In general, the team was comfortable with it and believed that it rendered an accurate appraisal of the College. Moreover, Dr. Freeland was most generous with his time

and held several lengthy after-hours sessions with Shuford and Giblin to brief them on the progress of the visit.

The third phase of the process was the review of the evaluation team's report by the association's Commission on Institutions of Higher Education. Shuford was pleased with that report, which was emphatically positive. The chair of the commission, Dr. Terrence J. MacTaggart, informed Shuford that the "College is continued in accreditation because the Commission finds the institution to be in substantial compliance with the *Standards for Accreditation*. We commend the College for its comprehensive self-study that will serve as a valuable guide to the strategic planning process that the College has recently initiated."[19] MacTaggart's letter also commended the College for its "many strengths, including a clear mission and set of purposes that give focus and direction to the College's work; capable and committed administrative officers; dedicated, well-qualified faculty; intelligent, energetic, and talented students; high-quality academic programs; impressive oversight of non-resident programs; and a culture of assessment that pervades the institution."[20] He also made special reference to the evaluation team's positive finding that "the students, the Navy, and the nation are well served by this excellent institution. Under the leadership of a capable, enthusiastic new president, the College seems well positioned to meet the challenges of the future."[21]

These findings notwithstanding, MacTaggart cited six areas wherein the commission determined that the Naval War College was not in full compliance with the standards. In the first instance, the team found it problematic that there was no legally constituted body responsible for the College's governance, effectiveness, and integrity, not to mention its fiduciary responsibility and physical plant, like most other colleges or universities.[22]

The team met with the College's Board of Advisors and noted with favor "the impressive qualifications of the members of the . . . Board . . . and their capacity to provide support to the College's leadership." However, the members of the team were perplexed as to why the College lacked a more traditional governing body that appointed the President of the College and why the President, as the Naval War College's chief executive officer, did not report to and was not accountable to that entity for purposes of governance, policy guidance, and direction.[23] This finding was not a surprise to the College. In fact, the College had underscored the different role of its Board of Advisors in the self-study.[24] In the end, the evaluation team accepted this explanation but the commission nonetheless recommended in its letter to Shuford "that the Board of Advisors could be even more effective in carrying out its functions."[25]

Dr. Freeland also expressed a profound and abiding concern over the length of time that a flag officer served as President of the Naval War College. The College had expected this finding and had drawn attention to the varying lengths of time each flag officer had served as President in its self-study.[26] The evaluation team noted that, since the last visit of an accreditation team in 1994, the average length of a president's tour of duty was thirty-four months, or just less than three years.[27] To its members, this was unheard of in civilian colleges and universities and they concluded that there was insufficient stability in the Naval War College's Office of the President. Shuford, Giblin, and Spain went to great lengths to explain that the needs of the Navy caused by the events of 11 September 2001 had produced an unusually high turnover rate in the position of President, with three flag officers in three years. They argued forcefully that the College, in spite of this situation, had continued to succeed and improve in every aspect of

its mission accomplishment, because its strategic tradition had served it well as its anchor to windward. Additionally, Rear Admiral Rempt's initiative in civilianizing the provost's position as a flag officer equivalent and then tasking the person filling that position with the responsibilities, authorities, and equities that Rempt envisaged had significantly added an element of institutional stability that mitigated the situation.

Nevertheless, the commission concluded that the practice of assigning flag officers as President for such short periods was not fully compliant with its standard on organization and governance.[28] Although MacTaggart appreciated that "the current needs of the nation have necessitated the early departure of the two previous presidents," he formally advised Shuford "such frequent turnover may have adversely affected the continuity of planning and the implementation of existing plans by the College," and urged him "to advocate for a longer appointment for its chief executive officer."[29]

The team's third area of concern was that the College was not doing enough to increase the diversity of the faculty and student body. Members of the College had expected this, as the self-study had identified this shortcoming. The College argued that it had made modest, though conspicuous, progress in increasing the representation of women and minorities on the faculty. At the time of the evaluation team's visit in 2004, the teaching departments and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies had thirteen women and five minority members; one of the women was chair of the National Security Decision Making Department. Ten years before, in 1994 at the time of the last self-study, the numbers were four and four, respectively. In 1999, at the time of the College's interim "Fifth-Year Report," there were eight women and three minorities. Nonetheless, MacTaggart noted that

> one of the strengths of the U.S. Naval War College is its talented, motivated students who come from all branches of the armed services as well as several civilian agencies. Although the College has had success in attracting international students, it has acknowledged the need to enhance its efforts to enroll greater numbers of minority students from the United States and to achieve greater racial and ethnic diversity among its faculty members.[30]

In the fourth instance, the team focused on providing the faculty with more research support and addressing issues of workload and sabbatical leave for faculty. MacTaggart's letter was direct and specific in this regard. The commission found that "the faculty teaching load is substantial and that opportunity for 'released time' and sabbaticals are limited. We concur with the visiting team's recommendation that the College study its workload and professional development policies to ensure that they provide faculty with sufficient support to meet the institution's expectations for research and scholarship."[31] Once again, the self-study had already identified this finding and candidly acknowledged that

> the College is less generous in providing to the teaching faculty the free time necessary for professional development, research, and scholarly publication. . . .
>
> . . . From the College's perspective, these last five years, characterized by changes in organization, the demand by the leadership of the Navy for increased connectivity to the Fleet and the senior Navy leadership, the uncertainty created by the Global War on Terror, and constraints on resources[,] have made a serious commitment to the policy hard to contemplate. . . . Remarkably, the scholarly output of the faculty significantly outpaces that of nearly all the other war colleges, but time, as always, remains the most precious commodity.[32]

In response to this, Shuford, Giblin, and Spain drew on the information presented in the self-study and on work that the provost had done with the Office of the General Counsel of the Navy, the Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs, and members of the House Armed Services Committee. These leaders stressed that they genuinely believed that there could be considerable benefit to individual faculty members as well as the College by implementing the stated policy of sabbatical leave and providing more financial support to faculty professional development. They also explained that this goal, while praiseworthy, required judicious execution by the College because of the existing legal and ethical obligations concerning the use of appropriated funds to support such faculty professional development.

In this regard, they took care to ensure that the evaluation team understood that there were very real restrictions imposed by U.S. law and the policies of the Office of Government Ethics and the Defense Department Joint Ethics Regulation concerning the use of public office for personal gain. Among other issues, they specifically mentioned the challenges faced by the College and the faculty concerning copyrighting and royalties.[33] They spent a substantial amount of time reviewing the Secretary of the Navy's policy and process concerning the acceptance of gifts by faculty members to fund their research.[34] Finally, they highlighted the fact that the President and the provost were personally engaged in a wide-ranging discussion toward clarifying the existing legal requirements and, if feasible, obtaining legislative or policy relief on behalf of the faculty. This involved discussions with the Office of the General Counsel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Legislative Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.[35] Although the evaluation team members acknowledged that they did not fully appreciate the boundaries under which the College operated in this regard, the members concluded that the lack of time and resources afforded to the faculty for purposes of professional development was significant and identified it as such in the commission's report.

The team's fifth area of concern was that a good portion of the College's physical facilities did not meet the standards that required the College to have "sufficient and appropriate physical resources" and to "provide facilities adequate to house the [library] collections and equipment." The College's self-study had in fact highlighted these shortcomings. Giblin and the College's comptroller, Commander Steve Smith, advised the team that the College would have a budgetary shortfall of between $5.6 million and $6.0 million, within fifteen months, at the beginning of fiscal year 2005. In the accreditation team's view, the net effect of this situation was so adverse that it called into question the College's ability to fund faculty, curriculum development, faculty development, research, information technology, books, printing, and copyright costs. The College needed to reallocate its resources to eliminate such shortfalls that affected the very essence of the College's education, research, analysis, and gaming functions.

Giblin and Smith also briefed the team that the financial ability of the College to maintain, repair, renovate, and modernize its aging physical infrastructure was in jeopardy with or without such a reallocation. They explained the actions the College had taken since July 2002 to deal with the facilities' issues. Giblin pointed out that the College had achieved some success in obtaining funding directly linked to facilities in the College's *Strategic Plan 2003*. Because of the attention paid to this issue and the aggressive programming and budgetary decisions by the provost and the comptroller, the College was on the verge of realizing, for the first time in over eight years, a stabilized, though modest, increase, when compared with the

requirement in the Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization facilities budget. Giblin and Smith were able to demonstrate that the College's actions had raised the total funds available to $7.5 million in this budget, minor facilities project funds, and grants in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, with modest increases expected in the following years.[36] Nevertheless, MacTaggart commented in his letter to Shuford, "five of the College's nine buildings are in need of significant modernization and . . . the physical space dedicated to the library is at capacity."[37]

The final area of concern to the commission was one that the College did not expect—its strategic planning process. MacTaggart's letter to Shuford acknowledged that

> the Commission understands that planning at the U.S. Naval War College is undertaken within the context of the wider planning of the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense and that the current climate is one of significant change and uncertainty about the place of the U.S. Naval War College in the nation's network of military colleges and the role of education in the future advancement of naval officers.[38]

MacTaggart advised Shuford that the standard on planning and evaluation requires that "planning and evaluation are systematic, broad-based, interrelated, and appropriate to the institution's circumstances. They involve the participation of individuals and groups responsible for the achievement of institutional purposes."[39] Shuford and Giblin were surprised that the commission concluded that the College had not met this standard. Recent external assessments of the College by the Naval Inspector General and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had affirmed, in the strongest of terms, that the College had a strong and effective strategic planning system that provided direction by means of clearly defined goals and objectives.[40] The College's executive leadership argued that the College's decision to alter the financial and manpower planning process from an organizationally driven process to one that was functionally based would better align planning and resources with mission accomplishment and institutional effectiveness. At the same time, the leaders believed this change would reduce the bureaucratic influences that often occur in an organizational-based process.[41]

The reaffirmation of the College's accreditation was the desired effect for the entire process, but there was another, equally important affirmation. In the private debrief for Rear Admiral Shuford and Provost Giblin at the conclusion of the evaluation team's visit, Dr. Freeland commented that he and his team had concluded that the College's "institutional effectiveness is one of the highest we've ever seen" and that the Naval War College's "institutional integrity, because of who you are, is unquestioned."[42]

Developing Strategic and Operational Leaders

Rear Admiral Shuford's tenure as President was an exceptionally vigorous one in terms of the scope of what the Navy's senior leadership demanded of the College with respect to developing strategic and operational leaders and what the College accomplished to influence and then meet or, in most cases, exceed those expectations. Through the increasing intensity of the conversation among the Navy's senior leadership on professional military and graduate education between 2002 and 2004, the requirement emerged for the Navy to introduce its officer and enlisted personnel to the principle that a career-long continuum of learning is central, if not vital, to their professional development. This goal was key and essential to the implementation of Admiral Vern Clark's vision of the Sea Warrior component of Sea Power 21 to develop

leaders by integrating Navy-specific professional military education, joint professional military education, and leadership development.

The College and the Continuum

Professor William R. Spain. After thirty years of active duty in the Marine Corps, Bill Spain transitioned in 2001 from the College's military faculty to its civilian faculty, serving in this capacity until his retirement in 2015, when he became Associate Provost Emeritus. Spain assisted seven consecutive Presidents and four provosts. His principal duties included assessing the College's institutional effectiveness, managing the College's strategic plan, and leading the College's accreditation efforts, both academic and joint professional military education. He served as acting provost in 2007–2008 and 2014–2015. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Rear Admiral Shuford with Captain Richard D. Suttie Seated behind Him during a Naval War College Ceremony. Suttie served at the Naval War College for a decade in a series of roles, including being the executive assistant to the President, Naval War College; deputy to the President; deputy dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies; assistant dean of academics for corporate affairs; and director of research for institutional effectiveness. He retired in 2011. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

On the basis of these conversations, Clark decided in January 2004 to "establish an enlisted and officer Navy Professional Military Education Continuum as a critical element for career progression and provide opportunities for completion of the requirements through a variety of delivery options."[43] The bulk of the responsibility for this work fell to the Naval War College.[44] This was not surprising given that it had consistently advocated the idea of the Navy's need for graduated levels of professional education throughout an officer's career with each period building on the previous one as the Knox-Pye-King Board had recommended in its twenty-eight-page report of 1920.[45] Rear Admirals Shuford and Route, Provost Giblin, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs Spain, and deputy director of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies Captain Richard Suttie engaged the Navy's senior leaders in a series of discussions and video conferences. Through this, they built a consensus that a continuum must provide a comprehensive and progressive educational framework of naval professional military education and joint professional military education across a career.[46] There was also a consensus that a continuum must specify the areas of emphasis at each level along it and should describe a succession of educational opportunities planned to prepare individuals for leadership challenges at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.[47]

On 18 November 2004, the Navy's leadership released a policy statement reflecting this consensus and asserted:

> It is essential that we broaden the professional and intellectual horizons of sailors throughout their careers to better prepare them to operate tomorrow's fleet, and to assume key naval and joint leadership roles. We will accomplish this objective through institutionalizing a professional military education (PME) continuum that integrates . . . Navy-specific professional military education (NPME), joint professional military education (JPME) and leadership development.[48]

The policy statement went on to declare:

> NPME will provide a broad, common understanding of the Navy and its full capabilities, thereby preparing our sailors to effectively perform their missions across the full spectrum of naval and joint military operations. It will be sequenced across a career, and will address three core competencies of the naval profession: military studies, professionalism, and national as well as global security. NPME will be an essential component of career progression for all sailors.
>
> . . . JPME will provide understanding of the principles of jointness that underpin Seapower 21. . . . Timely completion of appropriate JPME will be a key consideration in identifying our future leaders.[49]

Shuford recognized that the Navy needed a more detailed plan for both officers and enlisted in order to implement this policy. He also understood that this effort involved more than just the creation of a continuum. It was the current expression of the long-standing debate in the Navy about the value of education to increase the perspective and leadership capacity of the members of a profession versus the value of education for education's sake and about the character of that education. Shuford realized that the development of the Continuum was also a vital component of the ongoing work to determine the College's new mission, functions, and tasks. But Shuford, with his prior experience as head of the Navy's personnel office for enlisted and officer distribution, was profoundly concerned about the implications of creating additional hurdles on career development paths that were not likely to win support from the leaders in charge of current operations. Years in the budget arena had given these "barons" the instinct to resist any new program that might interfere or limit assignments or funding in their areas of responsibility. For the Naval War College to push such a high-profile, Navy-wide demand for the money and manpower that they managed was a particular challenge, given their seldom-explicit but generally held view that education should primarily be the result of time on the bridge or in the cockpit of an airplane, rather than time spent on campus or reading books. The responsibilities shouldered by these various type commanders reinforced this sense of ambivalence toward the College. Shuford's understanding of the sources of this ambivalence helped shape his approach to both the substance and the structure of the Continuum.

Shuford was not alone among his fellow war college presidents bewildered by the process for the Joint Staff's Officer Professional Military Education Policy, viewing it as a "necessary bureaucratic contrivance to advance a narrative of Jointness."[50] Shuford steadfastly believed that the President of the Naval War College had a distinct responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations for Navy-specific professional military education as well as a joint professional military education. He insisted that the final version of the Continuum reflect the standing of both within the context of Clark's vision. In this regard, Shuford contended that the Navy's professional military education builds and maintains the institutional strength necessary to underpin the unique cultural and intellectual framework of the Navy. This proposition helped Shuford evolve a supportive engagement plan with the "barons" and helped him begin to describe how the Continuum could provide the structure for clarifying other tasks in the realm of research, analysis, gaming, and other similar but yet not clearly defined functions of the College.[51]

These instincts proved to be prescient during Shuford's discussions with Clark in Newport on 17 December 2004. Shuford's intent was (1) to provide Clark with his assessment of the College after having served as its President for about 120 days; (2) to tell the Chief of Naval Operations where the College was heading; and (3) to get a "vector" check from him with respect to both. In short, Shuford viewed this as a "navigation check ride."[52] He had two broad themes that he wanted to convey to Clark with respect to developing



Changes in Professional Military Education for the Navy, 2005. These two slides, "PME in the Navy Today" and "Navy's PME/JPME Continuum Approved by VCNO BOD, 4 May 2005," were used by Rear Admiral Shuford in June 2005, while making a PowerPoint presentation to the Chief of Naval Operations on "The Naval War College and the CNO's PME Continuum."

Naval Historical Collection

operational and strategic leaders: first, "As the number of officers decreases, the importance of a broadly and efficiently educated officer corps increases," and second, "Our officers are not adequately prepared for Joint Ops and Planning."[53] During this meeting, Clark was very clear that the Naval War College's interpretation of the Continuum and its intent to differentiate the intermediate and senior courses was correct.

The implication was straightforward: the Chief of Naval Operations was demanding real differentiation across a sequential set of primary, intermediate, and senior professional military educational programs and that the progression of learning across the Continuum must be measured in terms of substance as well as the learning taxonomy of how the College taught the academic substance of the courses. At the end of this navigation check ride, Clark told Shuford directly, "You've got it right and you're doing good," but he also put Shuford on notice that "a higher level of discussion in the senior course isn't sufficient reason to send somebody here twice."[54]

After the College did a significant amount of work to propose changes to the existing plan of professional military education within the Navy, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations' Corporate Board approved on 4 May 2005 the new concept of the Continuum that the College had developed.[55]

In effect, the Continuum made the Naval War College responsible for the implementation and assessment of both naval and joint professional military education from seaman recruit to rear admiral within the Navy, with the exception of the precommissioning component of the Continuum. By so doing, it leveraged the College's enduring strength as an educational institution and, for the first time, formally aligned the Navy's approach to professional military education with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept of a continuum, as stated in the Chairman's *Vision for Joint Officer Development,* and the Chief of Naval Operations' intent with respect to Sea Warrior.[56] Perhaps more importantly, it officially acknowledged the importance of Navy-specific professional military education. Moreover, as Shuford was to learn a short two months later, it was to serve as the catalyst and organizing principle for the next Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, and his plan, "Path to Joint." Mullen's plan led the way for the Navy to comply with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and, eventually, the 2005 Ronald Reagan National Defense Act, which directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategic plan for joint officer management and joint professional military education that linked to the overall mission and goals of the Department of Defense.[57]

"TACAMO—Take Charge and Move Out"

With Admiral Clark's navigation check ride completed, Shuford charged the College's faculty and staff to "move out smartly toward implementation of the range of initiatives we have committed to."[58] Shuford directed the provost to focus the College's efforts on developing and implementing the Navy's primary professional military education program. Shuford's intent was to develop a shared understanding of the Navy's doctrine and capabilities for joint operations among the Navy's "deck plate–level" leaders—chief petty officers and junior officers in the grades of ensign through lieutenant. Unlike the other services, the Navy had no unifying course at the tactical level of warfare that taught these leaders how the Navy approached warfare from an integrated perspective. Shuford wanted the primary level of professional military education to provide a thorough introduction to joint warfare while, at the same time, giving the Navy's junior leadership a basic understanding of how the Navy thinks and fights. His desired effect was to move them beyond the views of their specialist warfare communities and to introduce them to an overarching doctrinal view of the Navy.[59]

The College of Distance Education, under leadership of its director, Professor Tim Jackson, and its deputy director, Professor Walt Wildemann, with the able assistance of Professor John Roberts, took the lead and

implemented the program's initial course for officers on 22 May 2006. Shortly afterward, they also implemented a tailored version of the course designed specifically for senior and master chief petty officers. One year later, in January 2008, the College of Distance Education introduced two additional professional military education programs, Introductory PME, designed for sailors in the grades of seaman recruit to petty officer third class, and Basic PME, designed for petty officers second class to petty officers first class. The result was that by the time of Shuford's change of command in November 2008 the College had enrolled 3,988 in the introductory enlisted course, 6,256 in the basic course, and 5,272 in the primary enlisted course. In doing this, the College closely aligned its actions with Admiral Clark's intent to implement the various components of the Continuum quickly in anticipation of its final approval. It is significant to note that the College implemented most of these components of the Continuum by making hard, priority-based funding decisions to use existing resources to implement Clark's decisions.[60]

Less than one week after Shuford had delivered his 120-day assessment on the College, Commander Jeffrey A. Harley, a 1996 Naval War College graduate in the Office of the Assistant for Strategic Actions in the immediate office of the Chief of Naval Operations, contacted Giblin on 23 December 2004. Harley advised that Clark planned to include a number of tasks related to the Continuum in his forthcoming *CNO Guidance for 2005*. He forwarded a draft of the *Guidance* to Giblin, telling him that Clark was still personally working it, and invited Giblin to submit a set of recommendations for Clark's consideration.[61] Since Clark would issue direction based on the recommendations he received, the opportunity to contribute drew Shuford's immediate attention. He directed the provost to work with the assistance of Associate Provost Bill Spain, with no distractions, to draft a recommended text for Harley. Spain and Giblin developed a set of eight tasks, crystalizing the intent transmitted by the Chief of Naval Operations earlier that month, which established a set of formal objectives for the College.[62]

After several detailed reviews running late into the holiday evenings, Shuford approved the draft on 27 December 2004 and directed Giblin to forward it to Harley. Although some of these initiatives were already under way at Newport, he also directed Giblin to begin to think through how the College would execute those tasks quickly and effectively, assuming Clark included them in his *Guidance*. On the morning of 3 January 2005, Harley sent Giblin a copy of Clark's *CNO Guidance for 2005: Winning the Fight . . . and Bridging to the Future*.[63] It contained all of the eight tasks, exactly as recommended by the College. The following day, as the College's faculty and staff returned from the Christmas break, they found at the top of their e-mail queues a note from Shuford with the *CNO Guidance* attached and the comment: "Major taskers articulated in this year's guidance from CNO. No surprises, but clear endorsement of the initiatives that are currently underway. I am excited about what you are doing."[64] In a separate comment to Giblin, Shuford noted, "Think we batted a 1000 here. Now to execute . . ."[65]

"Don't Set the Plow Blade Too Deep"

In his *Guidance,* Clark directed Shuford to "restructure the Navy's intermediate and senior service college programs to align them with the PME continuum"[66] by September 2005 and to "identify R[eserve] C[omponent] . . . professional military education requirements for incorporation into Sea Warrior."[67] Because this task generated the first major change to both the intent and the substance of the College's

curricula since the presidency of Admiral Turner, it is important to place it in context of the broader institutional history of the Naval War College.

In 2005, Dr. John Hattendorf, the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History and chair of the Maritime History Department at the College, pointed out that there has been "a recurring pattern of major revisions to the College's curriculum roughly every 25–30 years since the founding of the College."[68] He noted that the 1884 curriculum designed by the College's founding President, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, was changed in 1893 by Captain Henry Taylor, the sixth President of the College, with the personal support and encouragement of the Secretary of the Navy. The curriculum developed under Taylor's leadership remained essentially in place until 1919, when Rear Admiral William S. Sims, the College's sixteenth President, transformed it. The next major modification occurred in 1946 when Admiral Raymond Spruance, the College's twenty-sixth President, modified the curriculum in the context of the start of the Cold War, an emerging debate over nuclear weapons, and a quandary in service education policy. The next major change occurred in 1972 under the College's thirty-seventh President, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, with the personal backing of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt.[69] Hattendorf contended that each of these changes was a "radical one from the top down, not an evolutionary one from the bottom up, and, in most cases, it was the College's President taking the lead to compel the implementation of these changes with the support of the senior leadership of the Navy."[70]

In spite of this record of major curriculum changes in the War College's institutional history, the chairs of the academic departments were surprised that the Chief of Naval Operations would issue such direct guidance, aimed at restructuring the institution's curriculum. Their surprise notwithstanding, Shuford considered this directive to be expansive, and the validation of a larger role for the College, where it could use its traditional and unique strengths and credibility at the operational level of war. The Continuum met Congress's objectives for education that improved joint operations. It also reinforced and gave prominence to naval educational developments that linked to an officer's career development and produced opportunities to insert new educational and analytical programs where they made best sense over the entire careers of the warfighters and staff planners. Shuford interpreted the *Guidance* to apply to both the Navy's reserve and active components and directed Giblin to approach these two tasks as one, according it the highest priority in terms of the *CNO's Guidance for 2005*.[71]

Discussions among Shuford, Giblin, and Spain had already concluded that there was ample evidence that the intermediate-level College of Naval Command and Staff course overlapped significantly with the senior-level College of Naval Warfare course. In this regard, it is important to note that the College had made a conscious decision in academic year 1972–1973 to make those two courses similar. This decision acknowledged the practical reality of the decision that the Bureau of Naval Personnel had made in 1972–1973 that naval officers would typically have only one chance to attend a service college. However, the bureau had been unwilling to establish a policy that identified at what point in a career an officer would attend a service college. Because of this uncertainty, Vice Admiral Turner had decided to make the two courses only slightly different to accommodate this reality in the Navy's policies for personnel distribution and assignments.[72]

By 2004, the curricula for both the intermediate- and senior-level courses had become virtually identical. Shuford was convinced that this curricular structure did not fully satisfy the current requirements for professional military education. He argued that the outcome produced senior-level students who were well versed in grand strategy, but not sufficiently competent in the theater-strategic level of planning and conflict. At the same time, intermediate-level, pre-command students were given a very strong background in grand strategy at the expense of joint operational planning competence.[73]

Shuford's insight on this point was useful, as the senior leadership of the Navy had been grappling for some time with critical challenges in the area of operational planning as well as command and control. These issues arose earlier during Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in 1983, Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989, and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in Iraq in 1990 and 1991. The same issues also occurred in recent major joint exercises. There was no doubt that the Navy's contributions were substantial and that the tactical capabilities that naval forces brought to joint operations were nothing less than superb. But these same shortfalls appeared to be reoccurring in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq and in fighting the Global War on Terror in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Vice Admiral Robert F. "Rat" Willard, then Commander, Seventh Fleet, expressed this frustration in October 2002, when he argued, "We must rediscover the lost art of command and control. Our training and developmental emphasis in the Navy and joint forces needs to embrace command and control as a fundamental operational task, with priority in schooling our commanders in what they must know. . . ."[74] Shuford sensed that there was a consensus among the senior leadership that naval officers lacked the education, training, and experience required to plan and command and control campaigns and major operations. Moreover, he believed that the leadership regarded this deficiency as a critical vulnerability—perhaps even a mission-limiting deficiency. He concluded that this shortfall was, at least in part, one of the unintended consequences of the Naval War College's intermediate-level curriculum, which produced graduates with a very strong grand strategy background at the expense of joint operational planning competence.

Shuford and Giblin decided that the core issue at hand for Clark and his senior leadership team was the acute need for more competent operational planners that could operate effectively at the lieutenant commander level in the joint command and control environment. Based on these conclusions and the responses that Shuford received during a series of personal conversations with fleet commanders, the College's executive leadership decided that the immediate task was to separate the intermediate and senior courses. In accordance with Clark's direction, the College took action to create distinct curricula for each course level while, at the same time, increasing the focus on operational-level planning in the intermediate, Naval Command and Staff–level course. Shuford, on the recommendation of the provost, decided to focus on changing the intermediate-level course first, with a view toward mitigating the Navy's critical need for competent operational planners.

This task harkened back to the debate that took place in the late 1970s over the proper role of the College of Naval Command and Staff. The President of the College at the time, Vice Admiral Julien LeBourgeois, believed that "the course structure had to take account of the fact that less than 10 percent of the Naval War College command and staff graduates could be expected to return to Newport for the senior course."[75] In light of this, the Chief of Naval Personnel at the time, Vice Admiral James D. Watkins, argued strongly

that he believed that a "fundamental shift in the focus of the command and staff course is called for."[76] Watkins argued, "Our first priority in a command and staff course must be to ensure that the graduates possess a level of competence in naval operations and planning commensurate with the duties to which they will be assigned."[77] He went on to caveat his call for change with the caution that he did not believe that "an abrupt change is necessary. The intent is not to be disruptive but to migrate through an evolutionary reorientation back to a course that fulfills Navy needs."[78] The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, sided with Watkins and directed that "the intermediate-level course . . . will stress naval operations and planning and provide the opportunity to increase the professional competence associated with those areas."[79] Shuford took the same approach as Watkins in terms of implementing change after concluding, once again, that the fundamentals of the College's educational methodology were sound and would be consistent with any changes that became necessary.

Shuford also believed that it was essential, not only to this task, but to the broader Continuum, to establish an educational outcome that would guide the development of a revised curriculum. He steadfastly believed in the construct of Professor Morse Peckham, who had been writer-in-residence while Shuford had been an undergraduate at the University of South Carolina. Peckham defined decision making and responsibilities at the strategic and operational levels and linked them with the outcomes of education, thus defining drivers for a curriculum.[80] The majority of the work of developing this fell to Giblin and Spain. Working largely by themselves on Sunday afternoons, when the College was quiet, they quickly developed a set of educational outcomes and specific competencies for each desired outcome at the primary, intermediate, and senior levels for naval and joint professional military education and for the College's Naval Operational Planner Course.

After a significant amount of work and further consideration by the College's Academic Policy Committee, Shuford approved four desired outcomes with specified competencies for the graduates of the senior, College of Naval Warfare course.[81] These outcomes envisioned that these officers would be

- Skilled in formulating and executing strategy and U.S. policy[82]
- Skilled in joint operations, theater strategy, and campaign planning[83]
- Capable of strategically minded critical thinking[84]
- Capable of excelling in positions of strategic leadership.[85]

Shuford also approved five desired outcomes with specified competencies for the graduates of the intermediate, College of Naval Command and Staff course:[86]

- Skilled in applying operational art to maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations[87]
- Skilled in joint and naval planning processes[88]
- Capable of critical thought with operational perspectives[89]
- Prepared for operational-level leadership challenges[90]

- Effective as maritime spokespersons.[91]

Prior to 2005, no such educational outcomes had existed within the Navy. Shuford believed that these outcomes and the competencies associated with them could drive curricula development at the Naval War College to achieve what he believed Peckham had sought. As Shuford wrote in 2009, "Education should produce operational and strategic leaders who can sort out from the past and present what matters and what does not"; and "Education must give operational and strategic leaders the ability to orient to vastly different perspectives, to relate different fields of human knowledge, and to simplify complexity. . . ."[92]

Shuford was confident that the academic faculty would understand and embrace this approach, since it put the process in the hands of the academic leadership of the College. What guided Shuford in taking such a bold set of initiatives dealing with one of the core functions of the institution was the only words of guidance that Admiral Clark ever gave his new President of the Naval War College. On 12 August 2004, after the ceremony in which Shuford was installed as the College's fifty-first President, Shuford and Clark had a chance for a brief private discussion on the drive to the other side of Narragansett Bay to deliver Clark to his official aircraft waiting at Quonset Point. Concerning the means, Clark told his young protégé, "You figure out just how to get this done, Jake. Just make sure you don't set the plow blade too deep."[93]

The Devil Is Always in the Details

Given these decisions, the immediate challenge was how to increase the competency of the graduates of the College of Naval Command and Staff course as operational planners. The chairs of the academic departments argued that the best way to achieve this goal was to make the Joint Maritime Operations course for the College of Naval Command and Staff longer, allowing more time for hands-on operational planning exercises. Their preferred way of doing this was to increase the time that students spent in Newport. Shuford and Giblin knew that it was unlikely that the Chief of Naval Personnel and the Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command would agree to increase the time most naval students spent in Newport to more than the thirty-nine weeks of in-class time already allocated for the College of Naval Command and Staff course. A variety of practical reasons governed the Navy's personnel distribution and assignment practices, but Shuford directed Giblin to raise this course of action with the deputies at the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Naval Military Personnel Command.

When, as expected, this solution was rejected, the only other option available was to reapportion the time each academic department had available to it in the curriculum for the College of Naval Command and Staff. The chairs of the academic departments were hardly enthusiastic about this approach and even less so about the decision to reduce the time allocated to the Strategy and Policy course to ten weeks, and the National Security Decision Making course to twelve weeks. Giblin allocated the additional two weeks gained by this decision to increase the Joint Maritime Operations course to seventeen weeks.[94] To their credit, as dedicated professionals, the chairs modified the designs of the curricula by August 2005, only seven months after receiving the tasking from the Chief of Naval Operations.

The faculty prepared the revised curricula throughout the 2005–2006 academic year. Through the very hard work of the departmental chairs and their respective faculties, the revised three-part curriculum for

the College of Naval Command and Staff satisfied the Chief of Naval Operations within the constraints imposed by the provost and Shuford's guidance with respect to outcomes. The revised National Security Decision Making course began in August 2006, with the new Strategy and War course following in November 2006, and the completely revised Joint Maritime Operations course in February 2007.



Changes to the Naval War College's Core Courses, 2005. These two slides, "Existing Unitary Structure" and "New Mission. New Structure. New Content," were used by Rear Admiral Shuford in June 2005, during his "Naval War College and the CNO's PME Continuum" briefing to Admiral Vern Clark, while Clark was at the Naval War College for the Current Strategy Forum.

Naval Historical Collection

Dr. John Maurer, the new chair of the Strategy and Policy Department, led his faculty in creating the new course titled Strategy and War. It was distinct from the long-standing Strategy and Policy course, which continued for the College of Naval Warfare. Maurer and his faculty created a course that approached war from a theater-strategic perspective within a national-strategic context of military power as well as adding a new course theme, "Culture and Societies." The stated objective of the course was to sharpen students' abilities to assess how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve overall national objectives. In the same manner, Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department, shifted the focus of the shortened National Security Decision Making course to the theater-strategic level. Her intent was to examine the challenges, theater strategies, and activities of the regional combatant commanders by using a theater lens to explore issues of security involving decision making and leadership, particularly force selection and planning within national and theater resource constraints. She increased the proportion of sessions focused on specific theaters over those offered in 2003 and 2004 from 13 percent to 34 percent and restructured the intermediate-level final exercise to focus it on specific theaters. Captain Tony Ruoti, chair of the Joint Military Operations Department, and his successive reliefs, Captains Steve Kornatz and Jim Maynard, focused the Joint Military Operations faculty's work on giving students more time for hands-on operational planning exercises in a similar manner to what the students in the Naval Operational Planner Course received.[95]

Planning for the curricular changes that the Chief of Naval Operations required had started well before his task to restructure the curricula. As early as March 2003, Giblin had directed Ruoti to develop a proof-of-concept course to deal with Phase II in joint professional military education. At the same time, the College briefed the deputy director of the Joint Staff (J7) during the College of Naval Warfare's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education in May 2003 and again during the College of Naval Command and Staff's similar accreditation process in October 2003 on its intentions with respect to Phase II. On the basis of the preliminary assessment and effective planning that Ruoti and his faculty had conducted, the provost was able to brief the Navy's advanced education summit meeting on 13 June 2003. Giblin reported that the College would be able to implement a joint professional military education Phase II program in the senior-level, College of Naval Warfare course, should a legislative change authorize it to do so. On conclusion of that meeting, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William J. "Fox" Fallon, directed the provost to continue with this planning, keeping Fallon and the director of the Navy Staff advised of its progress.[96] On 9 January 2004, the Joint Staff advised the College that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to request legislative relief to authorize joint professional military education in all senior service colleges.[97] Less than one month later, on 4 February 2004, Rear Admiral Ron Route provided Admiral Mike Mullen, who had relieved Fallon as the vice chief, with a detailed assessment of the Naval War College's readiness to shift its senior-level program from one based on Phase I to a fully accredited Phase II course.[98]

Route advised Mullen that it was his intent to be prepared to conduct a Phase II proof of concept with the resident College of Naval Warfare course, using existing faculty, students, and funding.[99] However, Route cautioned that the "availability of JPME I qualified USN Unrestricted Line Officers in the College of Naval Warfare to participate in this proof of concept is vital to its success and, ultimately, its accreditation."[100] He further advised Mullen that this qualification had not previously been the case with recent naval students and he highlighted the fact that only one of the current naval students enrolled in

the senior course was qualified at the Phase I level and that officer was a Medical Service Corps officer.[101] In contrast, Route also highlighted the fact that the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps generally "have sufficient senior students in residence with JPME I to comply with what we believe will be the [Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] policy concerning the ratio of students from the respective Services in each seminar."[102] This was not surprising and repeated a continuing concern for the College. For a number of years, the College had wanted to build its senior curriculum on the academic foundations the students had acquired in an intermediate-level program. For example, in 1973, only 15 percent of the students in the College of Naval Warfare were graduates of any command and staff course.[103] Route, Giblin, and Spain knew that one of the elements of the ongoing conversation concerning the legislative authorization for senior service colleges to teach Phase II of the joint professional military education program was that such legislation would require completion of Phase I as a prerequisite for Phase II. What this meant in practical terms was that an officer had to be a graduate of an intermediate-level service college to enter a Phase II program because those service colleges were the only institutions authorized to offer Phase I.

After a lengthy phone conversation between Giblin and Mullen in April 2004 in preparation for a meeting between Mullen and Representative Ike Skelton, Mullen directed the College to develop and to administer a Phase II proof-of-concept course.[104] The College envisioned that the College of Naval Warfare Joint Military Operations course would be the foundation for the proof-of-concept course and would consist of two seminars with thirty students. The College would then take the lessons learned from the proof-of-concept course and incorporate them into a revised curriculum for the entire College of Naval Warfare in 2006. While this planning was in progress, discussion between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of Congress during the summer of 2004 indicated that Congress was open to extending the legislative authority to teach Phase II to the senior service colleges.

The Joint Military Operations faculty, under the leadership of Professor Jim Butler, developed a thirteen-week course designed to meet the chairman's published learning requirements for Phase II at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, because there was no course for senior service colleges yet in existence. Butler was uniquely qualified to take on this challenge because his last active-duty assignment as a U.S. Navy captain had been as dean of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. When Shuford briefed Clark on 17 December 2004 on his 120-day assessment of the state of the College, he was able to report that the development of a Phase II pilot course was on track. He estimated that the new course would consist of a 55 percent revision of the old course, 25 percent completely new material, and only 20 percent of the original course.[105] The Joint Military Operations Department taught this pilot course from March to June 2005, using teams of three military and civilian faculty members, each of whom taught seminars of thirty-three College of Naval Warfare students, with eleven students from each military department. The civilian faculty included retired officers who paired with active-duty faculty members so that there were representatives of each military department on the teaching team.

Shortly after the College offered this pilot course, Congress passed the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 and President George W. Bush signed it into law on 28 October 2004.[106] This legislation established the authority for joint military education Phase II instruction at

senior-level service colleges beginning in August 2006. It also authorized Phase II credit for officers who had graduated earlier with the same curriculum, but before the accreditation was completed.[107] Because of the changes implemented in the 2005 Defense Authorization Act, the direction contained in the CNO's *Guidance* for 2005, and the draft Phase II "Learning Areas" and "Objectives" that the working group of the Military Education Coordinating Committee had produced, the College significantly revised its initial pilot course to comply with the new policies and draft requirements. When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated the revised Officer Professional Military Education Policy on 22 December 2005, the Joint Military Operations faculty, again under Butler's leadership, further refined its senior course to ensure that it was in full compliance with the newly established "Learning Areas" and "Objectives" for senior-level colleges. The College taught this revised version twice, once from March to June 2006, and again from August to November 2006.[108]

If anyone knew how essential it was to bring Phase II into the College of Naval Warfare quickly and effectively, it was Shuford. From his time as the Navy's "Head Detailer," he knew that after October 2008, the legislation required joint specialty officer qualification for appointment of officers selected for flag officer. He also knew that qualification as a joint specialty officer required completion of three milestones: joint military education Phase I, Phase II, and a joint duty assignment. Shuford recognized that it was in the Navy's interest to create a large pool of post–major command, unrestricted line officers who were fully qualified and inherently joint leaders for promotion to flag officer to ensure selectivity and to avoid the so-called preselection effect.[109] The fact remained that the constraint on achieving these objectives was the number of students that the Navy's personnel distribution system made available for Phase II education.

An analysis conducted by the Naval Military Personnel Command for the Chief of Naval Personnel in December 2005 showed that the Navy had 262 student places available, but that those opportunities would grow to 391 beginning in August 2006 with the implementation of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act. The Naval War College accounted for 82 percent of the additional Phase II capacity available to the Navy.[110] Shuford also knew that the College had been in the forefront of arguing for senior-level service colleges to be able to offer joint professional military education Phase II to their resident students. He was, nonetheless, concerned that broadly educating senior officers in the College of Naval Warfare—even as well as the Naval War College did—was not enough. He was deeply frustrated from the outset and often privately remarked to Giblin that he had "concluded that one of the vital functions of the [College's] curricula . . . was to eliminate a glaring deficit in fundamental cognitive skills."[111] Shuford believed that any remediation of an officer's analytical and writing skills, if necessary, would best be accomplished before attending a senior-level service college. He understood that the College of Naval Warfare had to be something more to convince the Chief of Naval Operations that it was in his interest to send only the most promising commanders and captains to Newport for senior service college education. Based on this assessment, Shuford believed that the Navy undervalued the College of Naval Warfare. He and Giblin also knew that the Navy's leaders would value the fact that the College met the statutory Phase II requirement for eligibility for promotion to flag rank. The challenge for the College was to meet the Joint Chiefs' Phase II requirements, while at the same time it made the overall curriculum into something that was truly elite and that created critical thinkers, well versed in their profession. Shuford knew that the College's graduates would deal with not only military interests but also political, diplomatic, and economic ones in what Shuford

described as "a realm defined by a wide scope of responsibility, geopolitical consequence, complexity, uncertainty, and change."[112] To do this, however, the College had to deal first with the issues surrounding joint military education Phase II. The College was well prepared because of its detailed planning and the open, frank, and honest self-study it prepared in advance of the Joint Chiefs' Process for Accreditation of Joint Education team's visit to Newport from 14 to 18 May 2007. The outcome of this process was that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff certified the College of Naval Warfare joint military education Phase II program and authorized the Naval War College to recognize graduates of this program as having met all of the requirements, beginning with the class that attended the Joint Military Operations course starting in August 2006.[113] The report was especially encouraging. It found that the "college's clarity of purpose and strategic tradition provide focus for its mission and a means to calibrate the tensions between tradition and progress" and that the "current four-fold college mission provides synergies and interdependence among the four elements that mutually reinforce one another and strengthen the college's role in national and international security." In terms of restructuring the senior curriculum along the lines that Admiral Clark had directed, the report encouraged the faculty, pointing out: "The JMO course is noteworthy in how well it balances the need to focus on military operations from a joint perspective while retaining the maritime flavor that marks [the Naval War College] as a naval school."[114]

Reducing a "Cost of Opportunity"

In his 2005 *Guidance,* Admiral Clark also tasked Shuford to "develop and offer a set of clustered elective courses . . . to complement . . . [other ongoing] initiatives. These should produce skill sets that are identified and tracked by our personnel management system."[115] Shuford and Giblin knew that Clark had concluded that the Navy needed to expand its executive education and training curricula to ensure they maintained pace with the needs of the Navy and its operational communities. He had been discussing the state of the overall curriculum with Rempt, Route, Shuford, and Giblin for some time and concluded that the Navy may be paying a cost of opportunity in terms of the College's electives program.[116] When Vice Admiral Stockdale began the wide-ranging program of elective courses in 1977, he wanted the program to utilize the untapped knowledge of the faculty and to expand both the breadth and depth of the Naval War College's core curricula, providing opportunities to explore subjects not included or to investigate in detail specific elements of those curricula.

Although Clark did not argue with the premise that the electives program could expand a student's perspective, he believed that the cost of opportunity incurred by using this approach to electives that took up about 20 percent of a student's time at the College was too high. He felt that there was little or no focus in terms of what the students took away from their choice of electives in terms of outcomes and competencies. He believed that the College could and should align its elective offerings with his focus on expanding the Navy's executive education curricula to ensure it maintained pace with the needs of the Navy. Clark wanted to focus electives on professional areas that were increasingly demanding more-robust and higher levels of expertise for naval, joint, and coalition planning and command, like warfare analysis, operational law, information operations, and regional security challenges, to name a few, and he wanted the Navy's manpower and personnel system to be able to track these competencies. When Shuford briefed Clark on

17 December 2004 about how the College was proceeding to meet these increased demands, Clark responded, "Absolutely! Let's get on with it," and directed Shuford to accelerate this initiative.[117]

Issues of naval personnel were not Clark's only concern.[118] At that time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was considering a larger issue about the Defense Department's "ability to make Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQs) immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, information and maritime capabilities."[119] The challenge at hand was the fact that the services had experienced problems in sourcing and training the right people for assignment at joint task force headquarters because their personnel databases did not contain the information needed to match the best-qualified person with the professional competencies required by the various billets in a joint task force headquarters. To resolve this challenge, Rumsfeld directed the service secretaries and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness in coordination with the Commander, Joint Forces Command to "develop a common tracking mechanism to identify Active and Reserve Personnel with JTF HQs experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals."[120]

This direction, coupled with Clark's, required the College to create a tracking system that linked individual names tied to a set of practical competencies. The issue at hand for the College was what group of competencies it could credibly offer to satisfy the Chief of Naval Operations and what the best way would be to track them to help the Navy satisfy Rumsfeld's and Clark's requirements. After much discussion, Giblin recommended that the Naval War College use the already existing structure of AQD codes rather than try to create some new tracking mechanism. He argued that an additional qualification designator code identified the attainment of skills and knowledge, as recognized by competent authority, in addition to those identified by the officer's designator, grade, or subspecialty. The concept was that the College would develop areas of study and then require naval students to complete three courses in one of the areas. The College would develop and submit recommendations for the approval of an additional qualification designator for each area of study, to identify the key skills and competencies developed over the courses of study. On completion of the three required electives at graduation, in the case of each U.S. Navy student the Naval War College would forward a recommendation to the Naval Military Personnel Command to enter the appropriate code in the student's permanent personnel record.

Shuford approved the following eleven areas of study for the revised electives program as a basis for planning and execution during the 2005–2006 academic year:

- Asia-Pacific Regional Security Studies;
- Greater Middle East Regional Security Studies;
- Africa Regional Security Studies;
- Latin America/Western Hemisphere Regional Security Studies;
- Eurasian Regional Security Studies;
- Joint Operational Planning (as offered through the College's Naval Operational Planner Course);

- Executive Analysis for the Warfare Commander;
- Insurgency and Terrorism (planned for academic year 2006–2007);
- Joint Warfare Planning and Analysis;[121]
- Enterprise Strategic Planning; and
- The Law of Armed Conflict.

He also approved the following areas of study as a basis for planning and subsequent introduction into the College's electives program:

- Theater Strategic Planning (planned for academic year 2007–2008);
- Information Operations (planned for academic year 2007–2008);
- Operational Logistics (planned for academic year 2008–2009, but not implemented); and
- Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (planned for academic year 2008–2009).[122]

In creating this system in response to the Chief of Naval Operations' directions, the College intended it to be a useful tool for the officer personnel detailers (PERS 4) and the officer community managers to use at the Naval Military Personnel Command. The idea was that the competency codes based on areas of study would help indicate qualifications for an individual officer's future assignments. To the College's regret that did not happen for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, the College implemented the revised electives program in August 2005. In doing so, officers chose areas of study, based, for the most part, on their own preferences.

The revised electives program had a heavy emphasis on regional security studies. The reason for this was the Deputy Secretary of Defense's program decision memorandum to increase the services' focus on language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness in the services' professional military education programs and the policy statement of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that "regional expertise [is a] critical warfighting skill . . . integral to joint operations."[123] For some time, the College had been considering the need for increasing the regional expertise content of its core and elective curricula. Professor Joan Johnson-Freese had raised this issue in a memorandum to Rear Admiral Rempt in December 2002. At that time, she argued that

> it seems imperative that through direction, better coordination, and supplementary funding, NWC build a Regional Studies Program. That program . . . 1) would insure that each NWC graduate has considered U.S. national security issues in each region of the world, as well as regional perceptions of their own security issues . . . , and 2) has the opportunity for a more in-depth examination of one region, through the electives program.[124]

She proposed a phased introduction of such a program beginning in academic year 2003–2004 with the expansion of the regional studies aspects in the National Security Decision Making course. Over the longer

term, she recommended that the College require that each student take, at a minimum, one regional elective of the three electives taken each academic year as a requirement for graduation.[125] Though her recommendations were not quite what the Department of Defense envisioned in its push to increase language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness in the services' professional military education programs, she was, nonetheless, correct with respect to the need for such competencies.

When Dr. David Chu, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, visited the College on 7 June 2006, Shuford briefed him on the College's new approach to professional military education within the context of the Continuum. As part of this, Shuford explained where the College stood in implementing the deputy secretary's program decision memorandum on increasing regional expertise. At the conclusion of the discussion, Chu was pleased that the College had anticipated his direction and could have a coherent, aligned regional expertise and cultural awareness program up and running so quickly. He approved the College's approach in using a trial system, rather than waiting for the perfect solution, and that a tracking mechanism was in place using the system of additional qualification designators. To support this the College had hired, among other regional experts already on the faculty, a cultural anthropologist to help the Naval War College review its curricula development through a different lens. During the discussions, Chu agreed with the College's point that teaching language as part of an intermediate- or senior-level professional military education program incurred a high cost of opportunity. The outcome would be minimal in terms of investment; however, he strongly endorsed the Naval War College's belief that it is essential to sustain the language capability of students while in residence.[126]

"Accelerate Your Mind"

With these and other assigned tasks from the Chief of Naval Operations completed or well under way, Shuford and Giblin traveled to Washington, D.C., on the morning of 13 July 2005. There, they met with Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri and other members of the House of Representatives to discuss the state of the College's role in the Navy's progress on professional military education. During a meeting later that day, Rear Admiral John M. Bird, a member of the transition team for incoming Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen, told Shuford that Mullen wanted to establish a professional reading program. Following this conversation, Mullen made it clear to Shuford that the program was not to be "the Mike Mullen list," but rather "the Navy's list."[127] He did not want to compel participation in the program and it was not his intent to tie participation to officer fitness reports and enlisted performance evaluations. Mullen did not want to structure the program in terms of categories such as "Introductory" or "Intermediate" but wanted to match selected books with a career level. For example, since a junior officer should be thinking tactically, the list would recommend appropriate book titles on this subject. Mullen also made it clear that he did not want a "major roll-out" of the program.[128] The College's response to this challenge was an example of how the Naval War College could bring the right level of intellectual and management skills to bear on issues that mattered to the senior leaders of the U.S. Navy.

Shuford was enthusiastic about this challenge from the start and was actively involved in all the phases of the work.[129] To get the project started immediately, the provost tasked Professor John Jackson and Associate Professor Mike Barker to develop a structured program for both officers and enlisted, using Mullen's guidance. Shuford agreed completely and went on to add to this guidance that he believed that such a

program must be clearly identified with and supportive of what he sensed was one of Mullen's key goals—to develop twenty-first-century leaders. Working together, Jackson and Barker created an effective professional reading program for the officer and enlisted communities of the United States Navy.

Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter Addressing the Current Strategy Forum, 12 June 2007.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Jackson clearly articulated that its intent had to be simple and direct in order to encourage a lifelong habit of reading and learning among all sailors. Shuford directed Jackson and Barker to form a panel of key stakeholders from the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval Historical Center, the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Naval Institute, the Naval War College, the Senior Enlisted Academy (representing the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy), and other naval activities. The members of this group effectively collaborated to establish the structure of the program, the criteria for the selection of books, and, finally, the selection of the specific books to be included in the program. They developed a structure built around five levels of leadership: a junior enlisted collection, a leading petty officer's collection, a division leader's collection, a department and command leader's collection, and a senior leader's collection. Each collection had twelve books under the categories of leadership, military heritage, joint warfare, cultural awareness, critical thinking, and management. Shuford agreed wholeheartedly with the initial choice of titles.[130]

Shuford took the plan to Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert F. Willard, who strongly endorsed the initiative and directed Shuford to present the "top end," or most ambitious, of the reading options that had been developed. Having become the Chief of Naval Operations on 22 July 2005, Admiral Mullen approved this option on 27 February 2006 and set 1 June 2006 as the date to announce the program.[131] Mullen also directed the Navy's Chief of Information to take the lead in marketing the program, working closely with the College. The Chief of Naval Operations committed to provide $1.5 million in fiscal year 2006 funds to get the program started and to fund sustainment of it in the amount of $0.77 million in fiscal year 2007 and $0.68 million in fiscal year 2008. He directed Shuford to program $0.5 million in annual sustainment cost in Program Review 2009. After fiscal year 2006, the Navy would adjust spending as necessary, based on participation and other responses to the program.[132]

With the structure of the reading program established, Jackson and Barker were able to start the program effectively while still waiting for the funds that Mullen committed. In the interim, the provost, the College's chief of staff (Captain Dave Burns, CEC), and the College's comptroller, Commander Melinda Matheny, provided the financial management using the College's funding. To implement the program, they collaborated with the Navy Exchange Command, the U.S. Naval Institute, the Navy League of the United States, and fleet commands to put an effective and efficient management, procurement, and distribution system in place. Mullen formally announced the Navy Professional Reading Program on 2 October 2006, under the banner "Accelerate Your Mind."[133]

The "Path to Joint"

After discussing the challenge of creating a Navy reading program with Mullen's transition team, Shuford privately met with Mullen. The conversation was wide ranging. Mullen initially focused on what Shuford thought he could do immediately to get the officer assignment detailers in Millington, Tennessee, to send students with the right talent to the College. This led to a discussion of the details of the management of the career path for naval officers and the singularly powerful influence that the leaders of the Navy's operational communities had on officer assignments within their own communities. Mullen, a former head of Surface Officer Distribution (PERS 41), and Shuford, a former Assistant Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command for Career Management (PERS 4), understood the complexities behind the policies and practices of the officer assignment process. They both understood the economic realities between the two different policy objectives operating with the finite resources of time and talent. These topics brought into the conversation the name of Rear Admiral (Sel.) Daniel P. Holloway, then serving as the assistant commander for career management (PERS 4) at Millington.[134] At the conclusion of the conversation between Mullen and Shuford, Shuford fully appreciated that Mullen had skillfully analyzed the situation to conclude that changes were imperative in the Navy's officer assignment and promotion processes, as well as in the way that the operational community leaders affected these processes, if Mullen were to move the entire Navy into the joint world.[135] To this end, Mullen told Shuford: "Jake, I want you and Dan to tell me what I need to do year, by year, by year—over the next four years—to move the Navy down a path to a full commitment to jointness from which it cannot retreat."[136]

Shuford concluded that the Navy's Professional Military Education Continuum had created a framework for this kind of institutional change. The need to link one's personal career progression to the Continuum was the forcing function for individuals. The challenge for the College was to create the policy objectives and the personnel management mechanisms that would generate and sustain the driving force to link career progression and the Continuum and, at the same time, give due regard to the concerns of the leaders in charge of the operating forces.[137] Recognizing the importance and the scope of the task from the new Chief of Naval Operations as well as its potential impact, Shuford set the College to work on it almost immediately.

Giblin and Spain, once again working on the College's quiet Sunday afternoons, insisted that it was essential that everyone involved clearly understand the guiding principles that shaped the College's efforts. This initial task was relatively straightforward and completed by 21 July 2005. They concluded that there were three fundamental, strategic principles that shaped the development of the "Path to Joint." First, the

Navy's Professional Military Education Continuum provided the central guidance for the development of leaders that complemented training and experience in the U.S. Navy. The second principle was that whatever the College produced in terms of policy and management recommendations, it had to align with Admiral Mullen's intent as the Chief of Naval Operations, existing legislation, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' *Vision for Joint Officer Development*.[138] The third guiding principle was that it was imperative that the College's recommendations take into account the concerns of the Navy's operational leaders. Shuford approved these principles almost immediately.[139]

Law and policy governed much of joint leader development. At that time, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs' *Vision for Joint Officer Development* established a policy that "attaining the rank of colonel or captain will signify that an officer fundamentally thinks in a joint context at the operational and strategic levels of war and thereby possesses an unprecedented ability to integrate capabilities across the depth and width of a joint force."[140] In addition, there was the anticipated revision to the chairman's Officer Professional Military Education Policy, which would appear in December 2005,[141] and the chairman's draft policy statement on language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness, which would eventually appear in January 2006.[142]

The legislative acts were more numerous. They included the authority granted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces as part of the chairman's responsibilities concerning doctrine, training, and education.[143] This gave the chairman significant authority for joint professional military education in all the services. Another piece of legislation directly affected the Continuum and guided the development of the College's policy and management recommendations in this area. The law required the Secretary of Defense to establish that the standard sequence of assignments for joint professional military education required an officer to complete Phase I before proceeding to the Phase II course of instruction.[144]

Existing legislation also required the Secretary of Defense to establish policies concerning education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers that were similar to those for active-duty officers.[145] The College also understood the very practical effect of the legislation that required after 30 September 2008 that to qualify for appointment to flag or general officer, one must serve a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment and be formally designated a joint qualified officer.[146] This was important because College leaders knew that changes were in the making to migrate the existing joint specialty officer system to a joint qualified officer system that would ultimately require an officer to complete Phase I and Phase II and have a full joint tour of duty in order to be designated a joint qualified officer.[147] The fact that the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff at Newport were the only institutions within the U.S. Navy legally designated as senior- and intermediate-level joint professional military education schools was also noteworthy in how the College developed its recommendations.[148] Finally, Congress had also required the Secretary of Defense to establish a three-phase approach to joint professional military education as a matter of law and to require that there be a required sequence for the three phases.[149]

Taken together, these legislative and policy requirements were the same as those depicted in the Navy's Continuum. This analytical conclusion was confirmation of Shuford's instinct that the Continuum was the catalyst for the kind of institutional change that Mullen had in mind and that linking career progression to progress along that Continuum was the forcing function for individuals. Giblin and Spain summarized these

legislative and policy requirements on two briefing slides. Shuford quickly realized that the perspective portrayed on these slides conveyed the set of indisputable metrics that anyone assessing the Navy's intent to support "jointness" would have to use to measure both the Navy's compliance and its alignment with the requirements for joint professional military education. Shuford approved the outcome of this phase of the analysis on 1 August 2005.


Joint Policy Drivers
CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development (JOD), Nov 2005
JOD Focal Point : "All Captains and Colonels should be fully qualified joint officers"
(Exceptions detailed in 10 USC)
CJCSI 1800.01C -- Officer PME Policy (OPMEP)
CJCSI 1805.01 -- Enlisted PME Policy (EPMEP)
CJCSI 3126.01 -- Language and Regional Expertise Planning
Statutory Drivers
10 U.S.C. 153a: CJCS authorities: Doctrine, Training, and Education
Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces.
10 U.S.C. 619a: Full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment and selection as JSO required for GO/FO selection after 30 SEP 08.
10 U.S.C. 661: Requires SECDEF establish policies concerning education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers similar to those for officers on active duty.
10 U.S.C. 2154a: Requires a 3-phase approach to JPME
10 U.S.C. 2154a(2)(b): Authorizes senior level service schools to deliver JPME II in-residence.
10 U.S.C. 2154b/2155a: Requires the sequencing of JPME.

"The Path to Joint." These two slides, "Joint Policy Drivers" and "Statutory Drivers," were part of Rear Admiral Shuford's PowerPoint presentation "The Path to Joint: Integrated Plan of Action for CNO Review and Decision," presented to Admiral Mullen on 31 August 2006. *Naval Historical Collection*

Having completed the first two phases of their work, Giblin and Spain turned their attention to developing a set of recommendations to improve the existing personnel and management practices that guided how the Navy was implementing the extant policy and legislation. To do so effectively and efficiently, it was essential that the College collaborate closely with Rear Admiral Daniel Holloway and his staff in Millington. They completed their first set of draft recommendations by 19 August 2005 in preparation for Shuford's meeting with Mullen in Newport on 31 August 2005 to give him an update on the status of the development of the "Path to Joint." He briefed Mullen on the coordination that the College had already achieved with both the Chief of Naval Personnel and the assistant commander for career management at the Naval Military Personnel Command. Here, he pointed to the draft recommendations on quality in selection for a war college assignment, and on the process to standardize how the Navy assigned war college graduates.

Mullen was deeply interested in the subject of student quality. Separately, Mullen had asked the Chief of Naval Personnel for a "specific quality analysis of the officers attending all six in-residence Service Colleges."[150] The analysis confirmed that a set of rules already existed, and that they called for officers to be selected by "the Service College Selection Boards" and then "nominate[d] by their respective community's assignment officer" to attend a war college.[151] However, enforcement of these rules had been inconsistent and did not actively involve the leaders of operational commands. Additionally, the service college selection boards had no clear statement of guidelines and this further weakened any incentive for the officer distribution managers to prioritize assignments to war colleges.

Naval Command College Class of 2006. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Definitions of "quality" in naval officers varied. For example, in the naval aviation community, the criterion was that "all Aviation Department Heads with competitive #1 ranking [were] considered 'quality' until they fail[ed] to screen for Commander Command."[152] In the case of the surface warfare and submarine communities, "XO [executive officer] selectees and XO served [were] considered 'quality' until they fail[ed] to screen for Command or XO or if a selectee does not serve as an XO."[153] The Naval Military Personnel Command considered "all Commander Command selectees and Post Command Commanders as 'quality' until they fail[ed] to screen for Major Command or if [a] selectee does not serve in Commander Command."[154] At the same time, the Naval Military Personnel Command viewed "all Major Command selectees as 'quality' until they do not serve in Major Command."[155] Finally, "all Major Command served [were] always considered 'quality.'"[156] Using these diverse criteria, the analysis showed that the Naval Military Personnel Command had considered 100 percent of the naval officers ordered to the College of Naval Command and Staff class that convened in November 2005 "quality" officers. Similarly, it showed that 96 percent of those ordered to the College of Naval Warfare class that convened at the same time were "quality" officers.[157]

Shuford also discussed his collaboration with Holloway concerning Mullen's desire to assign the top, career-track officers to fill the U.S. Navy student billets in the two international courses in the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College. They also addressed the issue of senior leadership review and validation of the quality assessment of naval officers assigned to all service, joint, and international war colleges. Shuford was able to tell Mullen that the College's work to date had included these challenges in the "Path to Joint."[158]

By the middle of September 2005, the staffs at the Naval Military Personnel Command and Naval War College, with almost daily collaboration between Shuford and Holloway, had developed the first draft of the policy and management recommendations that would ultimately constitute the "Path to Joint." These recommendations

- Linked progress in the Navy's professional military education Continuum to both career progression and assignments;

- Formalized the selection and the scheduling process for the available opportunities for professional military education within the Continuum;
- Applied similar policy objectives to the entire active and reserve components; and
- Linked systematically the competencies identified through professional military education with officer assignments.[159]

For the next two weeks, Holloway, his unrestricted line career managers and detailers, and the financial managers at Millington focused on the details of completing their initial assessment on 29 September 2005. There was a strong consensus supporting Mullen's top-level goal of a "Navy that values and therefore systematically develops a group of Navy leaders who become strategically minded, capable of critical thinking, and skilled in naval and joint warfare."[160] Their review also produced a similar conclusion. They agreed that the implementation of a set of policy and management initiatives similar to those contained in the draft could effectively develop a "group of Navy leaders prepared to articulate maritime capabilities in the design and execution of joint, multiagency and multinational efforts to achieve the effects desired by the Joint Force commander and to lead joint forces."[161]

Holloway and his staff had some concern that the increase in numbers was too steep to achieve and that there were inflexible situations that would eliminate some otherwise competitive officers from meeting the critical milestones proposed. Their assessment also raised the issues of who validates "quality" in officers and who approves the officer assignments to and from the Naval War College and along the "Path to Joint." These questions highlighted the tension between service-oriented and joint-oriented considerations, as well as the view that there was a zero-sum equation regarding investment in officers' talents. Mullen had initially intended those judgments to reside personally with the Chief of Naval Operations. Holloway and his staff did not believe there was a compelling need for the Chief of Naval Operations to approve the assignment slate for the graduating classes at the Naval War College. Instead, they argued that it was better to establish guidelines or "business rules" concerning assignment and utilization and then hold the Naval Military Personnel Command accountable for meeting the guidelines. There were also more-prosaic concerns raised about a potential increase in the cost of permanent change of station assignments, since the tight sequencing of both community-specific and joint educational milestones could reduce opportunities for low- or no-cost moves.[162]

Giblin and Spain adjusted the draft to accommodate the concerns about manning and career progression, and Shuford approved the package of policy and management actions as the basis to move to the next level of coordination.[163] This package included thirty specific recommendations phased across fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2012 for implementing the plans.[164] In addition, the College's work had produced a plan of action and milestones in matrix form that identified the responsibility for implementation of these recommendations and the timeline for that implementation. The package, including a draft implementation directive for the Chief of Naval Operations to sign, went forward to Vice Admiral Gerry Hoewing, the Chief of Naval Personnel and Shuford's former boss at the Naval Military Personnel Command.[165] Hoewing responded on 24 October 2005 that he was "fine with all these extra costs because it is the right thing to do."[166]

With the draft plan coordinated now between the Naval Military Personnel Command and the College, Shuford and Holloway began a series of trips around the country to gain support from the flag officers heading the various operational type commands. They scheduled a series of personal meetings to work out a detailed plan of coordination and developed an agenda (1) to assess the feasibility of the policy and manpower and personnel management recommendations, (2) to build a consensus on the suitability of these recommendations, and (3) ultimately to gain the type commanders' concurrence with the final product. Just prior to embarking on this plan, the Navy assigned Vice Admiral John Harvey to relieve Hoewing as the Chief of Naval Personnel. Having served previously in a number of key personnel assignments, Harvey immediately recognized the importance of what had become known among officials in the manpower, personnel, training, and education area as the "PTJ" (i.e., "Path to Joint"). He invited Shuford to Washington for a lengthy, one-on-one session to discuss the details and the pending visits to the type commanders. Making the case for more-constrictive requirements in career management was going to be difficult, simply because of the number of officers involved as well as bureaucratic inertia. Resolving the issues regarding the assignment of talented naval officers—touching the heart of each operational community's identity—was an even more daunting task.

This dialogue could not have advanced without leaders of strong vision and self-confidence who were willing to involve themselves in the details. Shuford had been personally involved with Giblin and Spain at every stage in the review of the legislative, policy, and management components of the plan and, more importantly, the development of the details and sequencing of the thirty recommendations. Critical to crafting such a high-profile document was the long-standing professional relationship between Shuford and Holloway, and the fact that they had worked together at the Naval Military Personnel Command, both having led the Navy's career development and distribution function, and both profoundly aware of the complexities involved in the officer assignment process.

During October, November, and December 2005, Shuford and Holloway met personally in San Diego with Vice Admiral Terrance T. "Terry" Etnyre, Commander, Naval Surface Forces; in Norfolk, with Vice Admiral Charles L. "Chuck" Munns, Commander, Naval Submarine Forces; and then in Coronado, with Rear Admiral Joseph McGuire, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command. They were also scheduled to meet with Vice Admiral James M. Zortman, Commander, Naval Air Forces; however, Zortman was unavailable owing to operational requirements. Fortunately, Zortman was thoroughly familiar with the issues from several earlier conversations with Shuford.

All of them understood Mullen's vision and each believed that further "significant progress is constrained by Community Career Paths, designed to maximize warfighting expertise."[167] They each agreed that the established career paths were designed and executed to maximize the attainment not of joint officer qualifications but, rather, of operational proficiency in their respective warfare specialties. All of these two- and three-star leaders fully understood the need to change their respective operational communities in a fashion that not simply preserved their uniquely naval character but also better employed their unique capabilities involved in joint operations. These discussions underscored the need for the Navy's culture to change and to become inherently joint. Shuford and Holloway saw that the Navy could no longer be content with efforts merely to comply with joint policy initiatives, but should rather seek to impel and to lead joint policy.

This series of meetings encouraged Shuford and Holloway. In particular, they felt that the type commanders had "either fundamentally changed career paths," as in the case of Vice Admiral Etnyre and his surface warfare flag officers, or were "actively studying proposals for change," as in the cases of Zortman, with the naval aviation community, and Munns, with the undersea warfare community.[168] Shuford understood that the "Path to Joint" was difficult because it constituted a significant culture change on the part of their entire Navy, both officer and enlisted, active and reserve. In Shuford's final briefing on the subject to Admiral Mullen, Shuford noted the reservations that had emerged during his conversations with the type commanders. Nevertheless, Shuford was able to tell Mullen that the conversations with these leaders had "gain[ed] their assent to the final product."[169]

General John Abizaid, U.S. Army, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, Speaking in Spruance Auditorium on 6 February 2007. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The College completed the penultimate draft on 3 March 2006.[170] After further coordination over the following six months, the "Path to Joint" was ready for presentation to Mullen. Shuford met first with Harvey and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and then he briefed the Chief of Naval Operations on 31 August 2006 in Washington, D.C. The key policy element of his briefing was the College's recommendations that formally linked professional military education to an officer's career progression and assignments. The first of these was to establish primary professional military education as a prerequisite for entry to an intermediate-level Phase I school. The second was the completion of intermediate-level Phase I as a prerequisite for an unrestricted line commander's assumption of a command billet and for the equivalent positions for restricted line and staff corps officers, as well as being a statutory prerequisite for entry into a Phase II program after 30 September 2009. The third recommendation was that the completion of a senior-level Phase II course of professional military education be a prerequisite for the assumption of major command for unrestricted line officers and specified equivalent positions for restricted line and staff officers.[171]

The fourth recommendation moved the "Path to Joint" into the Navy's flag officer community. It recommended that completion of the Capstone Course be a prerequisite for attendance at the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Course, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Course, the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Course, and the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting (JFOWC) Course.[172] In addition, the College recommended that the Navy establish completion of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course as a goal prior to an officer's assignment as commander of a carrier strike group or an expeditionary strike group as well as assignment as commander of a joint task force. Shuford also recommended that completion of the Joint Force Air Component Commander Course was a goal for flag officers without prior schooling or experience in that

area. The final recommendation was that completion of one of these courses be a prerequisite for attendance at the Pinnacle Course conducted by the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.[173]

The recommendations that addressed the need to formalize the selection and the assignment process for the opportunities available in professional military education within the Continuum focused on personnel management initiatives. Their intent was to shift the thinking in the Navy that approached the filling of these assignments as "quotas" to one of making a "strategic investment" in the professional development of officers and enlisted personnel. To do so, Shuford recommended to Mullen that he establish a "Business Rule" that the Navy would send its best leaders to in-residence, joint professional military education opportunities in the United States and overseas. He also recommended that the Chief of Naval Personnel and the flag leaders of the various communities employ the following criteria to select those in whom they believed that a strategic investment offered the highest payoff:

- Select only those unrestricted line officers for in-residence intermediate-level professional military education at U.S. institutions who have met the appropriate criteria for their grades to qualify for unrestricted line command and those restricted line and staff officers whom the leadership of their respective communities assess as being likely to assume key positions within their communities.
- Select only those unrestricted line commanders and captains for in-residence senior-level professional military education at U.S. institutions who either have successfully completed command, have been successfully screened for command, or are still eligible for screening for command and those restricted line and staff officers whom the leadership of their respective communities assess as likely to assume key positions.
- Select officers to attend the war colleges of our friends and allies using the same criteria as selection for the equivalent in-residence level of professional military education in the United States.[174]

After boards made their selections of individuals, Shuford recommended that the Chief of Naval Personnel and the respective community flag leaders conduct a formal review of those officers' assignments in order for them to attend the most appropriate senior- or intermediate-level service or joint college. Shuford was passionate about treating the professional development of the Navy's reserve force in the same manner as that of the active force. Accordingly, he recommended to Mullen that the Navy begin to apply similar policy objectives and management practices as they pertain to professional military education to the entire active and reserve force. He argued that only a "full commitment to jointness built on the recommendations contained in the Path to Joint would achieve the desired acculturation to jointness into the Reserve as well as the Active force."[175] Owing to the close and effective coordination achieved between the College and the Chief of Naval Reserve, Vice Admiral John Cotton, Shuford was able to report to Mullen that Cotton was fully on board with the "Path to Joint." Cotton agreed to conduct formal professional military education selection boards for both Naval War College resident and nonresident educational opportunities, for the Naval War College's short-term resident opportunities, and for the Army War College's nonresident program. Shuford was able to report to Mullen that Cotton had already conducted a selection board for all Naval War College opportunities for fiscal year 2006.[176]

U.S. Army Faculty Members and Students at the Naval War College in 2005. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The "Path to Joint" addressed the importance of selection and assignment of officers to opportunities in professional military education in terms of the qualitative edge that accrues to those officers who have exhibited the greatest potential. Its policy and management recommendations ensured that all officers through the grade of lieutenant commander had the opportunity to complete primary-level and intermediate-level Phase I qualification in ways that did not leave out "late bloomers" or those with unusual career patterns. Using an officer's quality and career potential as the criteria for assignments to resident intermediate and senior-level courses provided the Navy's most qualified officers with an advantage by giving them the opportunity during educational assignments to build networks of trust and confidence with their peers both in and outside the U.S. Navy. As it developed, the "Path to Joint" led the Naval Military Personnel Command to begin to link systematically educational assignments for top performers to the key, joint duty assignments. That practice was already in place for the in-residence graduates of the Naval War College. Shuford recommended that Mullen expand it to the Navy's graduates in all accredited joint professional military education service and joint colleges. With the issues of student selection placed on a better foundation, a challenge remained in dealing with follow-on assignments after completion of these programs.

During his meeting with Mullen, Shuford made it clear that his analysis in coordination with Holloway indicated that the Navy could implement 90 percent of the College's recommendations by fiscal year 2009. However, Shuford, with the full concurrence of Harvey, made it clear that the Navy needed to pay close attention on several issues to ensure fairness to individuals and to take into account the concerns of the Navy's type commanders. These included the requirement for completion of the primary-level, Phase I

joint professional military education as a prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant commander,[177] and the completion of a senior-level program with Phase II as the prerequisite for an unrestricted line officer's assignment to a major command. This last point was an especially difficult challenge for the aviation community and those assigned to the command of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, because of the technical education and training requirements for these officers. In such cases, the Chief of Naval Personnel would likely have to request a significant number of waivers of this requirement for officers in those categories. There was also a challenge in managing the competition between the requirements to fill billets for officers in the grade of commander who had already been in command and to assign commanders to senior-level Phase II programs. An analysis had shown that by fiscal year 2012, the anticipated number of commanders who had already held command in any given year was 233, while the annual assignment requirement was for 362. This fact posed a significant challenge because the quality of post-command commanders was well known and the demand for that talent was very high.[178]

When Shuford briefed the "Path to Joint," Mullen made it clear to both Shuford and Harvey that he expected two things from the Navy's personnel development policies. First, Mullen wanted to create and to sustain in the Navy the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint leaders suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities. Second, he wanted to generate a pool of fully qualified and inherently joint officers for promotion to flag rank. "My expectations," he told them, "apply equally to the Active and Reserve components of our Navy."[179] Mullen also made it clear that "PME is at the heart of this process; the schoolhouses are lynchpin to producing the effects that I seek."[180] Mullen approved the "Path to Joint" and assigned Harvey the responsibility for implementing it. As they were leaving Mullen's office, Harvey turned to Shuford and remarked to him, "Whether [you] know it or not, you have just changed the United States Navy forever."[181]

NOTES

1. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers]: Subject Files: Admiral Vern Clark: "Admiral Vern Clark Edited Remarks, Change of Command, Naval War College, August 12, 2004," p. 3.
2. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford conducted on 9 October 2009 by James Rife at the Naval War College [hereinafter Shuford Oral History]; Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Shuford: CHINFO Official Biography as of 6/2/2004; Shuford to Hattendorf, e-mail, 22 November 2015, with biographical information.
3. Jacob L. Shuford and Andrew E. Gibson, "Strategic Sealift in the Context of Operation Desert Shield" (paper, Naval War College, 1990); Andrew E. Gibson and Jacob L. Shuford, "Desert Shield and Strategic Sealift," *Naval War College Review* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 6–19.
4. Shuford Oral History, p. 9.
5. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare, *Surface Combatant Force Level Study: Requirements for Joint Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: August 1995).
6. United States Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (Washington: The Commission, 1995).
7. Department of Defense, "Joint Theater Air Missile Defense Organization Is Established," release no. 021-97, 16 January 1997, available at http://fas.org/news/usa/1997/01/msg00020b.htm.
8. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. Conducted on September 17, 2009 by James Rife [hereinafter Giblin Oral History], p. 75.
9. "Admiral Vern Clark Edited Remarks, Change of Command, Naval War College, August 12, 2004," p. 5.
10. Giblin Oral History, pp. 75–76.
11. Ibid., p. 76; see also Naval War College, Office of the Provost, *Naval War College Self Study, Submitted to New England Association of Schools and Colleges, Inc., Commission on Institutions of Higher Education* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, August 2004) [hereinafter *NEASC Self Study*], p. 57.
12. This form of analysis and decision making with respect to the selection of a strategic posture was used during discussions between Shuford and Giblin. It was drawn from Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie, "Strategy under Uncertainty," *Harvard Business Review*, November–December 1997, pp. 67–79. Giblin used it extensively when he taught Strategy and Force Planning in the National Security Decision Making Department. Shuford was comfortable with it because it focused the discussion that he wanted to have at the right level and offered him three broad courses of action. Giblin Oral History, pp. 76–77.

13. In accordance with the NEASC/CIHE policy extant in 1989, the initial accreditation was for a period of five years.

14. The provost amplified this guidance. He directed the task forces to consider the *Naval War College Inspector General Self-Assessment* of April 2003; the Naval War College self-study for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff accreditation of the College of Naval Warfare in May 2003; and the Naval War College self-study for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff accreditation of the College of Naval Command and Staff and the College of Distance Education in October 2003.

15. Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "Preparations for the New England Association of Schools and Colleges Visit to the Naval War College for Reaffirmation of the Master's Degree Program," memorandum, 23 September 2003. The task force leaders of the respective areas of focus were as follows: mission and purpose: Dr. James F. Miskel, associate dean of academic affairs for graduate development; planning and evaluation: Prof. John E. Jackson, Director, College of Continuing Education, then director of development and long range planning; organization and governance: Dr. William C. Martel, National Security Decision Making Department; programs and instruction: Dr. John F. Garofano, then of the National Security Decision Making Department; faculty: Dr. Bradford A. Lee, Strategy and Policy Department; student services: Commander Sharon L. Roddy, USN, deputy dean of students; library and information resources: Prof. Patrick C. Sweeney, Joint Military Operations Department; physical resources: Commander Kevin J. D'Amanda, CEC, USN, director of facilities; financial resources: Captain Richard D. Suttie, USN, Deputy Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies; public disclosure: Dr. William D. Ferree, College of Distance Education; and integrity: Dr. Andrew R. Wilson, Strategy and Policy Department.

16. Although Giblin and Spain edited the final draft for purposes of consistency and substance, they both recognized that there was real potential for unintended consequences by altering something inadvertently so that it contravened what the faculty intended to convey. Because of this, they sent each edited chapter back to the respective task force leader for review to ensure that nothing of substance was inadvertently lost or changed in the editing. This process was successful in that there was only one justifiable objection from a task force leader. After discussion with the task force leader, Giblin and Spain both agreed with the task force leader's intent and most of the phrasing contained in the original draft. Where changes in phrasing were made, the task force leader agreed. Giblin Oral History, p. 46.

17. Members of the NEASC/CIHE evaluation team were the following: team leader Dr. Richard M. Freeland, President, Northeastern University; Dr. John Farrington, Vice President, Academic Programs, and Dean, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution; Dr. Peter Fish, professor of political science and law, Duke University; Dr. Lance Schachterle, associate provost and professor of English, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; and Mr. Alan T. Scheps, Administrator, Department of Laboratory Science, Yale University School of Medicine.

18. All members of the evaluation team were responsible for the mission and purpose standards area. The evaluation team members who took the lead on the ten other standards areas were as follows: planning and evaluation: Dr. Schachterle; organization and governance: Dr. Farrington; programs, instruction, scholarship, and research: Drs. Fish and Schachterle; faculty: Dr. Fish; student services: Dr. Schachterle; library and information resources: Dr. Farrington; physical resources: Mr. Scheps; financial resources: Mr. Scheps; public disclosure: Mr. Scheps; and integrity: Dr. Farrington. Based on the recommendation of the College's associate dean of academic affairs, Bill Spain, Dr. Freeland agreed that the programs and instruction standard and the faculty standard were very much interconnected. He also agreed the financial and physical resources standards were closely tied. For that reason, he scheduled a single, longer meeting to cover both programs and instruction and faculty and tasked Dr. Schachterle and Dr. Fish to run it. In the same manner, he scheduled a single, longer meeting to cover both financial resources and physical resources and tasked Dr. Farrington and Mr. Scheps to run it. See Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 500F: NWC History, 1984–2014, Subjects, A–F: Accreditation: Dr. Freeland letter to Dr. John Farrington, Dr. Peter Fish, Dr. Lance Schachterle, and Mr. Alan Scheps, copy to William Spain, 20 September 2004.

19. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Shuford, 2004–2006: New England Association of Schools & Colleges, Inc., Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, Office of the Commissioner, Terrence J. MacTaggart letter to RADM Shuford, 29 March 2005 [hereinafter CIHE letter], p. 2.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 3.

23. Ibid.

24. *NEASC Self Study*, p. 10. That document was clear that the Board of Advisors was charged with advising and assisting the President in matters of education, research, and physical and financial resources. The College made it clear that the Board of Advisors submitted its findings and recommendations to the President and, when deemed necessary, to the Chief of Naval Operations. Ibid., p. 20.

25. CIHE letter, p. 3.

26. *NEASC Self Study*, p. 23.

27. Rear Admiral Joe Strasser served as President from 17 July 1990 to 29 June 1995, or sixty months. Rear Admiral Jim Stark served as President from 29 June 1995 to 24 July 1998, or thirty-seven months. Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski served as President from 24 July 1998 to 22 August 2001, or thirty-seven months. Rear Admiral Rod Rempt served as President from 22 August 2001 to 9 July 2003, or twenty-three months. Rear Admiral Ron Route served as President from 9 July 2003 to 12 August 2004, or thirteen months.

28. This stated in part, "Through its organizational design and governance structure, the institution assures provision of support adequate for the appropriate functioning of each organizational component." See CIHE letter, p. 3.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 4.

31. Ibid.

32. *NEASC Self Study*, pp. 56–57.

33. In order to give the evaluation team members a better perspective of the challenges faced by the College in this area of concern whether resources were available or not, Giblin and Spain called to their attention the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 105 and 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(7) concerning copyrighting issues faced by the College and the faculty. They also explained that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 209 prohibited a faculty member from receiving royalties or receiving payment from any source other than the U.S. government meant as compensation for the employee's official duties for teaching, speaking, or writing that is conducted as part of a faculty member's official duties.

34. "Acceptance of Gifts," SECNAVINST 4100.2G, 16 April 1996.

35. *NEASC Self Study*, p. 80. Regrettably, the legislative proposal that had been prepared as a result of this work was not approved. Although there was support for it in the House Armed Services Committee, the House Judiciary Committee did not support it. It remained an open issue for the College.

36. These funds included $0.5 million in Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization funding in fiscal year 2004, increasing to approximately $1.4 million in the outyears; Defense Department International

Military Education and Training Infrastructure funds in the amount of $726,000 in fiscal year 2004 and the outyears; Pringle Hall structural repair funds in the amount of $2.1 million in fiscal year 2003; Anti-terrorism/Force Protection funds in the amount of $3.3 million in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004; and Naval War College Foundation grants totaling just over $0.5 million in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. Ibid., p. 87.

37. CIHE letter, p. 3.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. *NEASC Self Study*, p. 11.

41. Ibid., p. 18.

42. Giblin Oral History, p. 45.

43. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2004: Accelerating Our Advantages* (Washington, D.C.: January 2004), p. 9.

44. Giblin Oral History, pp. 21–22.

45. Dr. John Hattendorf to Dr. Kenneth Watman, "Historical Comments," e-mail, 10 February 2005; John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984) [hereinafter *Sailors and Scholars* (1984)], p. 128 (chapter 5 of this edition).

46. In addition, Dr. Tom Nichols, chair of the Strategy and Policy Department; Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department; Captain Tony Ruoti, USN, chair of the Joint Military Operations Department; Professor Tim Jackson, director of the College of Distance Education; Professor Vince Mocini, associate dean of academic affairs for international programs; Professor Robert "Barney" Rubel, head of the War Gaming Department; Professor John Jackson, director of long range planning; and Mr. Rick Menard, executive assistant to the provost, participated in and contributed substantively to the discussions in certain of these video teleconferences.

47. Giblin Oral History, p. 78.

48. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, naval message, CNO WASHINGTON DC 181833Z NOV 04, NAVADMIN 263/04, Subj.: Professional Military Education Continuum.

49. Ibid.

50. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Edits thru P. 29," e-mail, 10 December 2015.

51. Giblin Oral History, pp. 78–79.

52. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford to NWC faculty and staff, "Quickrep from PNWC 120-Day Assessment Brief to CNO," e-mail, 20 December 2004.

53. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the President, "120-Day Assessment for the Chief of Naval Operations" (briefing, 17 December 2004), slide 6.

54. Shuford and Giblin's recollection of CNO's remarks to Shuford following "120-Day Assessment for the Chief of Naval Operations" briefing.

55. Giblin Oral History, p. 22.

56. Chairman's *Vision for Joint Officer Development:* Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, November 2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/education/officer_JPME/cjcsvision_jod.pdf.

57. Ibid., p. iv.

58. Shuford to NWC faculty and staff, "Quickrep from PNWC 120-Day Assessment Brief to CNO."

59. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "The Naval War College and the CNO's PME Continuum" (briefing, June 2005), talking points from slide 6.

60. Giblin Oral History, p. 79.

61. Commander Jeffrey A. Harley, USN, to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "CNOG 05," e-mail, 23 December 2004. Giblin and Harley knew each other well from their days together on the staff of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet at Makalapa, Hawaii. Giblin, then a captain on active duty, was the head of Plans and Programs Division and the assistant chief of staff for plans and policy and Harley was a lieutenant serving in the Current Operations Division.

62. Giblin Oral History, p. 96.

63. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2005: Winning the Fight . . . and Bridging to the Future* (Washington, D.C.: 3 January 2005) [hereinafter *CNOG 2005*], available at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/clark-guidance2005.pdf.

64. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford to NWC faculty and staff, "2005 CNO Guidance," e-mail, 4 January 2005.

65. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "2005 CNO Guidance," e-mail, 3 January 2005.

66. *CNOG 2005*, p. 13.

67. Ibid., p. 12.

68. Hattendorf to Watman, "Historical Comments."

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Reserve component personnel were being increasingly relied on to fill critical positions in operational headquarters and played prominent roles in campaign planning on combatant commander and joint component staffs.

72. Hattendorf to Watman, "Historical Comments"; *Sailors and Scholars* (1984), pp. 288–89 (chapter 11 of this edition).

73. Shuford later expressed this view in print in his article "Commanding at the Operational Level," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 135, no. 5 (May 2007), p. 25.

74. Vice Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, "Rediscover the Art of Command and Control," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (October 2002), p. 54.

75. *Sailors and Scholars* (1984), p. 303 (chapter 12 of this edition).

76. Ibid.

77. Naval War College Archives, RG 3: 1977 Files 1500, Training and Education, NN-DEC: Watkins memo to CNO, PERS 40, serial 40 of 13 April 1977, as quoted in *Sailors and Scholars* (1984), p. 303 note 1.

78. *Sailors and Scholars* (1984), p. 303.

79. Naval War College Archives, RG 3: 1977 Files 1500, Training and Education, NN-DEC: Holloway memo to DCNO (Manpower), DNET, CNET, President, NWC, on Service Education Policy, serial 00/000315 of 11 July 1977, as quoted in *Sailors and Scholars* (1984), p. 304.

80. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN (Ret.), "Re-education for the 21st Century Warrior," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (April 2009), p. 15. See also Morse Peckham, *Humanistic Education for Business Executives* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1960).

81. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the President, "The Future of the College" (briefing to CNO, 22 February 2008), slides 29 and 30.

82. The specific competencies were being skilled in the art and science of strategy; steeped in the integrated employment and strategic effects of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power in many different types of war and in all phases of the cycle of war and peace; competent in embedding flexibility and adaptability in strategic-level plans that allow for uncertainty, ambiguity, and emerging conditions; capable of anticipating, perceiving, and adapting to opportunities, interdependencies, and patterns among diverse systems; capable of contributing directly to the strategic, operational, and resource planning processes that will shape the future of the nation's security; and prepared to serve as sought-after, trusted advisors in senior service, joint, and interagency positions and confident, broadly educated spokespersons for the profession of arms.

83. The specific competencies were being skilled in formulating theater policies, strategies, and plans that integrate and leverage military and nonmilitary capabilities that advance national interests and achieve national objectives; proficient in applying operational art to joint warfighting and the maritime/joint planning processes; competent in planning campaigns and operations, with military power as leading or supporting element; informed and effective joint and maritime advocates within joint/combined environments at joint force commander/component commander level; skilled in aligning and maximizing capabilities across components, services, agencies, and nations in both planning and execution; and imbued with a joint perspective and fluent in joint concepts, doctrine, systems, languages, and processes.

84. The specific competencies were being disciplined in applying critical analysis across the full spectrum of national security environments/operations; proficient in applying effects-based thinking and risk management in all facets of decision making; skilled in formulating comprehensive long-range, strategic assessments; able to bring a broad perspective of regional expertise and cultural awareness to strategic assessment and problem solving; capable in future force structure planning in the context of scarce resources; someone who understands the resource planning processes; disciplined in developing and applying measures of effectiveness to gauge progress and exercise sound resource stewardship; capable of excelling in positions of strategic leadership; skilled in articulating intent, then communicating it to a varied and dispersed audience; competent in fostering responsibility, accountability, selflessness, and trust; skilled in challenging assumptions and anticipating and leading change; informed in inspirational and transformational leadership; competent in strategic communications; and aware of strategic decision making by real-world, strategic leaders in peace, crisis, and war.

85. The specific competencies were being skilled in articulating intent, then communicating it to a varied and dispersed audience; competent in fostering responsibility, accountability, selflessness, and trust; skilled in challenging assumptions and anticipating and leading change; informed in inspirational and transformational leadership; competent in strategic communications; and aware of strategic decision making by real-world, strategic leaders in peace, crisis, and war.

86. "The Future of the College," slides 32 and 33.

87. The specific competencies were being someone who understands the operational challenge of changing domestic, regional, and global security environments; confident with the concepts, doctrine, systems, languages, and processes required to employ naval forces effectively in the joint, interagency, and multinational environments; skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across the range of military operations; capable of integrating naval/military power with other national instruments of power; and informed of challenges in accomplishing interagency/multinational coordination.

88. The specific competencies were being fluent with the joint warfighting planning processes contingency and crisis action; skilled in applying a naval perspective throughout planning's analytical frameworks; competent in planning/order writing with real-world scenarios at the joint force maritime component commander/joint task force level; prepared for the challenge of applying regional knowledge and cultural awareness to planning and execution of naval and joint operations; and knowledgeable in the formal Defense Department Resource Allocation Process and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

89. The specific competencies were being empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision-making process; disciplined in applying these frameworks, which incorporate effects-based thinking, risk management, return on investment, and best business practices, to decision making; aware of critical thinking and decision making by real-world, operational-level leaders; and imbued with a comprehensive operational-level perspective.

90. The specific competencies were being skilled in persuasive leadership: fostering collaborative relationships, building teams and trust, managing conflict, negotiating, and effectively communicating; competent in operational-level problem solving, creative thinking, and change management; informed about the unique challenges in leading from the middle; and confident with the full range of action officer responsibilities.

91. The specific competencies were being steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare; having understanding of operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future; being conversant in the full range of naval capabilities; and being informed in operational command-and-control issues, especially at the joint force maritime component commander level.

92. Shuford, "Re-education for the 21st Century Warrior," p. 15.

93. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Edits thru Page 29," e-mail, 10 December 2015.

94. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "Curriculum Differentiation Status Report" (briefing, 8 February 2005), slide 5.

95. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "Language and Regional Expertise at the Naval War College" (briefing for the Honorable Dr. David Chu, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 7 June 2006), slide 5.

96. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the President, "Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II," memorandum, 1521 Ser 00/4165, 9 February 2004.

97. Department of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Director J7, "CJCS Guidance for Reviewing Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) CJCSI 1800.01A," memorandum, 1 December 2000.

98. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the President, "Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II," memorandum, 1521 Ser 00/4165, 4 February 2004, enclosure 1.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Hattendorf conversation with Admiral Turner, 13 April 1984, as cited in *Sailors and Scholars* (1984), p. 288 note 35 (chapter 11 of this edition).

104. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the Provost, *Naval War College Self Study, College of Naval Warfare* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, March 2007) [hereinafter *JPME II Self Study*], p. 4-3.

105. "120-Day Assessment for the Chief of Naval Operations," slides 16 and 17.

106. *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,* Public Law 108-375, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 118 (2005), p. 1811.

107. 10 U.S.C. § 2154(a)(2)(B).

108. *JPME II Self Study*, p. 4-3.

109. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Command, "Joint Professional Military Education and Promotion: Information Brief for CNP" (briefing, 23 December 2005), slide 2.

110. Ibid., slide 6.

111. Shuford publicly acknowledged this conclusion in an article in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. See Shuford, "Re-education for the 21st Century Warrior," p. 15.

112. Ibid.

113. Department of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) College of Naval Warfare US Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 14–18 May 2007," memorandum, CJCS CM-0988-07 of 10 September 2007, enclosure A, "Report of Certification of the College of Naval Warfare at the United States Naval War College," p. 2. "Certification" is distinct from "accreditation." Under the OPMEP in effect at the time, "certification" was the initial PAJE review and was intended for three situations: (1) programs that had never been awarded any type of PAJE accreditation status; (2) programs that were formerly certified or accredited but had that status expire; or (3) programs that were currently certified or accredited but had undergone substantive change. See Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)," CJCSI 1800.01C, 22 December 2005, p. F-2.

114. "Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) College of Naval Warfare US Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 14–18 May 2007," enclosure A, p. 14.

115. *CNOG 2005*, p. 13.

116. In microeconomic theory, the "cost of opportunity" of a choice of actions is the value of the best alternative forgone, where a choice needs to be made among several mutually exclusive alternatives given limited resources.

117. Shuford to NWC faculty and staff, "Quickrep from PNWC 120-Day Assessment Brief to CNO."

118. The requirement to identify and track critical joint operational competencies was an early objective that Shuford had brought with him from his personal experience as PERS 4 and recognition through the joint flag officer development program (Capstone) of the Navy's lack of emphasis on joint component and combatant commander staffing and planning skills.

119. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters," memorandum, 4 February 2005, p. 1.

120. Ibid., p. 2.

121. This AQD reflects completion of the Halsey Group work by a student. Research by Professor Jim Fitzsimonds indicated that there did not appear to be an applicable code for this specific kind of effort among the current list of AQDs. The Naval Warfare codes were each too specific and Navy-centric. There was no Joint Warfare code grouping among the AQDs. The only Joint Specialty code that appeared to be close was the "Operational Planner" AQD granted to Naval Operational Planner Course graduates under the Joint Specialty grouping. However, this AQD tended to connote a specialty in the process of deliberate planning (i.e., production of an operation plan or operation order), rather than the specific application of analytical tools to a real-world problem. Fitzsimonds argued that it was essential to capture the idea that the Halsey effort encompassed rigorous analysis of specific problems at the operational level of warfare. That said, the Halsey work had a distinctly Navy point of departure and a strong naval flavor to it, and thus "Naval Operational Warfare Analysis" would not be off the mark. However, use of the terms *operational* and *analysis* were problematic in that the College wanted to avoid the impression that this was some type of Operations Analysis course like that taught at the Naval Postgraduate School. Rather, Halsey was the application of operations analysis and other tools to operational—that is, theater-level—problems. See Professor James Fitzsimonds to Rear Admiral Shuford and Provost Giblin, "The Halsey Project," e-mail, 18 October 2004.

122. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "POM 10 Program Review" (briefing, 24 October 2007), slide 18.

123. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Joint Staff, "Language and Regional Expertise Planning," CJCSI 3126.01 of 23 January 2006, enclosure A, p. A1.

124. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, "Creation of a Regional Studies Academic Program as Part of the NWC Curriculum," memorandum, 2 December 2002, pp. 1–2.

125. Ibid.

126. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral John Morgan, USN, "7 June Brief to Dr. Chu," e-mail, 7 June 2006. Although the College believed that it was essential to sustain the language capability of students while in residence and identified this requirement as part of its number two priority for funding above core in its POM 08, Program Review 2009, and POM 10 submissions, the Navy chose not to fund this capability.

127. Professor John Jackson to Rear Admiral Shuford and Provost Giblin, "Mullen Meeting Notes," e-mail, 13 July 2005.

128. Ibid.

129. On this point, Admiral Mullen remarked during the Current Strategy Forum in June 2006 that he had recently asked Admiral Shuford "to develop a new reading program for the Navy and you'd have thought I'd given him a brand new car. He grinned like a possum who just ate a sweet potato." See Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 471: Mullen, ADM Mike: "Remarks as Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen, Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, 14 June 2006," p. 2.

130. For purposes of understanding, this endnote lists what books Admiral Mullen thought were important to include in the initial version of the Navy Professional Reading Program to achieve his goals. The titles in the Junior Enlisted Collection comprised Stephen E. Ambrose, *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); John Grafton, ed., *The Declaration of Independence and Other Great Documents of American History, 1775–1864* (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 2000); Orson Scott Card, *Ender's Game* (New York: Tor Books, 1985); James Bradley, *Flags of Our Fathers* (New York: Random House, 2000); Khaled Hosseini, *The Kite Runner* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2003); Dennis J. Ringle, *Life in Mr. Lincoln's Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999); Donald T. Phillips, *Lincoln on Leadership* (New York: Warner Books, 1992); E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924); Thomas J. Cutler, *A Sailor's History of the U.S. Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Stephen R. Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Robert A. Heinlein, *Starship Troopers* (New York: Ace Books, 1987); and Julie Morgenstern, *Time Management from the Inside Out: The Foolproof System for Taking Control of Your Schedule—and Your Life* (New York: Owl Books, 2004). The titles in the Leading Petty Officers Collection comprised Robert A. Heineman, Steven A. Peterson, and Thomas H. Rasmussen, *American Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995); Herman Melville, *Billy Budd and Other Stories*

(New York: Penguin, 1986); Herman Wouk, *The Caine Mutiny* (Boston, Mass.: Back Bay Books, 1992); Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); James D. Hornfischer, *The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour* (New York: Bantam Books, 2004); Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* (New York: Berkley Books, 2005); Richard McKenna, *The Sand Pebbles* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000); Margot Morrell and Stephanie Capparell, *Shackleton's Way: Leadership Lessons from the Great Antarctic Explorer* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002); Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2004); Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (Boston, Mass.: Back Bay Books, 2002); A. B. C. Whipple, *To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001); and Richard M. Ketchum, *Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the American Revolution* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004). The titles in the Division Leaders Collection comprised Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything* (New York: William Morrow, 2005); Paul Stillwell, ed., *The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Black Naval Officers,* with a foreword by Colin S. Powell (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993; C. S. Forester, *The Good Shepherd* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1955); Clayton M. Christensen, *The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book That Will Change the Way You Do Business* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003); Dava Sobel, *Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time* (New York: Walker, 2005); Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1995); Michael Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam: Religion and Society in the Modern Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000); Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller, Jr., *Shield and Sword: The United States Navy in the Persian Gulf War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001); James S. Hirsch, *Two Souls Indivisible: The Friendship That Saved Two POWs in Vietnam* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 2004); Herman Melville, *White-Jacket; or, The World in a Man-of-War* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 2000); and Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). The titles in the Department/Command Leaders Collection comprised Nicholas Monsarrat, *The Cruel Sea* (Short Hills, N.J.: Burford Books, 2000); Ronald Spector, *Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985); Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan, *Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done* (New York: Crown Business, 2002); Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005); Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Anchor Books, 2005); Robert D. Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground* (New York: Random House, 2005); Marilyn Loden, *Implementing Diversity: Best Practices for Making Diversity Work in Your Organization* (Chicago: Irwin Professional, 1996); Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror, 1801–1805* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004); Christopher Kolenda, ed., *Leadership: The Warrior's Art,* with a foreword by General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) (Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College Foundation Press, 2001); Patrick O'Brian, *Master and Commander* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1996); and Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1988). The titles in the Senior Leaders Collection comprised Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World* (New York: Currency, 1996); Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); William Manchester, *Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War* (Boston, Mass.: Back Bay Books, 2002); Bernard D. Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Rudolph W. Giuliani, *Leadership* (New York: Miramax Books, 2002); Michael Lewis, *Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); Roger Knight, *The Pursuit of Victory: The Life and Achievement of Horatio Nelson* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Anthony D. McIvor, ed., *Rethinking the Principles of War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: Free Press, 1994); Kees van der Heijden, *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation* (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley, 2005); Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War,* vol. 1, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and David McCullough, *1776* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).

131. "POM 10 Program Review," slide 57.

132. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN, to Admiral Bob Willard, USN, "Navy Professional Reading Program," e-mail, 1 March 2006.

133. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of Public Affairs, "Navy Professional Reading Program Debuts," press release NNS060929-0, 29 September 2006.

134. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Developing Operational and Strategic Leaders," e-mail, 14 December 2015.

135. Ibid.

136. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "The Path to Joint: Integrated Plan of Action for CNO Review and Decision" (briefing, 31 August 2006), slide 1. Mullen clarified his intent with respect to jointness a few months later when he asserted, "The future of national and international security lies in interoperability and cooperation among the Services, the interagency, international partners and non-governmental organizations. . . . But *we* are only as good as the contribution *we* make to the overall effort." See Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 471: Mullen, ADM Mike: Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: 2006), p. 2.

137. Shuford discussed these conclusions with Giblin in a phone conversation late on the afternoon of 13 July 2005. Giblin Oral History, pp. 79–80.

138. *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*.

139. Giblin Oral History, p. 80.

140. *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, p. 3.

141. "Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)" (22 December 2005).

142. "Language and Regional Expertise Planning."

143. See 10 U.S.C. § 153(a).

144. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2154(a), 2155(a).

145. See 10 U.S.C. § 661.

146. See 10 U.S.C. § 619a.

147. 10 U.S.C. § 661, 10 U.S.C. § 2155. There were some exceptions detailed in the legislation.

148. See 10 U.S.C. § 2151(b).

149. See 10 U.S.C. § 2154(a)–2155(a).

150. Giblin Papers (privately held): Rear Admiral (S) Dan Holloway, USN, to Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, "Quality Analysis of Navy War College November 2005 In-Residence Nominees," e-mail, 2 September 2005, attachment 3.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

157. Ibid.

158. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, "CNO Tasker on Jointness," e-mail, 31 August 2005.

159. "The Path to Joint," slides 7 and 8.

160. Ibid., slide 2.

161. Ibid.

162. Captain Diane Lofink, USN, to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Assessing the Path to Jointness for Executability," e-mail, 29 September 2005.

163. Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., to Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, "Assessing the Path to Jointness for Executability," e-mail, 7 October 2005.

164. The Plan of Action and Milestones envisioned implementation of the recommendations as follows: three in FY 2006; sixteen in FY 2007; six in FY 2008; two in FY 2009; two in FY 2010; and one in FY 2012.

165. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral Gerald Hoewing, USN, and Vice Admiral Kevin Moran, USN, "Path to Jointness," e-mail, 7 October 2005.

166. Vice Admiral Gerald Hoewing, USN, to Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, and Vice Admiral Kevin Moran, USN, "Path to Jointness," e-mail, 24 October 2005.

167. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Command, "War College and Joint Assignments" (briefing, 16 October 2006), slide 25.

168. Ibid.

169. "The Path to Joint," slide 2.

170. Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., to Rear Admiral Dan Holloway, USN, "Path to Jointness," e-mail, 3 March 2006.

171. "The Path to Joint," slide 9.

172. The intent of the Capstone Course conducted by the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., was to prepare newly selected general and flag officers for high-level joint, interagency, and multinational responsibilities. Its mission was to help these officers understand (1) the fundamentals of joint doctrine and the joint operational art; (2) how to integrate the elements of national power in order to accomplish national security and national military strategies; and (3) how joint, interagency, and multinational operations support national-strategic goals and objectives. See Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)," CJCSI 1800.01C, 15 July 2009, p. E-K-1.

173. "The Path to Joint," slide 9. The Pinnacle Course helped prepare prospective joint/combined force commanders to lead joint and combined forces, building on the progression of knowledge imparted first by Capstone, the Combined or Joint Force Component Commander Course, or the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course. The intent of the course was to convey to the prospective joint/combined force commander an understanding of national policy and objectives with attendant international implications and the ability to operationalize those objectives/policy into integrated campaign plans. The overarching goal was to set conditions for future success in the joint, combined, and interagency arenas by using advanced knowledge of operational art to underpin the instinct and intuition of the prospective commanders. See "Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)" (15 July 2009), p. E-M-1.

174. "The Path to Joint," slide 11.

175. Ibid., Talking Points.

176. Ibid., slides 12 and 31.

177. Ibid., slide 18.

178. Ibid., slide 19.

179. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Draft Edits thru Page 50," e-mail, 27 January 2016, confirmed that this was Shuford's recollection of this statement.

180. Ibid.

181. Ibid.

Admiral Vern Clark
Chief of Naval Operations
21 July 2000–22 July 2005
In this photograph, Admiral Clark addresses Naval War College students on 18 April 2003. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Admiral Mike Mullen
Chief of Naval Operations
22 July 2005–29 September 2007
In this photograph, Admiral Mullen holds an all-hands call with students assigned to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., 9 January 2007. Mullen discussed the future of the Navy and individual augmentees in the War on Terror, empathized with deck-plate leadership, and took questions from the audience. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Admiral Gary Roughead
Chief of Naval Operations
29 September 2007–23 September 2011
In this photograph, Admiral Roughead announces the new maritime strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, during the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College on 17 October 2007. More than two hundred delegates representing one hundred countries attended the largest event up to that time. U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Greg Frazho.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Chapter Twenty-One

Helping the Chief of Naval Operations Define the Future Navy

When Rear Admiral Shuford presented his 120-day assessment on the state of the College to the Chief of Naval Operations on 17 December 2004, he was distressed. He had to report that, notwithstanding the excellent work done by the College to respond to the events of 11 September 2001, he judged that the College's "research, analysis and gaming no longer plays a central role in Navy's planning and decision making."[1] His assessment echoed that of the Naval Inspector General's report of the command inspection of the Naval War College a year earlier, in 2003. The Inspector General affirmed that "war gaming and research activity at the NWC appears to be underutilized while at the same time the Navy continues to pay a premium for similar contractor support."[2] Given the decisions he had made earlier in his term as President, Shuford made it clear to Admiral Clark that he believed that the Navy was paying a high opportunity cost by not fully using this portion of the College's capability. To change this adverse situation, Shuford told Clark that the Naval War College's research, analysis, and gaming effort must have "greater customer focus and impact."[3] To accomplish this, he advised Admiral Clark that his intent was (1) to move to a mind-set that was "focused on the needs of CNO and the Fleet"; (2) to shift from "long-range to a near/mid-term focus"; and (3) to "increase the use of student officers to focus on real world challenges" as the Halsey Group was already doing.[4]

The Good News

Shuford did have one piece of good news to tell Clark, about how the College's research, analysis, and gaming capability had made a substantial contribution to national security. He briefed Clark on the College's role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to give him a sense of the scope of the College's involvement in an important, national-level program and to highlight its capability to provide intellectual and management capacity to a real-world, strategic and operational challenge.[5]

Three months earlier, in September 2004, under the leadership of Dr. Ken Watman—then chair of the War Gaming Department—and Dr. Andrew C. "Drew" Winner of the Strategic Research Department, the College's War Gaming Department had planned and executed the first high-level proliferation security game. The College's involvement had begun with a discussion that Winner had with members of the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C., soon after President George W. Bush announced the initiative on 31 May 2003. This was the means that the Bush Administration had chosen to implement many of its policy objectives in National Security Presidential Directive 17, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,* issued in December 2002.[6] The president's national security directive emphasized that combating weapons of mass destruction was a top national security priority and called for enhanced interdiction of such capabilities.[7] The Joint Staff knew of the College's gaming capability and believed that it might be well suited to

help develop the new initiative; and the College's executive leadership agreed. Commander Michael "Mike" Martin of the War Gaming Department led a team of faculty to develop a unique game design that remained for many years the conceptual model for proliferation security tabletop games.[8]

Hosted by the College on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, representatives of seventeen countries of the Proliferation Security Initiative's operational experts group gathered in Newport from 27 September to 1 October 2004 to begin the process of thinking through how to plan and to coordinate maritime interdiction of the components and precursors of weapons of mass destruction.[9] The focus of the game was to find suitable legal grounds for boarding and inspecting suspected vessels at sea. Afterward, several delegates reported that the game allowed them to initiate or to enhance interagency collaboration within their own countries, since their delegations included officials who had not normally been involved in activities initially envisioned under the Proliferation Security Initiative. The delegates concluded that by familiarizing participants with the practices, legal standards, and authorities of other countries, the game was an unqualified success and that it had established the benchmark for future games.[10]

Professor Richmond Lloyd Installed as the First William B. Ruger Professor of National Security Economics, 1 November 2004. The academic chair is named in honor of William B. Ruger (1916–2002), founder of Sturm, Ruger & Company, the largest firearms manufacturer in the country. In 1990, Ruger established a charitable remainder trust, a portion of which came to the Naval War College Foundation after Ruger's death to fund research and study on the interrelationships between economics and security. Ruger's gift of over $3 million was the largest single contribution the Foundation had received up to that time. Ruger was a founder member of the Foundation and served as trustee, 1980–1987.

Left to right: Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, former President of the College, then executive director of the Naval War College Foundation; Townsend Hornor, President of the Naval War College Foundation, 1992–1995; William B. Ruger, Jr., the son of the donor; Professor Richmond Lloyd; and Rear Admiral Shuford.

Naval War College Museum Collection

The College also supported Norway for the second Proliferation Security Initiative game, at the Norwegian Naval Academy, in Bergen, Norway, from 3 to 7 October 2005. Faculty from the Naval War College, including Martin and Winner, helped the Norwegian government design the game and then to facilitate and to moderate it.[11] At the request of the staff of the National Security Council, the Naval War College hosted a third proliferation security game in October 2005 with more than sixty senior representatives from more than a dozen U.S. government departments and agencies. Following the two international games in Newport and Bergen, the National Security Council staff and the representatives of the several departments and agencies of the U.S. government involved in the Proliferation Security Initiative saw a need to look more closely at U.S. tactics, techniques, procedures, and organization for interdiction. Following this game, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Dr. Robert G. "Bob" Joseph, requested that the College

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 2006

Dear Admiral Mullen:

The Naval War College's support for the June 23 High-Level Political Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in Warsaw, Poland was critical to the meeting's success. Thank you for all that the Naval War College team has done to advance PSI.

Since the President launched PSI in May 2003, it has been an important tool in our efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the networks that support these programs, and terrorist organizations. The Naval War College's ongoing role in helping officials involved with PSI continues to be essential to advancing the initiative.

The staff of the Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies deserves enormous credit for helping to shape broader understanding of PSI, and I deeply appreciate the skill and dedication they have brought to this effort. I look forward to continued collaboration on PSI and other activities important to our nation's security.

Sincerely,

Condoleezza Rice

cc: Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN,
President, Naval War College

JUL 20 2006

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN,
Chief of Naval Operations,
2000 Navy Pentagon,
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000.

Letter from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, 20 July 2006, with a Copy to Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, Thanking Him for the Naval War College's Support of the Political Meeting on the Proliferation Security Initiative in Warsaw, Poland, June 23, 2006. *Naval Historical Collection, Ms. Item 631*

design and moderate a series of scenario-based discussions to support the Proliferation Security Initiative's high-level political meeting with participants from sixty-six countries in Warsaw, Poland, on 23 June 2006.[12] The scope of the Naval War College's gaming support and its success in these four Proliferation Security Initiative events motivated Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to write to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, on 20 July 2006 to record her official appreciation for the Naval War College's participation. Her letter to Mullen made it clear that the Secretary of State deemed that the College "deserves enormous credit for helping to shape broader understanding of PSI" and that the College's contributions to the Proliferation Security Initiative were "essential to advancing the initiative."[13]

The Games That Count

At about the same time that the Naval War College began to assist in the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the demand for the College's war-gaming support began to increase markedly. However, the resources available to plan and to execute those games declined substantially from late in 2002 because of the Navy's reduction in the number of positions for uniformed officers in faculty and staff positions at the College. By June 2006, the War Gaming Department in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies had a total of twenty-three officer and enlisted personnel, forty-five civilians, and very limited support from contractors to respond to the increased demand for gaming. With an average of five or six of the naval officers assigned to the War Gaming Department away on assignments to support ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the number of officers available to plan and to execute war games had fallen to its lowest level in living memory at the College.[14] Rear Admiral Shuford and Provost Giblin recognized that the combination of an increased demand signal for gaming support and declining personnel resources created a substantial risk for the College in terms of its institutional effectiveness and mission

priorities. This problem arose despite Admiral Vern Clark's remarks at the change of command ceremony in August 2004 about the importance of "focusing on operational challenges first" and "developing real concepts of operations for maritime joint forces."[15] Additionally, the problem arose despite the internal rebalancing of resources the College had made to put research, analysis, and gaming functions on a more equal footing with the more traditional educational function in the College's classrooms. In this, it was ironic that a mission-limiting risk was developing for an institution whose century-old reputation for war gaming was arguably its principal identifying mission.

The growing gap between demand for credible war-gaming analysis and the College's resources became a substantial one. On average, the College received requests to plan and to execute two or three Proliferation Security Initiative events each fiscal year in support of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Given the limitations on manpower and the competing demands to support war games, the Naval War College was able to execute an average of only one such game each fiscal year. Meanwhile, the Department of Homeland Security requested that the College plan and execute an average of two to four games each year.[16] The situation continued to deteriorate and by fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the College was unable to execute any games in support of the Department of Homeland Security.

There were some particularly notable illustrations of the problems that the College faced in this area. Shortly after the 11 September terrorist attacks in 2001, the naval staff and Coast Guard headquarters asked the College to conduct a series of games to help the two services coordinate their efforts. In response, the College supported two to four of these games per fiscal year. Over the next few years, the games produced progressively more-sophisticated understanding of the maritime security problem and led to the development of the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Conference procedure, which was subsequently institutionalized into doctrine.[17] The Canadian navy participated actively in these games and they also offered the Mexican Navy a means by which it could test cooperation with the U.S. Navy.[18] By 2007, the College was unable to support any of these gaming events. Similarly, the College had provided war-gaming support to the Navy Warfare Development Command by conducting from one to three games per year. By 2007, the College was only able to support one such game request. Since the events of 11 September 2001, the U.S. Northern Command had come to rely each year on the Naval War College's comprehensive and expert support for three or four of its maritime homeland security and homeland defense games. By the beginning of 2007, the College was no longer able to undertake those games. The same was true for its support to the U.S. Joint Forces Command's joint concept development and experimentation games and other service-sponsored Title X games. These were a series of major war games that examined future concepts and capabilities in the context of each service's responsibilities to organize, train, and equip its force as a component of the national instrument of power.[19]

The College's executive leaders understood that they had to make tough, priority-based decisions about how to employ the College's gaming resources. Shuford's guidance in this regard was clear. As he told Admiral Vern Clark in December 2004, his intent was to focus more on the needs that the Chief of Naval Operations and the fleet had and to shift from long-range to a near- or mid-term focus. This decision was consistent with national-level guidance to build "partnership capacity" in the maritime domain.[20] These policies required the "coordination of international efforts" to "ensur[e] the security of the Maritime

Professor Carnes Lord. Cary Lord became director of the Naval War College Press and editor of the *Naval War College Review* in 2006. At the Naval War College, he served additionally as professor of military and naval strategy, 2001 to 2012, and professor of strategic leadership from 2013. A 1966 graduate of Yale with a doctorate in government from Cornell in 1972 and another doctorate, in classics, from Yale in 1974, Professor Lord is a political scientist with a wide range of interests. Before coming to the College, he served as Assistant to the Vice President of the United States for National Security Affairs, 1989–1991. He also served with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Security Council. He taught at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Adelphi University, National Defense University, University of Virginia, Yale University, and Dartmouth College. He published a dozen books, including the *Politics* of Aristotle (1984, 2013), *The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now* (2003), and *Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today* (2012).

Naval War College Museum Collection

Domain" and stipulated that these efforts "must be . . . global . . . , in which United States Government efforts are developed and furthered with the support of other governments and international organizations[,] resulting in lasting international cooperation."[21] The College's triage of priorities for gaming support would thus eliminate virtually all gaming support outside of the so-called "games that count" in terms of maritime security cooperation and theater security cooperation initiatives.

The set of major recurring games supporting theater maritime security cooperation initiatives included (1) the long-standing annual Northwest Pacific game with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, sponsored by Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; (2) three to four in-theater, bilateral games sponsored by Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command; (3) two Gulf of Guinea games, sponsored by Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa; (4) one major war game with the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in Saint Petersburg, Russia, in support of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; (5) one or two maritime homeland security workshops with the Mexican Navy, in support of the commander of the naval component of Northern Command;[22] (6) one inter-American war game in support of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command; and (7) one hexilateral game in support of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command.

As a result of a series of discussions in late 2005 and 2006, Shuford and Giblin believed the timing was right to reintroduce the Navy to the power of high-level, large-scale war gaming to refine and to shape the arguments and options for the Navy. Indeed, Admiral Mike Mullen had intimated as much during his first visit to the College as Chief of Naval Operations in 2005: A reestablishment of what had been known in prior decades as the global war game could serve as an effective means to assess the influence of the future international security environment on the requirements for and characteristics of the Navy. In the near term, the results of such a game could help shape the Navy's input to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Shuford had raised the same subject explicitly with Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy, in September 2004 with respect to the Navy's gaming support for the Navy's effort for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, but he did not receive a timely response.[23] The leaders at the College recognized that, if they interpreted these conversations and documents correctly, the Naval War College

should begin to reconstitute its war-gaming capacity and get back into the business of future concept development on a regular basis.

The Navy–Marine Corps Warfighter Talks, hosted by the Marine Corps in the Pentagon on 2 February 2007, proved those instincts to be right. The agenda topic, in the form of a specific recommendation provided by the College, found the audience more than receptive. At this event, attended by the senior leaders in the Navy and the Marine Corps, including Mullen and the commandant of the Marine Corps, General James T. Conway, consensus coalesced quickly to "reinvigorate" war gaming at the College, with a near-term objective to help the Navy and Marine Corps prepare for the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010.[24] This decision led directly to the reestablishment of the Department of the Navy–sponsored "Global War Game" some eighteen months later in 2008.

The Concept Gap

Reinitiating a high-level gaming series was only one piece of what Shuford and others believed that the College should be doing to spur and to shape the evolving concept for future naval forces and force design.[25] Responsibility for concept generation and development within the Navy had become displaced from the strategic and operational nexus in Newport, and had been pulled into the orbit of the increasingly large U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. In 2001, Admiral Vern Clark had directed the transfer of the Navy Warfare Development Command to a third-echelon command reporting to Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Clark's intent was for the Navy Warfare Development Command to report directly to U.S. Fleet Forces Command, as the naval component commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, in order to coordinate the Sea Trial component of Sea Power 21.[26] Clark directed the Navy Warfare Development Command to "integrate wargaming, experimentation, and exercises to speed development of new concepts and technologies."[27]

In 2003, a series of events symptomatic of this responsibility-capability gap culminated in a situation in which the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., requested that the Navy co-sponsor a Title X war game with U.S. Joint Forces Command. As this new command's J9 Experimentation Directorate grew, the Navy Warfare Development Command worked to become the Navy's agency of primary responsibility for innovation, to include concept generation and development. The proposed game with the Navy was to be the second in a series of events where a military service had entered into partnership with U.S. Joint Forces Command to explore its future operational concepts. According to Major General James M. "Jim" Dubik, U.S. Army, the director of experimentation at U.S. Joint Forces Command, Giambastiani's intent was to "co-evolve the various Services' operational concepts from the start rather than wait until each Service determines its own concepts and then try to merge them into a joint operational concept in the end."[28] The Navy Staff passed this task to Commander, Fleet Forces Command, who in turn tasked the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command to plan and to execute the Title X game with U.S. Joint Forces Command.

In an embarrassing turn of events, the Navy Warfare Development Command concluded that it did not have the capability to plan and execute such a game. Accordingly, the Navy Warfare Development Command requested that the Naval War College assume responsibility for this game.[29] Giambastiani traveled to

Newport to discuss this initiative with the College's executive leadership. Meeting with the provost, Giambastiani agreed that the Naval War College would design the game, do its own analysis, and present the game's conclusions at a Senior Leader Seminar that Giambastiani would host. Admiral Giambastiani understood that the decision to plan and execute the game, subsequently named "Unified Course 04 (UC 04)," was not a commitment on the part of the Naval War College to institutionalize a relationship with U.S. Joint Forces Command concerning Navy Title X games for the purposes of joint concept development and experimentation and war gaming. With the understanding of the College's independent role in place, the War Gaming Department began the task of designing and executing the game sponsored by Joint Forces Command.

The game was played in Newport from 6 to 9 October 2003, focusing on countering adversaries' anti-access capabilities in 2018. It also featured an array of objectives that were intended to support both U.S. Joint Forces Command's and the Navy's process for spiral development of the Joint Operations Concept. Following the game, Giambastiani convened a Senior Leader Seminar in Washington, D.C., on 17 October 2003 to discuss the game's results. The game had accomplished what it was intended to do, but the events surrounding it highlighted once again what appeared to be a significant divide between the responsibility for concept generation and development in the Navy and the capability to validate and to analyze those concepts using war gaming.[30]

This gap in concept generation and development persisted for the next five years. The Navy Warfare Development Command remained closely engaged with U.S. Fleet Forces Command and sought to strengthen its concept generation and development portfolio in accordance with its interpretation of the mission that both Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Clark and U.S. Fleet Forces Command had assigned. At the same time, the Naval War College experienced a decrease in the resources available to execute its war-gaming task. Robert C. "Barney" Rubel, the director of the War Gaming Department, 2004 to 2006, and dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 2006 to 2014, was, during this period, the most informed person at the College about the close relationship among war gaming, concept generation, and development. He argued that this gap reinforced the need for the Naval War College not only to design and to execute the Navy's Title X and concept development games but to support the other services' Title X games. Satisfying these twin requirements, however, presented three fundamental challenges to the College. First, the College had to produce well-qualified game designers, players, and controllers for these games. Second, the College must provide experienced officers able to articulate future naval concepts in the other services' Title X games. Third, the College needed to return to the institutional role it had previously held in the generation and development of strategic and operational-level concepts. Rubel contended that a reconstituted, recurring, and properly funded Title X "Global" war game was the best means to address these challenges.[31]

To undertake these tasks, Rubel proposed a modest restructuring of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies that would use existing personnel resources. He contended that the College's Strategic Research Department was capable of producing the context and strategic issues for the global games. A newly established department, "Advanced Concepts," would generate the key tactical scenarios and warfighting issues within that strategic context. The College's War Gaming Department would then integrate the issues and scenarios into game design and execution in order to create a strategic and operational-level perspective. Again

using existing resources, the Naval War College would bring together an interdepartmental analysis team to produce the game report.[32]

Rubel fiercely believed that the Naval War College provided an atmosphere of intellectual honesty, clear of warfighting community bias, to allow the sort of dialogue necessary to understand and resolve contending issues. His experience also taught him that Title X war games were an ideal venue to socialize the future operational concepts of interest to the Navy.[33] Maintaining the infrastructure and genius to provide these unique capabilities was anything but assured given the cutbacks in staff and faculty positions. Reconstituting the global war games and creating and manning the "Advanced Concepts" department would demand an additional fourteen civilian billets, later modified to twelve billets.[34]

There was no doubt that the College needed to take prompt and effective action to reconstitute its wargaming capability as the key method to begin closing the concept development gap. Although Shuford directed Giblin to raise these resource requirements as an "above-core" issue in the College's program review in 2007 and its 2008 program objective memorandum inputs, the College's resource sponsor deferred action on the Naval War College's issue papers. Though considered by Shuford and Giblin, the option to seek end-of-year funds offered at best a limited increase in contractor support for only a short period of time and would not address the personnel deficiency. Shuford directed Giblin to develop the theme of "Reconstituting the College's Gaming Capacity" in detail as an above-core issue in the College's 2010 program review submission and to determine whether there were any available short-term alternative courses of action, such as support by the Navy Reserve, to help mitigate the shortfall in manning.

By the spring of 2007, the College had developed and submitted a revised mission, functions, and tasks statement. The portion of the revised mission statement that addressed research, analysis, and gaming was clear and specified that the Naval War College

> shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, the combatant commanders, the Navy component commanders, the Navy's numbered fleet commanders, other Navy and Marine Corps commanders, the U.S. intelligence community, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The desired effect is a program of focused, forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges; develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges; assesses the risk associated with these concepts; provides analytical products that inform the Navy's leadership and help shape key decisions; and contributes effectively to the public discourse on U.S. national security policy.[35]

The inclusion of the tasks that required the College to anticipate "future operational and strategic challenges" and develop and assess "strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges" was carefully crafted by Shuford and Giblin to reinforce the centrality of the operational-level analytical and concept development mission for the College. With similar purpose, the text highlighted that the College was tasked to assess "the risk associated with these concepts" and provide "analytical products that inform the Navy's leadership and help shape key decisions." Shuford and Giblin also intended that the revised mission, tasks, and functions statement ensure that the value of the College's ongoing, successful efforts—such as the work being done by the Halsey Groups—was not diminished. The Halsey work typified the direct support to the Navy's operational-level commanders, work relying on the important, iterative relationship

between war gaming and concept development and the capabilities that the Naval War College uniquely possessed.[36]

On the basis of this mission statement and its accompanying function and task statements, Shuford candidly advised the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, in October 2007 that the College (1) had a severe mission-limiting deficiency in its gaming capacity; (2) was "task-saturated" in terms of its war-gaming capacity; and (3) was turning away sponsor requests for gaming support.[37] Roughead had only just relieved Admiral Mullen a month earlier, but Roughead was fully aware of and supportive of the College's refocusing and of its emphasis on support of operational-level analysis and gaming. When Roughead had been serving as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, he had worked with Shuford to encourage and leverage the College's expanded capacity. Shuford also presented the set of the College's lessons learned in the development of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.* He argued that "understanding the plausible future trends in the international security environment is vital to effective strategic planning," but impossible to do so credibly "from a cold start. . . . You can't understand the strategic and operational challenges you will face in these futures without a robust research, analysis and gaming capability."[38] He expressed that the College would not be able to conduct the requisite level of gaming to help the Chief of Naval Operations understand future trends in the international security environment and that, in his opinion, there was a high likelihood that this shortfall would result in a significant gap in the Navy's ability to develop operational and strategic concepts. He specifically assessed that the risk associated with the College's inability to meet the demands from the Chief of Naval Operations, the combatant commanders, and the Navy's component commanders was unacceptable.[39] These were strong words conveying Shuford's views as the president of an institution that had such capabilities as its hallmark.

The Return of the Global War Game

Although it took time, the College deliberately approached the challenge of reconstituting its war-gaming capacity. The results were favorable. The College's persistence, driven personally by Shuford and Rubel, had convinced the Navy's senior leaders that Title X gaming provided a vital forum for examining and evaluating future concepts and capabilities. More specifically, the introduction of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* at International Seapower Symposium XVIII at the Naval War College in October 2007 was a key driving force in helping to reconstitute the College's gaming capability because the Navy, as well as the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, needed to examine the implications of the implementation of the new strategy from the perspective of manning, training, and equipping as well as testing—or if necessary, modifying—the concepts of operations most critical to its implementation.

The Naval War College planned and then, from 4 to 8 August 2008, executed "Global '08," the first Navy Title X war game since 2001. Its success in spite of the financial and other constraints was a tribute to Rubel's persistence and leadership. Over 190 participants, including representatives from nineteen international navies of our friends and allies, gathered in Newport to participate in the first phase of Global '08. Admiral Roughead's desire to gain the insights from U.S. coalition partners encouraged the Naval War College to design this phase to be executed in an unclassified format. The game focused on understanding the capabilities and risks associated with implementation of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.*

Delegates to International Seapower Symposium XVIII. Representatives of a hundred different navies attended, including seventy-four Chiefs of Naval Operations or equivalents. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

At the conclusion of this phase of the game, the College conducted a subsequent, classified U.S. Navy–only Force Design Workshop to examine various classified threats and associated analyses in order to assess their impact on the Navy's future force. The workshop was held from 11 to 15 August in Newport and drew from the experience of those players from the Navy Staff participating in the first phase of Global '08 plus twelve other Navy officers. The workshop was structured to help the Navy develop its understanding of plausible scenarios and supporting logic for the Navy's input to the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.

Rubel and his team designed the format of Global '08 in a way that differed from the two-sided, real-time, operational game structure that had been the hallmark of previous global games since 1979. Instead, the College argued that the "Return to Global" should be a strategy-level game. Rubel contended that this approach would establish a set of key strategic and operational perspectives that could then be used to build more-focused and more-detailed global games in the future. The College believed that this methodology would best support the Navy's objective of establishing both its internal and external narratives about the strategic and operational meaning of maritime security. Without such a deliberately developed narrative, the Naval War College believed that purposeful strategic analysis was, at best, difficult, and rational resource allocation that provided the means for its implementation within both national and service contexts was virtually impossible.

Using the lessons learned from the College's role in the development of *A Cooperative Strategy*, Rubel directed the design of a game that did not examine a particular scenario with war as an inevitable outcome, but rather a set of alternative futures with different driving forces and critical uncertainties. The College judged that a scenario-based approach would afford the Navy's decision makers the best approach through which to view the strategy and to examine how specific issues might affect its implementation. The additional challenge for Rubel and his team was to design a game that would give the Navy's senior leadership a coherent way to understand the changing conditions that would require revisions to the strategy and what kind of force structure and capabilities were needed. The Global '08 war game under its game director, Professor Don Marrin of the War Gaming Department, was a success and led directly to the Navy's decision to fund—at a cost of $1.3 million per year starting in fiscal year 2010—the twelve additional civilian billets for the College's War Gaming Department that it had sought during the previous budget cycle.

The global game provided a very useful feedback mechanism for planning and execution of the maritime strategy. Since the game had involved U.S. naval officers from all the fleets and officers from nineteen international navies in the game's cells as well as a wide variety of interagency and nongovernmental players, Global '08 constituted a mirror, so to speak, in which the Navy could see itself in the act of executing the strategy. Regardless of any other benefit of the game, Shuford concluded that this feedback process suggested that, in addition to any other games the College executed for Title X purposes (e.g., concept generation), it was important that the College continue to run this kind of game at least every other year to give the Chief of Naval Operations a running fix on how the Navy was doing in maritime strategy execution.[40]

The "Gap" Decision Goes against the Naval War College

The outcome for the College with respect to its ability to provide concept generation and development was not as favorable. One of the goals of Global '08 had been to evaluate the contributions of relevant joint and maritime concepts to the implementation of the *Cooperative Strategy*. The concept evaluation activity was not as productive as hoped, as many of the players were unfamiliar with several of the eleven concepts addressed in the game.[41] The key lesson learned in Global '08 with respect to concept generation and development was that there was an insufficient level of knowledge of either existing concepts or those under development to create a comprehensively informed, expert evaluation. This suggested that the process and substance within the Navy for concept generation and development were, at best, immature or, at worst, ineffective, in terms of advancing specific resourcing priorities relating to the implementation of the

Cooperative Strategy. This in turn suggested that any analysis to support resource decisions based on these concepts was vulnerable to the same deficiencies.

Shuford had suspected this for some time and had taken action at the War College to support the Navy's operational commanders in terms of the development of specific operational concepts—those tied to operational plans and assumptions on how naval forces were actually going to be used in war. He was a firm believer that the best way to do this was by "continuous war gaming," such as the first Halsey Group had used so effectively for the last four years, and by listening to and communicating directly with those commanders on whose shoulders rested the outcomes of the operational plans. The Halsey Group had developed credibility with naval operational commanders, and its techniques were proven to deliver critical insights into assumptions underlying planning. Perspectives gained from the Halsey initiatives galvanized Shuford's understanding of how best to leverage the College's unique strengths at the operational level of war: Shuford believed that momentum and timing were right for pressing forward with a detailed proposal for the College's role in concept generation and development. He had discussed the issue on several occasions with Admiral Roughead, and had exchanged a series of analytical e-mails that laid out the various courses of action in some detail.[42] He had also addressed the issue in a succession of face-to-face conversations in Washington, Norfolk, and Newport.

Shuford also believed that there was strong support within the Chief of Naval Operations' personal staff for tasking the College to create a Center for Concept Development, much as Dean Rubel had envisioned. Indeed, Shuford had already briefed Senator Jack Reed and Congressman Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island regarding support for a new building for the campus. He had also had Commander, Navy Installations Command provide the architectural support for the concept drawings of the new building to accommodate, among other supporting elements, a sensitive compartmented information facility so that technologies and their relevance to specific concepts of operations and operational plans could be gamed and analyzed. Between 11 April 2008 and 23 May 2008, Shuford had multiple discussions on the subject of courses of action for assigning responsibility for concept generation and concept development in the Navy with Vice Admiral John Harvey, director of the Navy Staff; Rear Admiral Carlton B. Jewett, Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command; Rear Admiral Wendi B. Carpenter, deputy commander at Second Fleet and Jewett's designated relief at the Navy Warfare Development Command; and Rear Admiral Peter H. Daly, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Policy (N3/N5).

Although these conversations took place, Shuford was troubled that the Naval War College had not been formally invited to participate directly until the very end of the process in shaping a decision for the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to the designation of an executive agent for concept generation and development. For the most part, Shuford had to rely on Jewett to convey his ideas and concerns as the process moved forward toward decision. On 23 May 2008, Shuford learned that the preferred course of action that was being prepared to be briefed to the Chief of Naval Operations by Jewett recommended that the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command be assigned additional duty as the executive agent for concept generation and development. About four weeks later, on the morning of 20 June 2008, Admiral Roughead informed Shuford and Rubel, while in Founders Hall just prior to the College's graduation ceremony, that he had decided to allow the concept generation and development role to evolve with the "new

NWDC" under the oversight of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy. Even though Shuford and Rubel had stressed the value of an operational-level framework that the Naval War College could uniquely provide through a more ambitious vision of continuous gaming with routine and direct involvement of operational commanders, the College's proposal ceded to a view of concept generation and development as more closely aligned with type commanders and the tactical-level processes in a resource context. Roughead told them that he judged that the Naval War College did not "really want all that tactical engagement up here . . . in Newport."[43] Accordingly, Roughead formally designated Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command as the Navy's executive agent for concept generation and concept development.

The Beginning of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

The College's restoration of its war-gaming capacity and the preservation of its role in concept generation and development in direct support of Navy operational commanders were important accomplishments in terms of its institutional effectiveness. By the end of 2008, Rubel believed that the Naval War College had substantially regained its influence on Navy concepts and doctrine,[44] although the resources that were required to sustain this accomplishment did not follow until two years later. But the most significant task undertaken by the Naval War College during Shuford's tenure to help the Chief of Naval Operations define the future Navy was its work on developing a new maritime strategy.[45] This work had begun three years earlier, in 2005.

Vice Admiral John Morgan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5), had argued in June 2005 at the Current Strategy Forum that the time was not yet right to draft a new strategy. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, agreed, and told Shuford, "We are going to have to make that a priority, and we want the College to play a role."[46] One year later, Mullen followed through on his statement when he announced during the annual Current Strategy Forum on 14 June 2006 that it was time "to talk about strategy, a maritime strategy to support the President's National Security Strategy and the President's National Strategy for Maritime Security. . . . I think it's high time we wrote a new one, and I'd like to get started on it as soon as possible."[47] Early in his remarks he jested that he could see that "Jake [Shuford] is already taking notes. Folks, he may actually have that strategy drafted by the time I'm done up here."[48] At the conclusion of them, Mullen again quipped, "Somebody grab Jake's notebook . . . , and let's get started."[49] There was little doubt in Spruance Auditorium that day that the Naval War College was going to play a significant, but as yet undetermined, role in the development of that strategy.

The College did not have to wait long. About a week after the Current Strategy Forum, Morgan gave an indication of what was to come during a briefing he delivered at the Chief of Naval Operations' All Flag Officer Symposium on 20 June 2006.[50] Using the analysis of Professor George W. Baer, the chairman emeritus of the College's Strategy and Policy Department and one of the College's most distinguished faculty members, Morgan criticized what he termed "the disarray" in which the Navy found itself during the decade of the 1970s and early 1980s along with the rationale for its force structure and levels associated with that disarray. Morgan quoted from Baer's *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890 to 1990*, where Baer argued:

> The Navy made a mistake in stating its case largely in terms of competition with Soviet capabilities—that is in terms of force structure, the same terms in which it justified its own doctrine. The mistake was the impassioned arguments about force structure, about the size of the hulls and the speeds of the airplanes, passed by most listeners outside the service. Such arguments failed to convey their implicit political and hence strategic content.[51]

Shuford was both eager and ready for the College to take on this task. Two years earlier, in August and September 2004, Shuford had had a series of discussions with Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies Ken Watman; Rubel, chairman of the War Gaming Department; and the provost to assess the effectiveness of the College's role in supporting the Navy Staff in the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review as well as Morgan's efforts to reinvigorate his own office's role in developing strategy for the employment of the Navy. As a result of these sessions, Shuford had advised Morgan on 3 September 2004 that the College was prepared to offer its support of

> a tight, logical and empirical analytical chain that assesses the future international security environment, our national interests in that environment, the strategic and operational challenges to those interests, a strategy for dealing with them that fully acknowledges the Navy's role as part of a Joint Mission Force, the required capabilities to implement this strategy, and an investment strategy for obtaining those capabilities on time.[52]

Shuford had emphasized the ability of the College to address alternative futures using scenario-based planning. Finally, he made it clear that his concept of support was "not an NWC 'go-it-alone' wargaming and analysis effort" and that he envisioned collaboration with "key elements of CNO's staff, CNA, NWDC, and [Commander, Fleet Forces Command]."[53] Shuford's concept proved to be an uncanny insight into what was to follow two years later.

The Meeting on the Barge

One week after the 2006 Flag Officer Symposium, Morgan visited the College to provide more detailed guidance from Mullen on how the College could participate in developing a new strategy.[54] During a late afternoon meeting on 27 June 2006 with Shuford; Giblin; Rubel, then the acting dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies; Professor John Jackson; and Captain Michael Sherlock on the President's barge in Narragansett Bay, Morgan laid out his vision for the new strategy and its development.[55] He emphasized that he was seeking a strategy that conveyed the strategic role of the maritime operational domain in the nation's security calculus and the role of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard within it. Morgan emphasized that the Chief of Naval Operations wanted the Naval War College to play a leading role in the development of that strategy. Morgan also stressed that Mullen wanted to "elevate the discussion" about the role of the sea services in the nation's security. Shuford, Giblin, and Rubel took this to mean that the College's task was to examine the nation's grand strategy and then derive the maritime contribution to it.

Morgan also made it clear that he and Admiral Mullen expected the strategy development process to be a "competition of ideas." Shuford, Giblin, Rubel, and Jackson concluded that the Chief of Naval Operations' intent was to make the development of the strategy an open and collaborative process by inviting wide participation and critical analysis throughout. From the start, this meant not just the direct and intense involvement of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard but the gathering of information, opinions, and



The Naval War College Barge under Way in Narragansett Bay.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The Naval War College Barge Being Taken Out of the Water for Repairs at Melville Marina.
Naval War College Museum Collection

analysis from the other U.S. military services, various U.S. government departments and agencies, academics, close international allies and partners, and ordinary U.S. citizens.[56] In regard to the last-named group, Mullen insisted that the Navy engage in a discussion with the American people to help identify the concepts and issues that this new strategy needed to address.

Morgan also advised Shuford that he wanted to utilize the technique of strategy development known as scenario-based planning and, if possible, involve the American futurist, innovator, and author Peter Schwartz in the process of strategy development in an as yet undefined capacity.[57] Morgan knew that Schwartz—then chairman and co-founder of Global Business Network, LLC, in Emeryville, California—was one of the leading practitioners of scenario-based planning. He also appreciated that Schwartz had been successful at Royal Dutch Shell in helping decision makers cope with uncertainty by "thinking through [scenarios as stories] and talking in depth about their implications" and bringing "each [decision maker's] unspoken assumptions about the future to the surface."[58] Mullen had tacitly recognized the potential value of these attributes to the maritime strategy development process in his remarks during the Current Strategy Forum when he asserted that "the great difference, of course, is that today's uncertainty and today's threats are of an entirely unique sort caused and perpetuated by new challenges. . . . We must redefine Sea Power for this new era and explain how we will operate differently, train differently, educate differently, and balance our forces differently."[59]

Four other elements of guidance emerged from the discussion with Morgan on the War College President's barge. When asked whether the project should be internationalized, he said yes. Taking the traditional

Naval War College stance, Shuford, Giblin, and Rubel insisted that the College would not undertake such a project with a given answer in mind. When asked if he agreed that there were no a priori assumptions of fleet size or policy constraints, Morgan again said yes. He also insisted on an intellectually defensible process, complete with an audit trail, as the senior leadership of the Navy did not want a strategy that was developed in a star chamber, where the assumptions, arguments, and processes were not clear and defensible.[60] From the start, Shuford and Morgan also insisted that the strategy development process was to be unclassified for the most part and the resulting strategy was to be unclassified and public. Shuford also advised Morgan that the Naval War College "will insist throughout our work that a top-down approach guide it. This is important because it will help the process focus on ends and effects rather than means."[61]

Make All Preparations for Getting under Way

Shuford took immediate action. By 14 July 2006, he was able to provide Morgan with a concept of operations for the College's role in the development of the new maritime strategy.[62] Giblin also advised Morgan that this initiative would not be resource neutral, but that the College would use existing mission funding to get this initiative started quickly. After making the decision that this entire effort constituted research, Giblin directed the College's comptroller to earmark $0.35 million of scarce Naval War College fiscal year 2006 Navy research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds to get the Red executive group and the Red team up and running.[63] In regard to the latter, Shuford stressed to Morgan that the establishment of a "diverse, well-qualified and stable RED Team as soon as possible" was perhaps the critical node in getting the strategy development process moving forward.[64] This investment in the Red executive group and Red team represented essentially all of the research funds allocated to the College for the remainder of fiscal year 2006 and required Giblin to make a set of hard decisions with respect to the College's research, analysis, and gaming commitments for the remainder of fiscal year 2006 and well into fiscal year 2007.

These decisions imposed a significant cost of opportunity on the College as well as a substantial risk to the ability of the Naval War College to plan to execute a return to global war games if so tasked. Giblin advised Morgan that the Naval War College would require an additional $0.4 million in these funds in 2007 in order to sustain the Red team and to fund other participants in the various activities of the strategy development process.[65] Giblin also cautioned Morgan that the College did not yet have a sound estimate of the funds that would be required to execute what would eventually be called the Conversations with the Country and the senior executive seminars, but would provide an estimate for those activities as soon as possible. At the same time, Giblin made a commitment to Morgan to execute these two activities by using the College's already allocated 2007 and 2008 research and development funds and prudent cash management practices until the Navy Staff was able to provide the funds for their execution. Although this approach was effective and demonstrated the College's support for the Chief of Naval Operations, it was to prove a formidable financial management challenge for the College through fiscal year 2007 and well into the third quarter of fiscal year 2008.[66]

Three days after Shuford had given Morgan the College's concept of operations for how the College would approach this challenge, Mullen formally issued his guidance in a memorandum to Morgan, on 17 July 2006.[67] The Chief of Naval Operations directed Morgan to lead the effort to "construct a new Navy Maritime Strategy . . . that is more fitting of the climate in which we operate today."[68] Mullen told Morgan that

he must "take the long view to address current and future threats, both transnational and state-centric, and balance the immediate focus on the Global War on Terrorism with the long term need for U.S. Naval strike, shield, sea basing, and sea shaping capabilities to counter the growing fleets of emerging powers."[69] In a handwritten note at the top of the memorandum, Mullen advised Morgan that "this is a *very high priority* and should be given the time and resources to be completed with all due speed."[70] To lead the team that would draft the strategy, Morgan brought Commander Bryan McGrath to Washington in September 2006. McGrath served as the primary author of what would become *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. McGrath was also Morgan's point of contact with Rubel and his team at the Naval War College.[71]

Additionally Mullen directed Morgan to align his work in leading the effort for a new maritime strategy with higher-level strategic guidance, coordinate it with component and fleet commanders, and seek "community stakeholder input from active and retired officers, the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, the Center for Naval Analyses, and pertinent industry, etc." Two further points in the memorandum touched directly on what would become the Naval War College's role in the process:

> d. Develop a strategic communications plan to optimally introduce, educate, and disseminate the strategy.
>
> e. Craft a comprehensive process by which the strategy will be developed over the next 12 months, if not sooner.[72]

"Kick the Tires . . . Light the Fires . . ."

Morgan informed Shuford that he intended to travel to Newport on 20 July 2006 to discuss the project. Rubel knew that the more detailed planning that he could provide to Morgan, the better off the College would be. In preparation for the meeting with Morgan, Rubel convened his team on 18 and 19 July 2006 to add more detail to the initial approach that had been developed and to build a preliminary layout of the specific activities that would be part of the process of developing a new maritime strategy.[73] Morgan was satisfied with what Rubel, Sherlock, and the rest of the War College team presented to him. The next day, he confirmed the guidance that he and the Chief of Naval Operations had given to Shuford. On 21 July 2006, Morgan directed that the College provide a set of maritime strategy options to him by 15 March 2007.[74] He made it clear that "the President of the Naval War College . . . will, with the CNO's staff, coordinate and integrate these various activities so that they effectively support the Strategy's development."[75] He also specified that a team, under his leadership, would then convert one of the options into a fully articulated strategy. According to Rubel, this guidance put in train a strategic logic vector that heavily influenced project design and the nature of the final product.[76] Giblin immediately turned Morgan's tasking around to Rubel with the simple, direct guidance to "kick the tires . . . light the fires . . . first man off is strike leader . . . we'll brief on GUARD. Here we go!"[77]

Using Morgan's broad direction that was conveyed during the meeting on board the barge, Rubel had already sketched out a set of guiding principles to accomplish what Morgan had asked of the College. They were thorough, but also simple and straightforward:

> 1) Reach out;
>
> 2) Don't reinvent the future;

3) Work top-down;

4) Establish an agenda-free zone;

5) Establish an intellectual audit trail; and,

6) Do options.[78]

Over the next nine months, Morgan's direction, Rubel's guiding principles, and the process that Rubel and his team had developed provided the intellectual focus for the management and direction of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and the senior executive leadership of the College.

From the perspective of the Navy Staff, the development of the *Cooperative Strategy* occurred across three phases. Phase I ran from July 2006 to January 2007; phase II, from January through March 2007; and phase III, from April through 17 October 2007, when the completed strategy was announced at International Seapower Symposium XVIII.[79]



Strategy Development Process, 2006. This slide from a PowerPoint presentation illustrates the broad process involved. "Maritime Strategy Update" (PowerPoint presentation, 17 August 2006), slide 36.
Naval Historical Collection, Ms. Coll. 23, Box 458

Under Rubel's direction, Captain Michael Sherlock was appointed the executive director of the new maritime strategy project. To provide the necessary working space, a section of the College's library that had previously been used for periodicals was renovated through a grant from the Naval War College Foundation and made into a working area for the project as Hewitt Hall's room 100.

As its first step, the College's strategy development team created a "strawman" set of concepts and issues that would presumably be the bedrock of any new strategy. Rubel insisted that his team begin with an understanding of a range of plausible strategic scenarios and their distinctive characteristics. Rubel's experience and sound judgment recognized the absolute imperative of not making a great leap of faith from self-interest to high theory by prematurely accepting an incomplete strategic concept that could serve to link the diverse elements that emerged in the early stages of the process. To execute most of the College's phase I activities, Rubel turned to Dr. Peter Dombrowski, chairman of the Strategic Research Department, who later recalled that

Phases of the Maritime Strategy Development Process, 2006–2007. This slide from a PowerPoint presentation shows the three main phases for the process. "The New Maritime Strategy: An In-Progress Review 11 Sept 06 Briefing," slide 4. *Naval Historical Collection, Ms. Coll. 23, Box 458*

he "became the de facto straw boss in the effort" with special emphasis on the development of options during phase I.[80]

The College's first activity in phase I was the Geostrategic Environment Workshop held in Newport on 24 and 25 August 2006. Because of the time constraint imposed by Morgan, its purpose was to survey a variety of existing documents and a set of baseline trends and uncertainties for future development.[81] Rubel was open and frank with respect to his decision concerning scenarios: "We don't want to reinvent the futures, let's just see what kind of futures workshops have been done and 'cherry pick' the best" for what was useful for the Naval War College's purposes.[82] McGrath, although he had not yet reported to Vice Admiral Morgan's office, later commented that he agreed with Rubel's decision. According to him, the leadership decided that a "full-up alternative futures effort would be time consuming and costly."[83]

The workshop was attended by thirty-four representatives from a variety of commands and agencies. The group determined that there was a set of four "geostrategic realities"—or predetermined elements, in Schwartz's lexicon of scenario-based planning—that characterized the geostrategic environment for the foreseeable future. The first of these was that the "commons (sea, space and cyberspace) remain important." The second asserted that "the U.S. military does not engage uniformly around the globe." The third predetermined element affirmed that "distance and geography still matter." The final geostrategic reality was that "strategic threats are not infinite."[84] The participants in the workshop also examined trend indicators, critical uncertainties, leverage points, and wild cards across the domains of economics, energy, the environment, governance, technology, the law, and demographics.[85] For purposes of their analysis, the participants in the workshop defined *critical uncertainties* as "events that could change the direction of current trend lines, but the change would not be entirely unanticipated" and noted that "uncertainties are most often expressed as questions."[86] The analysis of the participants in the workshop did not focus on the four predetermined elements in the consideration of what they termed critical uncertainties. Instead, the participants addressed "social and demographic uncertainties."[87] McGrath later credited the report of the

Geostrategic Environment Workshop as the basis for the portion of the new maritime strategy that surveyed the international security environment.[88]

The Gathering of the "Graybeards"

The provost argued that it would be useful to reach out to a group of established senior experts in the area of maritime strategy, "graybeards," to gain their perspective on the task at hand. Shuford agreed and, on 30 August 2006, a select group of people who had worked on the Maritime Strategy during the 1980s gathered at Giblin's invitation in the College's Decision Support Center for the "Maritime Strategy: Lessons Learned Workshop."[89] During this workshop, the graybeards agreed for the most part, albeit for different reasons, that it was imperative that the Navy begin this discussion. They were also unanimous in their assessment that this tasking created an opportunity for the Naval War College to demonstrate its enduring institutional value to the Navy's senior leadership and a means to get back into the business of strategy development.

One of the graybeards asserted that one of the elements of the previous Maritime Strategy in the 1980s, and what had been missing since the end of the Cold War, was "context." He explained that what he meant was that the Maritime Strategy told naval officers whom they would fight, why, and where, in addition to how. The Navy and Marine Corps's ". . . From the Sea" series of white papers issued in the 1990s did not; they were more doctrinal in nature. He strongly advocated that the College focus on "rediscovering context" in the development of its maritime strategy options in order to make strategic options compelling and useful. Another thread of discussion involved the need to "re-globalize" the Navy. Several of the graybeards contended that there was no "intellectual glue" that linked operations in the Philippine Sea with those in the Persian Gulf or the Caribbean, although most of the graybeards instinctively believed that what happened in one part of the world had important effects in other parts.[90]

The graybeards were skeptical that the Naval War College could accomplish what Mullen wanted to have done under the terms that Morgan had laid down. Their concerns centered on the ability of the College to produce a set of plausible scenarios and strategy options in the time specified by Morgan and the ability of the College to get leadership-level input from the fleet for those scenarios and options. None of the graybeards questioned the utility of scenario-based planning; however, they doubted the ability to produce credible scenarios quickly. There was near-unanimous agreement that this type of strategic planning activity required an extraordinary amount of time, in terms of both scenario development and getting the agreement of the senior leadership in Washington and in the fleet. Without that buy-in, their experience told them that it was difficult if not impossible to convince leaders to think seriously and analytically about a world of which they had little or no knowledge. The graybeards acknowledged that one workaround for this challenge was to use existing scenarios. Unless the Naval War College's team could create a set of plausible scenarios and grand strategy options drawn from these scenarios or do so by credibly using existing scenarios, the effort to use scenario-based planning to generate a set of maritime strategy options had little chance of success.[91] Several of the graybeards stressed privately to Giblin that the failure of the College to do so would make it conspicuously complicit in putting the leadership of the Navy in a de facto position in which the Navy would have to revert to considering linear and incremental improvements on the Navy's program of record as a strategy.[92]

The College's Strategy Team



The Naval War College's Maritime Strategy Development Team Organization, 2006. "Maritime Strategy Update" (PowerPoint presentation, 17 August 2006), slide 39. *Naval Historical Collection, Ms. Coll. 23, Box 458*

The immediate challenge for the Naval War College was to develop a coherent set of plausible grand strategies as a way to address the nation's interests in the future. Once that was done, the College was responsible for delivering a set of maritime strategy options to Morgan. To accomplish these objectives, Rubel chose his team carefully. Headed by Captain Michael Sherlock, it comprised Dr. Peter Dombrowski; Dr. John Maurer, chair of the Strategy and Policy Department; Dr. Andrew Winner, Strategic Research Department; Dr. Bradford Lee, Strategy and Policy Department; Professor Don Marrin, War Gaming Department; Professor Mike Martin, War Gaming Department; Dr. Lawrence Modisett, chair of the Warfare Analysis and Research Department; Commander David J. "Bart" Sampson, War Gaming Department; Professor Marshall Hoyler, War Gaming Department; Dr. Jonathan Stevenson, Strategic Research Department; Dr. Paul Kapur, Strategic Research Department; and Captain Maureen A. Neville, James P. Lewis, and Gary McKenna of the Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment at the College.[93]

On the same day as the meeting of the graybeards, Rubel's team conducted the College's third activity in the first phase of the strategy's development, when they met in a Process Analysis Workshop. This event afforded the team a valuable opportunity to review and reflect on the state of both the substance and the process of developing a new maritime strategy. The members of the team agreed that they all understood why the U.S. Navy badly needed a strategy and why this effort was so important. They understood that their work must be guided by both national strategy and national policy documents. The discussions convinced them that in order to utilize intelligence and to understand the range of responses of other countries, a Red team was vital to their work.[94]

The members of the team concluded that there was a significant amount of what they called "stuff" that they did not have that their predecessors, who had developed the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, did have. First and foremost was the fact they did not have the luxury of the three to four years of time that their predecessors had to develop a strategy. They also recognized that there was neither a set of clear

statements and beliefs from the Chief of Naval Operations—such as those that Admirals Thomas Hayward and James Watkins had successively provided—nor a single, strong, and visible civilian advocate within the administration, such as John Lehman had been in the 1980s. The members fully understood that they did not have the benefit of the "exquisite" intelligence that had been developed by the U.S. intelligence community and that had been heavily influenced, if not driven, by the U.S. Navy. Finally, they grudgingly acknowledged that there was no "A-Team" on the Navy Staff, whose members had extensive operational experience and had emerged from a system of closed-loop, officer detailing assignments that had involved working closely with similarly experienced counterparts at the various fleet command headquarters.[95]

Despite these shortcomings, Rubel's team developed a process that identified the concepts and issues that were a sound foundation for any new strategy. Rubel insisted on the integrity of the strategy development process. From the outset, he argued that the project would not simply derive from existing strategic guidance, such as the National Security Strategy or the National Defense Strategy. He argued that his team could not responsibly make the assumption that current U.S. security strategy would remain in place, and there was no adequate way to predict the direction of the next administration's policies. His team's solution was to postulate four different potential grand strategy vectors of a future administration.[96] Adhering to Morgan's injunction to collaborate internationally, the College invited selected naval officers from other countries to Newport to participate in development activities and sent delegations to various countries for consultations. Both the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Royal Swedish Navy provided officers, and the College sent delegations to Japan, Chile, and the United Kingdom for consultations on maritime strategy.

Schwartz publicly commented on the College's process in an address in Spruance Auditorium on 14 November 2006, during the first of the series of Conversations with the Country. Having been briefed on Rubel's analytical process as well as the concept of the Conversation with the Country during dinner at the Naval War College President's House the evening before, Schwartz remarked:

> What is begun today is, I think, a profound undertaking. . . . I think this is quite a remarkable undertaking in terms of the process that has been set in motion, the notion of a "Conversation with the Country." The word that I like is legitimacy and that is that the kind of process that has been established here and designed [here] is completely unique as far as I have ever seen in the United States or anywhere else in the world in terms of engaging the American people in a consideration of where the nation is headed, the world is headed, where U.S. strategy is headed, and, of course, where the U.S. Navy is headed. . . . I am quite convinced that if the process that has been set in motion here works its way through during the course of the next year, the nation will be very thankful, 10, 20, 30, 40 years in the future, and they'll say it began here.[97]

Let the Games Begin

Another of the College's activities during phase I was the Strategic Foundations Game, conducted from early September to mid-October 2006. Although it was not identified in the Geostrategic Environment Workshop as a critical uncertainty, Rubel and his team realized that perhaps the most important issue was the future direction of America's grand strategy.

By 11 September 2006, Rubel had added three additional items to his original six guiding principles. First, he had concluded that the new maritime strategy was "not intended to be operational level strategy [like]

the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s." Second, he affirmed that the College's work was "not intended to rely on discrete scenarios or system performance." Finally, Rubel made it clear that the new strategy would "establish the strategic logic for the Navy."[98] Given these factors, Rubel and Dombrowski decided to try to develop maritime strategic options for a plausible range of future U.S. grand strategies, based on the work of civilian academics.[99] These grand strategies included the concepts of primacy, cooperative security, and selective engagement, as outlined by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, as well as the concept of offshore balancing proposed by Christopher Layne.[100] Dombrowski has been very candid in admitting responsibility for pushing "those four terms—Primacy, Cooperative Security, Selective Engagement, and Offshore Balancing."[101]

Rubel believed that he needed his team to design a game driven by strategic challenge and response cycles to test these candidate grand strategies.[102] To do so, he created four Blue teams to play against five Red teams: North Korea, Iran, China, Pakistan, and the radical Salafists. At a meeting of the Red executive group on 7 September 2006 in Newport, Rubel directed each Red team to develop its own grand strategy. In a departure from most other war games, which are usually based on worst-case scenarios, the Red teams were instructed to adopt hostile strategies only if they found evidence that U.S. actions threatened to prevent them from achieving their own national or sectarian objectives.

Having completed these tasks, the five Red teams conducted move 1A of the Strategic Foundations Game from 19 to 22 September 2006. As the Red teams' first move was ending, Rubel convened a meeting of the Blue executive group on 22 September 2006. He assigned the first Blue team to play a "primacy" strategy, in which the United States would attempt to maintain a near-hegemonic status in the world. He assigned the second Blue team the task of adopting a "selective engagement" posture, in which the United States would focus its efforts on averting conflict among major powers. Rubel directed the third Blue team to play a "cooperative security" strategy, in which the nation committed itself to seeking security through multilateralism and international institutions. Finally, the fourth team represented an "offshore balancing" strategy, in which the United States retracted certain security guarantees and caused major powers to balance each other.[103] After completing their planning, the four Blue teams played move 1B of the Strategic Foundations Game from 2 to 8 October 2006.[104] At the end of moves 1A and 1B, the Green and White teams that had been formed by Rubel conducted an assessment of these moves from 10 to 13 October 2006. On the basis of this assessment and the additional guidance provided by Rubel, the Red and Blue teams made their second moves of the Strategic Foundations Game from 16 to 20 October 2006.[105]

But Rubel was worried. The various teams did not seem to be getting anywhere by the fifth week of the game.[106] He was concerned that his choice of a game based on challenge and response cycles may have been too restrictive in terms of how the players generated the various Red and Blue moves. However, as a result of several events inserted into the game by the Control team, such as the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China, during the sixth week of the game, all of the Red and Blue teams in the game, with the exception of the radical Salafists, suddenly found it in their interest, albeit for different reasons, to be more cooperative. In the open adjudication sessions during which each team proclaimed its strategy, a compelling central thread emerged. Each state had an intrinsic interest in the effective functioning of the global system of trade, even Iran and North Korea. Only al-Qaeda and its associated groups had endemic hostility to the system.[107]

Rubel's extensive war-gaming experience had convinced him that "it is easy to overstate what was learned from a game" and that it was just as easy "to ignore what it did produce . . . if that information or knowledge is either subtle or somehow threatening." Rubel termed such information "whispers."[108] At this point in the Strategic Foundations Game, the game was "whispering" to Rubel and Dombrowski that the protection of the existing global system of trade and security, as opposed to the process of globalization and its effects, provided both the context for a new grand strategy and the intellectual glue that tied together all regions of the world. This could not have been a more important, and, in its own way, revolutionary insight: "It's the system[,] stupid! Every team had a stake in the proper operation of the global system."[109]

Rubel and Dombrowski met with McGrath to explain that the game was whispering to those paying attention that "this is not globalization. . . . What the game is telling us is we want to defend the existing global system. . . ."[110] In effect, the game was suggesting a basis for a national grand strategy aimed not against a particular country or threat, but toward a positive interest common to all. This was an important finding because it directly challenged a part of Admiral Mullen's thinking about the need for a new maritime strategy. During the Current Strategy Forum some four months earlier, Mullen had asserted that globalization was the primary reason for a new maritime strategy when he said that "today's uncertainty and today's threats are of an entirely unique sort caused and perpetuated by new challenges . . . brought on . . . by . . . the unstoppable, unrelenting pace of globalization."[111] Mullen also acknowledged that one of the effects of globalization was the "undeniable expansion of interdependent world markets and economies on a truly global scale that binds nations, corporations and people."[112] The fact that Rubel's structure of challenge and response cycles had elicited this insight in terms of U.S. grand strategies was significant not only for its substance but, perhaps equally important, for the process that produced this substantive insight.

As Pierre Wack, the French oil executive who had developed scenario planning for Royal Dutch Shell, had argued, this was the kind of fresh insight that showed how this planning approach worked. In this case, it produced a way for the Navy's senior leaders to reperceive their assumptions about the way the world works and thus put them in a position to make better decisions about the future.[113] Though it is unclear how this specific whisper affected the senior leaders of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, it provided direct insight for the writing team that was developing the final version of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.[114] The document clearly stated that "our Nation's interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance" and that "U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance."[115]

Supporting Fires

The College also conducted a set of other activities during phase I. As highlighted during the "graybeards" meeting, the College recognized that there was a need for activities with the intent of examining the relevance of context in what the Naval War College had been asked to do with respect to strategic planning. Their specific purpose was to determine if there was adequate legal, economic, or regional context to support the development of a more specific maritime strategy—like that of the 1980s—or, alternatively, to create a new maritime strategy that was more doctrinal in nature.[116]

Dedication of the Strasser Dining Room. Rear Admiral Shuford and Rear Admiral Strasser cut the ribbon on 31 October 2006 at the dedication of the Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser Dining Room, Hewitt Hall, room 114. The forty-sixth President of the College, Strasser retired at the end of October 2006, having served five years as President, five years as a Foundation trustee, and six years as executive director of the Foundation. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

These activities included workshops on international law and economics as well as production of an edited volume with insights on maritime strategy from navies in the Western Hemisphere. The first of these was the "Future of International Law" workshop, sponsored by the College's International Law Department, under the leadership of Professor Dennis Mandsager, from 31 October 2006 to 1 November 2006. Professor Craig H. Allen, the Judson Falknor Professor of Law at the University of Washington's School of Law and the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War College during academic year 2006–2007, chaired this workshop. Its purpose was to convene a group of international law experts to provide Rubel and McGrath's strategy development team a candid assessment of the probable state of the global legal order in 2020.[117] In addition to four faculty members of the College's International Law Department, thirty-eight outside experts from the United States and ten other nations participated. "The group included military and coast guard legal advisers; attorneys from the Defense, State, Justice, and Homeland Security Departments and from the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia; law professors; an attorney specializing in commercial maritime law; and the director of the United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea."[118]

Using the concept of scenario-based planning, the experts discussed six possible scenarios for the future global legal order. The first three scenarios focused on the degree and direction of change in the legal order, ranging from significant growth to regression; another posited a shift from globalism to regionalism; and a fifth posed the possibility of a collapse of the global legal order. A sixth scenario posited a dynamic global legal order that defied the other, essentially linear, approaches before adopting a scenario that focused on twelve subject areas in which changes were likely to be important for maritime strategic planning.[119] For each of the twelve areas, the experts examined the possible trends in the rule sets, processes, institutions, and compliance levels within the international legal order. Next, they were asked to consider the consequences of those changes to the maritime strategy mission inventory and for the means and methods for carrying out those missions by examining a set of forty-eight questions about key benchmarks in the global legal order.[120]

The workshop produced a set of key findings and recommendations. First among these was the strong consensus that freedom of navigation cannot be taken for granted in the coming years. Second, fully 95 percent of the experts believed that more states will claim the right to exercise jurisdiction and control over military activities in their exclusive economic zones by 2020. The experts also reached consensus that the coming challenges to mobility will be potentially significant, and that the Navy must engage in shaping both aspects of international law by protecting the principles of freedom of navigation, and by ensuring that new measures at the United Nations and at the International Maritime Organization would not unnecessarily restrict the Navy's freedom of action. The group also found that a new maritime strategy had the potential to be a powerful strategic communication vehicle to reaffirm the U.S. Navy's strong support for the United States' accession to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Finally, the experts argued that the new maritime strategy should acknowledge the importance of international law as a source of the maritime rights on which U.S. mobility depended and, at the same time, as a limitation on indiscriminate or potentially threatening actions by state and nonstate actors.[121]


Perspectivas sobre Estratégia Marítima
Ensaios das Américas, a nova estratégia marítima dos EUA e comentário sobre *Uma Estratégia Cooperativa para o Poder Marítimo no Século XXI*
PAUL D. TAYLOR, *Organizador*

***Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas*, edited by Ambassador Paul D. Taylor.** This volume became the first book that the Naval War College had ever directly published in a foreign language. The image above shows the cover of the Portuguese edition. It also appeared in separate English and Spanish editions.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The second activity was the "Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century" Ruger Workshop from 7 to 8 November 2006 under the leadership of the Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, Professor Richmond Lloyd of the National Security Decision Making Department. This event brought together twenty-nine distinguished participants from around the world. These included such well-known academics as Dr. Barry R. Posen, the Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Geoffrey Till, professor of maritime studies in the Defence Studies Department of King's College London; Dr. Richard N. Cooper, Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics at Harvard University; Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Director, International Centre for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore; and Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, German Navy (Ret.), formerly the chief of the German Naval Staff.[122]

The third activity offered a way to test regional sensitivities to what the College had been asked to do, but even more importantly it demonstrated that the cooperative approach presaged the strategy itself. Admiral Shuford invited naval leaders from around the Western Hemisphere to author articles that could provide insights on maritime strategy. He asked for "the thoughts of strategic thinkers who can bring the long view of grand strategy to [the process of constructing a new U.S. maritime strategy] along with the perspectives of our maritime partners."[123] Shuford received thirteen thoughtful responses to his invitation and directed

retired Ambassador Paul Taylor to edit and publish them in a compendium in the Newport Papers series. This volume, *Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas,* appeared in separate English, Spanish, and Portuguese editions, becoming the first book that the Naval War College had ever directly published in a foreign language.

Among the contributors, Rear Admiral Alvaro J. Martínez of the Argentine Navy, a 2002 graduate of the Naval Command College in Newport, wrote about the process and substance of formulating a maritime strategy and contended that "the maritime strategy should be redesigned in line with a cooperative pattern agreed upon among the participating actors, pursuant to the synergistic principle of playing a win-win game, with a view to consolidating peace, cooperation, and security in the maritime areas."[124] Rear Admiral Federico Niemann of the Chilean Navy, a 1998 graduate of the Naval Command College, addressed suggestions for the new U.S. maritime strategy. He explained the importance of the exercise of sovereignty and control over the maritime space to the development of an ocean state. Niemann also explicitly identified issues that needed to be addressed in further international cooperation as part of the new U.S. maritime strategy.[125] Dr. James Boutilier, Special Advisor for Policy to the Commander, Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific, reviewed the long-standing partnership between the Canadian and U.S. navies. He recounted methods that have succeeded in meeting the challenge of technological interoperability and worked to some degree in the case of informational interoperability.[126]

Listening to the American People

Graduation, June 2006. International students processing along Luce Avenue toward the graduation ceremony under a tent on Dewey Field. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Admiral Mullen believed that few people in the United States knew anything about the U.S. Navy. He cited Gallup polls that indicated the most well-known services were typically the Army and the Marine Corps, with the Air Force third, and then the U.S. Navy. Mullen believed strongly that it was important to engage the country about the Navy and the maritime services. Commandant of the Marine Corps General Jim Conway and commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen agreed with him.[127]

Just prior to entering Spruance Auditorium to deliver his remarks to the Current Strategy Forum on 14 June 2006, Mullen spent about ten minutes introducing himself to a number of the attendees in the lobby. Later, after being introduced by Shuford at the podium,

Mullen immediately moved to center stage and departed from the prepared version of his remarks to tell the audience that he was "encouraged . . . [to have] met individuals from almost throughout the country, whether . . . it was [from] New Hampshire, Arizona, Ohio, California, Missouri, Illinois[:] pretty spectacular representation."[128] He seemed to be genuinely inspired by this experience and reflected that "to me that speaks volumes about the opportunities that are here to elevate the discussion and to be able to talk to our country about what the United States Navy is and what it should be in the future. . . ."[129] Thus crystalized the initiative that became known as the Conversations with the Country, developed and led by the College.[130]

Under the oversight of the provost, Professor John E. Jackson was responsible for the detailed planning and management of the execution of the Conversations with the Country.[131] Working with McGrath and his staff, Jackson developed a process that created opportunities for strategic conversations to identify the concepts and issues important to the American people in the development of the new strategy. Jackson and his team relied on several methods of creating the invitation list for these events. They started with the Naval War College Foundation mailing list, but then worked with local and state-level civic and academic groups to try to get a broad cross section of Americans. Although the College and Morgan modified the formula over the course of the conversations, the team never wavered from Mullen's core guiding principle that it was there to listen. The first round of the Conversations with the Country spanned phases I and II and included seven of these events while the *Cooperative Strategy* was being developed and written. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard hosted these events in the following cities: Newport, Rhode Island, on 14 November 2006; Phoenix, Arizona, on 24 January 2007; Atlanta, Georgia, on 9 February 2007; Seattle, Washington, on 9 March 2007; San Francisco, California, on 12 March 2007; Chicago, Illinois, on 9 April 2007; and New York City on 16 April 2007.

Following the launch of the *Cooperative Strategy* at International Seapower Symposium XVIII in October 2007, a second round of conversations began that brought senior officers from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to additional American cities, where they presented the new strategy to business and civic leaders and discussed future roles of the three sea services in protecting the homeland and working with global partners to prevent war. Cities visited during this phase of the Conversations with the Country included Miami, Florida, on 15 November 2007; Houston, Texas, on 24 January 2008; Portland, Oregon, on 21 February 2008; Denver, Colorado, on 27 March 2008; and Los Angeles, California, on 15 April 2008. In addition to these symposia, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard leaders met with local universities and faculty in a program called Campus Conversations. Sea service leadership believed it was important to present the strategy to future leaders and listen to feedback. Campus Conversations took place at the following universities: the University of Miami on 16 November 2007; Rice University on 23 January 2008; Oregon State University on 20 February 2008; the University of Denver on 26 March 2008; and the University of Southern California on 15 April 2008.

There is a wide range of opinion on what these conversations produced. Just how much the specific feedback from the participants in the first round of the Conversations with the Country helped shape the final maritime strategy is open to question. For example, Morgan reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that "expectations exceeded in Phoenix . . . surprising interest from political leaders—Mayor and Governor. Good press from NPR [National Public Radio] and PBS [Public Broadcasting Service]."[132] Professor

Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5), Participating in the Conversations with the Country. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Karl Walling of the College's Strategy and Policy Department was a key participant in almost all of the sessions. He was critical of what he considered to be "inadequate follow-up after the symposia were over." He concluded that "while the project had some operational successes it was a strategic failure, because even if you were able to get small audiences of a hundred people interested and engaged for a day, there was no follow up."[133] McGrath believed that he heard the American people at these conversations say that they "want us to remain strong, they want us to protect them here in their homeland, and they want us to work with other nations around the world to preserve peace."[134] But McGrath was surprised at what else he heard, or, in some cases, didn't hear. He later reflected that he had "spent a goodly part of the past 21 years working the edges of the empire; I just naturally assumed that the American public knew what we were doing out there and that they had some appreciation for why we do it. I was shocked at how wrong I was."[135] But his enduring takeaway from the first round of conversations was that

> Homeland Defense and National Defense were the exact same thing to most of the people in the audience. They were concerned with porous borders, port security, and terrorists on airplanes. I did not discern a great deal of understanding as to why we were forward deployed around the world. There was only a vague sense of the importance of the Navy.[136]

In order to tap into the widest group of experts, the College organized a series of senior executive seminars, smaller groups of fifteen to twenty people, all of whom were senior business and government executives and leading academics. The purpose of the senior executive seminars was similar to that of the larger events in the conversation with America, but reached out to Fortune 500 leaders—*Fortune* magazine's annual ranking of the top five hundred American corporations in order of revenue earned—to sample their concerns about maritime security issues. It was not just a presentation, although the organizers did kick things off with a number of speakers, but a true dialogue about U.S. security. There were a total of five executive seminars. The first was in Newport, using the College's annual Ruger Conference on 14 November

2006. The second was at the Global Innovation and Strategy Center in Omaha, Nebraska, on 13 April 2007. The third senior executive seminar took place at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas, on 25 April 2007. The fourth event occurred at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, on 8 June 2007. The final seminar took place at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia on 29 April 2008. A sixth seminar was planned for Stanford University, but had to be cancelled because of a conflict with Mullen's successor's—Admiral Roughead's—schedule.

Participants in the Senior Executive Session at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, 8 June 2007.

Left to right: Rear Admiral Shuford; Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, USN (Ret.); Robert J. Decker, President, AIG Global Marine; John F. Reinhart, President, Maersk Line, Ltd; Admiral Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; General James Conway, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Bruce Redditt, Executive Vice President, Omnicom Group; the Honorable Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the Navy; Ambassador Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State; John F. McWethy, former national security correspondent, ABC News; Stephen Waters, founding partner, Compass Partners; William H. Swanson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Raytheon Company; Michael Coulter, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs; Robert B. Coutts, Executive Vice President, Electronic Systems for Lockheed Martin Corporation; Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5). *Naval War College Museum Collection*

During the second round of the senior seminars, the participants were asked: "Here is the new Maritime Strategy. Do you think we got it about right?" For example, at the senior executive seminar at the Wharton School of Business, chief executive officers did not hesitate to tell Roughead what they thought.

Giving very frank advice, they posed questions such as: "Do you really understand the impact of globalization in my area?"

Long on Data . . . Short on Options

As it turned out, the Strategic Foundations Game and the several workshops associated with it did not produce maritime strategic options in a straightforward way. Rubel's team was left with a considerable body of data and differing perspectives. He decided that a further strategic development workshop was necessary and he convened one in Newport from 11 to 16 December 2006. During that workshop, Rubel and his team set about trying to deduce strategic options from the four policy futures. There was one writing group, composed mainly of professors from the College's Strategic Research Department, who drafted all the options. Then, the larger team came together to assess collectively each option. Once completed, one author from the team took the draft and the notes from the team's collective session and turned it into a narrative that was then turned back to everybody to review. One author usually took ownership of each option, and then the entire team had the opportunity to comment, suggest, and edit. Professor Jonathan Stevenson of the Strategic Research Department took the lead in smoothing the prose. Ultimately, Rubel and Dombrowski had the final say about the document and the language in it. Pelham Boyer, the managing editor of the Naval War College Press, conducted a final review of the options to ensure that they met copyedited publishing standards.[137]

This work produced five maritime strategy options. Option Alfa, called "Winning Combat Power Forward," was derived from the primacy policy future and called for strong forces to be deployed in the northern Arabian Sea and in Northeast Asia. Its underpinning assumption was that since deterrence could not be relied on and sufficient strategic depth in the sea areas was lacking, strong naval forces must be positioned where they would be most needed. Option Bravo was based on the offshore balancing policy future and called for U.S. naval forces to be forward deployed only in the Persian Gulf. The rest of the Navy would remain in home waters, in a "surge" status. Option Charlie called for a focus on securing the global commons as a key element in the health of the global system. Rubel believed that this option seemed to have relevance across most of the policy futures. Option Delta, one that came "over the transom" from Captain Wayne Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School, called for high-end forces to combat anti-access capabilities in Northeast Asia and low-end forces for the "Long War" and engagement elsewhere. The final option, Option Echo, came from McGrath and was an outgrowth of the selective engagement policy future and called for raising war prevention to the same level of importance as war winning.[138]

The second phase in the process for the development of the *Cooperative Strategy* began in January 2007 and ran through March 2007. On 16 January 2007, Shuford and Rubel briefed the Maritime Strategy Executive Committee on the five maritime strategic options that had been developed as a result of the College's work. The members of this executive committee included Vice Admiral Morgan; Lieutenant General Jim Amos, USMC, then serving as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and Coast Guard Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimmich, then serving as Assistant Commandant for Policy and Planning. At the conclusion of the brief, the executive committee directed Shuford to continue to develop all five options, and return to brief the executive committee on the more fully developed options in March 2007.[139] At the March session, the executive committee quickly winnowed down the five options to three: Option Alfa,

a forward strategy for winning a war; Option Charlie, a strategy for securing the global maritime commons; and Option Echo, a strategy to prevent war.[140]

The Completion of the College's Work on A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Once the executive committee had made its choices among the five strategic options, the College yielded its lead role to McGrath and his team in Washington to complete the work on the new strategy. The fact that the Chief of Naval Operations had chosen the Naval War College to play such a substantial role in developing *A Cooperative Strategy* was important to the College. The process of developing the strategy and its associated activities identified significant lessons to be learned should the College be called on to do such work again. More importantly, the process had produced in the participants a sobering assessment of what the College needed to do to ensure that its research, analysis, and gaming capability played a central role in the Navy's planning and decision making. In reflecting on the College's participation in this strategic development process, Shuford and Giblin affirmed that the College's experience had clearly shown the following:

- Understanding the plausible future trends in the international security environment is vital to effective strategic planning.
- One cannot do credible analysis of future strategic options without extensive preparation.
- One cannot understand the strategic and operational challenges that one will face in examining future strategic options without a strong research, analysis, and gaming capability.
- The development process showed a clear gap in the U.S. Navy's concept development process. No one in the Navy had been focusing on the issues that might be found in the longer-term projections in the period beyond the next six years in the current Future Years Defense Program, the summary of forces, resources, and equipment associated with all Department of Defense programs, resources, and force structure.
- Gaming scenarios is vital to testing the concepts that will overcome the future strategic and operational challenges.
- The increasing demand for the College to do research, analysis, and gaming exceeded its capacity.[141]

Shuford directed Giblin to include these lessons learned in the College's contribution to the program objective memorandum review for fiscal year 2010 (POM 10) and to give them the widest possible dissemination at every opportunity in the resource allocation process.

The result of the work of Rubel's and McGrath's teams was *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.[142] The hallmark of their work was the legitimacy it had established through the wide range of people who had been consulted and whose ideas had been worked into the concept, involving some 230 individuals in the maritime strategy working group as well as the results of the Conversations with the Country.[143] The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, along with the commandant of the Marine Corps, General James T. Conway, and the commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, personally

The Three Chiefs of the U.S. Maritime Services in Spruance Hall at International Seapower Symposium XVIII, 17 October 2007, to Present the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.*

Left to right: Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; General James Conway, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations.

Naval War College Museum Collection

View of Several Translators' Booths at International Seapower Symposium XVIII. Professionals from the State Department and the United Nations provided simultaneous translation for all presentations and discussion at the symposium.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Admiral Thad Allen on the Stage in Spruance Auditorium Presenting the U.S. Coast Guard's Contribution to the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.*

Naval War College Museum Collection

introduced the new strategy publicly for the first time on the morning of 17 October 2007 at International Seapower Symposium XVIII at the Naval War College. Admiral Roughead had deliberately chosen that occasion. Attended by 195 delegates from one hundred different countries, the International Seapower Symposium offered the perfect forum to demonstrate that the strategy was, indeed, cooperative and that the Naval War College had gone to great lengths to collaborate with U.S. friends and allies in its development. During his welcoming remarks to the delegates at the opening of the symposium on 17 October, Shuford emphasized the role that the College had played in the development of the strategy and the fact that the Chief of Naval Operations had chosen this international forum to introduce publicly the *Cooperative Strategy*. Shuford highlighted the fact that the College "has had the privilege of finding itself in a position to support the leadership of our maritime forces and those of our global partners in thinking through implications of this new set of global security challenges and opportunities."[144] Shuford also took the opportunity to underscore the broader theme of maritime security cooperation embedded within the *Cooperative Strategy*. He stressed that

> critical to this effort to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive series of scenario analyses, war-gaming efforts, a series of high-level conferences as well as symposia and other professional exchanges with our maritime partners here in Newport . . . and around the world—many of which you have participated in. This collaborative effort has been very successful in producing great and profound insights and has brought into focus a broad range of diverse perspectives.[145]

Filling a Critical Gap

One of the early and recurring criticisms of the *Cooperative Strategy* was that it did not address the growing power of China at sea. However, the Naval War College had already begun to put itself into a unique position to do so with respect to research and analysis on the maritime developments of the People's Republic of China by the time that the *Cooperative Strategy* was introduced. In 2004, a small group of faculty members had a sense of unease about the proportion of focus that the College was putting on Central Asia and the Middle East, both in terms of research and analysis and in its curricula. They believed that the College needed to balance its efforts by devoting more intellectual capital to what they believed to be a first-order, strategic priority for the United States over the long term—China. They argued that it was China that posed the most enduring challenge to U.S. global economic, political, and security leadership and that a good deal of this concern rested in China's role in the maritime domain.[146]

With this conviction as their driving force, Associate Professor Lyle Goldstein and Assistant Professor Andrew Erickson of the Strategic Research Department, Associate Professor Bill Murray of the War Gaming Department, and Professor Andrew "Dex" Wilson of the Strategy and Policy Department started an informal e-mail group and called themselves the "China Maritime Studies Group." Their purpose was to concentrate human capital, share sources and ideas, and thereby catalyze research and discussion of China's growing turn to the sea.[147] In October 2004, this group approached the provost with the support of the dean of Naval Warfare Studies, Dr. Ken Watman, and the chairman of the Strategic Research Department, Dr. Jonathan Pollack, with the idea of creating a China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the College. The provost found their idea to be sound, but one that required guidance concerning its focus and a detailed plan for implementing the concept in terms of manpower and financial resources. After extensive meetings in the provost's office and over the group's nascent library collection of publications in Chinese in McCarty Little Hall, the provost and these faculty members concluded that what set the Naval War College apart from any other such activity in the Navy was the College's increasing ability to collect and to translate relevant, open-source, Chinese-language literature and then to analyze it in the strategic and operational context of the maritime domain.

A Shelf of Books in the Library of the China Maritime Studies Institute.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Goldstein, Erickson, Murray, and Wilson recognized that there was an extraordinary volume of Chinese journals and other publications concerning Chinese maritime issues that were available on the open

market, particularly in the bookstores of northwest Beijing, but not obtainable outside China. Goldstein and Murray had already published an exceptionally well-received article on China's submarine force in the prestigious journal *International Security*, using some of this Chinese open-source material that Goldstein had acquired and translated.[148] These Chinese publications covered a range of topics from very detailed engineering studies to the broader questions of China's maritime strategy. Included in this literature were equally detailed analyses by credible Chinese authors of U.S. Navy forces and their vulnerabilities. Drawing on his experience, Giblin recognized that this was not unlike the volume of open-source literature that characterized the internal analysis and debate about the Soviet Navy during the Cold War, which had been of value to the U.S. Navy in that period.[149] To exploit this opportunity, much as the U.S. Navy had done in the 1970s with Soviet naval literature, Giblin insisted that the group had to become a defined organization within the College, so that its work could be structured systematically and funded on a full-time basis to conduct the kind of work that Goldstein and his colleagues envisioned. Giblin also insisted that the group work across organizations—inside and outside government—to make the most effective use of its available capacity and capabilities.

With this focus as its point of main effort, Giblin approved the idea and took the concept of how it would be executed to Shuford, who strongly endorsed it and directed that the provost immediately establish the China Maritime Studies Institute within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Shuford recognized the potential of the institute in terms of enhancing the College's institutional effectiveness and its relevance to the senior leadership of the Navy, especially the Navy's operational-level commanders in the Pacific. Shuford established three, top-level objectives:

1. Produce analysis of open-source Chinese-language publications on the naval development of the People's Republic of China;
2. Analyze the implications of these developments for the U.S. Navy; and
3. Integrate Chinese maritime studies into the Naval War College's teaching and research.

Accordingly, on 1 December 2004, the provost established the China Maritime Studies Institute within the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, with Professor Lyle Goldstein as the institute's first director. Giblin also committed to finding NWC mission or other funds to get the organization up and running. In this regard, the Naval War College Foundation was exceptionally helpful in providing funds to support the China Maritime Studies Institute's early efforts. Giblin directed Goldstein to draft an issue paper for the College's POM 08 submission that contained a budget estimate of the resources required and the rationale for the initiative. Working with the College's comptroller, Commander Melinda Matheny, Goldstein, Erickson, Murray, and Wilson drafted an above-core issue paper for the College's submission to the Navy's program objective memorandum for fiscal year 2008. After substantial editing, Giblin took the issue paper into the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval Operations personally approved the establishment of the China Maritime Studies Institute and provided sufficient funding to hire four additional faculty members in fiscal year 2008, along with a modest amount of additional funding to support the institute's research and analysis.

Professors Lyle Goldstein, William Murray, Andrew Erickson, and Andrew "Dex" Wilson with Students from Their "Chinese Maritime Development" Class (Spring Elective 672) in 2008. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

The result was that the China Maritime Studies Institute acquired seven full-time and two part-time faculty members, including five Mandarin speakers, by the end of 2008.[150] During its first four years, the institute sponsored four conferences and published edited volumes of the papers from each of them.[151] These included its first effort from 26 to 27 October 2005 to address China's future nuclear submarine force. The second conference, held 6 to 7 December 2006, examined the maritime implications of China's energy strategy. The third, held from 5 to 6 December 2007, considered the challenge of defining a maritime security partnership with China. The institute's fourth conference took place 10 to 11 December 2008 and investigated the evolving maritime roles for Chinese aerospace power. In addition, the institute's faculty members completed studies that addressed the Chinese tanker fleet, naval mines, the East China Sea, submarine rescue, and the Chinese shipbuilding industry.[152] Of these, the study by Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray on Chinese mine warfare helped, in particular, to validate the concept of the China Maritime Studies Institute within the U.S. Navy by demonstrating the strikingly accurate and insightful findings that could be derived from open-source analysis.

In just four years, between the China Maritime Studies Institute's founding in December 2004 and the end of 2008, the institute had quickly emerged as an active and effective contributor in terms of its breadth and depth of coverage of China's growing power at sea. Its team's remarkable ability in using open-source literature to identify and to highlight new and critical trends in Chinese maritime activities added substantially to the College's institutional effectiveness as well as to its relevance in the eyes of the Navy's senior leadership. In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates cited the China Maritime Studies Institute as a model for the Defense Department's Minerva Research Initiative, which sought to build a deeper understanding of the social, cultural, and political dynamics that shape regions of strategic interest around the world.[153]

> The Chinese government publishes a tremendous amount of information about military and technological developments on an open-source basis. However, it is often inconvenient, if not impossible, for American researchers to get access to this material since it is often available only in China. A real—or virtual—archive of documents acquired by researchers and others abroad would help us track Chinese military and technological developments. . . . Faculty members at the Naval War College have already instituted a smaller version of this idea focusing on the Chinese Navy. . . .[154]

Indeed, the actions of this small group of CMSI's founding members personified Luce's 1903 guiding principle that the College is a "place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war."[155] Just as important, they embodied Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner's charge to the College in 1972: "Always keep in mind that the product which the country desperately needs is military men with the capability of solving complex problems and of executing their decisions. Scholarship for scholarship's sake is of no importance to us. You must keep your sights on decisionmaking or problem solving as your objective."[156] Although the College's executive leadership deserves some of the credit for the foresight in establishing the China Maritime Studies Institute, the real credit for filling this critical gap belongs to this group of young faculty members who had the courage of their convictions to think and to act strategically with their unusual skills, the very essence of what the Naval War College is about.

NOTES

1. Giblin Papers (privately held): Naval War College, Office of the President, "120-Day Assessment for the Chief of Naval Operations" (briefing, 17 December 2004) [hereinafter cited as "120-Day Assessment"], slide 6.
2. Giblin Papers (privately held): Department of the Navy, Office of the Naval Inspector General, "Command Inspection of Naval War College, Part 2," letter 5040 Serial N3B/1316 of 25 August 2003, p. 24.
3. "120-Day Assessment," slide 2.
4. Ibid., slide 5.
5. See Andrew C. Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction," *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 129–43, on the origins and intent of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
6. Executive Office of the President, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)* (Washington, D.C.: December 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf.
7. Ibid.; see also Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program," CJCS Instruction 3520.02B of 5 March 2015, p. 1, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3520_02.pdf.
8. Giblin Papers (privately held): Dr. Andrew C. Winner to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update to John Hattendorf's Book –Sailors and Scholars," e-mail, 8 November 2015.
9. The operational experts group (OEG) is an informal coordinating structure that discusses proliferation concerns and plans future exercises. The OEG consists of military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts from PSI states. See Mary Beth Nikitin, *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*, CRS Report for Congress RL34327 (Washington, D.C.: 8 January 2010), p. 2, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137190.pdf.
10. Giblin Papers (privately held): Professor Robert Rubel to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., and Dr. Kenneth Watman, "PSI," e-mail, 1 October 2004.
11. Winner to Giblin, "Update to John Hattendorf's Book," 8 November 2015.
12. Ibid.
13. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Manuscript Item 631: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, 20 July 2006.
14. The College's War Gaming Department was less than half the size it was in 2001, the year the last global game was conducted. See Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, "President's Forum: Strategic Investment and Title X War Gaming," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008), p. 10.
15. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers]: Subject Files: Admiral Vern Clark: "Admiral Vern Clark Edited Remarks, Change of Command, Naval War College, August 12, 2004," p. 4.
16. During the command inspection of the Naval War College by the Naval Inspector General (IG) in 2003, the IG noted that "NWC has assumed the role of providing homeland security training within available resources." In his report to the CNO, he found that "meeting the needs for homeland security war games with civilian authorities—NWC has an appropriate facility to assist in meeting this new national requirement. However, this role is being accomplished at the expense of conducting [research, analysis, and gaming] to support the NWC mission." See Department of the Navy, Office of the Naval Inspector General, "Command Inspection of Naval War College, Part 2," p. 15.
17. For an example of a Naval War College student's paper on this general topic, see Commander John J. Gordon, "Maritime Operational Threat Response Center: The Missing Piece in the National Strategy for Maritime Security" (paper, Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2006), available at http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA463549.

18. Giblin Papers (privately held): Professor Emeritus Robert Rubel to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update of Sailors and Scholars," e-mail, 16 November 2015.

19. Giblin Papers (privately held): Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "POM 10 Program Review" (briefing, 24 October 2007) [hereinafter cited as "POM 10 Program Review Brief"], slide 14. As President Shuford has written, "The College originated [Title X] gaming in 1979, when the Navy decided to explore conflict with the Soviet Union on a worldwide scale. Its purpose was to help rebuild the Navy's operational and strategic perspective, a perspective many felt had become too narrowly tactical." "Title X, U.S. Code, concerns federal law for the organization and operation of the armed forces of the United States. It constitutes the legal basis for the roles and missions of each of the services and responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping them." Title X games examine the strategy-to-force alignment and operational concepts for the employment of that force with a view toward rationalizing the service's future strategic investment profile. See Shuford, "President's Forum," pp. 7, 10.

20. Executive Office of the President, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 13, "Maritime Security Policy," 21 December 2004 [hereinafter cited as NSPD 41], available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf. In addition, the Secretary of Defense's *Security Cooperation Guidance* and CNO's *Maritime Security Cooperation Guidance for FY05/06* lay behind Shuford's decision.

21. NSPD 41, p. 6.

22. The Honorable Paul F. McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Homeland Defense (HD), later to become Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (HD&ASA), was particularly interested in the bilateral relationship between the U.S. Naval War College and the Center for Superior Naval Studies (CESNAV), Mexico's equivalent of NWC, in Mexico City. McHale believed that the relationship had "enormous potential to assist an expansion of our mil[itary]-to-mil[itary] relationship with Mexico, with an added opportunity to discreetly build Mexican political and military confidence in NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command]." Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, ASD Paul McHale to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, e-mail, 21 June 2005.

23. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, RG 28 Presidents File: Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, USN, e-mail, 3 September 2004.

24. Rubel to Giblin, "Update of Sailors and Scholars," 16 November 2015.

25. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 500.2: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. Conducted on September 17, 2009 by James Rife [hereinafter Giblin Oral History], p. 88. For a number of years, people at the College like Mr. Bill Glenney, deputy director of the CNO's Strategic Studies Group, Professors Chuck Bartlett and Tim Somes of the National Security Decision Making Department, Rubel, and Giblin had persistently argued that a gap in Navy concept generation and development had emerged.

26. Hattendorf Papers, Subject Files, box 369, Fleet Forces Command file. Fleet Forces Command was initially established by OPNAVNOTE 3111 of 16 October 2001 as a concurrent duty of Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

27. Admiral Vern Clark, USN, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 121, no. 10 (October 2002), p. 39.

28. Department of Defense, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Office of Public Affairs, "USJFCOM Co-sponsored War Game Begins at Naval War College," public affairs release, 6 October 2003.

29. Rubel to Giblin, "Update of Sailors and Scholars," 16 November 2015.

30. Giblin Oral History, pp. 88–89.

31. See Naval War College Archives, Center for Naval Warfare Studies: RG 37, series I [hereinafter CNWS Deans' Papers], box 44, file 28: NWC Title X MARSTRAT War Gaming Brief, 22 May 2007.

32. Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, "Advanced Concepts Generation at the Naval War College" (brief, April 2008), slide 4.

33. Ibid., slide 2.

34. "POM 10 Program Review Brief," slide 54; Giblin Papers (privately held): Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN, e-mail, 11 April 2008.

35. Giblin Papers (privately held): Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "Mission, Functions and Task of the Naval War College," DRAFT OPNAVINST 5450.207D, 7 March 2007, p. 2.

36. Giblin Oral History, pp. 90–91.

37. "POM 10 Program Review Brief," slide 22.

38. Ibid., slide 23.

39. Ibid., slide 22.

40. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN, to Admiral Gary Roughead, USN, e-mail, 5 November 2008.

41. For a complete discussion of the concepts examined in Global '08, see *Global '08: U.S. Navy Title X War Game, "Implementing the Maritime Strategy," 4–8 August 2008; Game Report* (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, March 2009), pp. 24–27, available at http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA548964.

42. Shuford to Roughead.

43. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., e-mail, 24 October 2015.

44. Rubel to Giblin, "Update of Sailors and Scholars," 16 November 2015.

45. It is not the intent of this portion of this chapter to offer a complete history of how *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* came about. This portion of the chapter focuses on the Naval War College's role in that process. It does not address the contributions of such institutions as the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval Academy, the Center for Naval Analyses, Lockheed Martin, and Johns Hopkins University and its Applied Physics Laboratory.

46. Personal interview with Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), 25 August 2011, cited in Dr. Bruce Elleman, "The Making of the Maritime Strategy" (unpublished draft typescript, 1 July 2013), p. 31.

47. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Remarks as Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen" (Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 14 June 2006) [hereinafter "Mullen Remarks," 14 June 2006], pp. 2–5, available at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Mullen/CNO_CSF140606.pdf.

48. Ibid., p. 2.

49. Ibid., p. 9.

50. CNWS Deans' Papers, box 43, file 2: Navy's Maritime Strategy, All Flag Officer Symposium, June 20 2006.

51. George Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890 to 1990* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 415, quoted in Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Strategy and Operations, "Navy's Maritime Strategy" (brief), slide 42.

52. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, USN, "QDR

Analysis and War Gaming Support: Support of Strategies," e-mail, 3 September 2004.

53. Ibid.

54. Personal interview with Dean Robert Rubel, 25 August 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 31. See also CNWS Deans' Papers, boxes 43–44.

55. Giblin Oral History, p. 90.

56. Timothy D. Hoyt and Andrew C. Winner, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Thinking about the New US Maritime Strategy," *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation* 3, no. 2 (Winter 2007), p. 8, available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/Indian-Ocean-Regional-Studies-Group/documents/Journal-of-NMF_Vol-3-No-2_Article-03_Hoyt-and-Winn.aspx.

57. See, for example, Pierre Wack, "Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead," *Harvard Business Review* 63, no. 5 (September–October 1985), pp. 73–79; Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View* (New York: Doubleday, 1991); and Kees Van der Heijden, *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996).

58. Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Yourself and Your Company* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. xv.

59. "Mullen Remarks," 14 June 2006, pp. 2, 5.

60. Hoyt and Winner, "A Cooperative Strategy," p. 8.

61. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, USN, "Maritime Strategy Process Strawman," e-mail, 14 July 2006.

62. Ibid. Subsequently, the College modified the construct in Shuford's e-mail to a timeline that envisioned four, somewhat overlapping phases: phase I—preliminary research; phase II—analysis of national strategies; phase IIA—research and analysis; phase III—testing, vetting, and refinement of alternative strategies; and phase IV—synthesis and report.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Giblin Oral History, pp. 90–91.

67. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Maritime Strategy, series IV, box 458: CS21: Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5), 17 July 2006, Subj.: New Navy Maritime Strategy [hereinafter CNO Memorandum, 17 July 2006].

68. Ibid., p. 1.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Morgan assigned Lieutenant Commander Audrey Snyder, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Christopher Sweeney, USN, to assist McGrath with the myriad of details that would mark this complex project.

72. CNO Memorandum, 17 July 2006.

73. Giblin Papers (privately held): Dean Robert Rubel to Dr. Peter Dombrowski and Colonel James Conklin, USMC, "Maritime Strategy Process Strawman," e-mail, 17 July 2006.

74. Giblin Papers (privately held): Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, USN, to Admiral John Nathman, USN, et al., "New Maritime Strategy," e-mail, 21 July 2006; Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Office of the Dean, "Options Development Workshop" (brief, 13–15 December 2006) [hereinafter cited as "Options Development Workshop" briefing], slide 2.

75. Morgan to Nathman et al., "New Maritime Strategy," 21 July 2006.

76. Robert C. Rubel, "The New Maritime Strategy: The Rest of the Story," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008), p. 70. This article is reprinted in Rubel, *Writing to Think: The Intellectual Journey of a Naval Career,* Newport Paper 41 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2014), pp. 9–18.

77. Giblin Papers (privately held): Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., to Dean Robert Rubel, "New Maritime Strategy," e-mail, 21 July 2006.

78. "Options Development Workshop" briefing, slide 6.

79. From the Naval War College's perspective, there were initially five stages. See Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 458, file NWC Process. Later this became four, with the period from July through September 2006 comprising an initial phase to collect inputs and analyze the strategic environment. See Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 458, file "The New Maritime Strategy: An In-Progress Review 11 Sept 06 Briefing," slide 4.

80. Personal interview with Dr. Peter Dombrowski, 21 July 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 41.

81. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 458, file Geostrategic Environment Workshop, 24–25 August 2006; CNWS Deans' Papers, box 44, file 26. See also "Proposed Outline for MARSTRAT Discussion with PCNO, 10 SEP 2007," cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 18. The futures documents surveyed included National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, Based on Consultations with Nongovernmental Experts around the World,* NIC 2004-13 ([Washington, D.C.]: December 2004), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_Mapping%20the%20Global%20Future%202020%20Project.pdf; U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment: The World through 2030 and Beyond* (CreateSpace, 2007); and the work being done in connection with the Center for Strategic and International Studies on strategic futures, particularly its Seven Revolutions project, which began in 1992. See "Seven Revolutions," *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* https://www.csis.org/programs/seven-revolutions.

82. Dean Robert Rubel to Dr. Bruce Elleman, e-mail, 25 August 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 41. As a matter of due diligence, Giblin advised Shuford and Rubel that this workaround created a potential vulnerability in the College's institutional integrity with respect to the process. He emphasized that Schwartz had always stressed the role that "specific research," or what he called "skilled hunting and gathering of information," played in the development of scenarios and that "observations from the real world must be built into the [scenarios]." Schwartz had argued forcefully that it is essential to the effectiveness of the process "for the storyteller to sample evidence from the real world before spinning the tale." Giblin concluded that the College had accepted a set of tales that had already been spun by other traditional national security institutions without completely understanding the specific research that went into spinning those tales. In short, Giblin questioned whether the process had been weakened by defining the starting point and constrained to the realm of the usual suspects. While the provost understood that the approach was resource and time driven, he nonetheless argued that the decision was inconsistent with the importance attached to scenario development in the scenario-based planning process. See Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View* (1996), pp. 60, 62.

83. Anonymous [Commander Bryan McGrath], "Maritime Strategy 2007: The Team Leader Speaks," *Steeljaw Scribe* (blog), 21 October 2007, http://steeljawscribe.com/2007/10/21/maritime-strategy-2007-the-team-leader-speaks [hereinafter cited as McGrath, "The Team Leader Speaks"].

84. "The New Maritime Strategy: An In-Progress Review 11 Sept 06 Briefing," slide 11.

85. Ibid., slides 12–19.

86. Ibid., slide 15.

87. Ibid., slide 16.

88. McGrath, "The Team Leader Speaks." See also Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, D.C.: October 2007) [hereinafter cited as *CS21*], pp. 2–4.

89. For the NWC archival record of this workshop, see Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 458: Maritime Strategy Lessons Learned Workshop, 30 Aug 2006. The "graybeards" included Rear Admiral Mike McDevitt, USN (Ret.), then serving as director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses and formerly as the Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy at the Pacific Command's headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii, Director, Long Range Planning for the Navy, and Director, East Asia Policy Office for the Secretary of Defense; Rear Admiral Bill Pendley, USN (Ret.), formerly Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy at the Pacific Command's headquarters and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Rear Admiral Jim Stark, USN (Ret.), formerly the executive director of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, a member of the National Security Council staff, and President of the Naval War College; Captain Ken McGruther, USN (Ret.), formerly a key member of the staff supporting the CNO's Strategic Studies Group, located at the Naval War College; Captain Roger W. Barnett, USN (Ret.), former director of the Navy's Strategic Concepts Branch and NWC professor; Captain "Bud" Cole, USN (Ret.), then a professor at the National War College and former Head, Plans and Programs Section on the staff of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), then serving as CNA senior research analyst and formerly a long-standing member of the Navy's Strategic Concepts Branch; Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Ret.), former director of the Navy's Strategic Concepts Branch; Captain Dick Diamond, USN (Ret.), formerly head of the Navy's first Joint Operations and Doctrine Branch in N3/N5 and head of the Strategic Concepts Branch, then the lead strategic trends and opportunities analyst for Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, Rhode Island; Dr. John T. Hanley, Jr., former deputy director of the CNO's Strategic Studies Group and then at the Institute for Defense Analysis in Arlington, Virginia; and Commander Mitch Brown, USN (Ret.), NWC faculty member at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey and a former staff officer in the Navy's Strategic Concepts Branch.

90. Rubel, "The Rest of the Story," p. 71.

91. Giblin Oral History, p. 93. When asked later, Provost Giblin confirmed that he believed that in his opinion "the fleet felt that it was cut out . . . , they felt that they weren't being listened to, and that their views weren't being given due deference. They were very skeptical about the timeline involved and actually publishing a document. The maritime strategy in the 1980s came from the bottom up, it came from [U.S. Pacific Fleet]." See Elleman, "The Making," pp. 35–36.

92. Giblin Oral History, pp. 93–94.

93. Dr. Peter Dombrowski to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "CNWS Support for CS 21," e-mail, 9 October 2015.

94. Ibid.; "The New Maritime Strategy: An In-Progress Review 11 Sept 06 Briefing," slide 22.

95. Dombrowski to Giblin, "CNWS Support for CS 21," 9 October 2015; "The New Maritime Strategy: An In-Progress Review 11 Sept 06 Briefing," slide 23.

96. Giblin Oral History, p. 95.

97. Peter Schwartz, "The Art of the Long View" (remarks at the initial "Conversation with the Country," Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 14 November 2006), YouTube video, 18:07, posted by Stern Speakers, May 6, 2014, available at https://sternspeakers.com/peter-schwartz.

98. "The New Maritime Strategy: An In-Progress Review 11 Sept 06 Briefing," slide 5.

99. Hoyt and Winner, "A Cooperative Strategy," p. 10.

100. See Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–97), pp. 5–53; and Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86–124. Provost Giblin expressed some concern about the manner in which the process seemed to be portraying at least one and perhaps two of the Posen grand strategies. Although he acknowledged that they represented the state of the debate in the literature on grand strategy, Giblin believed that the choice of these grand strategies accepted globalization as a favorable, predetermined element of the futures in which they might be called on to operate. Moreover, he believed that they were all somewhat weak on addressing the relationship of U.S. military power in general and maritime power in particular to globalization. He based his assessment on the critical analysis of the senior and intermediate-level students he taught in the Strategy and Force Planning course in the National Security Decision Making Department from 1997 through 2002. Giblin Oral History, pp. 95–96.

101. Personal interview with Dombrowski, 21 July 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 41.

102. Personal interview with Rubel, 25 August 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 41.

103. Rubel, "The Rest of the Story," p. 70.

104. "Options Development Workshop" briefing, slide 2.

105. Ibid.

106. Personal interview with Rubel, 25 August 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," pp. 44–45.

107. Ibid., p. 45.

108. Robert C. Rubel, "The Epistemology of War Gaming," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 124; reprinted in Rubel, *Writing to Think*, pp. 221–40.

109. Personal interview with Rubel, 25 August 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 45.

110. Ibid.

111. "Mullen Remarks," 14 June 2006, pp. 3–5, 8.

112. Ibid.

113. Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight*, p. 9.

114. Dean Emeritus Robert C. Rubel to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update of Sailors and Scholars," e-mail, 8 January 2016.

115. *CS21*.

116. "Options Development Workshop" briefing, slide 32.

117. Craig H. Allen, "Moderator's Report: Legal Experts' Workshop on the Future Global Legal Order," *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 73–91. See also CNWS Deans' Papers, box 43, file 10, and box 44, file 8: Final Report, Legal Experts Workshop on Future Global Legal Order, 2006.

118. Final Report, Legal Experts Workshop on Future Global Legal Order.

119. Ibid. These twelve areas were consideration of the broad parameters of the baseline from which change would take place; ocean governance

issues; regional developments; nonproliferation and disarmament; the law governing the resort to the use of armed force; the law of armed conflict; the law of the sea; environmental laws applicable to military operations; accountability of military and civilian personnel; law enforcement and international criminal law; the relationship between intelligence and the law of the sea; and migrants and refugees.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Richmond M. Lloyd, ed., *Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century; Proceedings [of] a Workshop Sponsored by the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, Newport, Rhode Island, 6–8 November 2006,* William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics Papers, no. 2 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, [2006]).

123. Paul D. Taylor, ed., *Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas,* Newport Paper 31 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2008), p. ix.

124. Paul D. Taylor, preface, p. ix; Rear Admiral Alvaro J. Martínez, Argentine Navy, "A Maritime Strategy for the South Atlantic," pp. 1–10; both in ibid.

125. Taylor, preface, p. x; Rear Admiral Federico Niemann Figari, Chilean Navy, "Views of the Chilean Navy on a New U.S. Maritime Strategy," in Taylor, *Essays from the Americas,* pp. 41–52. See also CNWS Deans' Papers, box 43, file 6: Vision of Chilean Navy toward a New Maritime Strategy, 2007.

126. Taylor, preface, p. ix; Dr. James Boutilier, "Grey on Grey: The Critical Partnership between the Canadian and U.S. Navies," in Taylor, *Essays from the Americas,* pp. 113–20.

127. Telephone interview with Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN (Ret.), 24 January 2013, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 47.

128. "Mullen Remarks," p. 1.

129. Ibid. According to Professor John Jackson of the Naval War College: "Mullen said that he was very impressed by the level of input he received about maritime issues from average American citizens attending the annual Current Strategy Forum, and he wanted to replicate the conversational dynamics of the Current Strategy Forum around the country." See personal interview with Professor John Jackson, 1 September 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 46.

130. There is a contending view about how the term "Conversation with the Country" came about. Mullen attributed the idea to Vice Admiral John Morgan. See telephone interview with Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN (Ret.), 24 January 2013, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 47.

131. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: CS 21 and NWC 2006, box 458, file: Conversations with the Country. This briefing is an early concept for the conversations.

132. Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, USN, to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, "[no subject]," e-mail, 25 January 2007. See also CNWS Deans' Papers, box 43, file 9: CNO New Marstrat "Conversations with the Country," Phoenix AZ, 2007.

133. Personal interview with Professor Karl Walling, 14 July 2011, cited in Elleman, "The Making," p. 51.

134. McGrath, "The Team Leader Speaks."

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Elleman, "The Making," pp. 52–53.

138. Rubel, "The Rest of the Story," pp. 76–77.

139. McGrath, "The Team Leader Speaks"; Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, USN, to Admiral John Nathman, USN, et al., "New Maritime Strategy Update #14," e-mail, 16 February 2007.

140. Rubel to Giblin, "Update of Sailors and Scholars," 8 January 2016.

141. "POM 10 Program Review," slide 23.

142. *CS21*.

143. Individuals in the Maritime Strategy Work Group: see Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 458, file: Maritime Strategy Working Group.

144. John B. Hattendorf, ed., with John W. Kennedy, *Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 17–19 October 2007* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009), p. 2.

145. Ibid.

146. This motivation was confirmed in Professor Peter Dutton, Director, China Maritime Studies Institute, to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update to John Hattendorf's Book-Sailors and Scholars," e-mail, 23 February 2016; and Professor Andrew S. Erickson to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "CMSI–Update to John Hattendorf's book—*Sailors and Scholars,*" e-mail, 29 February 2016.

147. Goldstein had previously approached Murray, then a nuclear submariner on active duty at NWC, in mid-2002 with a stack of Chinese naval journals that had a good deal of what appeared to Murray to be worthwhile information regarding People's Liberation Army Navy submarines. Goldstein suggested he could translate them into English and that Murray could then assess the relevance of the contents. As a result of their work, Dr. Jonathan Pollock invited them to present their analysis at the Naval War College's Asia-Pacific Forum, held in Newport on 6–7 February 2003. The work was well received and was subsequently published as Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Murray, "The Submarine Force in China's Future Maritime Strategy," in *Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), pp. 185–98. Associate Professor William S. Murray to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "CMSI-Update to John Hattendorf's Sailors and Scholars," e-mails, 28 February 2016 and 7 March 2016.

148. See Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161–96.

149. See, for example, the work of Robert G. Weinland, Michael K. McCGwire, and James M. McConnell, *Admiral Gorshkov on "Navies in War and Peace,"* CRC 257 (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1974). Weinland, McCGwire, and McConnell examined eleven articles authored by Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov, then commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, that were published in the journal *Morskoĭ Sbornik (Naval Digest)* in 1972 and 1973. Their analysis addressed such topics as the possibility of an internal debate over Soviet naval missions and budgets, their implications for the future course of Soviet naval force structure and levels, and their meaning for the use of Soviet naval forces in wartime and peacetime.

150. Initial faculty affiliates were Associate Professors Bruce Elleman and Christopher Yeaw, then of the Strategic Research Department; Professor Michael Chase, then of the Warfare Analysis and Research Department; Professor S. C. M. "Sally" Paine of the Strategy and Policy Department; Professor Paul Smith of the National Security Decision Making Department; Professor Kathleen Walsh of the National Security Decision Making Department; and Professor Toshi Yoshihara of the Strategy and Policy Department. Because of the requirements of their respective departmental chairs, Wilson and Murray did not migrate to a full-time status with CMSI. However, they remained affiliated with the new organization. "The China Maritime Studies Institute" (concept briefing slides, September 2008).

151. Ryan Martinson, Research Administrator, China Maritime Studies Institute, to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update of John Hattendorf's Book — Sailors and Scholars," e-mail, 25 February 2016. These volumes included Andrew S. Erickson et al., eds., *China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007); Gabriel B. Collins et al., eds., *China's Energy Strategy: The Impact on China's Maritime Policies* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Nan Li, eds., *China, the United States, and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010); and Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, eds., *Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2011).

152. See, for example, Peter Dutton, "International Law and the November 2004 *Han* Incident," *Asian Security* 2, no. 2 (2006), pp. 87–101; Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, "Beijing's Energy Security Strategy: The Significance of a Chinese State-Owned Tanker Fleet," *Orbis* 51, no. 4 (Fall 2007), pp. 665–84; Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Murray, "International Submarine Rescue: A Constructive Role for China?," *Asia Policy,* no. 5 (January 2008); Gabriel Collins and Lieutenant Commander Michael C. Grubb, USN, *A Comprehensive Survey of China's Dynamic Shipbuilding Industry: Commercial Development and Strategic Implications,* China Maritime Studies, no. 1 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, August 2008), available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/CMS1_Collins-Grubb.aspx; and Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, *Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy "Assassin's Mace" Capability,* China Maritime Studies, no. 3 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, June 2009), available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/CMS3_Mine-Warfare.aspx.

153. "Launched by the Secretary of Defense in 2008," the Minerva Research Initiative focuses on "areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy." The initiative's objective is "to improve [the Defense Department's] basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape the regions of the world of strategic importance to the U.S. The research program will:

"Leverage and focus the resources of the Nation's top universities.

"Seek to define and develop foundational knowledge about sources of present and future conflict with an eye toward better understanding of the political trajectories of key regions of the world.

"Improve the ability of [the Defense Department] to develop cutting-edge social science research, foreign area and interdisciplinary studies that is developed and vetted by the best scholars in these fields.

"The Minerva Initiative brings together universities, research institutions, and individual scholars and supports interdisciplinary and cross-institutional projects addressing specific topic areas determined by the Secretary of Defense." See "Program History," *The Minerva Research Initiative,* accessed 27 September 2017, http://minerva.defense.gov/Minerva/Program-History/; "Objectives," *The Minerva Research Initiative,* accessed 27 September 2017, http://minerva.defense.gov/Minerva/Objectives/.

154. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speech to Association of American Universities (Washington, D.C., 14 April 2008).

155. Stephen B. Luce, speech at the Naval War College (Newport, R.I., 2 June 1903), reprinted as "An Address Delivered at the United States Naval War College, Narragansett Bay, R.I., June 2, 1903," in *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce,* ed. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, Historical Monograph Series, no. 1 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1975), pp. 39–40.

156. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Challenge! A New Approach to a Professional Education at the Naval War College," and "Convocation Address," *Naval War College Review* 25, no. 2 (November–December 1972), pp. 1–10, quotation at p. 7; "Convocation Address" reprinted in *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 72–80, quotation at p. 79.


In Memory of
Naval War College
Students and Alumni
Who Gave Their Lives
While Serving the Nation
CAPT GERALD F. DECONTO, USN
LCDR ROBERT R. ELSETH, USNR
CAPT LAWRENCE D. GETZFRED, USN
Ms. ANGELA M. HOUTZ, DON
LCDR PATRICK J. MURPHY, USNR
LT JONAS M. PANIK, USNR
CAPT JACK D. PUNCHES, JR., USN (Ret.)
CDR ROBERT A. SCHLEGEL, USN
CDR DAN F. SHANOWER, USN
MAJ KIP P. TAYLOR, USA
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
September 11, 2001
CAPT JOHN D. YAMNICKY, SR., USN (Ret)



Ernest E. Evans Hall. The building is named for Commander Ernest E. Evans, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions in command of USS *Johnston* (DD 577) at the battle of Leyte Gulf on 25 October 1944, when he fought his ship until she was sunk by overwhelming Japanese forces. Born in Oklahoma in 1908, he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1931. Today, the building houses the College of Maritime Operational Warfare.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Chapter Twenty-Two

Supporting Combat Readiness

In the Navy's budget process between 2001 and 2004, the decision makers who made the allocations for personnel and finance to the College repeatedly asked the question, "What does the War College do to support combat readiness?" Initially, the College's executive leadership replied that it was improving current and future readiness through its professional military education programs and its research, analysis, and gaming activities, citing specific examples to support this contention.[1] The decision makers ignored such arguments and replied that the College had not clearly and convincingly demonstrated why it had not established a direct, measurable link to readiness and to operational effectiveness and, more importantly, why it was not investing more of its resources to modify existing programs or to create new ones that did so.

This line of budgetary reasoning weakened the College's position for gaining new funds and additional faculty and staff in the budget process. It also tended to confirm Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt's suspicion that there was an acute disconnect between the College and what the Chief of Naval Operations expected of the College. This disparity, at least in part, was the result of assessments made in Washington that the College's contribution to the Navy was declining. As a result, senior leaders in the Navy had not increased the College's financial resources. In 2003, the Naval Inspector General pointed to this issue when he noted that the Naval War College "is continually challenged to makeup program shortfalls due to its flat funding profile."[2]

Taken together, the implications of Rempt's and the Inspector General's conclusions were clear: less value in the eyes of the leadership meant fewer dollars and fewer students, faculty, and staff allocated to the College. There was some validity in their arguments. While Provost Jim Giblin was a member of the faculty, he and other members often traveled to the headquarters of the various combatant commanders as well as the fleet and numbered fleet commander headquarters from 1997 through 2002 as part of their faculty development responsibilities. Giblin knew many of these commanders personally and met with them during these visits. During one such visit, he watched as a senior naval officer struggled, although he was a graduate of the College of Naval Warfare, to organize and to lead an operational planning team to deal with a maritime planning problem. A senior Army officer, who was a graduate of the Army War College, relieved the naval officer to finish the task. Incidents such as this underscored a persistent message from fleet commanders. As one told Giblin, "I need War College graduates who are competent operational planners, who arrive in my headquarters ready to function on a crisis action team and an operational planning team[,] and I need them now, not in two or three years."[3]

Admiral Robert F. "Rat" Willard's article in 2002 on the erosion of the Navy's interest in and understanding of command and control raised the level of this discussion from that of individual naval officer

competence in operational planning to that of the perspective of a senior operational commander. His target audience was the Navy's uniformed leadership. He contended that the U.S. Navy had made a serious "mistake when [it] combined command and control with communications and computers to yield the C^4 acronym."[4] He went on to argue that the "acquisition of and training on command and control (C^2) tools—computers, radios, and software—became confused with the requirement for continuous training in the operational art of and methods for effective control of forces."[5] His deliberate use of the term "operational art" was telling in the context of his statement that the Navy had "lost sight of a fundamentally operational duty."[6] Willard told the leadership of the Navy that its commanders and staffs had lost their ability to apply creative imagination—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. The Navy "must rediscover the lost art of command and control," he declared.[7]

Admiral Robert F. Willard. Admiral Willard, an F-14 naval aviator, as a vice admiral was Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet in 2003–2004. Promoted to admiral, he served as Vice Chief of Naval Operations from March 2005 to April 2007 and then successively became Commander, Pacific Fleet, 2007–2009, and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, 2009–2012. *U.S. Navy Photograph*

Just over one year after Willard published this seminal article, another "signal in the air" was over Newport. This one specifically challenged the implementation of the doctrinal concept of a joint force maritime component commander. Although the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet had developed a concept that Admiral David E. Jeremiah had approved in 1989, its further doctrinal development had languished. For some time, the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command had been working on guidance to resolve this problem with the leaders of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Second Fleet, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. By mid-July 2003, the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command and the Commander, U.S. Second Fleet had drafted a tactical memorandum (TACMEMO) that described a joint force maritime component commander's staff organization and the processes it would use for planning and execution. The next steps were to convene a seminar from 14 to 18 July 2003 at the Naval War College, followed by a game design workshop from 21 to 24 July, in preparation for a war game at the College that would examine the concepts from 12 to 21 November 2003.[8]

The sponsors of this game wanted to exercise and to assess how a joint force maritime component commander's staff would use the processes described in the draft tactical memorandum to manage internal planning and executive activities. The sponsors also wanted to test the ability of staff to perform dynamic retasking and replanning within the context of current and future operations. It was also a crucial point for the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command and Commander, Second Fleet to determine

whether the draft tactical memorandum was sufficiently complete to enable the staff and the commander to interact horizontally with other functional component commanders and vertically with senior and subordinate commanders. Finally, the sponsors expected that the results of the game would provide the insight for the Navy Warfare Development Command to refine the tactical memorandum.[9] To accomplish these objectives, the College's War Gaming Department designed and executed a game that focused on dynamic replanning during campaign execution based on a maritime supporting plan developed using the scenarios for the 2002 exercise Millennium Challenge 02.[10]

The results of the game reinforced Willard's analysis. The participants concluded that "inadequate joint operational education and training for naval officers interfered with (and in some cases precluded) the ability to understand interaction requirements, and then to interact with other component CDRs [commanders] & [the commander, joint task force]." In short, naval officers could not exercise effective command and control. The game also documented the fact that the players' "lack of knowledge of joint doctrine and paucity of joint operational experience highlighted inconsistencies between joint doctrine and the JFMCC TACMEMO." The participants concluded, "The Navy's lack of emphasis on joint education and assignment adversely affected the JFMCC's ability to dynamically re-plan."[11]

The Overview in 2004

In August 2004, when Rear Admiral Shuford arrived at the College, he was fresh from his command of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* Strike Group. On his detachment from that assignment and en route to Newport, Shuford had discussions with other commanders and staff members within Third Fleet. In addition, he consulted with Willard, who was then in command of the Seventh Fleet and responsible to Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, as the naval component commander for the region's most challenging and complex operation plan. Shuford, through his experience and these discussions, was fully aware of the issues brewing on the subject of naval and joint command and control. He had discerned a growing consensus among the senior leadership, both within and outside the Navy, that suggested a significant number of naval officers lacked the education, training, and experience required to plan campaigns and command large-scale operations. Catalyzing a consensus about these issues and driving a plan to remedy the situation were the objectives that Shuford brought with him to add to the College's—and the Navy's—agenda. In this regard, he often privately remarked to the provost that the Navy "talked a good game [but] about the best we [could] do was to send a liaison officer to the JFACC [to] advise on the number of bombs we could hang on a Hornet."[12] Shuford fervently believed that the Navy "deserved more than a seat on the back row of the JFACC" and that the Navy "had to do more than 'talk' a good joint game" to get that "seat."[13] He also knew that the Chief of Naval Operations was concerned about the Navy's ability to create a standing joint task force (SJTF) and had directed the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command to ensure that "[continental United States]–based numbered Fleets have the capability and skills to function as employable SJTFs."[14]

Just before Shuford left command of the USS *Lincoln* Strike Group, Willard told him that the key to correcting this deficiency was in the "schoolhouses" and that "the College had the dot on its forehead" to do so.[15] He arrived in Newport with the conviction that "the time was ripe, and the Naval War College was the place with the genius and [capability] to do something about" the Navy returning to the operational level

of war.[16] Within his first month at the College Shuford began to hold a series of almost daily, intense sessions with a variety of faculty and staff on this subject. The fact that these continued, albeit at a reduced pace, even during the period immediately preceding and during the New England Association of Schools and Colleges' reaffirmation visit in September 2004 was a testimony to the level of importance that Shuford attached to this challenge.

Moreover, he believed that the Navy's senior leaders were beginning to regard this deficiency as a critical vulnerability, perhaps even a mission-limiting deficiency. Several of his flag officer cohorts—among them Rear Admirals James Stavridis, Samuel Locklear, and Douglas Crowder—shared his perspective. In Shuford's discussions with his flag colleagues and with the College faculty, he voiced his frustration with the fact that there seemed to be no clear doctrinal expression of the Navy's and Marine Corps' unique combat capabilities and task-organized, expeditionary platforms. There was already a doctrine developed for the joint component headquarters to use for ground and air operations, but the way that naval forces designed and applied force to use their mobility and ability to mission reconfigure or task organize on the fly did not translate easily into the doctrinal canons of the Army and Air Force.

Shuford concluded that the College was at a critical inflection point in its history. It could either continue on its present course and leave the solution to these challenges to someone else or take a leading role in tackling them. Shuford believed that he had a clear linkage to the Chief of Naval Operations as an echelon II–level commander and in the manner that he approached the challenge of the Navy's role within joint component headquarters. At the conclusion of one of the many meetings on this subject in October 2004, he remarked privately to the provost that if the President of the Naval War College "want[s] to be an Echelon II commander, [he has] got to act like an Echelon II commander."[17]

Shuford's approach followed this straightforward assertion of the College's status within the Navy's organizational structure and the College President's direct link to the Chief of Naval Operations. In doing this, Shuford focused on the College's teaching and use of the concept of the operational level of war. At the same time, he functioned effectively as an echelon II commander by stressing the importance of regaining naval competence at the operational level of war to the Chief of Naval Operations and to his colleagues as echelon II commanders.

The Campaign Plan

By the end of October 2004, an early consensus had begun to coalesce in Newport around the idea that the College could serve as the bedrock for developing a greater understanding of the Navy at the operational level of war. Moreover, there was agreement that joint operations started and were most prominent at the operational level and, therefore, the commander who controlled at this level ultimately influenced the requirements process and profoundly shaped the resource process. These two key insights convinced the College's executive leadership that the Naval War College needed to wage a purposeful campaign internally and externally to persuade the Navy of the importance of regaining its competence to exercise sufficient command and control at the operational level of warfare.[18]

A broad framework already existed that called for the College to conduct education, training, leadership, and assessment activities to support the ability of naval joint and combined force component commanders (CFMCCs) and Navy component commanders to function as operational commanders. In this, the College supported their needs for operational planning to respond to emerging operational requirements.[19] In many ways, Shuford considered that such activities were the very essence of the College's strategic tradition. He saw this as a return to the College's roots and to some of the things that had made the College great in the past. Indeed, Shuford's ideas seemed to coincide very closely with those of his predecessor Rear Admiral William S. Sims, USN, the sixteenth President of the Naval War College. At the conclusion of World War I, Sims stressed that the College should "concentrate on promoting a common methodology in the officer corps for dealing with the practical aspects of naval planning" and that by doing so the College would "supply commanders-in-chief and fleet staff officers competent to prepare and carry out such plans."[20]

First, Shuford directed that the College realign its efforts internally to support the Navy's operational commanders directly. Second, he charged the leadership of the College to take every opportunity to remind the senior leadership of the Navy that the operational level of war was part and parcel of the strategic tradition of the College. For that matter, Shuford argued that the College was the only organization within the Navy that focused on it routinely. Third, he considered it vital that the Naval War College bolster the Navy's capacity to lead at the operational level of war. Though somewhat roughly expressed, Shuford's desired effect of this campaign plan was to "get some Navy elbows back on the table" regarding command and control at the operational level.[21] To achieve this effect, he established two clear guiding principles:

1. Whatever the Naval War College did to accomplish these things, it had to accept the fact that it would be "flying this plane while it's building it."[22]

2. The speed of execution of any opportunity that furthered these goals was critical to success even if it meant making tough resource decisions that resulted in costs of opportunity to the College.

Shuford's choice to wage this campaign was a profound strategic decision that eventually resulted in one of the significant accomplishments of the College since the "Turner Revolution" of 1972–1974 and, some would argue, in the history of the institution.[23]

The Lines of Operations—JFMCC

Meeting with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, on 17 December 2004 to deliver his 120-day assessment of the College, Shuford stressed to Clark the importance of the College's focusing more on the operational level of war.[24] He argued forcefully that "our officers are not adequately prepared for joint ops and planning."[25] Less than one week later, on 23 December 2004, Commander Jeffrey A. Harley of the Office of the Assistant for Strategic Actions in the immediate office of the Chief of Naval Operations contacted the provost. Harley told him that Clark had heard Shuford's argument and planned to include some tasks related to the Navy Professional Military Education Continuum in his forthcoming *CNO Guidance for 2005*.[26] Harley then forwarded a draft of the *Guidance* to Giblin, telling him that Clark was still personally working on it, and invited the College to submit a set of recommendations for Clark's consideration.[27] There was a distinct sense in Newport that afternoon that the Chief of Naval Operations was looking to the College to help him develop a way forward on returning the Navy to its traditional level of excellence at the

operational level of war. Because these recommendations would subsequently become "taskings," the opportunity to influence the leadership's thinking on the operational level of war drew Shuford's immediate attention.

When the faculty and staff at the College read Clark's *CNO Guidance for 2005: Winning the Fight . . . and Bridging to the Future* in January 2005, they found that it contained a set of three specific tasks for the Naval War College directly related to the operational level of war. Their wording directly reflected the phraseology that Shuford had recommended that Clark use. Most importantly for the College, the Chief of Naval Operations tied these tasks to the section of his guidance that addressed future readiness. They included the requirement that the Naval War College "develop and evaluate a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander's (JFMCC) course for flag officers" by September 2005.[28] In addition, the *Guidance* directed that the College "double the capacity of the Naval Operational Planners Course (NOPC) to increase the number of qualified joint operational planners" by April 2005.[29] Admiral Clark also tasked the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, with the assistance of the President of the Naval War College, to "develop a plan to improve strategic and operational planning capability on Joint and Navy Staffs, afloat and ashore," by March 2005.[30]

Although the Chief of Naval Operations' task concerning the Naval Operational Planner Course had high priority, Shuford and Giblin recognized that the key task for the College to exert real influence on the Navy was through an emphasis on the operational level of war. The College's executive leadership had been considering ways to establish a joint force maritime component commanders' course since September 2004.[31]

They had deliberately inserted these tasks in the Naval War College's recommendations for the Chief of Naval Operations' *Guidance* to commit the Navy to a path to begin the return to the operational level of war and to tie these tasks directly to the Navy's future readiness. They understood that the Navy's input to operational plans, whether it be through the deliberate, crisis action, or adaptive planning process, required commanders to engage effectively with their staffs. The ability of the commanders and their staffs to articulate the results of that planning process was, therefore, the key to getting Navy assets used efficiently and effectively from the beginning of any operation. The commander could not do this without an understanding of the operational level of war and without having a group of skilled operational planners. If the commander and the staff did not use the specialized language of joint operations and understand how to plan, task, execute, and assess at the operational level of war, the Navy could not be effective in joint operations with the other armed services. If successful, Shuford and Giblin believed that the Naval War College's response to Clark's task for the College to initiate a joint force maritime component commander course created the opportunity to get the one- and two-star operational commanders involved with the path creating proficiency at the operational level of war. Indirectly, this also highlighted to these flag officers the importance of having skilled operational planners. Shuford recognized that Willard, with whom he had discussed the urgency of "rediscovering" operational-level C2 while he was at Seventh Fleet and again at the Joint Staff, would assume the duties of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in March 2005. Willard's presence in this position created leverage for the College to move forward, not only on the joint force maritime component commanders' course, but also on focusing the leaders of the Navy on the broader subject of regaining the Navy's appropriate position within the operational level of war.

Starting almost from scratch, the College had to execute quickly to meet the Chief of Naval Operations' target date of September 2005. With no funds programmed for current year execution, Giblin asserted, as a matter of record, that the joint force maritime component commanders' course was part of the College's mission, functions, and tasks. As such, the College would use mission funding to execute the first course and predictably the following four courses until it could program the resources needed to sustain the program in fiscal year 2008 and beyond. Despite the absence of formal tasking and programmed funds, in November 2004 Shuford and Giblin had directed Captain David Duffie and Colonel Richard "Sleeps" Findlay, USMC, both of the Joint Military Operations Department, to take charge of the detailed planning for and execution of a joint force maritime component commander course. These two senior, experienced officers were dispatched to interview and gain the perspectives of the numbered fleet commanders and to solidify their support for this initiative.

By the end of February and within six weeks after the College had received the Chief of Naval Operations' *Guidance* for 2005, Findlay and Duffie had completed their mission, traveling to Yokosuka, Japan, to meet with Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, to discuss the way ahead for the first course from a numbered fleet commander's perspective, and then to San Diego to meet with Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, Vice Admiral Michael J. McCabe, for the same purpose.[32]

In February 2005, Shuford hosted the Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral David C. Nichols, Jr., in Newport to discuss similar matters. Nichols strongly supported the effort to create a joint force maritime component commanders' course and pushed the College to move out just as quickly on the Chief of Naval Operations' directive to increase the number of students in the naval operational planners' course. Nichols expressed strong views on the Navy's level of competence at the operational level of war.[33] In this regard, Nichols bluntly told Shuford,

> By the time I get an officer in here who figures out what he needs to be doing, he's got his next set of orders. There is 1) no codified processes, no standardized backplane, structure or outfitting to make this staff truly an operational level one; and, 2) there was no pipeline to prepare these folks for what they would be required to do. It was quintessential Naval expeditionary: a pick-up game . . . and it took about 9 months to figure out the rules.[34]

The timing of Admiral Clark's task concerning the joint force maritime component commanders' course and the College's immediate response could not have been more opportune. In July 2004, Commander, Fleet Forces Command had assigned responsibility to Commander, Second Fleet to develop the organization and doctrine to make the concept for a joint force maritime component commander course a reality. The Navy Warfare Development Command issued a revised tactical memorandum in June 2004 on the subject of a joint force maritime component commanders' course, basing the revision on the results of the College's war game of November 2003.[35] The Third Fleet provided the first test of the concept in Exercise Blue Flag 05-1/Joint Task Force Exercise 05-02 in January 2005. Although this exercise was a step in the right direction, McCabe reported to Admiral Walt Doran, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Bill "Fox" Fallon, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, that "the JFMCC concept is immature . . . as compared to other Services . . . [and] as demonstrated in exercises and real-world events."[36] He went on to highlight, much in the same manner as the College's Joint Force Maritime Component Commander War

Game did, the critical importance of the staff in this regard and asserted that "Navy staffs are generally not manned, organized, trained or equipped for this purpose."[37] McCabe's point was that "Navy staffs are not prepared to plan and execute at the operational level in a joint environment."[38]

Stars to Steer By: Laying the Track

Shuford had begun the work of establishing the objectives for the course as early as October 2004. By the end of 2004, he had coordinated several meetings with Willard, then serving as director of resources on the Joint Staff, and Lieutenant General James Mattis, Commander, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in Quantico, Virginia. Both of these three-star leaders had been at the forefront of major, joint-force operations and had written extensively and argued persuasively regarding the need to evolve the unique processes and structures necessary to leverage the significant capabilities of expeditionary, naval forces. Shuford's first meeting with Willard took place at the Pentagon and produced eight pages of detailed notes as the basis for ideas that evolved over the following months of discussions with these two mentors. Working closely with Willard and Mattis during the period from early March to mid-June 2005, Shuford effectively used these notes and these strategic conversations in an intense effort to shape his commander's guidance for the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course.[39] Shuford personally drafted the final version of the "Guiding Principles for Course Design," which made it clear that the intent of both the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Courses was to do the following:[40]

> Prepare future 3-star officers to serve effectively as Maritime Component CDRs.
>
> Develop perspectives necessary for FO/GOs [flag officers/general officers] to gain a high degree of confidence with concepts, systems, language and processes req[uired] to effectively employ naval forces in a joint, interagency and multinational environment.
>
> Address the practical challenges confronting the CDR at the operational level of war in the maritime domain.
>
> Serve as both a foundation & a catalyst for Navy cultural adjustments to accelerate the evolution of JFMCC concepts & capabilities.
>
> Improve the ability of graduates to articulate the role of the Maritime Component in the design of a campaign plan to achieve the effects desired by the [joint force commander].

Shuford's guidance also specified that these courses were to be the "senior executive component of the Navy's PME continuum."[41] As such, he expected them to "be a world-class educational experience—equal to or better than contemporary courses in other services or countries."[42] He directed that the course content was to "be built around the presumption that JFMCC operations will be conducted in a Joint/Coalition/Inter-agency environment" and that the course was to emphasize that "maritime plans are not built in isolation from operational and strategic levels."[43] Finally, he directed the faculty to involve "senior naval operational leadership in course design and execution."[44]

As Findlay and Duffie were to learn, there was a substantial effort involved in executing Shuford's guidance and establishing the complex course cycle it envisioned. Early on, Shuford, Giblin, Findlay, and Duffie

The Participants in the First Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course, 2005.

The group included Rear Admiral Donald K. Bullard; Rear Admiral John J. Donnelly; Brigadier General Jon Gallinetti; Rear Admiral Richard W. Hunt; Rear Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, Jr.; Rear Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III; Rear Admiral Carl V. Mauney; Rear Admiral (Sel.) John W. Miller; Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller; Rear Admiral Robert B. Murrett; Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford; and Rear Admiral Patrick M. Walsh.

Naval War College Museum Collection

also recognized the need to arrange for a small group of retired three- and four-star flag and general officers with significant operational-level experience to serve as senior mentors for the joint force maritime component commanders' course. Shuford expected that they would leverage the talent of the flag officers attending the course to expand and to enrich their knowledge of the complexities of planning for and exercising command and control of major maritime operations. After discussions with Willard and Fallon, Shuford invited the following officers to be mentors for the course participants: Admiral Gregory G. "Grog" Johnson; Vice Admiral David E. "Frosty" Frost; Vice Admiral Lyle G. "Ho Chi" Bien; and Lieutenant General Emil R. Bedard, USMC (Ret.). They would provide the insight and advice on handling the future challenges that the flag officers attending the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course would face in commanding at the theater and operational levels in conjunction with other functional component commanders.[45]

Although Duffie retired before the course convened, he and Findlay successfully coordinated all these actions along with the support coordinator, Lieutenant Commander Sean Carroll, who was invaluable in tending to the myriad of details associated with these first and subsequent courses.[46] Once Shuford had advised Willard that the College was ready to take action, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations announced in an "all flag officer" e-mail that the first course would convene in Newport at the College from 21 to 27 August 2005.[47] Willard's e-mail reflected the fundamental tenets of the joint force maritime component commanders' course that he had helped build. He made it clear that this was a practitioner's course intended to achieve the objectives that Shuford had established.[48] The vice chief's implementing directive emphasized that "real-world operational level challenges would be used as the basis for discussions and study . . ." and that the flag officers attending the course could expect to "consider existing JFMCC concepts and doctrine and command and control processes and applications."[49] The course convened as planned with eleven flag officers and one Marine Corps general officer in attendance.[50]

In general, these officers considered the course an unqualified success. Captain Thomas Bayley, who had taken over for Duffie to serve as the course's co-director with Findlay, reviewed their detailed comments and prepared an assessment of the course for Shuford. The attendees noted that one of the highlights was the perspective of the relationship that the joint force maritime component commander has with the commander of the joint task force or the joint force. In particular, this emerged from the sessions with Admiral

Timothy J. Keating, Commander, U.S. Northern Command; Admiral Gary Roughead, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; and General Gary E. Luck, U.S. Army (Ret.), formerly Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Korea), Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces, Korea.[51] The flag officers strongly recommended that the Navy's senior leadership endorse the course concept by making it a program of record and assigning it a resource sponsor to give the concept visibility and to move it forward. In this regard, they applauded the action of Commander, Fleet Forces Command and Commander, Second Fleet in focusing on the joint force maritime component commander and stressed the importance that their effort become actively involved in the determination of doctrine and organization. They emphasized that it was essential to develop an educational, training, and assessment process and structure for this purpose and that the President, Naval War College was in the best position to do so. Finally, they affirmed the value of senior mentors and recommended that the Navy establish a "Navy Senior Mentor Program" under the management control of the Naval War College.[52]

The College continued the program with a second course held in Newport, from 7 to 13 May 2006.[53] Shuford's intent for this course was to expand the scope from a focus on planning to address execution and assessment as well. Twelve Navy flag officers, one Marine general officer, one Coast Guard flag officer, and two Air Force general officers attended.[54] Johnson and Frost served as the senior mentors. The recent experiences of Rear Admirals Doug Crowder and Mike LeFever as joint task force commanders brought currency and diverse views of the challenges of command and control in large-scale humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations into the classroom.[55] In addition to all the numbered fleet commanders, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Willard and four combatant commanders participated: Admirals William J. "Fox" Fallon, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; Thomas Keating, Commander, U.S. Northern Command; John Nathman, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; and Gary Roughead, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander, Joint Task Force Five Hundred Nineteen. Each introduced and guided discussions for various segments of the course. The establishment of these two courses and the performance of the first two sets of senior leader mentors established the College's standard for the course curriculum. The sequence of discussions, linked with current perspectives from serving combatant commanders, provided both relevance and depth. The ability of the College to bring these officers together in a practitioner-based course produced extraordinary insight and perspective on command and control of maritime forces and generated wide-ranging and significant discussion among the attendees.

One of the recommendations that emerged from the flag officers attending the first course was a compelling need for the Naval War College to implement a combined or coalition force maritime component commander course. The officers in the second course later affirmed this need.[56] Although the consensus was that the Navy's joint force commanders course concept needed to mature before initiating a combined force commanders course, Shuford acted on the recommendation and decided to begin to develop such a course.[57] Once again, Giblin determined as a matter of record that the financial expenditure was consistent with the College's mission, functions, and tasks. Shuford viewed the new course as a response to the national policy directive to build partnership capacity in the maritime domain regarding specific support for maritime security cooperation and theater security cooperation initiatives.[58] Moreover, he sensed that such an initiative would help to develop a network of leaders, increase trust and confidence within the various regions, and

mitigate barriers to coalition command and control. The task to organize the course fell to Findlay, Bayley, and Carroll, working under Giblin's oversight.

Prompted by his conversations with Vice Admiral David Nichols, Shuford talked in August 2005 with Nichols's relief as Commander, Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Patrick "Sponge" Walsh, a graduate of the first Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course. After further discussion with Admiral Willard, Shuford decided that the College would host the initial Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course in Newport to focus on the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. Working with Walsh and his staff to develop the concept and details, Shuford, Findlay, Bayley, and Carroll concluded that the College could be ready to execute the new course between 10 and 15 September 2006 in Newport.[59] Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, the former chief of the German Naval Staff, joined American Admirals Gregory Johnson and David Frost as well as Marine Corps Lieutenant General Emil Bedard to serve as senior mentors for the course.[60] Along with Findlay, Bayley, and Carroll, Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (Ret.), chairman of the College's War Gaming Department, played a critical role in developing and presenting case studies for the attendees to analyze and discuss.

Thirteen international officers from the coalition countries involved in the Central Command theater of operations attended this course—with the majority of representation coming from countries at the top of Walsh's Theater Security Cooperation Plan.[61] As the first course discussions began, it became apparent that the mix of participants would benefit from extraordinary perspectives that spurred frank and informed exchanges. Rear Admiral Shahid Iqbal, Pakistan Navy, a former Commander, Joint Task Force One Hundred Fifty, candidly discussed his experience of being the commander of a coalition maritime force as a non-U.S. commander. Admiral Mike Mullen, the new Chief of Naval Operations, met with the class on the morning of 15 September 2006, emphasizing the U.S. Navy's support for the course from "the top." U.S. Army General John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command, discussed the regional perspective of the U.S. combatant commander, focusing on the importance of making the coalition functional. Abizaid highlighted critical impediments to coalition operational effectiveness. Admiral Keating, commander of the U.S. Northern Command, returned to the College to address the flag and general officers.[62] Comments and written feedback from the students and the senior officer seminar leaders, whom Shuford referred to as "Senior Fellows," suggested that the course had exceeded both Shuford's expectations concerning the coalition force maritime component commander course concept and Walsh's concerning his theater security cooperation objectives. The international officers—all experienced operators with obvious potential to contribute in the future—were crucial to this outcome. Their enthusiasm and energy ignited this first course as these extraordinarily talented officers laid claim to the most vigorous discussions of the course.[63]

On the heels of this success, Roughead set his headquarters in Hawaii as the venue for the College's second Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course, from 19 to 24 February 2007. Air Force General Paul Hester, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces; Marine Lieutenant General John Goodman, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; and Coast Guard Vice Admiral Charlie Wurster, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area, joined Mullen, Fallon, Roughead, and Willard to address the twenty-three flag and general officers from the Pacific area. Also, Singapore's chief of navy, Rear Admiral Ronnie Tay, traveled to Hawaii to address the course. He spoke on the "allied perspective on CFMCC." Admiral Tom Fargo,

USN (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy (Ret.), former chief of the naval staff of the Indian Navy and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and graduate of NWC's Naval Command College, joined Johnson and Bedard as Senior Fellows for the course.[64]

The College continued with its execution of the Chief of Naval Operations' task concerning the joint force maritime component commanders' flag course and its derivative, the combined or coalition force maritime component commander course. By the end of 2008, the College had developed and presented a total of nine joint force and coalition force courses with 123 U.S. flag and general officer graduates and 49 international flag and general officer graduates.[65] The College accomplished this, for the most part, by using its fixed budget until the requested funds for sustaining these courses became available through Program Objective Memorandum 08.

The Lines of Operations—Naval Operational Planner Course and "the Short Course"

In July 2003, the director of the Navy Operations Group/Deep Blue, Rear Admiral Douglas Crowder, conducted a detailed study of the state of operational planners in the Navy.[66] The participants in the Deep Blue study began their work with the Center for Naval Analyses' 1993 study that contended that the Navy had not been well prepared for planning in the joint operational arena during Operation DESERT STORM.[67] That study concluded that the few Strike Planning Team members present had limited experience in joint planning, were relatively junior, and had minimal experience with Army and Air Force warfighting doctrine. The result of these shortfalls was the inability of the Navy planners to articulate the Navy's requirements and capabilities. They could not efficiently insert them into the planning cycle for air tasking orders. This mismatch in timing often resulted in inefficient use of naval aviation and an inability to support attacks on maritime targets.[68]

Things had not improved by the end of the first phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. In a post-operation assessment, the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command concluded that "staff members [engaged] in operational planning [duties] had limited education or experience" with equally "limited exposure to deliberate planning terminology and methodology."[69] The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command also noted that the tempo of the deliberate planning process made on-the-job training "feasible but with a negative impact in a crisis action planning scenario," with the effect that the "planning cycle [became] a training cycle."[70] Finally, this assessment found that there was no process available to match specific skills, such as those of an operational planner, to particular billet requirements.[71] The Deep Blue briefer highlighted the conclusion that "the effort and time put into education by other services pays off in execution—Army, Air Force, and USMC are well positioned to utilize the Navy as a force provider. The same cannot be said about the Navy." He then asked the rhetorical, but probing, question: "Can you picture the Navy trying to coordinate JOINT Global Strike in support of naval objectives in a China/Taiwan scenario?" Rear Admiral Crowder's conclusion in this study was that "if you can't talk the lingo and use the working tools, you can't efficiently get Navy assets and capabilities optimized. . . . Joint operations mean joint planning and without education and training, we aren't optimizing our efforts."[72]

As a result of Crowder's analysis, in December 2003 Vice Admiral Kevin Green, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, assumed sponsorship of the Naval Operational Planner Course

and the family of additional qualification designators for operational planners.[73] Green also initiated a review of existing billets on Navy, joint, and combined staffs to determine the billets to identify with the appropriate Operational Planner qualification designator that these specially educated officers would fill. The Naval War College recommended that the Navy establish a set of three of these designators for officers who had completed the appropriate education or who had demonstrated competence as operational planners.[74] Vice Admiral Green also called for a renewed involvement of the assignment and distribution staff at the Navy Personnel Command (in Millington, Tennessee), to screen applicants and track the assignments and the careers of personnel with these codes.[75] Green also requested that the Navy's various component commanders, the numbered fleet commanders, and the commanders of U.S. Naval Forces, Japan and U.S. Naval Forces, Korea examine their billets for lieutenant commanders and commanders and recommend those that should require a qualified planner. For those that needed educated and experienced planners, he requested that the personnel system recode them as such by 16 January 2004.[76]

This praiseworthy initiative did not achieve its desired effect. Although the reasons for this are unclear, it is certain that the follow-on assignments of the graduates of the College's Naval Operational Planner Course remained inconsistent. However, the Navy's component commanders and numbered fleet commanders continued to reiterate the need for joint operational planners. From January to October 2004, naval component commanders at Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands and numbered fleet commanders besieged the College with questions, wanting to know, "Where are the NOPC guys?"

Course director Captain Michael Critz and his deputy, Professor Paul Romanski, reported to the provost that these commanders had turned to the College for an answer because the staff at the Navy Personnel Command did not know, as they were not tracking these officers or their assignments.[77] The Naval Operational Planner Course had produced forty-two Navy graduates since its founding in 1998.[78] The College learned that as of 30 September 2004 there were only five billets coded for qualified operational planners on Navy, joint, and coalition staffs.[79] Critz and Romanski reported that their informal coordination with their counterparts in the fleet had identified fifty-one lieutenant commander and commander billets for qualified planners. Additionally, liaison with the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders' staffs had informally identified an additional twenty-eight lieutenant commander and commander billets that they desired to fill with qualified planners. Critz and Romanski pointed out that they were still awaiting responses from the staffs at four of the combatant commands. The situation only added impetus to insert the expansion of the Naval Operational Planner Course into the College's recommendations for the Chief of Naval Operations *Guidance* for 2005. In effect, this tied the Naval Operational Planner Course directly to the Navy's future readiness, as was the case with the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course. The increased appreciation for these Naval War College initiatives across the fleet drove a closer look at the business processes and priorities supporting assignment, distribution, and tracking of the scarce and vital expertise represented by naval planners.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was concerned about "the Department of Defense's ability to make Joint Task Force Headquarters immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, information, and maritime capabilities."[80] The challenge at hand was the fact that services had experienced problems in sourcing and training the right personnel for the joint task force headquarters. On

4 February 2005, Rumsfeld directed a set of actions to accelerate the Department of Defense's ability to "develop a common tracking mechanism to identify Active and Reserve Personnel with JTF HQs experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals."[81] He also directed Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command to "develop joint staffing documents, training programs and readiness standards for [joint task force headquarters]."[82]

The College responded quickly to the Chief of Naval Operations' task to double the capacity of the Naval Operational Planner Course. As was the case with the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course, Giblin determined, as a matter of record, that this task was within the scope of the Naval War College's mission, functions, and tasks. Therefore, the use of mission resources to expand the program was appropriate. The half-million-dollar decision to expand and support this course and its supporting infrastructure from the existing budget was painful. Nevertheless, the decision demonstrated that the College was listening closely to the Chief of Naval Operations and his senior operational leadership and was serious about leading the Navy's return to the operational level of war.[83]

Under Professor Romanski's leadership, the College upgraded the facility that the Naval Operational Planner Course used to a full sensitive compartmented information facility including several special communications capabilities. This initiative enabled twice the previous number of Naval Operational Planner Course students to conduct extremely sensitive, joint operational planning work. On completion of this improvement, the enhanced facilities enabled the students to work in direct support of Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet; Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Ten candidates from officers ordered to the College of Naval Command and Staff were selected for the initial expanded course, convening in March 2005.[84] By December 2005, the College had worked together with the combatant and fleet commanders to determine that there was a need to recode 125 Navy billets for qualified operational planners. But this was still not enough. Even if the Navy put its entire inventory of Naval Operational Planner Course graduates where they belonged, the Navy was still critically short of the planning talent and skills needed to run its operational headquarters. By September 2006, the College had increased its production of qualified naval, joint operational planners to seventy-six. It was in a position to graduate twenty-two naval officers plus eight officers from other services as qualified joint planners each September by the end of fiscal year 2007. Even this production remained short of the need.

Given the Navy's record in tracking and assigning Naval Operational Planner Course students, Shuford believed that it was essential to define the roles and responsibilities of those organizations that dealt with the selection of officers to attend this course. These responsibilities included the need to identify and track the student's education and assignment as well as the management of the "Joint Planner" additional qualification designator. Starting in October 2005, Shuford discussed this need with Vice Admiral John Morgan and Rear Admiral Dan Holloway at some length. The three agreed that the entire process for developing and tracking this specific skill set as an additional qualification designator required an overhaul. Working over several months, Morgan's staff in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Holloway's team at the Navy Personnel Command, and the College drafted a memorandum of understanding that recognized the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) sponsorship of the Operational Planner qualification designator.[85] Signed by Morgan, Shuford, and Holloway on 12 April 2006,

the memorandum established an improved process for ensuring program visibility, administration, and accounting. It developed a set of business rules for the placement of Naval Operational Planner Course graduates in ways that best met the Navy's needs for operational planners.[86]

While the memorandum of understanding laid the basis for future management, the need at the various fleet headquarters for educated planners was an immediate one. In late July 2006, Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, Deputy Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, asked Shuford whether the College could conduct a series of short courses to help prepare lieutenants and lieutenant commanders who were not War College graduates to augment a standing joint task force staff as operational planners. Although there were other pending requirements, the immediate challenge for Cosgriff was to provide qualified officers to serve on the staff of the Commander, Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. Within a week of the conversation between Shuford and Cosgriff, Findlay, Bayley, Romanski, and Captain Jody "Jeffro" Richardson (Critz's relief as the director of the Naval Operational Planner Course under Giblin's leadership) had conducted an abbreviated mission analysis of Cosgriff's intent. The team concluded that Cosgriff's desired outcome was an officer who, though not a graduate of either the Naval Operational Planner Course or of the College of Naval Command and Staff, was prepared to function effectively as a member of an operational planning team but not able to initiate or to lead one. From this analysis, the College's leaders concluded that the desired outcome was to have officers who

- are familiar with a joint staff organization at the "know" and "comprehend" level;
- understand how an Operational Planning Team functioned at the "comprehend" and "value" level to include a fundamental grounding in Joint Doctrine;
- appreciate operational art concepts and terminology at the "value" level;
- are versed in Navy and other Service capabilities; and,
- understand the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) process at a low level of "application."[87]

Cosgriff agreed. Shuford advised him that the College could meet his requirement and identified several courses of action to do so at Newport or elsewhere. The course of action that was the most suitable and feasible was that the Naval War College execute a three-week "Short Course for O-Planners." This course would be in Newport under the supervision of the director of the Naval Operational Planner Course, using off-the-shelf curriculum within one month after the Commander, Fleet Forces Command formally stated the requirement. Giblin arranged for former director of the Naval Operational Planner Course Captain Mike Critz, now retired, to return to the College to teach and administer the short course along with Romanski, and other faculty members on a temporary basis. The College estimated that it could offer three such courses per year for about $50,000. Shuford made it clear that this course of action would require the Commander, Fleet Forces Command to fund the cost of the course.[88] Shuford recommended this course of action because it provided the desired outcomes at the right level of training and education. It included a substantial practical planning exercise and service on an existing joint task force staff. The fact that the Naval War College could execute this course using existing curriculum materials in close concert with and under the leadership of the Naval Operational Planner Course program was a significant factor.[89] The pace

for approval of this effort was fast. Cosgriff approved the plan and provided the funds in September 2006, enabling the Naval War College to teach short courses in November 2006, January 2007, March 2007, and July 2007. For these courses, the College used classroom space at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command in Newport. Captain Critz, Captain Brent Griffin, Commander Dario Teicher, and Lieutenant Colonel John Mangold, USMC, taught these courses. By the time the College had offered its last "Short Course for O-Planners," it had produced fifty-five graduates who served capably as operational planners on the staffs of Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa; Fleet Forces Command; Second Fleet; Fifth Fleet; Expeditionary Strike Group Two; and Amphibious Group Three.[90]

The Maritime Operations Center

While the College was responding to the Navy's immediate need for qualified operational planners, the Navy's senior leaders also acknowledged that the Navy had a limited ability to exercise command and control in dynamic, operational environments. In addition to pointing to the need for qualified planners, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's directive in February 2005 also had accelerated initiatives to improve the Department of Defense's ability to command and control an integrated force.

The challenge at hand was the fact that all services had experienced some degree of difficulty in finding and training the right people to serve in joint task force headquarters. Rumsfeld's directive required the services to establish and to refine their abilities to conduct, coordinate, and integrate operations, both vertically and horizontally, across a wide range of activities. It was in this context that the concept for "maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers" emerged as a solution to the problem. The idea became the vehicle to achieve what the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations wanted in order to enable the exercise of command and control in the maritime operational domain.

The concept had evolved from lessons learned during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The key lesson learned was that the U.S. Navy typically served in a force-provider role. Although the Navy had a maritime counterpart to the combined air operations center, it lacked the doctrine as well as the standardized staff organization, functions, and process that made the combined air operations center effective. In 2002, the U.S. Second Fleet had first used the idea of the maritime operations center during Fleet Battle Experiment Juliet during Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 02, basing its use of it on a draft tactical memorandum. Fleet Battle Experiment Kilo and the resulting tactical memorandum further developed the concept during the following year. In subsequent years, six fleets—Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and the Pacific Fleet—each developed maritime operations centers. In this broader effort across the Navy, the Naval War College played a role that helped significantly modify and standardize the organization of each of the fleet headquarters and develop processes to enable a designated naval operational-level command to transition rapidly to a joint task force headquarters, a functional component headquarters, or a single-service-based task force headquarters when activated.

On 20 September 2005, the George W. Bush Administration issued *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*.[91] The emphasis throughout this document is the global nature of the maritime domain. It stresses the importance of "a high degree of interoperability, reinforced by joint, interagency, international training and exercises to ensure a high rate of readiness, and supported by compatible communications and, where

Admiral John B. Nathman Speaking to the Joint Force Component Commander Course. A naval aviator, Nathman served as Vice Chief of Naval Operations from August 2004 to February 2005, then became Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command on 18 February 2005, a position he held until 17 May 2007.
Naval War College Museum Collection

appropriate, common doctrine and equipment."[92] One of its supporting plans, *The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness,* requires the Department of Defense to "integrate the [Global Maritime Community of Interest] with the network of national level maritime command centers through shared situational awareness to ensure coordinated response efforts consistent with the threat identified and desired national outcome."[93] Shortly after the promulgation of *The National Strategy for Maritime Security,* Clark issued his guidance on it as well as on his expectations for *The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness*. He directed Admiral John Nathman, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, to develop a concept of operations for a global network of Navy component commanders and joint force maritime component commanders to operate more collaboratively in support of maritime domain awareness.[94] Nathman envisioned a global network of maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers that would form the backbone for the Navy's contribution to *The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness* and be the vehicle to strengthen the Navy's capabilities at the operational level of war.[95] Nathman directed Commander, Second Fleet to task the Operational Advisory Group, formed in January 2005 to organize and develop the effort to establish joint force maritime component commanders, to shift its focus to the new initiative. The Operational Advisory Group had examined issues surrounding joint force maritime component commanders using the structure provided by the so-called DOTMLPF process for identifying capability gaps. This process considers the seven elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. The Operational Advisory Group decided to continue to use this process for development of the initiative for creating maritime headquarters (MHQs) with maritime operations centers (MOCs).[96] This process focused on enhancing the Navy's ability to function at the operational level of war and to provide commanders commanding at that level with competent staffs to support them. The College was positioned to assist with the broad aspects of the initiative for creating maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers. The College would be responsible for the doctrine, training, and leadership and education aspects. Findlay and Bayley were the Naval War College's representatives to the Operational Advisory Group, in particular,

and to the maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers process, in general. Because of their substantive expertise, they, in fact, led the Operational Advisory Group on the path to return the Navy to the operational level of war.

New Lines of Operations

The College was well ahead of several initiatives under consideration by the Operational Advisory Group and was able to guide development in those areas. These were the Naval War College's flag officer–level Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Courses, the nascent Senior Mentor Program, and the planned changes to the Naval Operational Planner Course.[97] Within the Operational Advisory Group, there was unanimous agreement that there was a need for a course to prepare officers and enlisted personnel for assignments to the maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers. The College had already been working on the development of such a course since mid-2005. Findlay and Bayley had made it clear to the Operational Advisory Group that the graduate of such a course would have neither the Naval Operational Planner Course graduate's expertise nor the Naval Command and Staff College graduate's grasp of the joint and interagency environment. Instead, the College defined its development of such a course on the desired outcome. The course needed to produce graduates who had a firm understanding of joint and service doctrine, concepts, organizations, functions, and roles as well as the responsibilities of the joint and maritime operations center staff. Additionally, they needed to be immediately and efficiently able to participate in the planning process that supported the commander's decision cycle in joint, coalition, and multinational operations within the various sections of the headquarters staff.

Working with a small group of faculty and two contractors, Findlay and Bayley reported to Shuford and the provost that the College would be prepared to conduct an initial trial course in August 2007. Immediately after the completion of this course, the War College hired the core faculty members for the Maritime Staff Operators Course. They included Captain Jeff Fullerton, USN (Ret.), Captain Jim Harrington, USN (Ret.), Lieutenant Colonel John Mangold, USMC (Ret.), Captain Robert McCabe, USN (Ret.), and Captain Jim Murray, USN (Ret.). Findlay and Bayley reported to Shuford and the provost that the College would be prepared to conduct a revised pilot course from 13 November 2007 to 14 December 2007. For the five-week-long course, the students immersed themselves in a simulated operational-level battle rhythm of a headquarters staff in the dynamic execution of its functions. The Maritime Staff Operators Course—or MSOC, as it became known—provided a level of competency in operational planning that most commanders agreed would have taken a minimum of nine months of on-the-job training to achieve. This efficiency in time was a significant return on investment for the Navy. As Shuford had warned, this group was "flying this plane while [it was] building it." The Operational Advisory Group had initially envisaged that the course would begin in fiscal year 2009, but the College was able to introduce it a full year ahead of schedule. With an unambiguous demand signal from the fleet, the College readily agreed to use its existing funding to start the course development with some financial support from the staff of Fleet Forces Command during fiscal years 2006 and 2007.[98] The provost arranged for the commanding officer of the Surface Warfare Officers School to transfer Evans Hall to the Naval War College. Commander Beth Leinberry, the

College's director of facilities, worked closely with Findlay, Bayley, and their faculty team to plan and execute the modifications required to make Evans Hall suitable for the course to use.

With a building, faculty, and curriculum dedicated to the course, the College planned that the Maritime Staff Operators Course would produce 250 graduates in ten class offerings in fiscal year 2008. The course was expected to grow to 400 graduates in eighteen class offerings in fiscal year 2009 and achieve a steady rate of 700 graduates in twenty-eight class offerings per year in the program objective memorandum for 2010.[99] In its first two years of operation, the Maritime Staff Operators Course produced 181 graduates in fiscal year 2008 and 352 graduates in fiscal year 2009.[100] Validating the College's initiative, Vice Admiral John Bird, Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, remarked that

> with the intense pace of the Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF), there is no time to learn the basics. I need staff officers to walk across the brow already understanding the complexities of maritime staff operations and how to best employ the functions and capabilities of the Maritime Operations Center. The FDNF demands sharp officers at the helm, and MSOC provides the whetstone.[101]

Vice Admiral William Douglas Crowder, Bird's predecessor as Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, noted to Shuford, "Finally! This is wonderful! I need every officer headed to my staff to attend!"[102] Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly, deputy commander of Fleet Forces Command, commented that "without a doubt MSOC has proven its value to date, and will remain an essential part of continuing to mature the Navy's [operational level of war] capability."[103] The Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet saw the Maritime Staff Operators Course as a crucial contribution to the Fifth Fleet, owing to tour lengths in Bahrain being only twelve months in duration at that time. The constant planning tempo on the staffs of Fifth and Seventh Fleets quickly matured through the skills that the graduates of the Maritime Staff Operators Course had acquired in Newport. At the fleet headquarters with lower operational tempo, skills learned in the Maritime Staff Operators Course were ready when an exercise or operations caused staff to transition from being a fleet staff to becoming staff for a joint force maritime component commander.

In early 2005, the Naval War College began planning the establishment of an assist and assess team. The purpose of this team was to support fleet operational commanders and share lessons learned and effective practices. This College initiative proved to be fortuitous, because the Secretary of Defense soon established the requirement that combatant commanders certify their joint task force headquarters and subordinate functional component commands. Giblin had many years of experience in linking strategy to specific program capabilities and then successfully maneuvering these programs through the complex and competing agendas that characterized the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Navy's budget processes. His experience provided the College with a decided advantage in arguing for the fiscal and human resources required to implement this program. With the assistance of Bayley; Findlay; Commander Don "Bull" Bosch, USNR; and the College's successive comptrollers, Commander Melinda Matheny and Mr. Steve Smith, the College once again managed to "lead turn" the workforce requirement. The College emerged from Program Objective Memorandum 08 with twenty-eight new military billets and six civilian billets to support the start of the buildup for assist and assess teams in fiscal year 2008.[104]

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that Exercise Flexible Leader would take place in Europe in May 2007. As an exercise designed to increase the speed and cohesiveness of establishing a joint force

maritime component command, it required the Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet to go through the joint force certification process a year earlier than had been expected. The Navy had not planned to have an assist and assess team available to guide and support the transition to joint force staff procedures until the following fiscal year. To deal with the absence of a naval assist and assess team, the Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center informally approached Findlay and Bayley to see whether they could provide observers and trainers to create such a team in early 2007. While the Joint Warfighting Center concentrated on preparing the Third Air Force headquarters at Ramstein Air Base in Germany for joint certification, the Navy would deal with certification for the Sixth Fleet's headquarters staff.

The Navy was at a critical decision point regarding how it would handle its first joint force maritime component commander certification. The Joint Staff had begun planning for Exercise FLEXIBLE LEADER in January 2006 and had scheduled several planning conferences for March.

In the light of these developments, Shuford raised the subject with the director of the Navy Staff, Vice Admiral Cosgriff, in February 2006.[105] Shuford identified three alternative courses of action on how the Navy might deal with the situation. The first, the "Duck It" option, would have had the Navy just say no and work to reschedule the certification plans. The second, the "Fake It" alternative, envisioned the Navy making a limited effort with an ad hoc team. The third, the "Go for It" option, called for the Navy to develop both a short- and a long-term response for an effective certification support capacity and process.[106] Shuford argued that selecting the first or second course of action

> gives us some time and saves us funds in the short term. But, both COAs [courses of action] delay the inevitable. If we select COA I, we stand a strong chance that Navy will once again be viewed as lagging well behind the other Services in terms of tasking as spelled out in the [Secretary of Defense] memo of 4 FEB 05. If we select COA II, we run the risk of being perceived as limping up to the plate with a half-hearted response to this tasking.[107]

Shuford pointed out that the third alternative course of action was "exactly what [had been] envisioned" but would "require a rapid organizational development effort with the funds and people to support it."[108]

Shuford strongly recommended the third course of action because "CNO's and V[ice] CNO's comments and the atmosphere of the Maritime Security Conference in January 2006 in San Diego supported COA III [the third course of action]."[109] Pending a decision in Washington, Shuford directed the provost, Findlay, and Bayley to continue to prepare for Exercise FLEXIBLE LEADER as best they could within existing resources. He advised Vice Admiral Cosgriff that the College needed a decision by the end of March 2006 because "our time to gracefully 'Duck It' or 'Fake It' will have elapsed and we will either have to engage fully or trust JWFC [the Joint Warfighting Center] to pick up the task for Navy."[110] Cosgriff responded two weeks later, telling Shuford that "the smart money here says go for COA III."[111] Once again, the College found itself "flying this plane while [it was] building it." Vice Admiral John "Boomer" Stufflebeem, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, was excited to undergo the joint certification event and invested significant time into ensuring the team had whatever access it needed. Vice Admiral David Frost accepted the Naval War College's invitation to be a senior mentor for the exercise. Besides Frost, Findlay, and Bayley, the advise and assist team consisted of David DellaVolpe, Commander David Glenister, Captain Brent Griffin, Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel John Mangold, Commander Richard "Grumpy" Keltner, Mr. Mike Waite, and several reserve officers.

The Navy's Senior Leaders on the Operational Level of War

When Admiral Mike Mullen published his *CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era* on 2 January 2006, he called for the senior leaders of the Navy to "establish and enable Globally Networked Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders. . . ."[112] In making this statement, Admiral Mullen wanted to close significant gaps that he saw between the various areas of responsibility among joint force commanders. Later that month at the invitation of Admiral Nathman, Shuford traveled to Point Loma in San Diego to participate in the first CNO Maritime Security Conference, on 5 and 6 January 2006, and then to Little Creek, Virginia, for the second one, on 12 and 13 August 2006. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Nathman had been working to establish a means to develop a conversation between the joint component and headquarters commanders, so that they could identify operational-level issues and to develop alternatives to solve them. The two conferences brought together the senior operational commanders in the Navy to address the service's most pressing operational challenges, including the need for a global networked structure to exercise effective command and control in the maritime domain. As Shuford recounted, the "primary proposition that emerged from [these conferences was] . . . 'The Navy is a Service focused at the operational level of war.'"[113] This statement was the key pronouncement that had been missing and was, in the view of many senior officers, the beginning of a new narrative for talking about the Navy. Admiral Gary Roughead, who had been Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet during these conferences, followed through with them after he became Chief of Naval Operations in September 2007. Roughead made the same point in the first line of his first slide at his first All Flag Officers Training Symposium, declaring, "The Navy is a Service Focused at the Operational Level of War."[114] Such statements were essential and reflected a new view and commitment among the Navy's leaders that gave purpose and focus to the work that was already under way and the future work that needed to be done to achieve a full operational capability for the concept of maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers. As a result of this emphasis and the range of initiatives that were beginning to take shape in this area, the Naval War College was in a position to become a significant factor in focusing the Navy at the operational level of war.[115]

The development of the concept for the joint force maritime component commander, and subsequently the process for the maritime headquarters with a maritime operations center, required complex arrangements and close collaboration and coordination across many commands. This collaboration was evident at the staff level throughout 2005 and 2006. Although the Operational Advisory Group built an administrative structure to facilitate the process for identifying capability gaps, there was little progress, other than the specific steps taken by the Naval War College, in 2005 and 2006 to gain meaningful entry into the budget process with the Chief of Naval Operations' staff. At this point, it was clear that there was an immature understanding of the concept for a maritime headquarters with maritime operations center. There was no centralized mechanism to coordinate the process to enable deliberate decision making toward the creation of maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers, but there were several attempts to protect various existing programs at the expense of implementing the idea. Even with the statements of senior leaders, the route to full operational capability for the concept was unclear.

Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., as a Vice Admiral. A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1973, as a vice admiral, Harvey served as Chief of Naval Personnel from 2005 to 2008, then Director, Navy Staff from 2008 to 2009. Promoted to admiral, he was Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command from 2009 to 2012.

U.S. Navy Photograph

Findlay and Bayley repeatedly told the College's executive leadership that there was distinctly uneven progress in producing capabilities to implement the concept. There was a tendency within the Operational Advisory Group to choose technical solutions at the expense of holistic solutions envisioned by the process for identifying capability gaps. The group argued that there was a need for some authoritative body to balance near-, medium-, and long-term priorities across the planning, programming, and budget cycle. These issues led the College's leadership to question the purpose of the Operational Advisory Group in this process and how to govern it. On 16 February 2007, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education, Vice Admiral John Harvey, formally advised Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, that he could not "support moving forward with any of the options since we are not also presented with a picture of the opportunity costs associated with achieving this capability."[116] Harvey argued that "to move forward, though, with a sound recommendation to CNO, we also need to represent what we are not going to fund, which current capabilities we intend to forgo, in order to develop and field this capability."[117] Significantly, Harvey noted that the Naval War College's requirements were not included in this assessment, because funds and human resources were already in the program objective memorandum for 2008 that he had personally approved as the College's resource sponsor. Moreover, the College had already aligned its requirements for financing to include the critical elements of the initiative for which it was responsible regarding the concept for maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers.

At the end of the 2006 Current Strategy Forum, Admiral Gary Roughead, who had just taken the helm as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, stayed over an extra day at the College to get a more comprehensive view of the operational level of war–related initiatives in which the College was involved. At the end of two days of in-depth discussion, Roughead decided to establish a flag-level, governing board to provide oversight, focus, and recommendations for improving the Navy's capability at the operational level of war. He asked Shuford to contact the flag officers involved with the concepts and the commands necessary to implement the idea. Shuford began with calls to Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Evan M. "Streak" Chanik, and Rear Admiral Carlton "Bud" Jewett, Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command, two flag officers who were closely involved with the College on the issue of command and control. The "kitchen cabinet," as Shuford liked to refer to it, eventually comprised the commanders of Second

Fleet, Third Fleet, Naval Network Warfare Command, and Navy Warfare Development Command; the President of the Naval War College; and U.S. Fleet Forces Command's Director of Operations and Plans.[118]

On 17 August 2007 Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command formally established the Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center Fleet Governing Board to facilitate "better coordination and increased coherency of the development and implementation of the MHQ with MOC concept."[119] Established to provide oversight to the implementation of the concept throughout the Navy, the Fleet Governing Board had wide latitude to make "recommendations to USFF [U.S. Fleet Forces] on MHQ w/MOC functionality and strategic goals" and to "approve and shape the MHQ with MOC project plan."[120] The board also directed the work of the already-established Operational Advisory Group in its task of advancing the concept. Also, the board took responsibility to "monitor and make recommendations to USFF on the allocation of resources between commands to ensure optimal delivery of capacity requirements for all MHQs."[121]

Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor. After his retirement from active duty, Admiral Zelibor became the first dean of the College of Naval Leadership in July 2006, renamed the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership in 2007. A naval flight officer, he had graduated from the Naval Academy in 1976. Attaining flag rank in October 1998, he took command of Naval Space Command as the naval component commander for U.S. Commander in Chief, Space. In July 2000, he reported as Commander, Carrier Group Three, in USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70), homeported in Bremerton, Washington. On 11 September 2001, he was assigned responsibilities as Commander, Task Force Fifty during Operation Enduring Freedom in charge of a three-carrier task force in the North Arabian Sea.
U.S. Navy Photograph

Before Admiral Roughead's detachment from Fleet Forces Command on 28 September 2007 to relieve Admiral Mullen as Chief of Naval Operations, Roughead discussed the subject with Second Fleet commander Vice Admiral Chanik. Those discussions resulted in the Fleet Governing Board issuing a lengthy set of categorical statements that the "Navy must operate at the Operational Level of War (OLW)" and that "OLW is a joint fight."[122] The board's statement of guiding principles also highlighted the fact that "OLW requires Navy full integration into Joint planning and warfighting" and that "common OLW operational processes and staff alignments will enhance and extend operational support and collaboration beyond Combatant Commander boundaries."[123] These statements from the board, along with its responsibility to govern the Operational Advisory Group, helped to focus the work to move the Navy toward what Shuford and the College had promoted as fundamental precepts of the Naval War College's institutional identity. Shuford was encouraged by these decisions and was a willing and active participant in the deliberations of the Fleet Governing Board.

Matching Form with Function

As the College expanded its reach in helping the Navy to return to the operational level of warfare, Shuford and Giblin saw that the College needed a dedicated organization within itself with sufficient faculty and staff to assume responsibility in this area. They found that the scope and intensity of the work were too wide-ranging for them to continue to manage personally. They needed a team to support and, in some cases, to lead the Operational Advisory Group and the Fleet Governing Board, the planning and execution for the Joint and Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Courses, the development and execution of the Maritime Staff Operators Course, the Senior Mentor Program, and the still-emerging demands for the assist and advise teams. Early in the process, Findlay had recognized

that this effort was growing and requested the provost to provide help from naval reservists to work the administrative details as well as build the course schedule and plan the logistics of this effort. The provost had established a productive working relationship with Vice Admiral John Cotton, the Chief of the Navy Reserve, and was able to provide through this channel limited but beneficial support. Moreover, retired Rear Admiral Tom "Chain" Zelibor joined the College as dean of what was initially the College of Naval Leadership in July 2006, and ultimately the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership after Shuford formally established it as such in October 2007. The intent of bringing Zelibor on board was to have him focus on the integration of leadership, ethics, and character development across the professional military education spectrum for operational- and strategic-level leaders.[124] As it turned out, Zelibor focused on the return to the operational level of warfare and the development of operational leaders.

Working closely with Zelibor, Provost Giblin determined that the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership was the organization within the College charged with conducting education, training, leadership, and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy's joint force maritime component commanders and Navy component commanders to function effectively as operational commanders. The desired effects of the activities in the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership were to improve the capability of naval officers to lead maritime, joint, and combined forces and their staff members to plan, execute, assess, and function cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization.[125] Zelibor and Giblin also agreed that this new organization was responsible for coordinating curriculum development efforts with the dean of academics, academic department chairs, the director of the College of Distance Education, and the associate dean of academics for electives and directed research for integrating leadership education into the College's various professional military education programs. In short, Tom Zelibor had the responsibility for the ten tasks that detailed how the College supported combat readiness as outlined in the College's draft mission, functions, and tasks statement. He worked closely with Shuford to increase the College's effectiveness in dealing with the Operational Advisory Group and the Fleet Governing Board and the issues they were facing.

The immediate challenge at hand was to find the financial and personnel resources to support these activities. On the basis of the College's detailed planning and programming work, Vice Admiral John Harvey ordered members of his staff to visit the Naval War College during April and May 2006 to discuss the issues presented. After meeting with Giblin, Findlay, Bayley, Smith, and Bosch, Harvey's staff agreed with the College's analysis that there was a valid requirement for an additional forty-two billets. Harvey concurred with his staff's assessment and, as the College's resource sponsor, personally handled the workforce issue with Vice Admiral Greenert for inclusion in the Navy's program objective memorandum for 2008 to fund these new positions. Harvey also directed his staff to realign specific program dollars within his control to support the College's civilian workforce issues within the programming cycle. Additionally, Greenert inserted $10 million into the College's budget for fiscal year 2008 to help the institution's near-term education and training programs in support of the initiative for maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers. In the budgeting process in 2009, Harvey, working in conjunction with Shuford and Giblin, added additional funding to support the College's budget in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. This funding included thirty-two additional civilian staff and instructors, funds to support temporary duty under instruction

at the Naval War College, the development of course content, and the development of the battle lab and classrooms in Evans Hall.

The ability of the College's staff to analyze and to portray with accuracy the requirement for additional funding and a larger workforce brought significant results. The College submitted plans to phase its growth in civilian hiring across fiscal years 2008 through 2011 and to phase military billet growth across fiscal years 2008 through 2010. As a result, the College grew by forty-nine additional positions in fiscal year 2008, twenty-five in fiscal year 2009, and a further ten in fiscal year 2010, with the final increment of thirteen in fiscal year 2011. Thus, the College grew by ninety-seven additional positions over a four-year period.[126] These actions provided strong support for the concept of the maritime headquarters with maritime operations center. Equally important, they demonstrated the College's ability to develop credible analysis for its financial and workforce needs to execute its responsibilities in helping the Navy to return to the operational level of warfare.

Other Initiatives

The Operational Advisory Group and Fleet Governing Board also recognized the distinct benefit that the Halsey Groups brought to the Navy's efforts to focus on the operational level of war and future fleet readiness. Since the founding of the Halsey Groups in 2001, senior officers in the fleet had grown to appreciate and trust the Halsey methodology. In particular, many welcomed the groups' focus on real-world challenges at the operational level of warfare, rather than on hypothetical situations, to generate concepts of operations carried out with available and near-term forces. The Halsey Groups' application of operations analysis and other tools to theater-level operational problems, along with their repeated and iterative gaming of similar scenarios, helped them develop a set of best practices that were important to the fleet. In their analytical process of a long-term examination of a single major operation, the groups' ability to include operators in the fleet was one of their strengths. Major commanders in the fleet also appreciated that the groups' members formed a core of talent better equipped for operational-level analysis and risk assessment when they left the Naval War College.[127] Indeed, the accreditation team for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Process for Accreditation of Joint Education recognized the Halsey programs as "the jewels in the crown" in 2007 during the certification of the College of Naval Warfare as a joint professional military education Phase II program.[128] In the same way, as the fleet expressed a demand for the College's Naval Operational Planner Course graduates, Mullen emphasized how "immediately valuable this sort of deep operational understanding was for his commanders at Fifth and Seventh Fleet."[129] During a meeting with Shuford at Newport in June 2007, Mullen expressed his desire for the Navy Personnel Command to track Halsey graduates.[130]

The College also took on the task of creating the doctrine for the operational level of war where none existed previously. The Marine Corps attendee at the first Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course, Brigadier General Jon A. Gallinetti, USMC, asked Findlay what the basis for instruction was. At that time, the Navy did not have any doctrinal basis other than joint publications, the joint force maritime component commander tactical memorandum, and the multiple carrier strike groups' tactical memorandum. By 2007, three different Navy warfare publications (NWPs) on operational-level subjects were nearing completion. *Navy Planning* (NWP 5-01) was the first. Shuford, as the principal review authority for *Navy*

Planning, directed the Joint Military Operations Department—specifically Professors Patrick Sweeney and Albion Bergstrom, who were retired U.S. Army colonels with substantial operational planning experience—to take the lead. As subject matter experts, Findlay and Bayley also participated in drafting *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War* (NWP 3-32) and *Maritime Operations Center* (Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Publication 3-32.1). With the publication of *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War* in October 2008, the fleet finally had a clear and authoritative doctrinal expression of the Navy's and Marine Corps' unique warfighting capabilities and task-organized, expeditionary platforms.

Shuford and Giblin recognized that there was a need to develop a small number of naval officers who were capable of filling theater-strategic-level planning billets on the staffs of the National Command Center and the combatant commanders. After discussions with Admiral Timothy Keating, while he was serving as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Shuford and Giblin identified the need for officers serving on these staffs to have specific knowledge of theater military forces and security concepts, the impact of U.S. presence and operations on pivotal countries, and the analysis of U.S. strategic and theater-wide courses of action. Underlying all these specific needs was the need for officers who could think and act strategically. The vehicle the College chose to achieve this goal was the Joint Land, Aerospace, Sea Simulation program, which brought a selection of the Naval War College's students together with students from the other senior-level service and joint colleges in a theater-level war game played at the Air Force War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, in Alabama. The Naval War College matched this program's process of employing joint forces to execute national and theater-level strategies with a set of three electives that addressed theater and strategic planning within a specific theater. Senior students who participated in the College's Theater Strategic Planner program gained competency in the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational and strategic objectives in a theater. As planned, twenty officers completed the initial Theater Strategic Planner program in academic year 2005–2006 and twenty-three completed it in the following academic year, 2006–2007. The College envisioned that the program would certify an average of fifteen Navy officers per year in academic year 2007–2008 and beyond with the additional qualification designator AQD 247, designating them "Theater Strategic Planners."

Sound leadership was an essential element in the Navy's return to the operational level of war. Within thirty days of his reporting aboard, Rear Admiral Zelibor and his assistant dean, Professor John Meyer, conducted an abbreviated mission analysis. They concluded, among other things, that the Naval War College was effectively focusing on the operational-level set of programs it had conceived, but that there was not as much attention to the leadership aspect of the Navy's return to the operational level of war. Zelibor and Meyer argued that it was essential that the College address the subject of leadership development as part of its campaign to strengthen the execution of its mission to develop strategic and operational leaders and to do this in the context of another mission element, supporting combat readiness. As a first step, the two recommended to the provost in August 2006 that the College establish the Stockdale Group, named for former Naval War College President Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale. Giblin approved the recommendation. He directed Zelibor and Meyer to create the group as an advanced research project to "conduct a critical examination of current operational leadership and to provide recommendations to the Chief of Naval

Operations on how best to structure the Navy's training and education system to develop proficient and capable operational-level leaders in a continuum that builds throughout an officer's career."[131]

Zelibor and Meyer chose eight students from the College of Naval Warfare and one student from the Naval Command College to participate in the Stockdale Group in academic year 2006–2007. They selected these officers on the basis of their sustained superior performance throughout their military careers, especially in command; their demonstrated ability or potential for graduate-level research and writing; and their classroom performance at the Naval War College, as reflected in recommendations by one or more faculty members. The members of the first Stockdale Group included Captain David A. Cinalli, USCG; Lieutenant Colonel Jay G. Flowers, USA; Lieutenant Commander Chris Hayes, USN; Colonel Daniel Kessler, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Marcia Ledlow, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Rob Maness, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Reilly, USA; and Captain Ryo Sakai, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Zelibor asked the first Stockdale Group to examine the question: "What changes are needed to improve the U.S. Navy's officer education, training, and development process to best prepare Navy officers to perform successfully as leaders at the operational level of war?"[132]

The Stockdale Group, "in contrast to most efforts in the recent past to identify a leadership development system by [combining] existing Service leadership models into an acceptable whole, sought first to identify the capabilities an operational level leader requires and then work back to discover the competencies that produce those capabilities."[133] The group then defined leadership as "the art of direct and indirect influence, both internally and externally, based on a common vision that builds unity of effort while employing tactical activities and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives."[134] The group then organized the identified characteristics into three distinct domains that served to "identify the differences between traits and competencies with regard to their nature and the means needed to develop them."[135] This fundamental step took the Stockdale Group well beyond another simple listing of competencies. It skillfully tied them to a potential methodology for learning and developing those characteristics. The next stage of research entailed refining and validating this conceptual model. The principal instruments used to do so consisted of two tailored surveys. Through a combination of both open-ended questions and rank-order methodology, the group sought to conduct both a qualitative and quantitative analysis. The group sent one version of its survey to current and former operational-level commanders—all flag officers or flag officers select—and a slightly different text to flag officers who were serving or had served in prominent billets on operational-level staffs. Seventy-four officers responded to the first version and thirty-three officers to the second, totaling 107 respondents with the collective experience and judgment of 236 stars. Given the cross-cultural nature of operational leadership, the Stockdale Group made the conscientious decision to include select senior officers from international militaries in the survey.[136]

From its research and analysis, the Stockdale Group identified "several commonalities among other, effective advanced leadership development systems."[137] These commonalities suggested the need for "adjustments to the Navy's ethos, structure, policies and processes to improve upon its ability to produce effective operational level leaders."[138] The Stockdale Group's products included individual analytical papers, a synthesis of those analyses, and a culminating briefing of the group's findings and recommendations intended for Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen.[139] Taken together the group's products formed

a sound basis from which the College could proceed in working the leadership component of its mission to develop strategic and operational leaders and to do so in the context of another mission element, supporting combat readiness.

The Outcome

Shuford's campaign plan worked. The growth of programs at the Naval War College for the operational level of warfare in support of combat readiness was rapid and effective. From a near-dead start with little or no external direction, the framework that the College's executive leadership established in October 2004 created much of what the Operational Advisory Group and the Fleet Governing Board later determined to be the essential elements for the Navy's return to the operational level of war.

The Naval War College's actions bolstered the Navy's capacity to lead at the operational level of war and were a crucial factor in the effort to include naval commanders in positions of command and control at the operational level of war. Admiral Vern Clark's ready acceptance of the College's recommendations for his 2005 statement of the Chief of Naval Operations' guidance was the cornerstone of this major effort. Subsequently, Shuford and Giblin took every opportunity to remind the senior leadership of the Navy that the operational level of war was part of the strategic tradition of the College and, for that matter, the Naval War College was the only organization within the Navy that focused on it routinely. Most importantly, the College's work toward this goal highlighted two critical facts. First, the College was listening to and responding quickly and effectively to the Navy's senior leaders, especially the calls for assistance from the fleet. Just as important, the College's actions demonstrated once again that the thinking, analysis, and teaching at the College influenced the Navy's leaders as well as the Navy at large. The College enhanced its institutional effectiveness and its relevance to the Navy and the nation by demonstrating the ways that it supported combat readiness.

NOTES

1. The College was unable to cite the groundbreaking work of the Halsey Group during this process, because the first Halsey Group was not established until August 2003 and did not report out until June 2004.
2. Giblin Papers (privately held): Department of the Navy, Office of the Naval Inspector General, "Command Inspection of Naval War College, Part 2," letter 5040 Serial N3B/1316 of 25 August 2003, p. 18.
3. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. Conducted on September 17, 2009 by James Rife [hereinafter Giblin Oral History], p. 97.
4. Vice Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, "Rediscover the Art of Command and Control," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 128, no. 10 (October 2002), p. 52.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 54.
8. Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, War Gaming Department, "Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Seminar, Development Review and Game Design Workshop," memorandum, NWC-WGD Memo xx-03 332/jbg, 30 June 2003.
9. Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, War Gaming Department, "JFMCC War Game Design Overview" (brief, 28 October 2003), slide 2.
10. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 was a controversial transformation exercise that brought together both live field exercises and computer simulation. Sponsored by Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, it took place from 24 July to 15 August 2002. The exercise focused on how the United States explores the military's ability to conduct rapid decisive operations against a determined adversary.
11. Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, War Gaming Department, "JFMCC Language Process: Summary Answers" (brief, 17 November 2003), slides 3 and 5.
12. Shuford stated this view in public during his remarks on the hundredth Maritime Staff Operators Course. See Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), "Admiral Shuford Talking Points, Centennial Class, Maritime Staff Operators Course" (Newport, R.I., 20 May 2014) [hereinafter "100th MSOC Remarks"], p. 1.
13. Ibid.

14. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2004: Accelerating Our Advantages* (Washington, D.C.: January 2004), p. 9.
15. "100th MSOC Remarks," p. 1.
16. Ibid.
17. Giblin Oral History, p. 101.
18. "100th MSOC Remarks," p. 2.
19. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "POM 10 Program Review" (briefing, 24 October 2007), slide 3.
20. John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984), p. 119.
21. "100th MSOC Remarks," p. 1.
22. Ibid., p. 2.
23. Although the College was accomplishing all the elements of the framework it developed in October 2004, it took until May 2012 for the Chief of Naval Operations to designate the President, Naval War College as the overall lead for education at the operational level of war. In 2012, the College was formally directed to provide education in the operational level of war to senior enlisted personnel, officers, and flag officers. OPNAVINST 3500.40A, 15 May 2012, p. 2.
24. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford to NWC faculty and staff, "Quickrep from PNWC 120-Day Assessment Brief to CNO," e-mail, 20 December 2004.
25. Giblin Papers (privately held): Naval War College, Office of the President, "120-Day Assessment for the Chief of Naval Operations" (briefing, 17 December 2004), slide 6.
26. Giblin and Harley knew each other well from their time together on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet at Makalapa, Hawaii. Giblin, then a captain on active duty, was the head of the Plans and Programs Division and later the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy and Harley was a lieutenant serving in the Current Operations Division. They interacted on almost a daily basis on operational, strategic, and resource matters from 1988 through 1990.
27. Giblin Papers (privately held): Commander Jeffrey A. Harley, USN, to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "CNOG 05," e-mail, 23 December 2004.
28. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2005: Winning the Fight . . . and Bridging to the Future* (Washington, D.C.: 3 January 2005), p. 17.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. In September 2004, Shuford had spent time in Norfolk with the commanders of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Second Fleet, the Navy Network Warfare Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command, laying the groundwork to establish a joint force maritime component commanders' course at the Naval War College. See RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Captain Dan Davenport, USN, "[no subject]," e-mail, 21 September 2004.
32. "100th MSOC Remarks," p. 3.
33. Nichols made it clear to Findlay and Duffie that no one was doing "effects-based approaches to phase zero operations" in his area of operations and that no one on his staff knew how to do it. He also made it clear that his staff could not do campaign analysis. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Navy Warfare Development Command, "JFMCC Planning and Execution," TACMEMO 3-32-03, 18 June 2004.
36. Department of the Navy, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, "JFMCC and the Operational Level of War: Lessons Learned and a Way" (brief, 2 February 2005), slide 4.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., slide 10.
39. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Supporting Readiness Piece," 2 August 2016.
40. Naval War College, Office of the President, "JFMCC Flag Course: Guiding Principles for Course Design," June 2005, p. 1.
41. Ibid., p. 2.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. The Navy had no centralized management system in place for utilization of the senior mentors for purposes such as this course. Also, there was little guidance available on the employment of senior mentors. Individual fleet commanders and numbered fleet commanders had contracted senior mentors for exercise participation either directly or through the Joint Warfighting Center at the Joint Forces Command, in Norfolk, Virginia. The Naval War College had submitted in its program objective memorandum for the 2008 budget an approach to establish a system by which the Chief of Naval Operations could have senior mentors available for a variety of purposes under the College's management control. The increase in scope would include both additional educational courses and participation in large-scale joint and combined exercises.
46. There were some other people whose contributions were noteworthy in this regard. These included Mr. Richard R. Menard, the provost's executive assistant; Mr. T. Kelly Williamson, the provost's administrative assistant; Ms. Elizabeth "Gigi" Davis, the College's director of graphics; and Mr. Leonard Coleman, the College's director of security.
47. JFMCC Flag Course 05-1 data provided by Professor Sean Carroll, Operational Level Programs, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, U.S. Naval War College, 11 March 2016.
48. Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, to all flag officers, "JFMCC Course," e-mail, 22 June 2005.
49. Ibid.
50. These were Rear Admiral Donald K. Bullard; Rear Admiral John J. Donnelly; Brigadier General Jon Gallinetti; Rear Admiral Richard W. Hunt; Rear Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, Jr.; Rear Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III; Rear Admiral Carl V. Mauney; Rear Admiral (Sel.) John W. Miller; Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller; Rear Admiral Robert B. Murrett; Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford; and Rear Admiral Patrick M. Walsh. Data provided by Professor Sean Carroll, Operational Level Programs, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, U.S. Naval War College, 11 March 2016.
51. U.S. Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "Assessment of JFMCC Flag Course, Class 0, 21–27 August 2005" (brief) [hereinafter "Bayley's Assessment Brief"], slide 6.
52. Ibid., slide 4.
53. JFMCC Flag Course 06-1 data provided by Professor Sean Carroll, Operational Level Programs, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, U.S. Naval War College, 11 March 2016.
54. Rear Admiral David "Hollywood" Anderson; Rear Admiral John M. Bird; Rear Admiral Bruce Clingan; Rear Admiral W. Douglas Crowder; Rear Admiral Peter H. Daly; Rear Admiral Jeffrey L. Fowler; Rear Admiral William E. "Shortney" Gortney; Brigadier General Anthony L. Jackson, USMC; Rear Admiral David W. Kunkel, USCG; Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFever; Rear Admiral Terence E. "Terry" McKnight; Rear

Admiral Carol M. Pottenger; Rear Admiral Kevin M. Quinn; Major General Edward A. Rice, Jr., USAF; Rear Admiral Michael E. Tracy; and Major General Loyd S. "Chip" Utterback, USAF. Data provided by Professor Sean Carroll, Operational Level Programs, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, U.S. Naval War College, 11 March 2016. Unfortunately, the Army was unable to provide a general officer to participate in this course, because of its manning situation for general officers and its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

55. Crowder served as the Commander, Combined Support Group Indonesia as part of Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE to provide tsunami relief. LeFever served as the commander of the Disaster Assistance Center that coordinated the U.S. military response to Pakistan's 2005 earthquake.

56. "Bayley's Assessment Brief," Talking Points, slide 12.

57. For the consensus on the need for the course concept to mature, see ibid.

58. Executive Office of the President, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 13, "Maritime Security Policy," 21 December 2004.

59. CFMCC Flag Course 06-2C data provided by Professor Sean Carroll, Operational Level Programs, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, U.S. Naval War College, 11 March 2016.

60. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford to Admiral Michael Mullen, USN, "CFMCC CSE SITREP," e-mail, 10 August 2006.

61. Saudi Arabia cancelled at the last minute because of internal issues in the kingdom concerning permission to travel abroad. Bahrain, Iraq, Italy, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates declined the invitation for this course but expressed their intent to accept future invitations.

62. Attendees included Rear Admiral Raymond Berube; Lieutenant General Robert Blackman, USMC; Rear Admiral Mark Buzby; Major General David Clary, USAF; Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff; Rear Admiral James Hart; Brigadier General James Laster, USMC; Rear Admiral John Mateczun, MC; Rear Admiral Allen Myers; Rear Admiral David Pekoske, USCG; Rear Admiral David Philman; Rear Admiral Garland Wright; Commodore Ray Griggs, Royal Australian Navy; Commodore Bruce Donaldson, Canadian Maritime Command; Rear Admiral Loïc Raffaëlli French Navy; Rear Admiral Klaus von Dambrowski, German Navy; Captain Makoto Kondo, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force; Colonel Abed Kareem Alfdoul, Royal Jordanian Navy; Colonel Marco Hekkens, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps; Commodore Johan Ort, Royal Netherlands Navy; Captain Mahfoodh Hamood Mohamed Al Wahaibi, Royal Navy of Oman; Rear Admiral Shahid Iqbal, Pakistan Navy; Rear Admiral Saleem Meenai, Pakistan Navy; Colonel Kian Seng Tay, Republic of Singapore Navy; and Commodore Keith Winstanley, Royal Navy. Data provided by Professor Sean Carroll, Operational Level Programs, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, U.S. Naval War College, 11 March 2016.

63. RADM Jacob Shuford, USN, to Admiral Gary Roughead, USN, "CFMCC Course Planning," e-mail, 27 September 2006.

64. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, et al., "PNWC CPF Hosted CFMCC Flag Course 19–24 FEB," e-mail, 10 February 2007.

65. Data derived from information provided by Professor Sean Carroll, Operational Level Programs, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, U.S. Naval War College, 11 March 2016.

66. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, the Navy had established an operations group, informally known as "Deep Blue," to provide intellectual support for the Chief of Naval Operations and regional warfighting commanders in chief for the Global War on Terror. The Navy Operations Group, as Deep Blue was officially designated, was similar to the Air Force's Checkmate strategic planning organization.

67. Gregory M. Swider, *The Navy's Experience with Joint Air Operations: Lessons Learned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm*, Center for Naval Analyses Report 92-166 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1993), as cited in Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, Navy Operations Group/Deep Blue, "Naval Operational Planners" (brief, 3 July 2003), slide 4.

68. Deputy Chief of Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, Navy Operations Group/Deep Blue, "Naval Operational Planners," slide 3.

69. Ibid., slide 6.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., Talking Points, slide 2.

73. CNO WASHINGTON DC message 052110Z DEC 03, Subj.: Naval Operational Planner Course and Personnel Management. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson directed the establishment of the Naval Operational Planner Course. Johnson approved the College's plan for it in 1998. This thirteen-month program prepared intermediate-level naval officers and officers from other services for assignments to operational planner billets on the staffs of the commanders of the numbered fleet, naval component fleets, and unified, geographic, and functional commands.

74. These included the JP1, JP2, and JP3 AQDs. See Provost, Naval War College, "Recommendation to Establish Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) Code JP (X), Operational Planner," ltr 1500/Ser 1C7/4993 of 22 October 1999. Executive Secretary, Navy Officer Occupational Classification Board, "Recommendation to Establish Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) Code JP (X), Operational Planner," ltr 1211 ser 12/0107 of 3 April 2000, approved the College's recommendation.

75. The JP1 AQD code indicates those officers with operational planner education only. The JP2 AQD code designates those officers who have completed a tour of duty as an operational planner. The JP3 AQD code indicates those officers who have both education and experience as operational planners.

76. CNO WASHINGTON DC message 052110Z DEC 03, Subj.: Naval Operational Planner Course and Personnel Management.

77. "100th MSOC Remarks," p. 3.

78. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Director, Naval Operational Planner Course, "NOPC Throughput" (brief, 20 July 2006), slide 1.

79. RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Captain Diane Lofink, "Navy Operational Planner Course (NOPC) for March 2005 Inputs," e-mail, 29 December 2004.

80. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters," memorandum, 4 February 2005, p. 1.

81. Ibid., p. 2.

82. Ibid.

83. In April 2005, there was a discussion among the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark, Shuford, and Giblin about doubling the output of the Naval Operational Planner Course again in 2006 or 2007. For a variety of reasons, this did not come to pass. Principal among these concerns was the potential to put too many of the qualified joint operational planners in too few officer year groups.

84. Shuford to Lofink, "Navy Operational Planner Course (NOPC) for March 2005 Inputs," 29 December 2004.

85. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5); Assistant Chief of Navy Personnel Command for Distribution (PERS 4); and President, Naval War College, "Execution and Overall Management of Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) and Planners' Billets," memorandum of understanding, 12 April 2006.

86. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to VADM John G. Morgan, USN, and RDML Dan Holloway, USN, "NOPC MOU," e-mail, 24 April 2006. The memorandum also covered Navy graduates of the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies at the Army's Command and General Staff College, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Air University, at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama; the Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, at Quantico, Virginia; and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College, in Norfolk, Virginia.
87. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, USN, "Short Course for Junior Operational Planners," e-mail, 10 August 2006.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Captain Mike Critz, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Supporting Combat concerning—Giblin Draft," e-mail, 17 August 2016.
91. Executive Office of the President, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: 20 September 2005).
92. Ibid., p. 4.
93. Executive Office of the President, *The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness* (Washington, D.C.: October 2005), app. B, p. 5.
94. CNO WASHINGTON DC message 281331Z SEP 05, Subj.: CNO Guidance—Development of a ConOps for Globally Networking Navy Maritime Organizations.
95. CFFC NORFOLK VA message 291412Z SEP 05, Subj.: Commanders Guidance—Worldwide Navy Component Commanders and Globally Networked Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders.
96. These solutions may result from a capabilities-based assessment or any study that investigates DoD warfighting capabilities and identifies capability gaps. See Department of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)," CJCS Instruction 3170.01.
97. With the support of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the College successfully budgeted $0.8 million to support the Senior Mentor Program in the Future Years Defense Program starting in fiscal year 2010. See Department of the Navy, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, "MHQ with MOC POM 10 Requirements" (brief, 15 January 2008), slide 6; Vice Admiral Evan Chanik to Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford et al., "MHQ/MOC POM 10 Update," e-mail, 4 April 2008.
98. Chanik to Shuford et al., "MHQ/MOC POM 10 Update," 4 April 2008.
99. Ibid.
100. Captain Jeff Fullerton, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Maritime Staff Operators Course Statistics," e-mail, 28 March 2016.
101. "100th MSOC Remarks," p. 5. Bird served as Commander, Seventh Fleet, 12 July 2008 to 10 September 2010.
102. Ibid. Crowder was Commander, Seventh Fleet, 12 September 2006 to 12 July 2008.
103. Ibid.
104. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, "Commanding at the Operational Level," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 133, no. 5 (May 2007), p. 28.
105. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, "JFMCC DCR: NWC Assess and Assist Component," e-mail, 20 February 2006.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, USN, to Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, "JFMCC DCR: NWC Assess and Assist Component," e-mail, 7 March 2006.
112. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: 2006), p. 7.
113. Shuford, "Commanding at the Operational Level," p. 28.
114. "100th MSOC Remarks," p. 4.
115. See Shuford, "Commanding at the Operational Level," for a comprehensive summary of the initiatives the College had developed and was in the process of implementing. This article reflects how NWC influenced the Navy's "return to the OLW" as a service focused at the operational level of war.
116. Vice Admiral John Harvey, USN, to Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, USN, "R3B Announcement—MOC/MHQ," e-mail, 16 February 2007.
117. Ibid.
118. Shuford to Giblin, "Supporting Readiness Piece," 2 August 2016.
119. Department of the Navy, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, "USFF Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center Fleet Governing Board (MHQ WITH MOC FGB)," memorandum, 17 August 2007, p. 1.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., p. 2.
122. Department of the Navy, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, "USFF MHQ with MOC Fleet Governing Board: Guiding Principles" (brief, 17 August 2007), slides 4 and 5.
123. Ibid.
124. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval War College, Stockdale Group, "Operational and Strategic Leadership: Genius Is the Main Battery of the Fleet" (brief, June 2007) [hereinafter "Stockdale Brief"], Talking Points, slide 3.
125. Naval War College, "POM 10 Program Review," slide 25.
126. Vice Admiral John Harvey, USN, to Admiral Gary Roughead, USN, "Naval War College Manpower in Support of MHQ/MOQ," e-mail, 26 December 2007.
127. Symptomatic of the competencies attained by members of the Halsey Group is the following comment offered by one of its members who was then serving in a key position in N8: "Just a quick email to let you know how much being part of the Halsey Group has paid off for me in my current job. I probably attend 2 to 3 meetings/briefs a week that deal directly with MCO-2 campaign analysis. . . . I'm also amazed at how many contractors are involved in analyzing this campaign and how much they are getting paid. In most instances, these contractors don't go into the detail that we went into in the Halsey Group. Also, their campaign analysis or [concept of operations] development lacks imagination. Each excursion only varies slightly from one decade to the next. Just wanted to say thanks for allowing me to be part of the group." See Commander Robert G. Marin, USN, to Professor James Fitzsimonds, "Halsey Group," e-mail, 30 January 2007.
128. Department of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) College of Naval Warfare US Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 14–18 May 2007,"

memorandum, CJCS CM-0988-07 of 10 September 2007, enclosure A, "Report of Certification of the College of Naval Warfare at the United States Naval War College," p. 3.

129. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Rear Admiral Scott Hebner, USN, "Halsey Group Listing," e-mail, 18 June 2007.

130. Ibid.

131. Assistant Dean John C. Meyer to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update to John Hattendorf's Sailors and Scholars—Supporting Combat Readiness," e-mail, 9 June 2016.

132. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval War College, Stockdale Group, "Executive Summary Academic Year 2006–2007 Inaugural Stockdale Research and Analysis Group," June 2007 [hereinafter "Stockdale Executive Summary"], p. 1.

133. Ibid.

134. "Stockdale Brief," Talking Points, slide 5.

135. "Stockdale Executive Summary," p. 2.

136. Each survey consisted of two sections. The first section consisted of open-ended questions: "What do you think are the top three characteristics that led to your success as an operational leader?" "What do you think most led to your development as a leader?" and "How did you develop those specific characteristics?" These preliminary, open-ended questions afforded the opportunity to surface any traits or competencies that the Stockdale Group failed to identify in the early stages of its research. The second survey section consisted of the characteristics and skills the group identified earlier and asked the participants to rank order the top ten characteristics that operational leaders of the future would need. It also asked the respondents to explain how the Navy could best develop those characteristics. See ibid., pp. 2–3.

137. Ibid., p. 5.

138. For a more detailed discussion of the Stockdale Group's significant findings and recommendations, see ibid., pp. 5–9.

139. The individual analytical papers included "Building Navy Officer Operational Leadership Skills: Back to Basics," by Lieutenant Colonel Gregory D. Reilly, USA; "Operational Command and Control—Are We Educating Officers on Principles at ILC and SLC?," by Colonel Daniel A. Kessler, USA; "21st Century Naval Leaders: How to Achieve the CNO's Vision of Developing 21st Century Leaders," by Lieutenant Colonel Jay Gordie Flowers, USA; "Developing Operational-Level Leaders: What Is the Role of the Personal Competency Domain?," by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maness, USAF; "236 Stars on Leadership Development: An Analysis of the 2007 Stockdale Group Survey Data," by Lieutenant Colonel Marcia Ledlow, USAF; "Preparing the Navy's Future Operational Leaders: Organizational Culture and the Challenges to Progress," by Captain Dave Cinalli, USCG; "Developing 21st Century Leaders: Assessing the U.S. Navy's Capacity to Cultivate Operational Leadership," by Lieutenant Commander Christopher Hayes, USN; "Operational Leadership Development from a Coalition Perspective," by Captain Ryo Sakai, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force; and "A Conceptual Framework for Operational Leadership Development: The Imperative for Balance on Multiple Levels," by Lieutenant Colonel Norm Cooling, USMC.

THE UNITED STATES
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

". . . a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war."

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy
Founder, and first President, Naval War College, 1884–1886,
in an address to the Naval War College on 2 June 1903.

Artist's Rendering of the Engraved Glass Plate at the Main Entrance to Spruance Hall.

Jason Peters, Naval War College Graphics

Chapter Twenty-Three

Evolution of the College's Mission, Functions, and Tasks, 2001–2012

The statement of the mission, functions, and tasks of the College that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson approved on 10 July 2000 was markedly out-of-date just a year afterward when Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt assumed command of the Naval War College on 22 August 2001.[1] At the direction of Johnson's successor, Admiral Vern Clark, the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command was now on track to report to Commander, Fleet Forces Command on 1 October 2001 as a third-echelon commander, no longer reporting to the President, Naval War College. During command inspection of the College from 28 April to 2 May 2003, Naval Inspector General Vice Admiral Albert T. "Tom" Church III found that the College's mission, functions, and tasks statement was out-of-date "because the command responsibility for the Navy Warfare Development Command had shifted to Commander, Fleet Forces Command, thereby affecting the Naval War College's mission."[2] The Inspector General recommended that the Chief of Naval Operations, with the assistance of the Naval War College, issue a new statement to document the College's current missions and tasks.[3]

Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III. A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1969, Admiral Church served as Naval Inspector General from 2003 to 2004 and as Director, Navy Staff from 2003 to 2005.

U.S. Navy Photograph

Admiral Clark had already questioned the College's value to the naval service when Rempt took command. At the same time, Clark implied that he and his senior leaders doubted the effectiveness of the College's execution of its assigned mission, functions, and tasks with the funding and workforce allocated. To those in Newport, it seemed that the Chief of Naval Operations either did not understand what the College was doing or did not accept it, or both. Up to this point, the faculty and staff in Newport had thought that they were sailing in a calm sea with clear sailing ahead in respect to the College's mission, functions, and tasks.

Nevertheless, the College recognized that there was a distinct disconnect between mission and resources. Rempt saw this clearly in the work that the provost and the College's comptroller, Commander Steve Smith, had done with the budget in June and July of 2002.[4] Vice Admiral Church and his inspection team confirmed this serious situation, noting "funding increases have been less than [the] required statutory increases in civilian pay" since fiscal year 1996.[5] Although Church praised the College for its astute financial management and cost-saving measures in the adverse financial climate, he concluded that such actions "cannot offset the real and dramatic decline in NWC mission funding if the current FY-04 budget deficit remains uncorrected."[6] The Naval Inspector General determined that there was "no explanation for why future program levels drop well below the FY-03 execution level."[7] These findings confirmed Rempt's suspicion that the College was misaligned with what the Chief of Naval Operations expected of it.

Any seasoned seagoing officer understands that the characteristic of a "confused sea" is a conspicuously unsettled expanse of ocean with no single, well-defined direction of its waves and swells. Any prudent mariner would assess the situation of his or her ship in such conditions and take the necessary action. Similarly, it was indisputable that the President of the Naval War College and the Chief of Naval Operations needed to reevaluate the formal statement of the College's mission, functions, and tasks. Initially Rempt focused sharply on getting a current statement that reconciled what the leadership of the Navy expected of the College and what the College was actually doing. His intent was straightforward: to align the College's programs under the legislative and policy directives under which the College was operating. This ostensibly clear-cut task took considerably longer to complete than expected.

An Anchor to Windward

Rempt knew that, despite a confused sea, there were no immediate hazards to navigation on the horizon with respect to the statement of the mission, functions, and tasks.[8] However, he also foresaw that if the College continued to operate as it had before, there was a chance that it could very well find itself in dangerous waters. Rempt understood that it was imperative to demonstrate that the College was contributing to the Navy in ways that were consistent with the resources allocated to it. He also knew that a rigorous self-assessment, or mission analysis, was essential to the task of reconciling the mission, functions, and tasks with the Chief of Naval Operations' intent in order to avoid encountering any hazards to navigation. He knew that the College had a strong reputation for its ability to perform dispassionate self-assessments and that such an effort would take time and require the participation of most of the faculty and staff. The events of 11 September 2001 and the priority Rempt accorded to the College's focus on responding to them forced Rempt to postpone work on a new statement.

However, in July 2002 he returned to the challenge of creating a new mission document as a major effort for the College when he initiated a comprehensive strategic planning process that involved the entire institution. His purpose in doing so was to look to the future in terms of the extant and anticipated legislative, policy, and strategy requirements for the College. In this, he included a careful consideration of the College's role in the ongoing Global War on Terror. Another aspect was to determine, and perhaps to influence where necessary, what the senior leaders of the Navy expected of the College. Rempt directed Provost Jim Giblin to oversee the mission analysis and drafting of a revised mission statement and strategic plan. He directed the provost to use the required self-assessments for the anticipated visits to the College by the Naval Inspector General in April and May 2003 and for the Joint Staff's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education review of the College of Naval Warfare later in May 2003 to inform the strategic planning process and mission analysis.

In response, Giblin recommended to Rempt that four very basic questions guide both the mission statement and the strategic planning efforts:

1. Who are we?
2. What do we believe that we do and should be doing?

3. Are what we do and what we should be doing aligned with the legislative, policy, and strategic requirements that shape our operating environment and the vision of the senior leadership of the U.S. Navy?

4. Do we have sufficient workforce, dollars, and talent to accomplish what it is we think we should be doing?

Rempt agreed. Rempt and Giblin's collective experience told them that purpose trumped everything else when it came to a mission analysis as well as mission execution. Because of this, they agreed that it would be useful at the outset to review and then underscore the College's core purpose before proceeding to answer the other three questions. To accomplish this, the two decided that it was imperative to revisit the College's origins and the distinctive competencies that had matured from that heritage and then compare them with what that inquiry told them with respect to what the senior leadership of the Navy expected of the College.

To do so, Giblin proposed that the College needed to understand exactly what its strategic tradition was. The provost cautioned Rempt that the term *strategic tradition* was surprisingly undefined, but he believed that an existing paradigm could be adapted to help ascertain the College's strategic tradition. Giblin started by applying an academic definition—that there are "consistent and persistent patterns of the way a particular institution thinks about the use of its resources and talent to achieve its desired ends."[9] That is, different institutions have different "prevailing sets of strategic preferences that are rooted in the formative experiences of the institution. These, in turn, are influenced to some degree by the [various] characteristics of an institution as it develops over time in terms of their impact on the institution's effectiveness and its integrity."[10] These factors oftentimes shape decision makers' mental maps of their operating environment and, therefore, the way they choose to act toward that environment.[11] The provost's paradigm posited that it was essential to the future well-being of the College that its leadership pay close attention to substantive shifts in external forces—particularly, legislation and policy guidance—as well as the strategic direction of the Navy and the Defense Departments, with the College's own collective best judgment of what it needed to do. This was necessary to ensure that the importance attached to the College's strategic tradition not blur the leadership's awareness of the need for change.[12]

Professor Charles Chadbourn and "Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce" in 2010. Professor Chadbourn came to the College in 1974 to teach the Center for Continuing Education's off-campus Strategy and Policy seminar in Washington, D.C. In 2010, he succeeded Professor Richmond Lloyd as faculty marshal. He regularly came from Washington to Newport to lead academic processions at convocation and graduation ceremonies, carrying the faculty mace that had been presented to the College at its centenary in 1984. Starting in about 2003, Commander Tyrus "Ty" Lemerande, a 1994 Naval Academy graduate and public affairs officer with a master of fine arts degree in theatre arts from Pennsylvania State University, regularly played the costumed role of Admiral Luce, presenting a version of Luce's 1903 address to incoming students on the meaning of the College.

Naval War College Museum Collection

In short, the Naval War College needed an anchor to windward. It needed something that the College's executive leadership and faculty and staff could come back to time and again to see whether the College was being true to its purpose or whether it needed to change its purpose as a result of some set of emerging issues.[13] Rempt and Giblin also believed that a statement of the College's strategic tradition had to be more than rhetoric. The statement needed to have a very practical and abiding influence in everything the College did. For Rempt and Giblin, the Naval War College's statement of its

strategic tradition was, in effect, its anchor to windward: its broad measure of institutional effectiveness and a strong indicator of its institutional integrity.[14]


2
Unclassified
Executive Summary
THE COLLEGE'S STRATEGIC TRADITION ...
WHO WE ARE
"The War College is a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war."
RADM STEPHEN B. LUCE, USN
Founding President, NWC, 1884
"Always keep in mind the product which this country ... needs is military leaders with the capability of solving complex problems and executing their decisions. Scholarship for scholarship's sake is of no importance to us. You must keep your sights set on decision making or problem solving as your objective."
VADM STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
President, NWC, 1972

"The College's Strategic Tradition . . . Who We Are." PowerPoint slide from 24 October 2007 "POM 10 Program Review" briefing, slide 2. The versions of the quotes here differ slightly from those found in the sources cited in the notes.

A review of the history of the College affirmed that its institutional effectiveness had been highest in the eyes of the Navy's senior leadership when two essential conditions existed concurrently.[15] The first indicator was that the College was effective when it held fast to the belief, first articulated by its founding President, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, on 2 June 1903, that the War College "is a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war."[16] Rempt and Giblin also concluded that the College was remarkably well respected when it consistently acted in keeping with Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner's clarification of the purpose of the institution communicated during his commencement address on 24 August 1972. In discussions with his senior staff at the time, Turner was very clear about returning the College to the ideals of Luce, because both Luce and Turner were adamant that the purpose of the College was to prepare leaders to deal more effectively with complicated problems.[17] Accordingly, he charged the College to "always keep in mind that the product which the country . . . needs is military men with the capability of solving complex problems and of executing their decisions. Scholarship for scholarship's sake is of no importance to us. You must keep your sights on decision making or problem solving as your objective."[18] Rempt and Giblin concluded that the closer the College had held to the intent of Luce and Turner, the more effective it had been. They decided that these two historic statements of intent constituted the enduring strategic tradition and fundamental purpose of the Naval War College and should be the driving forces of the College's approach to everything it did.

The Turner Conference Room in Conolly Hall as It Appeared at the Time of Its Dedication in 2004. The room, located across the corridor from the President's office, had served as the President's conference room since the construction of Conolly Hall in 1974. After renovations to the room in 2019, the room was rededicated in December 2019 to Vice Admiral James Stockdale, who had been President of the College from 1977 to 1979. A year earlier, on 7 August 2018, General David Petraeus had delivered the inaugural Admiral Stansfield Turner Memorial Lecture and dedicated the Admiral Stansfield Turner Walkway between Mahan and Spruance Halls. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Indeed, Turner confirmed that this had been his intent in a conversation with Rear Admiral Ronald Route and Provost Giblin on 7 May 2004 during the dedication of the Stansfield Turner Conference Room. Turner verified that he wanted to get this message across to the College's faculty, staff, and

Professor John E. Jackson. A captain in the U.S. Navy's Supply Corps, Jackson served at the Naval War College in a variety of roles in uniform and as a civilian professor. Among his various duties, he was a speechwriter and research assistant for several Naval War College presidents and master of ceremonies at evening lectures, key figure for the Chief of Naval Operations' Professional Reading Program, Director of the College of Continuing Education from 1996 to 2002, and Director of Development and Long Range Planning.
Photo Courtesy of Professor Jackson

students as the very essence of the College's purpose. He recognized the importance of academic rigor and original research to achieve the effect of producing graduates who could lead in the solution of complex national security problems. Turner believed that academic rigor was an essential means to that end, not its purpose. He confirmed that Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., who had been the Chief of Naval Operations during his tenure as President of the College, explicitly approved his thinking on this point.

Setting the Anchor

The provost directed Professor John E. Jackson, the College's Director of Development and Long Range Planning, assisted by Associate Dean of Academics Bill Spain, to use this strategic tradition as the core purpose of the College and to lead the College's strategic planning process and mission analysis in preparation for the visit of the Naval Inspector General.[19] After eight months of work, Rempt approved a new strategic plan on 1 April 2003. The Naval War College's strategic plan for 2003 established a vision for the future with a set of guiding principles to execute the following revised mission:[20]

> The Naval War College serves the nation by providing graduate and professional maritime and joint military education, advanced research and study, gaming, and public outreach programs to:
>
> - Prepare U.S. and international military officers and civilians to meet national security challenges as senior leaders in naval, joint, interagency, and multinational arenas.
> - Enable students to develop and execute the national military strategy and conduct maritime and joint operations applying sound strategic and operational art.
> - Develop advanced strategic and operational concepts for employment of naval, joint, and multinational forces.
> - Assist the Chief of Naval Operations in defining the future Navy and its role in national security.
> - Provide leadership in shaping the global maritime order to foster peaceful use of the world's oceans.

The faculty and staff in general approved the revised mission statement and the College's strategic tradition, which were first articulated in public during the Naval Inspector General's visit to the College. There was unanimous agreement on Luce's expression of the strategic tradition by the civilian and military faculty. There was also near-unanimous agreement among the military members of the faculty, and concurrence by some of the civilian faculty, on the importance of the inclusion of Turner's intent in the College's strategic tradition. Indeed, the 2003 strategic plan affirmed that one of the Naval War College's guiding principles in executing the College's mission was to "keep the research and scholarly activities of the College relevant to the needs of the Navy and the Nation."[21] However, some of the civilian faculty were uneasy with Turner's viewpoint. Though they acknowledged that he did indeed make the statement

during his near-legendary convocation speech in 1972, some were concerned that the inclusion of this part of his address in the strategic tradition set the wrong tone and challenged the College's commitment to academic freedom. Their line of reasoning was sincere and generally followed the position of the American Association of University Professors that "institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole."[22] The College's 2003 strategic plan unequivocally stated that the first of the College's guiding principles was to "safeguard individual academic freedom and the academic integrity of the institution."[23] Nevertheless, one well-respected civilian faculty member, who had served at the College for a number of years, insisted that the inclusion of Turner's statement challenged the College's commitment to academic freedom and the intrinsic value of scholarship, the search for the truth, and, therefore, the integrity of the institution. For other faculty members, the quotations from Luce and Turner seemed to put the two views against one another, placing applied and pure research in opposition. In fact, they were complementary. A closer examination of these two flag officers' thinking shows that the two quotations, when taken out of context, suggest a dichotomy, but in fact the two admirals agreed. Both leaders understood that the ultimate purpose of the institution was to educate and to widen the intellectual and professional perspectives of officers who had to undertake enormous practical responsibilities. At the same time, both also understood that established knowledge was not sufficient to provide the basis for the applied insights that the College's graduates needed. New and original pure research had to create continually the insights that formed the basis for practical applications.

The strategic planning and mission analysis effort led by Jackson and Spain generated broad acceptance of a simple, abbreviated mission for the College: "Educate Tomorrow's Leaders" and "Help CNO Define the Future Navy."[24] The first two elements of the mission statement clearly focused on the function of education. The last three elements incorporated the College's role in helping shape the future in terms of the maritime and military instruments of national and international power on the world's oceans. Although these elements highlighted the responsibilities of the College's research, analysis, and gaming function, they did so in a more inclusive manner than previous statements of the College's mission.[25] The faculty and staff were uncertain about the mission element that required the Naval War College to "provide leadership in shaping the global maritime order to foster peaceful use of the world's oceans." While sufficiently precise to some, this function was new to much of the College community. Accordingly, there was a good deal of discussion among the faculty about an adequate definition of the function. Faculty members acknowledged that there was no doubt that a portion of the faculty had been engaged in studying oceans policy focused on the law of the sea for several years. However, many of the faculty believed that this function was the least understood and least emphasized aspect of the College's research, analysis, and gaming activities as well as its curricula. Some viewed it as more in the nature of an underlying theme.[26] The events of 11 September 2001 and the College's response to them had created a strong sense in Newport that the College should be more broadly involved in activities than this element of the revised mission statement implied.

Vice Admiral Church and the Naval Inspector General's team subjected to their scrutiny the College's new statements for its mission and its strategic tradition. They validated the College's assessment that it was meeting its revised mission of providing professional maritime and joint military education to educate the future leaders of the Navy.[27] Church also concluded that the College was helping the Chief of Naval

Operations to define the future of the Navy through its research, analysis, and gaming programs.[28] However, he commented informally to Rempt and Giblin that the revised mission in *Strategic Plan 2003* lacked the detailed tasking—by function and task—characteristic of a complete mission, function, and task statement. This was not a surprise to Rempt and Giblin. During the course of the strategic planning process and mission analysis, it became evident that the faculty and staff had a difficult time in moving beyond the broad mission statement to distinguish the particular functions of the College from other Navy second-echelon commands. The same was true with respect to the drafting of the specified and implied tasks required to execute those functions. After considering the Inspector General's very positive response to the new mission statement and strategic tradition statements, despite the shortcoming with respect to specific functions and tasks, Rempt considered that the anchor was set when it came to the broad outlines of the College's mission.

Now Set the Anchor Watch

Rempt recognized that it was prudent to set an anchor watch, as a ship does after it anchors, to ensure that the College's anchor to windward through the new mission statement was holding firm. On conclusion of the Inspector General's visit, he decided to continue to use the phrasing of the strategic tradition and new mission statements during the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education with the College of Naval Warfare in May 2003. He also concluded that, assuming the board agreed, it would be best for the College to subject the statements to additional scrutiny during the reaffirmation visit of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges scheduled for September 2004. Rear Admiral Route, who had relieved Rempt on 9 July 2003, strongly endorsed *Strategic Plan 2003* and its "intensive [development] process of meetings, discussion, and analyses."[29] At the Board of Advisors meeting in Newport in November 2003, the board affirmed the statements of both the mission and the strategic tradition in the strongest of terms and concurred that the College needed to add the detailed functions and tasks to create a complete statement of the College's missions, functions, and tasks. The members of the board also confirmed their belief in the importance of an authoritative statement in terms of the command relationships of the College. They stressed that the new mission, functions, and tasks statement would be the document that, if approved, would affirm the Chief of Naval Operations' intention with respect to the importance of the President, Naval War College's reporting to him as a second-echelon commander for purposes of mission assignment and accomplishment, governance, and broad policy guidance.

This was an important piece of advice on the part of the Board of Advisors. In making this recommendation, its members were aware of the agreement that Rempt and Admiral Vern Clark had made for the College President to shift resource sponsors but to remain a second-echelon commander reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations for broad policy guidance, mission assignment and execution, and governance.[30] The board's concerns showed prescience in the light of subsequent initiatives to examine educational governance between 2004 and 2007. These included such initiatives as the Vice Chief of Naval Operations' top-down review of naval education and training, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education's Education Strategy Task Force, and the integration effort. In addition, the staff of the Commander, Naval Education and Training Command made several attempts during the tenures of Admirals Rempt and Route to portray the President of the Naval War College as a third-echelon

commander reporting to Commander, Naval Education and Training Command. Dean "Barney" Rubel eloquently explained, "Institutional strength . . . governs how much value a service derives from its investment in education. Institutional strength is a function of the overall influence a school has on its students, service leadership and on concepts and doctrine."[31] This simple, but persuasive, truism highlighted the importance of a close command relationship between the College and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Before the College could develop the 2003 draft mission statement into a complete mission statement and forward it to Washington for approval, Clark issued his *CNO Guidance for 2004*. Issued on 2 January 2004, this document directed the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Chief of Naval Education and Training, and the President of the Naval War College to "increase opportunities for JPME completion by delivering an accredited maritime-focused JPME Phase I course for URL [unrestricted line] officers, incorporating JPME Phase I into Naval Postgraduate School curriculum, and increasing both quotas and fill rates for Naval War College" and to "establish an enlisted and officer Navy Professional Military Education continuum as a critical element for career progression and provide opportunities for completion of the requirements through a variety of delivery options."[32] Rear Admiral Route understood that this was a significant statement by the uniformed leader of the naval profession and indicated that there were other things on Clark's mind with respect to the future of the College. Because of this, he decided that it would be in the College's best interest to delay the submission of a revised mission statement until the effects of the expanded continuum for the Navy's professional military education became clearer.

In preparation for the New England Association's visit to reaffirm its academic accreditation, the College initiated a yearlong self-assessment. Part of this self-study addressed the association's standards of academic freedom and integrity. To assess the level of compliance within the College, a self-study team headed by Professor Andrew R. "Dex" Wilson of the Strategy and Policy Department assessed the New England Association's standards for integrity. In March 2004, this team administered a self-evaluation questionnaire to measure the faculty's opinion of the level of compliance with those standards. The team's purpose in doing this was to gather information for drafting its portion of the self-study. Although not intended, the results of the team's questionnaire also provided insight into the level of the faculty's acceptance of the revised mission and strategic tradition statements, after they had been in effect for nearly a year. The vast majority of respondents—85 to 95 percent, depending on the question—agreed or strongly agreed that the College was in full compliance with the letter and spirit of the New England Association's ten specified standards on institutional integrity.[33]

From the results of the survey and its assessment, the task force concluded that a majority of the faculty deemed that the "College could not be as successful if it were not absolutely committed to the NEASC goal of 'the free pursuit and dissemination of knowledge.'"[34] The self-study highlighted the fact that the faculty "are expected to recognize that one of their primary responsibilities is 'to seek and state the truth without bias' and to extend and transmit knowledge in their respective fields of expertise."[35] The self-study went on to state that "practice and experience to date in the implementation of this relationship suggest that the faculty is remarkably productive in scholarship, and many are recognized as leading figures in their respective disciplines."[36] The New England Association's accreditation team appreciated the diligence of the College's task force in conducting this survey and the overall assessment. The accreditation team did not

question it. In fact, during private meetings with Giblin and Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, who had relieved Route on 12 August 2004, the accreditation team affirmed the value of the College's statement of its strategic tradition in terms of its mission, as a measure of the College's institutional effectiveness, and as an indicator of its institutional integrity. The final report of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges noted with approval "the longstanding commitment of the College's faculty to research and other forms of scholarship."[37] As far as Shuford was concerned, this conclusion put to rest any questions of the College's strategic tradition and core purpose. The College had set its anchor to windward, and it was holding.

Now Set the Underway Watch: The Course to the New Mission

On conclusion of the New England Association's accreditation visit, Shuford, Giblin, Spain, and others discussed the situation. Shuford decisively endorsed Route's earlier decision to delay the further development and submission of a revised statement of the College's missions, functions, and tasks.[38] Shuford agreed that the College was responsible for professional military education and research, analysis, and gaming, but he was confident that there was a set of additional, critical missions and functions that were uniquely associated with the College that could become a basis for planning and action and, perhaps, eventually become part of a new mission statement to replace the outdated document.

By late October 2004, Shuford, Giblin, and Spain had concluded that the abbreviated mission statement to "Educate Tomorrow's Leaders" that emerged from the strategic planning and mission analysis process in 2003 did not convey an adequate sense of focus on Navy professional military education and joint professional military education. They determined that it was imperative that the new mission statement do so. These two areas were what distinguished the College from other naval educational institutions, such as the Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. Both lines of operations rested on the seminal requirement for leadership at the operational and strategic levels of the military. The Naval War College's mission to develop strategic and operational leaders reflected this linkage; it was arguably the first of the College's core mission elements and the one most closely associated with the College's strategic tradition.[39] In November 2004, Shuford confirmed that the mission to develop leaders, along with the portion of the mission statement in *Strategic Plan 2003* that expected the Naval War College to help the Chief of Naval Operations define the future Navy, represented the College's enduring strengths and unique value to the Navy. Shuford declared that taken together, they constituted the Naval War College's core mission.[40]

During Shuford's meeting with Admiral Clark on 17 December 2004, Shuford told the Chief of Naval Operations of his decision with respect to the College's two mission elements. Shuford emphasized the point that he believed that the College needed to begin to revitalize and focus its capabilities at the operational level of war and the near-term (i.e., two to ten years out) strategic, operational, and policy challenges in the maritime domain.[41] One of the broad themes Shuford emphasized in developing strategic and operational leaders was that "our officers are not adequately prepared for Joint Ops and Planning."[42] Shuford also noted that "while the fundamental functions of the College's mission as the Navy's intermediate and senior-level professional military education institution remain constant, the context within which NWC must accomplish its work continues to evolve rapidly."[43] During this meeting, Clark responded that the College's interpretation of the Navy's Professional Military Education Continuum and its intent to differentiate between the intermediate and senior courses were correct. The implication for the College's mission was

straightforward: the Chief of Naval Operations was demanding explicit differentiation across a sequential set of primary, intermediate, and senior professional programs. Emphasizing the quotation from Stansfield Turner in the statement of the College's strategic tradition, Shuford told Admiral Clark what he saw as the clear, fundamental measures of effectiveness for the College. "Our academic programs and research products must remain relevant and focused on key issues of the day," Shuford stated. "Our case studies, war games, and exercises must address the issues of transformation, change management, risk analysis, the evolving international security environment, and defeating terrorism."[44]

Three weeks later, when Clark's *CNO Guidance for 2005* appeared, it was clear to Shuford that the College needed to further revise its draft mission, functions, and tasks statement. He still believed that there were additional functions and tasks that could affect a final version. Although the 2005 CNO guidance hinted at one of them, it did not emerge clearly for another year until Admiral Mike Mullen published his *CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era* on 2 January 2006.[45] Mullen's guidance included a call to "establish and enable Globally Networked Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders. . . ."[46] The net effect of Mullen's goal, along with Clark's *CNO Guidance for 2005* decisions on various initiatives to focus on the operational level of war, was for the Navy to embark on an ambitious initiative to regain its competency in command and control at the operational level.[47] The role of the College in this quest generated a third core mission area and significantly drove the development of the new statement of the mission, functions, and tasks. Commander, Fleet Forces Command's additional requests in 2006 for the planners "Short Course," the Maritime Staff Officers Course, and an assess and assist team added both urgency and momentum to the development of this mission area.



Chief of Naval Operations–Commander, Fleet Forces Command–Directed Mission Growth. PowerPoint slide from 24 October 2007 "POM 10 Program Review" briefing, slide 4.

By the end of August 2006, Shuford, Giblin, and Spain had agreed that the majority of changes for the various new tasks assigned to the College were, in varying degrees, already initiated or in progress. Giblin and Spain believed that the College could draft a detailed mission, functions, and tasks statement that would comprehensively describe the College's unique capabilities, would align the College to support emerging challenges, and could stand for the next twelve to fifteen years. Because of the challenges the faculty and staff encountered in developing the detailed tasks in 2003, Shuford directed that Giblin and Spain prepare an initial draft to accelerate and focus the subsequent comment and discussion by College faculty and staff.[48] Working closely together, sometimes on weekends when the College was quiet, Spain

and Giblin first focused on reviewing the existing and expected statutory, policy, and strategy requirements that defined the operating environment of the College for the near future. On the basis of previous work on the "Path to Joint" and more recently on the evolving standards for joint qualification, they decided to formulate the new statement to reflect a set of eight legislative requirements, eight policy requirements, fourteen strategy requirements, and those elements of the existing statement that were still germane.[49]

They first turned their efforts to the sections that stated the mission and the details of the functions. They believed that it was imperative to get these clearly stated and to get Shuford's agreement before proceeding to the drafting of the detailed tasks. Given Shuford's previous decisions regarding the College's mission statements with respect to developing strategic and operational leaders and helping the Chief of Naval Operations define the future Navy, Giblin and Spain went to great lengths to define the functions that operationalized these mission statements. In the first case, they focused on wording that called for the College to provide a "rigorous and relevant resident and non-resident program of PME with JPME embedded in it."[50] Their intent was to create a clear distinction in terms of what the Chief of Naval Operations expected of the Naval War College that was different from other naval commands. After substantial discussion, they agreed that the desired effect of the College's work was to create "a group of leaders of character who have trust and confidence in each other and are operationally and strategically minded, critical thinkers, proficient in joint matters, and skilled naval and joint warfighters."[51]

This mission-driven approach, along with the other decisions made concerning the rest of the mission elements, created an opportunity to better align resources and organization or function with form. The sheer breadth and diversity of the College's mission sometimes made communicating and aligning organizational action with mission-level intent problematic. A key issue among the considerations was the fact that the College had been generating its budget submissions using an organizational rather than a functional model before 2003. This made it difficult for the Navy Staff, as well as the War College's staff, to link the College's budget requirements with its approved mission, functions, and tasks statement. For purposes of organizational planning, programming, and budgetary clarity, the provost designated the group of educational programs—that is, the resident and nonresident intermediate and senior-level core courses, electives, and the resources they required—"Major Functional Program–1." In addition, Giblin made it clear that the responsibility for this program rested squarely with the dean of academics.[52] Thus, in a fundamental change of approach, mission-based programs were to become the impulse and motivation for the College's workforce and financial resource requirements rather than the organizations that expended the resources. In early September 2006, Giblin and Spain explained their work to Shuford on this portion of the new mission, tasks, and functions statement. He agreed completely and directed them to continue their work using the major functional program model to formulate the remainder of the statement.

Concurrently with the new requirement to develop strategic and operational leaders, the two worked on the second element of the new mission. Based on Shuford's 17 December 2004 meeting with Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark and confirmed by the directions of his successor, Admiral Mullen, to develop a new maritime strategy in August 2006, the second element of the mission was clear and was consistent. As the abbreviated mission statement created during the 2003 planning process succinctly stated it: "Help CNO Define the Future Navy." In practical terms, this mission would require the College to conduct "research,

analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the combatant commanders, their Navy component commanders, the numbered fleet commanders, other USN and USMC operational commanders, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government."[53] The desired effect would be a "program of focused, forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming that: anticipates future operational and strategic challenges; develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges; assesses the risk associated with these concepts; and provides analytical products that inform the Navy's leadership and help shape key decisions."[54]

In this statement, Shuford, Giblin, Spain, and Rubel had deliberately chosen the words "anticipates future operational and strategic challenges" and "develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges." Similarly, they had carefully worded the parts of the mission, tasks, and functions statement that tasked the College to assess "the risk associated with these concepts" and provide "analytical products that inform the Navy's leadership and help shape key decisions." Their intent in using these words was to ensure that the College's ongoing, successful efforts—such as the work being done by the Halsey Groups to provide direct warfighting support to the Navy's operational-level commanders—would not be limited bureaucratically in terms of the essential linkage between war gaming and concept development, two capabilities that only the College possessed.[55] For purposes of organizational and planning, programming, and budgetary clarity, the provost designated the programmatic means to achieve this desired effect and the resources required to execute them "Major Functional Program–2."[56] The provost's action aligned the College's research, analysis, and gaming programs (e.g., war gaming, strategic analysis, decision support, maritime history, and international legal research) under the dean of naval warfare studies, who had the responsibility to plan, program, and budget for these programs rather than the organizations that expended resources to execute them.

Revitalizing the Navy at the Operational Level of War: Supporting Combat Readiness

Shuford's experience while in command of the USS *Lincoln* Strike Group and as the Navy's head detailer, along with a running discourse with his peer group and several numbered fleet commanders, had crystalized his view of a fundamental weakness of how the Navy had positioned itself vis-à-vis the joint command structure over preceding decades.[57] With an effective approach to this deficiency as his highest priority, Shuford met with a like-minded and willing group within the College. By late fall 2004, a very broad consensus had begun to emerge in Newport that much work to do remained to restore within the Navy its sense of primacy at the operational level of war, and that the Naval War College could be the catalyst. First, Shuford directed the College to realign its efforts internally to support directly the Navy's operational commanders. Second, he directed leaders within the College to take every opportunity to remind the Navy's senior officials that the operational level of war was part of the College's strategic tradition. Third, he believed that it was essential that the Naval War College bolster the Navy's capacity to support and to lead at the operational and strategic levels of war. Roughly expressed, the desired objective of his plan was to "get some Navy elbows back on the table" in terms of command and control at the operational level.

The directives to the College in 2005 and 2006 from successive Chiefs of Naval Operations Clark and Mullen added momentum to this objective and supported the College's initiative. The executive leadership of the

College quickly appreciated that these tasks and the College's responses to them gave a way to answer the question that had been hounding it since 1999: "What does the War College do to support combat readiness?" Rear Admiral Tom "Chain" Zelibor, USN (Ret.), then dean of the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership; Professors Richard "Sleeps" Findlay and Thomas Bayley; Giblin; and Spain concentrated on developing a mission and functions statement focused on the requirement to support combat readiness. Given his personal interest in the importance of this subject, Shuford was aggressively involved in the drafting and review of this portion of the statement.

The most suitable role for the College, the drafters concluded, would be for it to

> conduct training, education, leadership and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy's Joint Force Maritime and Navy Component Commanders to function effectively as operational commanders. This effort shall include supporting the needs of the Combatant Commanders, Navy Component Commanders, and the Navy's numbered fleet commanders for operational planning, analysis, and war gaming to respond to emerging operational requirements.[58]

They posited that the desired effect of these activities was to "improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint and combined forces and their staff members to plan, execute and assess and function cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization."[59] These words represented the basis for a wide range of programs to revitalize and reinforce the Navy's ability to plan and lead the joint effort. For purposes of organizational and planning, programming, and budgetary clarity, the provost designated the programmatic means to achieve this desired effect "Major Functional Program–3."[60] In the same manner as Giblin's decisions with respect to the first and second mission functional programs, this action aligned the College's combat support programs under the dean of the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, who had the responsibility to plan, program, and budget for these programs, not the organizations that executed them. These programs included the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course, the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course, the Maritime Staff Operators Course, and the assist and assess teams.

The Fourth Mission Element

The fourth element of the mission emerged from the process that led to *Strategic Plan 2003*. There had been some uncertainty about the mission statement in that document that required the College to "provide leadership in shaping the global maritime order to foster peaceful use of the world's oceans." In the interim, a number of national policy documents had focused attention on the importance of maritime security cooperation.[61] Admiral Vern Clark's *CNO Guidance for 2005* reinforced the importance of these policies. Clark directed the Naval War College to "improve on our maritime security cooperation initiatives" and to "increase the representation of countries identified in [Secretary of Defense's] Security Cooperation Guidance and CNO's FY05–FY06 Maritime Security Cooperation Guidance in the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College to at least 85%."[62] Giblin, Spain, and Assistant Dean for International Programs Vincent Mocini conducted a detailed mission analysis that led them to conclude that the College's focus on educating international students was strong but that there were missing elements that could enhance

navy-to-navy relationships and thereby enhance maritime security cooperation. They concluded that the College needed to

> bring together senior- and intermediate-level naval officers from other countries to develop leaders for high command in their navies; understand and evolve operational planning methods; create opportunities for expanded, high level professional exchange through venues such as the International Seapower Symposium, Regional Symposia, formal college-to-college relationships with international counterparts, international publications, and alumni relations; and establish a regional studies structure to focus resources for greater impact in building and extending maritime partnerships.[63]

The desired effect would be to "build more robust and productive international maritime relationships, to improve the ability to operate effectively with partner nations, and to improve maritime security cooperation."[64] For purposes of organizational and planning, programming, and budgetary clarity, the provost designated the group of programmatic means to achieve these desired effects "Major Functional Program–4."[65] This decision effectively aligned those programs and the organizations that executed them under the assistant dean for international programs, later the dean of international programs.

A fifth function, "Mission Support," was the "housekeeping" element of the College's mission. It required the College to manage and administer its human, physical, and financial resources in accordance with Department of the Navy, higher headquarters, and internal guidance, and as required to accomplish its mission, functions, and tasks. It addressed such requirements as facilities management, security, public affairs, financial management, special events support, and human resources management. For purposes of organizational and planning, programming, and budgetary clarity, the provost designated the group of programmatic means to achieve these desired effects "Major Functional Program–5," aligned under the responsibilities of the chief of staff.

Once Shuford had approved these mission and functions statements, Giblin and Spain turned their attention to drafting the tasks associated with each of the College's functions. Their goal was to ensure that the set of tasks for each function represented precisely what the College was or should be doing. In some cases, this amounted to refining the tasks from the previous mission, functions, and tasks statement. In others, they needed to draft new tasks. This detailed and tedious work involved coordination with a variety of the College's faculty and staff. By early February 2007, the two had identified and achieved a consensus among the faculty and staff on the following:

- nineteen tasks that specified how the College would "Develop Strategic and Operational Leaders";
- seventeen tasks that described the College's research, analysis, and gaming activities that would "Help CNO Define the Future Navy";
- ten tasks that detailed how the College would "Support Combat Readiness";
- seven tasks that defined those actions required to "Strengthen Maritime Security"; and
- thirteen tasks that enumerated the necessary "Mission Support" activities of the College.

After a final review to ensure accuracy and consistency, the provost formally submitted the College's revised mission, functions, and tasks on 6 March 2007 to the Chief of Naval Operations via the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education.[66]



3 Unclassified

Executive Summary

THE COLLEGE'S MISSION … WHAT WE DO

Develop Strategic & Operational Leaders

➢ **Desired Effect:** A group of leaders of character who:
- Have trust and confidence in each other
- Are operationally and strategically minded
- Are critical thinkers
- Are proficient in joint matters
- Are skilled in naval and joint warfare

➢ **Requirement:** Provide PME/JPME programs that are current, rigorous, relevant, and accessible to the maximum number of qualified U.S. officers and Navy enlisted personnel, civilian employees of the U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations, and international officers.

Help CNO Define the Future Navy

➢ **Desired Effect**: A program of focused, forward-thinking and timely research that:
- Anticipates future operational and strategic challenges
- Develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome these challenges
- Assesses the risk associated with those concepts
- Provides analyses that inform the Navy's leadership and help shape key decisions

➢ **Requirement**: Conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of SECNAV, CNO, the COCOMs, the NCCs, numbered fleet commanders, other USN and USMC operational commanders, the US Intelligence Community, and other departments and agencies of the USG.

Strengthen Maritime Security Cooperation

➢ **Desired Effect**:
- Build and strengthen international maritime relationships
- Improve the ability of the U.S. and partner nations to operate together in the maritime domain

➢ **Requirement**: Bring together senior and intermediate level naval officers from other countries to:
- Develop leaders for high command in their navies
- Promote an open exchange of professional views
- Encourage friendship and cooperation
- Study operational planning methods

Support Combat Readiness

➢ **Desired effect:**
- Improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint, and multinational forces
- Improve the capability of their staff members to plan, execute and assess, and to function cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization

➢ **Requirement**
- Conduct education, training, leadership, and assessment activities to support the ability of Navy J/CFMCCs and NCCs to function effectively as operational commanders.
- Support their needs for operational planning, analysis, and war gaming to respond to emerging operational requirements

"The College's Mission: What We Do." PowerPoint slide from 24 October 2007 "POM 10 Program Review" briefing, slide 3.

The action officers in the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations did not warmly receive the new mission, tasks, and functions statement. Although they accepted the broad mission statement, the action officers approached their review as if the Naval War College were a third-echelon command reporting to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education rather than as an echelon II command reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition, they took issue with the statement of the College's functions and tasks but did not offer any specific objections or corrections to them. The College's leaders found this unacceptable as an echelon II command. As a temporary measure, Giblin reached an agreement in July 2007 with Mr. Pat McLaughlin, the deputy to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education. They agreed that the College's revised mission, tasks, and functions statement would be the basis for the College's planning, programming, and budgeting actions until such time as Admiral Gary Roughead, the prospective Chief of Naval Operations, relieved Mullen and made a decision with respect to what he expected of the Naval War College.

Neither Giblin nor Shuford was comfortable with the tenuous nature of this interim agreement. Giblin, who had played the lead role in creating and staffing the statement through extraordinary political and practical wickets, planned to retire from his position as the provost in January 2008. During Roughead's first visit to the College as Chief of Naval Operations, Giblin took the opportunity for an informal "pull aside" with him on the evening of 16 October 2007 during the welcoming reception at the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium. Roughead thanked the provost for his service to the Navy and the College and asked him whether there was anything he could do for Giblin prior to the provost's retirement. In

Admiral Roughead and Provost Giblin Chatting during the Welcome Reception for the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium on the Evening of 16 October 2007. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

a move that was uncharacteristic of Giblin in a social context, he responded to Roughead that there was indeed. Giblin then very briefly explained the state of the situation surrounding the revised mission, functions, and tasks statement. He acknowledged that the College and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations' staff could disagree about certain tasks in the document but affirmed that, in fact, the College was already accomplishing nearly all of them. Giblin asked Roughead to meet with Shuford to review the matter with a view toward getting the Chief of Naval Operations to agree to the mission and functions. Roughead promised that he would do so.

Subsequently, Shuford briefed Roughead on 22 February 2008 on the Naval War College's revised mission statement with its four major functions. Roughead approved the mission statement and its four functions, indicating that it aligned with his intent for the College.[67] Roughead's decision enabled the College to continue to operate as well as to plan, program, and budget for its execution under the terms of its revised statement. In doing this, Roughead validated that the College's strategic tradition and its updated mission and functions paralleled the track Roughead was laying for the direction of the Navy he was leading.

Epilogue: The Bureaucratic Resolution

The College used the draft mission statement during the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education that recommended the College of Naval Warfare for full accreditation of the joint professional military education Phase II program in the spring of 2009. The accreditation team was scheduled to return in the fall of 2009 to reaffirm the Phase I accreditation of the College of Naval Command and Staff and the four College of Distance Education intermediate-level programs. Before that occurred, the new President of the College, Rear Admiral J. Philip Wisecup, who had relieved Shuford in November 2008, and Ambassador Mary Ann Peters, who had assumed the position of provost in January 2009, wanted to resubmit the statement of the College's mission, functions, and tasks for formal approval. Associate Provost Spain, working with Professor Jay Hickey, updated the 2007 draft and submitted it in October 2009 to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education. The staff's reception of this update was no different. The staff rejected it in the spring of 2010 without consideration at the flag level.[68]

In September 2011, the College began the process of reviewing and updating its strategic plan. Part of that process was to review again the draft mission statement under which the College had been operating. Later that autumn, the director of the Navy Staff, Vice Admiral John Bird, discovered that there were several second-echelon commanders operating under and resourced against outdated statements of the missions, functions, and tasks. Bird directed those commanders, including the President of the Naval War College, to submit revised statements directly to him. In response to this, Spain coordinated with the various deans

to complete a final update of the College's statement. The College submitted the revised statement directly to the director of the Navy Staff with a copy to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education. Vice Admiral Bird personally reviewed the College's draft early in the spring of 2012 and recommended some changes to the wording. In particular, he asked that the College change the phrase "Help CNO Define the Future Navy" to "Support Defining the Future Navy and Associated Roles and Missions" and change the words "Strengthen Maritime Security Cooperation" to "Strengthen Global Maritime Partnerships." Spain made these changes and resubmitted the draft within one day.[69] Several weeks later and after a journey of just over five years, the director of the Navy Staff issued the College's mission statement on 23 May 2012 as an instruction.[70] The approved version was substantially the same as the draft submitted over five years earlier on 6 March 2007.

NOTES

1. For the 2000 statement of the mission, functions, and tasks: OPNAVINST 5450.207C, "Mission, Functions and Tasks of the Naval War College," Washington, D.C., 10 July 2000.
2. Giblin Papers (privately held): Department of the Navy, Office of the Naval Inspector General, "Command Inspection of Naval War College, Part 2," letter 5040 Serial N3B/1316 of 25 August 2003 [hereinafter cited as "Command Inspection Report (2003)"], p. 24.
3. Ibid., p. 25.
4. See chapter 19, p. 439, for a discussion of the "divot."
5. "Command Inspection Report (2003)," p. 17. The IG report also confirmed the College's assessment that, although prior-year augmentation did occur, "increases reflected one-time budget adjustments rather than permanent program budget increases" and that while an "additional baseline adjustment in FY-02 and FY-03 enabled the College to sustain its basic mission, functions, and tasks," neither of these baseline "adjustments were carried forward in the outyears."
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 1.
8. Unless otherwise noted, this section is adapted from Giblin's recollections.
9. This paradigm was adapted from that proposed by Alastair Iain Johnston in his *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), p. 1.
10. Ibid.
11. This part of the concept was adapted from Alan Henrikson's "The Geographical 'Mental Maps' of American Foreign Policy Makers," *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique,* October 1980, pp. 495–530.
12. Adapted from Johnston, *Cultural Realism,* p. 1.
13. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers]: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. Conducted on September 17, 2009 by James Rife [hereinafter cited as Giblin Oral History], p. 20.
14. Ibid., p. 21.
15. Rempt and Giblin used John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984), extensively during this review.
16. Stephen B. Luce, "An Address Delivered at the United States Naval War College, Narragansett Bay, R.I., June 2, 1903," reprinted in *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce*, ed. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1975), pp. 39–40.
17. Prof. John Hattendorf to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Evolution of the College's Mission," e-mail, 2 February 2016.
18. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File: Stansfield Turner, "Convocation Address by the President of the Naval War College, 24 August 1972."
19. See attachment 1 to Professor John Jackson to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update of *Sailors and Scholars,*" e-mail, 16 February 2016. The Executive Steering Committee included Rear Admiral Rempt; Dr. Jim Giblin, provost/dean of academics; Captain John Meyer, USN, deputy/chief of staff; Dr. Alberto Coll, dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies; Professor Bill Spain, associate dean of academics; Dr. Jim Miskel, associate dean of academics for graduate development; Dr. Mac Owens, associate dean of academics for electives; Dr. Tom Nichols, chair of the Strategy and Policy Department; Dr. Joan Jonson-Freese, then chair of the National Security Decision Making Department; Captain Tony Ruoti, chair of the Joint Military Operations Department; Professor Dennis Mandsager, chair of the International Law Department; Dr. Ken Watman, chair of the War Gaming Department; Dr. Lawrence Modisett, chair of the Decision Support Center Department; Commander Carol Elliott, director of special events; Captain Rich Suttie, then deputy dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies; Dr. George Baer, chairman emeritus of the Strategy and Policy Department; Dr. Donald Chisholm of the Joint Military Operations Department; Dr. Andy Ross of the Strategic Research Department; Captain Vince Mocini, Director, Naval Command College; Commander David Distito, then Director, Personnel Department; Commander Steve Smith, SC, the College's comptroller; Dr. R. Neff, chief information officer; and Commander Kevin D'Amanda, CEC, then Director, Facilities Department.
20. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval War College, Office of the President, *U.S. Naval War College Strategic Plan, 2003* [hereinafter cited as *Strategic Plan 2003*], p. 1. Rempt was well satisfied with the work that produced *Strategic Plan 2003*. In a handwritten note to Professor John Jackson he remarked, "You have helped me set a strategic plan that has the College on a firm course to come." See President, Naval War College, informal personal note to Professor John Jackson, 2 May 2003.
21. *Strategic Plan 2003,* p. 5.
22. American Association of University Professors, *Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure* (Washington, D.C.: 1940), available at http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure.

23. *Strategic Plan 2003,* p. 5.

24. Ibid.; VADM Rempt to Hattendorf, e-mail, 3 April 2015, with comments.

25. Naval War College, Office of the Provost, *Naval War College Self Study, Submitted to New England Association of Schools and Colleges, Inc., Commission on Institutions of Higher Education* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, August 2004) [hereinafter cited as *NEASC Self Study 2004*], p. 3.

26. Ibid. There was similar concern expressed over the mission element that required the College to conduct "public outreach programs."

27. Church and his team found that "NWC conducted a comprehensive command self-assessment, assessing their performance in all areas, describing their successes as well as identifying challenges and shortfalls." See "Command Inspection Report (2003)," executive summary, p. 1.

28. Ibid.

29. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval War College, Office of the President, "Naval War College 2003 Strategic Plan," memorandum, 25 September 2003.

30. See above, chapter 19.

31. Dean Robert Rubel to RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN, and Dr. James Giblin, "Meeting with DNS on 17 JUL 07 — Education Flagship Institution Navy Enterprise Series," e-mail, 6 July 2007.

32. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2004: Accelerating Our Advantages* (Washington, D.C.: January 2004), p. 7.

33. *NEASC Self Study 2004,* p. 109. The self-appraisal questionnaire prepared by the integrity task force was anonymous, and its organizers were under no pressure to tailor results to satisfy the commission's standards. See ibid., p. 111.

34. Ibid., p. 107.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 108.

37. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Shuford, 2004–2006: New England Association of Schools & Colleges, Inc., Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, Office of the Commissioner, Terrence J. MacTaggart letter to RADM Shuford, 29 March 2005, p. 4.

38. Giblin Oral History, p. 76.

39. Giblin Papers (privately held): Naval War College, Office of the President, "120-Day Assessment for the Chief of Naval Operations" (briefing, 17 December 2004), slide 3.

40. Ibid.

41. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford to NWC faculty and staff, "Quickrep from PNWC 120-Day Assessment Brief to CNO," e-mail, 20 December 2004.

42. "120-Day Assessment," slide 6.

43. Ibid.

44. Shuford to NWC faculty and staff, "Quickrep," 20 December 2004.

45. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: 2006). Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2005: Winning the Fight . . . and Bridging to the Future* (Washington, D.C.: 3 January 2005) [hereinafter cited as *CNOG 05*], p. 9, challenged Navy leadership to expeditiously "develop new concepts of operation and the systems to support them . . . to achieve true integration, even interdependence, with our joint partners. . . ."

46. *CNO Guidance for 2006,* p. 7.

47. Clark's initiatives in *CNO Guidance for 2005* included the need for JFMCC and CFMCC flag courses; the requirement to double the capacity of the Naval Operational Planner Course; and the need to improve the Navy's strategic and operational planning capability. See chap. 22, p. 562, of this edition.

48. The assistance of Mr. Rick Menard, the provost's executive assistant, and Mr. Kelly Williamson, the provost's administrative assistant, was invaluable in this process.

49. For legislative, policy, and strategy requirements, see Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "POM 10 Program Review" (briefing, 24 October 2007), slide 8.

50. Ibid., slides 3 and 15.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., slide 15. Giblin adapted this term from the concept of a "major force program" (MFP) used in DoD's Future Years Defense Program. An MFP is an aggregation of program elements that reflects a force or support mission of DoD and contains the resources necessary to achieve an objective or plan. It also reflects fiscal time-phasing of mission objectives to be accomplished and the means proposed for their accomplishment.

53. Ibid., slide 3.

54. Ibid.

55. Giblin Oral History, pp. 90–91.

56. "POM 10 Program Review," slide 22.

57. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN (Ret.), to Dr. James F. Giblin Jr., "Jacob's Edits—Evolution of the College's Mission," e-mail, 8 May 2016.

58. "POM 10 Program Review," slide 25.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. These included documents such as, but not limited to, Executive Office of the President, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 13, "Maritime Security Policy," 21 December 2004; Executive Office of the President, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: 20 September 2005); and Executive Office of the President, *The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness* (Washington, D.C.: October 2005).

62. *CNOG 05,* p. 14.

63. "POM 10 Program Review," slide 27.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., slide 3.

67. Associate Provost William R. Spain to Prof. John Hattendorf, "NWC Mission, Function and Task Instruction," e-mail, 2 April 2015; Naval War College, Office of the Provost, *Naval War College Self Study: College of Naval Command and Staff and the College of Distance Education, Submitted to CJCS PAJE Team for JPME Phase I* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, September 2009), p. 1-1.

68. Spain to Hattendorf, "NWC Mission, Function and Task Instruction," 2 April 2015.

69. Ibid.

70. OPNAVINST 5450.207D, "Missions, Functions and Tasks of the Naval War College," 23 May 2012.

PRINGLE HALL

Rhode Island Governor Donald Carcieri, President George W. Bush, and Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford at the Podium in Spruance Auditorium, 28 June 2007. President Bush visited the Naval War College as part of the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the Naval Command College. He discussed the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the larger struggle against terrorism.

U.S. Navy Photograph by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Greg Frazho

Chapter Twenty-Four

Strengthening Maritime Security Cooperation

When Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt approved the College's 2003 mission statement, on the recommendation of the planning team it included the requirement to "provide leadership in shaping the global maritime order to foster peaceful use of the world's oceans."[1] While sufficiently specific to some, this portion of the recommended mission was disquieting to several members of the College community. The use of the term *leadership* and what it implied raised questions about the scope and intent of this potential assignment. There was also anxiety on the part of some members of the faculty about raising this requirement to the same level as the long-standing mission components of professional military education, research, analysis, and gaming in light of the possible diversion of already scarce funds and human resources to this newly envisioned activity. Accordingly, there was a good deal of discussion about whether it was adequately mature regarding both substance and process to be executed effectively and efficiently as part of the College's mission, functions, and tasks.

A New Mission Element?

During these discussions, there was a unanimous agreement about the College's responsibility to plan, program, host, and execute the International Seapower Symposium. Its purpose had been clear and enduring—to provide a forum for senior international naval leaders to discuss common maritime challenges and opportunities to enhance international maritime cooperation—since the thirty-fifth President of the College, Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, had conceived and hosted the first symposium in November 1969. It remained a signature effort of the College on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations.[2] There was also no doubt about the unrivaled standing of the senior-level international course, the Naval Command College, founded in 1956, and the intermediate-level international course, the Naval Staff College (NSC), established in 1972. Friends and allies across the globe continued to find great value in these two trademark programs. By 2003, the Naval Command College and Naval Staff College had successfully built trust and confidence among officers from 136 countries over almost five decades in the case of the Naval Command College and more than three decades in the case of the Naval Staff College. Several members of the College community likewise argued that there was value in the faculty's interaction with international navies, institutions, and individuals at other nations' war colleges, civilian universities, and think tanks. While some thought this interaction useful for purposes of faculty development, others thought that most of these activities had little direct connection or coordination with the broader Navy with regard to combatant commanders and Navy component commanders' theater engagement plans and their objectives.[3] For decades, the College's international law faculty had very effectively engaged with many U.S. friends and allies around the globe in the specialized areas of ocean policy, the law of armed conflict, the law of naval

Children of Naval Command College Students Participating in the International Dress Show, 2009. *Naval War College Museum Collection*



Black and White Night Became a Perennial and Highly Popular Social Event for Naval Command College Students and Their Sponsors. During the evening, everyone dressed in black-and-white costumes.

Naval War College Museum Collection

Naval Command College Cookbook Night in the Mahan Hall Reading Room, April 2009. Typically, each year, the members of the Naval Command College create and print a cookbook of their own favorite recipes that reflect their national cuisines. They serve their delicacies to their classmates and others at the College during an international food night.

Naval War College Museum Collection

warfare, and rules of engagement. This activity had been a continuing and prominent means of international engagement that was broadly consistent with various commanders' theater engagement plans, although rarely acknowledged by the Navy's senior leadership as a vital task for the College.

Of the five mission elements proposed by the planning team and approved by Rempt in 2003, the requirement to "provide leadership in shaping the global maritime order to foster peaceful use of the world's oceans" was the least understood and least emphasized in the College's curricula. A majority of the faculty assumed that it was more akin to an underlying theme of the College's professional military education and, to a lesser extent, research, analysis, and gaming programs. Furthermore, the planning team had found it difficult to draft a statement of function and tasks to support this mission element. This limitation was unambiguous testimony to the fact that the members of the team found it problematic to move beyond the broad concept conveyed by this mission element to articulate its corresponding function that differentiated the Naval War College from other echelon II–level commands in the Navy and to specify the tasks required to execute the function.

Suspicions Confirmed

Considering the events following 11 September 2001, the members of the planning team recognized that there was a sense, though not uniformly informed, in Newport in 2002 and 2003 that it was in the interest of the College to be involved more broadly in activities suggested by this new mission element. This perception also tended to confirm the belief among some that the College's mission was evolving to one that was more wide-ranging in scope than professional military education, research, analysis, and gaming. There was also evidence that the planning team under the leadership of Associate Dean of Academics Bill Spain and Professor John Jackson under the oversight of the provost may have unintentionally identified a subtle but significant change in the way national policy makers and the Navy's senior leadership were beginning to think about the maritime operating domain.

Rempt had recognized that these were essential insights and that a vital driving force of the international security environment following 11 September 2001 would be the nation's ability to form and sustain new, broader, and more-effective coalitions. The planning team also recognized that enhancing maritime security cooperation among the United States' friends and allies was one of the crucial functions to support this policy objective and was influential in the way that the College evaluated the suitability and feasibility of this new mission element.

During Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark's remarks at the Fourth Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice, Italy, on 16 October 2002, he struck a theme that focused on "maritime security cooperation." His comments exhibited a distinct shift in tone and substance from the U.S. policy of "engagement" to support the "shaping" strategy of the Clinton Administration to one of "cooperation."[4] Clark candidly admitted to his colleagues that he was in Venice because he was seeking "a continued and stronger relationship with each of your Navies" and that he had "come to believe strongly in the importance of maritime cooperation to national security and to free navigation of the seas for all."[5] He stressed that the U.S. Navy was "looking for every opportunity to increase the level of cooperation with every nation willing to join the challenges of the 21st Century."[6]

The same was true during Clark's opening remarks at the Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium in Newport one year later. He went to great lengths to link the College with his emphasis on the importance of maritime security cooperation. In opening the symposium on the morning of 26 October 2003, Clark noted the impressive composition of the audience in Spruance Auditorium. It included fifty-two chiefs of navy, eighteen personal representatives of heads of navy who could not attend, four commandants of coast guards, five additional personal representatives of commandants that were unable to participate, and fifteen war college presidents, plus thirty-three other representatives from those colleges whose presidents could not be present. This event was Clark's first International Seapower Symposium as Chief of Naval Operations, and he was surprised to learn that twenty-four of the delegates and other key international representatives were alumni of the Naval Command College or Naval Staff College, with two having graduated from both colleges.[7] He stressed to his colleagues, "This is the very best setting that we could think of to bring us all together to discuss important maritime issues, and . . . to talk about the future of maritime cooperation."[8] There was little doubt among the members of the senior executive leadership of the Naval War College who were at the opening session that Clark was looking for the College's help to bring about a shift from a policy of engagement to one of maritime security cooperation.

At the national level, there had been some unease about just how much the concept of engagement effectively supported the nation's security goals and objectives. For some time, there had been a persistent question in defense circles about the capability to link the scarce resources allocated to engagement activities with specific, desired effects of such efforts. During an informal visit to the College in July 2002, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith had discussed the essence of this concern privately with Rempt and Provost James Giblin during a conversation in Rempt's office in Conolly Hall. In April 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld introduced the first Department of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance to focus these efforts, even though there was not an agreed-to policy and operational definition of what constituted security cooperation.[9] In September 2004, Feith took this concern into the public

realm when he asserted that security cooperation was the means to "move beyond the relatively unfocused practice of engagement—which sometimes amounted to little more than showing the flag abroad—and towards a more specific and practical set of goals."[10]

The Challenge—How Best to Move Forward?

One of the matters that Feith discussed was the 2002 joint letter issued by Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell that included a call for a significant increase in U.S. spending on defense and maritime security cooperation and on the education and training of defense personnel from other countries in the United States. Rempt and Giblin were aware of this joint letter, but not its specific details, and began to look for ways that the Naval War College could immediately respond after their conversation with Feith. Both realized that expanding the enrollment of international officers in the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College directly supported the Rumsfeld-Powell initiative. In August 2002, after some discussion, Rempt directed Giblin to plan to double the number of international officers annually in residence at the College, starting with the classes that would convene in August 2003. He established a goal of 150 officers per year, with 50 international officers enrolled in the Naval Command College and 50 international officers registered in each of the Naval Staff College's two six-month courses.[11] In September 2002, Giblin discussed this initiative with the director of the Naval Command College and the director of the Naval Staff College. In light of their discussion, Giblin determined that an expansion in enrollment was suitable to the College's mission, feasible in terms of execution, and acceptable in terms of the College's available financial and workforce resources, if there were no decrease in the funds provided to the College through its International Officer Course Earnings account. In January 2003, Rempt discussed the Rumsfeld-Powell initiative and his plan to increase international officer enrollment at the College with Admiral Clark. The Chief of Naval Operations approved Rempt's plan. In doing so, Clark stressed that he was confident that, considering the Rumsfeld-Powell letter, the Department of State and the Department of Defense would approve the expansion under the terms of the Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training, and Expanded International Military Education and Training programs.[12]

From Clark's remarks to his counterparts in Venice and his discussion about the expansion of the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College, Rempt and Giblin also recognized that Clark was seeking ways to broaden the U.S. Navy's ability to join with other navies in regional partnerships to improve maritime security and share information. It was clear that the College needed to reconsider its long-standing approach to what it had traditionally called "international programs" to ensure that the College and its resources aligned with emerging national-level and U.S. naval policies. In February 2003, Rempt asked Giblin to assess ways for the College to emphasize the theme of maritime security cooperation, even though there was still no common policy and operational characterization of what constituted it, while maintaining and, perhaps, strengthening the College's signature international programs. The provost, working directly with Captain Vincent Mocini, director of the Naval Command College, and Captain Steve Senteio, director of the Naval Staff College, sketched a comprehensive framework of options available to the College to support the maritime security cooperation objectives of the Navy and the Navy component commanders.[13] Although not yet of sufficient detail to serve as a basis for budgeting and execution, it provided a framework for planning and programming. It highlighted the value of the International Seapower Symposium,

the actions that Rempt had already taken concerning the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College, and the International Law Department's emerging relationship with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in Sanremo, Italy.

Giblin's framework emphasized that it was in the College's interest to establish relationships with its counterpart institutions overseas in the form of college-to-college relationships. The provost included this element in the framework because of a discussion he had with the members of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel in July 2001. That advisory group was interested in what role the College was playing in the Navy's broader effort to collaborate with other navies to achieve common goals.[14] Giblin highlighted the fact that, for the most part, the Navy had been successful in such efforts when it had institutionalized its relationships with other navies at the appropriate levels. For example, Giblin pointed out that the U.S. Navy organized its relationship with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force around navy-to-navy strategic-level talks and navy-to-navy operational-level talks that occurred on a regular, annual basis. However, until 1999, there was no such relationship between the two navies' professional military education institutions.[15] The provost also believed that it was essential to the College's implementation of a framework of maritime security cooperation to improve the management of the visits to Newport of students and faculty from counterpart institutions and the visits of faculty from Newport to other navies and their respective institutions.

The outline also stressed that it was important to look for ways to improve the internal organization and operations of the College's two international courses to avoid duplication of effort and use the resources saved to enhance the program effectiveness of the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College. Giblin privately raised the issue with Rempt of the need for a permanent civilian billet at the College to help better align the College's international activities with the Chief of Naval Operations' and national-level policy concerning maritime security cooperation. When Giblin briefed Rempt on the framework and recommendations in November 2002, Rempt concurred with the broad outline of the plan. Separately, he directed Giblin to proceed to hire a civilian to develop the other elements of the framework in more detail and to examine other options that would align the College more closely with the move away from an engagement framework toward a security cooperation agenda.

The College Moves Downrange

In December 2003, the College created the new civilian position of associate dean for international programs reporting to the dean of academics and the provost, with Vincent Mocini in that post. Giblin tasked Mocini with a very broad portfolio. His focus was to exercise oversight of the administration and operation of the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College as well as the planning, programming, and execution of their budget activities and academic year activities, to include their Field Studies Program. Mocini's portfolio also included the responsibility to serve as the corporate memory of the College for purposes of planning and executing the International Seapower Symposia. In effect, Mocini became the permanent secretary of the group of various organizations tasked to plan, program for, host, and conduct the biennial International Seapower Symposium for the Chief of Naval Operations. Mocini was also responsible for developing and coordinating bilateral relationships with international counterpart institutions and coordinating visits by the faculty and students of such institutions to Newport and the visits of Naval War College faculty and staff to these institutions.[16] Giblin also expected Mocini to plan and execute the visits

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Presenting Dean Vincent Mocini with the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award at the Naval War College's Graduation Ceremony in June 2012, on Mocini's Retirement as Dean, International Programs. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

of chiefs of navy and other senior delegation visits to the College and to represent the President of the Naval War College and the provost at meetings and conferences when necessary. Finally, Mocini was responsible for liaison with the teaching and research, analysis, and gaming faculty on maritime security cooperation matters.[17] Mocini also took on the implied tasks of (1) enhancing the exchange between international officers and U.S. officers during their year in Newport, and (2) taking steps to improve the quality of the physical spaces for both the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College. This wide-ranging portfolio represented a conspicuous departure from the way the College had been doing business in the past with respect to the responsibility for its international programs.

But more significantly, Giblin tasked Mocini to establish a set of policy and strategy benchmarks against which the College could continually test the alignment of its international programs to enhance maritime security cooperation with existing national, Department of Defense, and U.S. Navy policy and strategy documents.[18] This was important from a policy as well as a practical standpoint. Between 2004 and 2008, this set of directives served as the benchmark to assess alignment with respect to the purpose, planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of the College's maritime security cooperation programs. Mocini rightly concluded that the thrust of these policy documents was to build partnership capacity in the maritime domain. Collectively, these policy papers called for the coordination of international efforts to ensure the security of the maritime domain and directed that these efforts must be global, in which U.S. government efforts are developed and furthered with the support of other governments and international organizations, resulting in lasting international cooperation.

Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford expressed a strong interest in the College's international programs immediately on his arrival in Newport. He and Mocini knew each other well, having served together as commanding officers of hydrofoil missile boats in Key West. Indeed, the first element of substance considered by Shuford during his relieving process was the College's approach to maritime security cooperation. On 7 August 2004, Shuford called Giblin and Mocini aside on the after deck of the President's barge during a welcoming reception hosted by Rear Admiral and Mrs. Route on Narragansett Bay. After a discussion of the broad framework, Shuford strongly endorsed it but contended that there was probably more that the Naval War College could be doing. His focus on this subject became a dominant theme of what the College did during his tenure as College President.

By mid-2005, Shuford and the executive leadership of the College had decided that "strengthening maritime security cooperation" was the third of the College's core mission elements, after developing strategic

and operational leaders and helping the Chief of Naval Operations define the future Navy. After a series of informal and wide-ranging conversations with a number of the Navy's senior leaders, Shuford, Giblin, and Mocini agreed that the desired effect was to "build and strengthen international maritime relationships" to "improve the ability of the U.S. and partner nations to operate together in the maritime domain."[19] In practical terms, the three men concluded that the College would "bring together senior and intermediate level naval officers from other countries." In doing this, they developed five objectives: (1) "Develop leaders for high command in their navies"; (2) "Build trust and confidence between and among these leaders"; (3) "Promote an open exchange of professional views"; (4) "Encourage friendship and cooperation"; and (5) "Study operational planning methods together."[20]

Using Mocini's set of benchmarks, the College conclusively demonstrated by October 2007 that its maritime security cooperation programs aligned with broad national and naval policy and strategy. In doing this, the Naval War College skillfully used its talent as well as the funds provided by its International Officer Course Earnings account, International Military Education and Training funding from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and its mission funding.[21] With the College's approach to maritime security cooperation maturing to the point of being a separate function within the College's overall mission, Shuford and Giblin decided in October 2007 to align form with function by designating Mocini the dean of international programs, with full responsibility for this portion of the College's mission, functions, and tasks statement. Reflecting on the value of the Naval War College's work on enhancing maritime security cooperation during his change of command remarks on 6 November 2008, Shuford noted, "You will be hard-pressed to find any area of priority interest for the Navy where this institution is not somehow contributing and, in some cases, leading or playing a catalytic role."[22]

Mocini's comprehensive assessment produced a program of maritime security cooperation that expanded the College's lines of operation in this arena from two major program elements to six.[23] The College's long-standing core programs, the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College, were already consistent with the policy and strategy behind maritime security cooperation because they focused on building trust and confidence between and among the international officers in Newport, which was the essence of the extant and emerging policy and strategy. The results at the close of 2007 spoke for themselves.[24]

	NCC	NSC	Total
Graduates	1,702	1,720	3,422
Flag Officers	870	273	1,143
Chiefs of Service	191	80	271
Currently Serving Chiefs of Service	14	16	30

During his meeting with Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark in December 2004, Shuford highlighted the work of the international programs. He reported to Clark that the College was working on increasing "integration [of its international students] with [their] U.S. counterparts" and that, on the basis of the Vice



Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy. A Naval Command College graduate in 1990, Prakash served as eighteenth Chief of the Naval Staff, from 31 July 2004 to 31 October 2006, and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee from 31 January 2005 to 31 October 2006. A naval aviator, he is one of India's most decorated naval officers. *Wikimedia Commons*

Chief of Naval Operations' approval, the first class of the new yearlong Naval Staff College course had convened in July 2004.[25] Its purpose was to integrate mid-grade international officers with their U.S. officer counterparts in the ten-month College of Naval Command and Staff course in the same manner as was done with senior-level international officers in the Naval Command College. Shuford also discussed the broad framework that was guiding the College's efforts to enhance cooperation among U.S. allies and friends. Clark appreciated this approach and tasked NWC to "increase the representation of countries identified in [the Secretary of Defense's] Security Cooperation Guidance and CNO's [fiscal year 2005–2006] Maritime Security Cooperation Guidance in the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College to at least 85%" as a way to "improve on our maritime security cooperation initiatives."[26] The College accomplished this objective by the time the classes of 2006 arrived in Newport in July 2005.

The anecdotes about how Naval Command College and Naval Staff College graduates stayed in contact with each other and the professional value of those contacts based on the trust and confidence gained during their time together in Newport are near legendary and reflect the richness and effectiveness of the relationships established between and among the College's international graduates. One such narrative unmistakably demonstrates the consequence of the "Newport Connection." While speaking to the College in Spruance Auditorium on 24 March 2005, Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy, a graduate of the Naval Command College in 1990 and formerly Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy and Chairman of the Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee, recounted a fascinating story that demonstrated the effectiveness of the "Newport Connection."[27] Prakash used a short vignette in response to a question from the audience to describe what he considered to be "his most valuable takeaway from attending the Naval Command College."[28] He recounted that shortly after he had "arrived in Newport in 1989, [he] checked into the Naval Command College and went . . . to the gym."[29]

Admiral Shahid Karimullah, Pakistan Navy. A Naval Command College graduate in 1990, Karimullah served as Chief of Naval Staff from 3 October 2002 to 6 October 2005. He later served as Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 2005–2009. *Detail from U.S. Navy Photograph by Chief Photographer's Mate Johnny Bivera*

> I saw a [fellow] that looked like me across the gym. I walked over to him and . . . stuck out my hand and introduced myself as Arun from India. I told him that I played squash and asked him if he did. He introduced himself and told me that, as a matter of fact, he did. And thus ensued a thrice weekly thrashing by [Shahid] Karimullah from the Pakistan Navy.[30]

Prakash continued, "I never beat him in squash in one year at the Naval War College. . . . But today we remain the best of friends and rarely a week passes by when we don't speak on the telephone."[31] This is especially significant because Prakash and Karimullah served as chiefs of naval staff and commanders of their respective navies at the same time. Equally important for maritime relations in Asia, another classmate from the Naval Command College class of 1990, Takashi Saito, was the Chief of the Maritime Staff, and later Chief of the Defense Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. The ability of three such key leaders from Japan, India, and Pakistan to speak openly and frankly because of

Admiral Takashi Saito, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. A Naval Command College graduate in 1990, Saito served as Chief of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force from 2004 to 2006, and then Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, 2006–2009. *Wikimedia Commons*

the "Newport Connection" was an invaluable asset to their mutual relations as well as to international stability.

The Question of Graduate Degrees

During Shuford's tenure as President of the Naval War College, there was a wide-ranging discussion within the College about the granting of a master of arts degree to graduates of the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College.[32] There were a number of contending views. There was a genuine interest on the part of many of the College's international officers in earning the degree, as their American classmates had been doing since academic year 1990–1991. In many cases, the possession of such a degree would benefit them professionally and personally when they returned home to their own countries. Although the College had a cooperative program in the form of an articulation agreement with Salve Regina University to enable the College's international officers to apply academic credit earned at the Naval War College toward a Salve Regina master's degree, very few of the Naval Command College and Naval Staff Course officers participated in it. A key and essential component of this issue was the assessment of whether international officers should take graded exams and submit papers for grading.[33] There was a strong belief among the members of the faculty that such requirements were necessary to sustain the institutional integrity that was vital to maintain the College's accreditation to award such a degree. There was also some concern expressed by the faculty about the amount of time that international officers were absent from the College because of their participation in the Field Studies Program. It is interesting to note that when queried about how well an examination program fit with the stated mission and objectives of the Naval Command College, only 27 percent said "excellent to good"; 73 percent said "poor to very poor."[34]

The issue was larger than these two more-mundane aspects of academic life for the College's international officers. The debate turned on the fundamental purpose of the two international programs. Mocini and his successor as director of the Naval Command College, Captain Bradley Smith, argued that the purpose of the two courses was broader than "education" and it always had been so. They contended that a move toward more academic rigor ran counter to the original vision for these programs. Admiral Arleigh Burke had stressed that

> it wasn't technical training or even academic training that was needed—what was needed was friendship among senior officers who knew the people and the methods of operation in other navies. . . . If some countries sent not their best officers, but somebody of lesser capability, or if the course developed into a teaching course rather than a mutual exchange of information course, the result we all wanted would not be achieved.[35]

In short, Mocini and Smith argued strenuously that the goal was to build trust and confidence among allies and friends and to enhance the experience of international officers while in the United States, not to enroll officers who were better master of arts candidates. The provost agreed and argued further that the College did not have the authority under extant legislation to award the master of arts degree to its international

students and that any change would require legislation. The statutory authority was clear; it specified that "the President of the college may confer the degree of master of arts in national security and strategic studies upon graduates of the college who fulfill the requirements for the degree."[36] The statute went on to define the College as "the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff," thereby excluding students in the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College.[37]

A Broader Approach to the Field Studies Program

In 2006, the Secretary of Defense issued new guidance on field studies programs for international students that required that the College provide a program for its international students that gave them an awareness and understanding of human rights, the law of war, international peace and security, U.S. government institutions, U.S. political processes, the judicial system, and the free market system.[38] Mocini, after reviewing the College's programs with Captain Steve Kornatz, the new director of the Naval Command College, and Captain Rob Winneg, the new director of the Naval Staff College, concluded that the College was in substantial, although not full, compliance with the new directive. Together, they concluded that there needed to be a more deliberate review of the Field Studies Program plan each year well before its execution to ensure alignment with current policies. Shuford strongly concurred, understanding the practical importance of the Field Studies Program as well as the need for the College to adhere to the directive. The guidance was complex, and the College needed to align its resources with it. Mocini, Kornatz, and Winneg organized this yearly review to take place no later than the end of May each year. Ms. Carol Elliott Parfet's management expertise and her planning and execution acumen were critical to not only the program review but also its execution. Captain George Cox and Commander William Villareal developed, planned, and supervised the execution of the specific visits and crafted a coherent program. Commander Randy Weitman, Ms. Cathy Ramos, Ms. Kelly Murphy, and Ms. Alice Deery ably assisted them in working the myriad of administrative details associated with the review and execution of the Field Studies Program.

The College's comptrollers, Mr. Steve Smith and Commander Melinda Matheny, provided substantive and procedural guidance and assistance when it came to the programming, budgeting, and execution of the financial resources required to make the Field Studies Program a reality and to maintain fiduciary responsibility.[39] At the direction of the provost, Matheny—along with Mocini, Bradley Smith, and Winneg—initiated a comprehensive review of the costs chargeable under the Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training programs for attendance at the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College. Working with the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity in Pensacola, Florida, the review determined that the rates charged were substantially less than the cost to the College to operate and to maintain these programs. As a result, the College was occasionally using its scarce mission funding to make up for the shortfall. The result was a 14 percent increase in the funds for international cooperation to support the College's two international programs.

The Fiftieth Reunion

To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Naval Command College, the College, aided by the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation under the leadership of its executive director, retired Rear Admiral Roger Nolan, in cooperation with Mr. Dick Diamond of Raytheon's Integrated Defense Systems Division,

sponsored an International Maritime Symposium from 25 to 29 June 2007. More than two hundred of the Naval Command College's distinguished alumni joined by well over three hundred spouses, family members, former Presidents of the Naval War College, former directors of the Naval Command College, sponsors, and staff members returned to Newport for this event. Admiral Patrick Walsh, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, delivered the keynote address. Retired Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, who had served as Admiral Arleigh Burke's aide for three years, delivered a moving address that recounted his "Reflections on the Legacy of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke." Rempt, now a vice admiral and the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, delivered an address on "Maritime Security Cooperation at the Naval War College and the U.S. Naval Academy" in which he detailed how he had used the paradigm of the Naval War College's maritime security cooperation programs model to increase the scope and effectiveness of the Academy's international programs. Mrs. Prudence B. Mackall, widow of the first director of the Naval Command College and later President of the Naval War College, Admiral Richard G. Colbert, also traveled to Newport to mark the occasion.[40] Mocini and Kornatz, the director of the Naval Command College, led the planning of this important landmark in the institutional history of the Naval War College. Weitman served as the planning officer for the event and supervised the execution of the details of the various events marking the anniversary.

Rear Admiral Shuford Introducing President George W. Bush in Spruance Auditorium, 28 June 2007. *U.S. Navy Photograph by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Greg Frazho*

The highlight of this gathering was the visit by President George W. Bush to the Naval War College and his address in Spruance Auditorium on 28 June 2007. The president's visit was only the fifth visit of a sitting president of the United States to the Naval War College since Theodore Roosevelt's visit for the battleship conference ninety-nine years earlier in July 1908.[41] The governor of Rhode Island, Donald L. Carcieri, had invited President Bush to visit Rhode Island some months earlier in connection with a Republican governors' convention held at the Hyatt Regency Newport on nearby Goat Island. Carcieri turned to Shuford to help prepare a draft schedule of events that included a visit to the Naval War College. The agenda included an address on "The War on Terror," meetings with families of local service members who had lost their lives in the Global War on Terror, and reviewing the tall ships of Operation SAIL 2007 in Newport harbor from the presidential helicopter, Marine One. Carcieri passed this recommendation forward to the White House, and the president's staff approved the plan.

The president's visit was a complex event for the College to plan and execute because of the limited time available for the visit and the extensive coordination and security needed. The agencies involved in the coordination included the White House Press Office, the White House Protocol Office, President Bush's

speechwriter, the head of the Secret Service's Presidential Protective Detail, the Office of the Governor of Rhode Island, the Rhode Island State Police, the Coast Guard, the Rhode Island Air National Guard, and the staff of Operation SAIL 2007. Rick Menard, the executive assistant to the provost, was a key figure in the success of the planning and execution of this visit, along with Len Coleman, the director of security, and Commander Beth Leinberry, the director of facilities.

The Long Line of Attendees to Hear President Bush's Address, 28 June 2007. On reaching the north end of Conolly Hall, each person verified his or her identity, received a ticket, and passed through magnetometers. Then, entering Spruance Lobby from Colbert Plaza, attendees took their assigned seats in the auditorium. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

Security at the Naval War College was at a very high level for the president's visit. The College's chief of staff, Captain David Thorson, circulated a list of the designated attendees allowed to enter Spruance Auditorium; all others who were neither attending nor supporting the visit were on administrative leave. The Secret Service allowed no personal vehicles on the inner College campus, with Conolly and Spruance Halls under Secret Service lockdown. Attendees—including faculty, staff, students, alumni, Naval War College Foundation members, and guests of the governor—parked their cars at the north end of Coasters Harbor Island, near Gym 109 and the Surface Warfare Officers School, and then walked along the designated route from the East Gate on Porter Avenue to Conolly Hall. On reaching the north end of Conolly Hall, each person verified his or her identity, received a ticket, and passed through magnetometers. Then, entering Spruance Lobby from Colbert Plaza, attendees took their assigned seats in the auditorium.[42]

Bush's Newport visit came while he was on his way to the Bush family summer home at Kennebunkport, Maine, where he was to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the American plan for a missile shield in Eastern Europe. After Air Force One touched down at Quonset Point Air National Guard Station, Bush embarked in Marine One for Naval Station Newport. Governor Carcieri accompanied the president and showed him the sights of Rhode Island on the way, including the square-rigged sailing ships in the harbor.

Meanwhile, the president's limousine traveled separately by road to Newport with a police escort. The public was not aware of what mode of travel the president was using. A group of anti-war protestors greeted the limousine as it approached Gate 1 at the Naval Station. On the other side of Training Station Road, a small group of Bush supporters cheered as the limousine passed. As the *Newport Daily News* remarked, "Bush counts few friends in Rhode Island, the congressional delegation is comprised of Democrats[,] . . . the state's voters overwhelmingly voted against him in both elections, and his approval ratings are historically low."[43] The editor concluded, "Politics aside, a presidential visit always is a momentous occasion—and Newport rose to this one in style."[44]



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 2007

Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rhode Island 02841

Dear Friends:

Thank you for inviting me to speak at your fine institution. I was grateful for the opportunity to discuss our progress in the war on terror.

The Naval War College is preparing dedicated men and women to serve in the finest military in the world. Your efforts are helping our Nation to win the war against the enemies of freedom, and I am proud to be your Commander in Chief.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

Letter from President George W. Bush to the Naval War College, 1 August 2007. *Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll 364, Box 33, Folder 2: Manuscript Item 653*

Rear Admiral Shuford and Captain Todd Malloy, the Commanding Officer of Naval Station Newport, greeted the president on his arrival. President Bush proceeded to the College, where he delivered his planned address to a packed Spruance Auditorium on Iraq and the War on Terror. Three Republican state governors, who were attending the Republican Governors Conference (Governor Matthew R. Blunt of Missouri, Governor Jodi Rell of Connecticut, and Governor Mark C. Sanford, Jr., of South Carolina), in addition to Rhode Island's Carcieri, came to the Naval War College for the president's speech.

At the outset of his speech, Bush noted, "I am really pleased to be among the best and brightest of the United States military. And I am pleased to see the many here who represent nations from around the world."[45] Continuing, President Bush remarked,

> The Naval War College is where the United States military does some of its finest thinking. You help the Navy define its mission. You support its combat readiness. You strengthen our maritime security cooperation with other countries. You train officers to think strategically. And that's important. The United States Navy is the most professional and advanced navy the world has ever seen—and the men and women of the Naval War College are determined to keep it that way, and I appreciate your work.[46]

On completing his remarks, the president answered several questions from the audience, including those posed by Professor Peter Dutton; Commodore Stephen R. Kirby, Royal Navy, Naval Command College class of 1994; and Admiral Alvaro Campos, Colombian Navy (Ret.), Naval Command College class of 1979.[47] As President Bush departed the auditorium, he shook hands with a number of Naval Command College alumni seated in the front row, stage right.

International Seapower Symposia XVII and XVIII

The second element of Mocini's program, the International Seapower Symposia, had been one of the College's signature events and one of its most complex evolutions to plan and execute. The symposia in 2005 and 2007 were no less a challenge. The theme of the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium, "A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons," clearly reflected the shifting policy focus from engagement to maritime security cooperation. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen hosted the event held from 20 to 23 September 2005, attended by delegates from one hundred nations.

There were forty-nine chiefs of naval operations, six commandants of coast guards, and twenty-seven war college presidents in attendance, making the event the single largest gathering of naval leadership in history. Thirty-six of the delegates were graduates of the Naval Command College or Naval Staff College.[48] Mocini, assisted by Captain Lee Tabenken, led the planning for and execution of this event. Deb Maddix of the College's Special Events Division, who had been involved with the planning and execution of previous symposia for almost twenty-five years, directed the complex logistics planning for the event. Elizabeth "Gigi" Davis, the head of the College's Graphics Department, led her team in overcoming a set of demanding, quick-turnaround requests for graphics support during the event. Weitman was Mocini's "right-hand man" for the myriad of challenges that emerged because of the seniority of the attendees and their respective schedules. Coleman was particularly attentive to organizing a comprehensive security plan for the event. Steve Rebello, who had likewise been involved with the symposia for more than twenty-five years, provided superb audiovisual support.

The 2005 symposium's *Report of the Proceedings* included an innovative feature: a substantive summary. Professor Catherine Kelleher of the College's Strategic Research Department took on this task and reported that there was clear emphasis on maritime security cooperation by the participants. She noted, "Throughout the [symposium], there were two common threads: the urgent need to increase information and information sharing, and the equally urgent need to increase the level of maritime security cooperation within and across regions."[49] Kelleher went on to report, "Few of the [symposium] leaders stressed solutions that required radical new technologies or complex new designs or organizational frameworks. Rather, the focus was on progressive, systematic improvement and expansion of existing regional cooperation."[50]

Two years later, International Seapower Symposium XVIII featured the formal presentation of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* in Newport on the morning of 17 October 2007. This reflected Roughead's decision to use this signature international naval venue to highlight the cooperative character of the strategy. Roughead's choice was a deliberate decision that recognized the College's role in crafting the new strategy statement and underscored the College's mission in terms of directly supporting the improvement of navy-to-navy relations and the Navy component commanders' theater security cooperation initiatives. During Shuford's welcoming remarks to the delegates that morning, he purposely advised the audience in Spruance Auditorium: "No group of maritime leaders has ever come together in the number and with the distinction that this group represents here in this room today. There are sixty chiefs of navies among us this morning, seventeen commandants of coast guards, twenty war college presidents, many other senior representatives from the United States and from our most trusted friends and partners."[51]

Shuford highlighted the fact that the College "has had the privilege of finding itself in a position to support the leadership of our maritime forces and those of our global partners in thinking through implications of this new set of global security challenges and opportunities."[52] Shuford also took the opportunity to underscore the broader theme of maritime security cooperation embedded within the new strategy document. He stressed that "critical to this effort to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive series of scenario analyses, war-gaming efforts, a series of high-level conferences as well as symposia and other professional exchanges with our maritime partners here in Newport . . . and around the world—many of

which you have participated in. This collaborative effort has been very successful in producing . . . profound insights and has brought into focus a broad range of diverse perspectives."[53]

Shuford's remarks reflected the culminating point of a subtle but nonetheless substantive change in how the College viewed its responsibilities with respect to the maritime security cooperation theme of the document. Traditionally, the Naval War College had viewed its "International Programs" in terms of the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College as professional military education programs with the broader purpose of developing trust and confidence between and among the international officers attending the College. Shuford went to great lengths to note that their success in these areas was unquestioned: "Admiral [Roughead], I am sure you sensed . . . that there are a good number—well more than a quarter of you here today—who are alumni of this war college."[54] Shuford also emphasized the notion of cooperation among equals when he stressed,

> For almost 125 years, the Naval War College has welcomed our international partners from around the world. . . . We believe it is strong evidence of the international trust and confidence that we seek to build here and I think it's also a tribute to the integrity of this institution. The point of all this . . . is that this college is seen not just as an asset for the United States, the United States Navy, but is recognized as something that is owned by all of the maritime nations around the world.[55]

Shuford frequently used and developed this theme during subsequent budgeting cycles to press for additional private and public funds for international programs and the continued expansion of the College's role in building and strengthening cooperative mechanisms for international maritime security.

College-to-College Relationships

When Shuford arrived in Newport, the College had only one formal, regularized relationship with a counterpart institution overseas. In 1999, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force initiated a formal relationship between the Naval War College and its Maritime Staff College in Tokyo. This arrangement focused on curriculum development and faculty research exchanges between the two institutions' Asia-Pacific studies groups and international law and war gaming departments.

Several senior officers in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force had noticed a gap at the strategic and operational levels in what was otherwise a very strong navy-to-navy relationship. They had communicated this informally on several past occasions.[56] Professor James Giblin knew of this situation. He was aware that two old friends, Vice Admiral Katsuji Tani, president of the Maritime Staff College, and Rear Admiral Takashi Saito (NCC class of 1990), director of operations and plans in the Maritime Staff Office, intended to raise this matter with Giblin during his participation in the first annual Asia-Pacific Naval College Seminar. In January 1998, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force sponsored and hosted this seminar in Tokyo.

Giblin was also aware that another friend, Admiral Yasumasa Yamamoto, Chief of the Maritime Staff, had approved Tani and Saito's intentions to raise the issue. Giblin briefed the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson with a view toward being able to respond that the Naval War College was ready to develop such a relationship as part of the broader navy-to-navy strategic and operational relationships. Both agreed. It took about a year to work through the details and, as a result, Tani's successor, Vice Admiral Michio Yamada, traveled to

Newport in early 1999 to meet with Cebrowski. The meeting was a success. In response, Cebrowski traveled to the Maritime Staff College in the Meguro section of Tokyo to meet with Yamada's relief, Vice Admiral Kaoru Fukutani, to sign the memorandum of talks that formally established the relationship.

Five years later, in 2004, when Shuford came to the Naval War College, he recognized the very real potential of these kinds of associations and directed Mocini to pursue additional relationships as the third program element of the College's initiative to enhance maritime security cooperation. Using the relationship with Japan as a model, Mocini argued that it was in the College's interest to "create and maintain a series of college-to-college agreements between the [Naval War College] and its counterpart institutions overseas to foster enhanced trust, confidence, and cooperation through visits and exchanges involving mutually agreed upon interactions involving leadership, faculty, staff, or students."[57] Shuford personally worked with his international counterparts to produce a network of naval colleges and other institutions to collaborate on global maritime security issues. Indeed, Shuford devoted as much of his time and energy on this component of the College's maritime security cooperation as he did in waging his campaign to convince the Navy of the importance of regaining its competence to exercise effective command and control at the operational level of war. He allocated a significant amount of his time and energy to extensive overseas travel to meet personally with his counterparts and often to leverage those meetings with a broader agenda for conferencing with academic, political, and military leadership of the region. Shuford also strongly encouraged reciprocal visits to the College.

Mocini engaged in a wide-ranging effort to create new college-to-college relationships. Shuford and Giblin directed him to develop these relationships so that they were complementary to the navy-to-navy relationship between the United States Navy and the partner navy. They were to be substantive relationships between two academic institutions concerned with professional military education, and the college-to-college exchanges were to be conducted on the basis of equality, academic freedom, mutual benefit, and reciprocity. Finally, each institution should bear the costs of its participation in the agreed exchanges, and each would simultaneously make every effort to reduce the costs for the other. Using this guidance, Mocini focused on creating associations with several institutions. Among them were the Indian Naval War College, in Mumbai; the Centro de Estudios Superiores Navales (the Mexican Naval War College), in Mexico City; the Academia de Guerra Naval (the Chilean Naval War College) in Viña del Mar; the Escuela de Guerra Naval (the Argentine Naval War College) in Buenos Aires; the Escola de Guerra Naval (the Brazilian Naval War College) in Rio de Janeiro; the United Kingdom's Joint Services Command and Staff College, at Shrivenham in Oxfordshire; the Singapore Command and Staff College, in the Jurong section of Singapore; the Canadian Forces College, in Toronto, Ontario; and the Kuznetsov Naval Academy, in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Mocini also began discussions with counterpart institutions in Australia, Cameroon, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, and Uruguay.[58]

The initiative to develop a relationship with the Kuznetsov Academy is an instructive example of how Shuford and Mocini approached the challenge of developing college-to-college relationships, although not all of what Shuford wanted to accomplish with the Russians was applicable to other college-to-college relationships. In 2004, the Naval War College hosted the "Cold War at Sea" conference, attended by Vice Admiral Yuri Sysuev of the Russian Federation Navy, director of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy.[59] On the

sidelines of that conference, the Naval War College proposed a draft memorandum of understanding with the Kuznetsov Academy.[60] Vice Admiral Sysuev was not prepared to sign such an agreement at that time, but it served as a continuing subject for discussion.

In early 2005, Shuford sensed that the time was right to conduct a reciprocal visit to the Kuznetsov Academy to pursue the development of the relationship between the two institutions. Shuford knew that the U.S.-Russian military-to-military contact program had seen some improvement in terms of substance and reciprocity. He also knew that in late October 2005, the Navy planned to move beyond its previous focus on Cold War "Incidents at Sea" into wider staff talks.[61] With this in mind, Shuford and Mocini began extensive discussions with the staffs of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet to determine whether such a visit was appropriate within the context of the plans for a broader relationship with the Russian Federation Navy. With the approval of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, the U.S. defense and naval attachés' offices in Moscow coordinated an invitation for Shuford to travel to Russia to meet with Sysuev in Saint Petersburg from 17 to 20 October 2005.

Shuford informed Vice Admiral John Morgan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy, that he had accepted the invitation.[62] Shuford explained to Morgan that this visit was to be a reciprocal follow-on to Sysuev's visit to Newport in 2004 and was part of the U.S.-Russian military-to-military contact program. Shuford further explained that the purpose of the visit was to expand the Naval War College's contacts with the Kuznetsov Naval Academy to advance U.S. and Russian naval relations in accordance with the Chief of Naval Operations' fiscal year 2005–2006 *Maritime Security Cooperation Guidance*.[63]

Shuford established five goals for this visit:

- Establish a college-to-college relationship to assess the Kuznetsov Naval Academy as an institution and to understand how it fit into the broader perspective of the Russian navy to determine whether there were additional effective linkages that served the U.S. Navy's interests.
- Use war gaming of maritime security challenges as the unifying theme to assist both navies in familiarizing one another with each other's doctrines, sense of the issues, sensitivities, and framework for discussing them; subject to the approval of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, propose an initial planning conference in Naples to begin preparing for a war game in Newport in late fiscal year 2006.
- Explore the feasibility of regular, but limited, exchanges of faculty members to lecture at each institution and engage in exchanges on a set of wide-ranging issues, such as professional military education, and the maritime component of homeland defense.
- As an interim measure and subject to the availability of funds, send limited numbers of U.S. officers and faculty to the Kuznetsov Naval Academy for short periods and, as a matter of reciprocity, expect the Russian Federation Navy to do likewise by sending officers to Newport.
- Encourage the Russian Federation Navy to send an officer to participate in the College's Current Strategy Forum in June 2006 to foster diversity of opinion and debate.[64]

Shuford's trip to Saint Petersburg was not without its challenges and lighter moments. The requirement to coordinate the visit with the U.S. defense attaché's office in Moscow, the drama of last-minute visa approvals, and a complicated set of travel arrangements given Shuford's requirement to travel to Japan on conclusion of the visit to Saint Petersburg created a unique set of circumstances to surmount. In one of the lighter moments of the visit, Shuford's plan to present a uniquely American gift, two five-gallon containers of a signature brand of South Carolina mustard-based barbecue sauce, to Vice Admiral Sysuev at the opening dinner hosted by Shuford failed. Regretfully, and despite extraordinary diligence on the part of the staff in Newport, the intended gift did not survive the transatlantic flight. Instead, Shuford found himself presenting a mass of broken glass awash in a large plastic bag of barbecue sauce.[65]

In spite of this disappointment, Shuford's visit was successful and resulted in a formal relationship between the Naval War College and the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in the form of a memorandum of talks.[66] Based on the first three of Shuford's objectives, the focus of that association was to bring together expert working groups to explore issues of mutual interest relevant to professional military education, research, analysis, and war gaming on matters pertaining to peacekeeping and maritime security cooperation.[67]

The Kuznetsov Naval Academy was not able to accept an invitation to participate in the Current Strategy Forum and could not agree on the exchange of students and faculty. Over the next year, the working groups planned a war game to be held in Newport. After several planning meetings held under the auspices of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe in Naples, Italy, the working groups set the game for Newport from 31 July to 3 August 2006.[68]

On Sunday, 30 July 2006, the day the Russian delegation was due to arrive in Newport, their designated escort, Captain J. R. Mathis, deputy director of the Strategic Research Department, had no word about their whereabouts. Finally, just before 3 A.M. on Monday, 31 July, a travel-weary Russian delegation arrived unannounced at the front entrance to Quarters AA. Unshaven and groggy from their long and complicated journey from Saint Petersburg, the Russians climbed the steps of Quarters AA, where Shuford warmly and enthusiastically welcomed them into his quarters. With the full public quarters staff poised in starched-white attire, the Russians' fatigue was replaced with genuine joy and laughter, and the party enjoyed a very late supper of fresh salmon, caviar, and very fine vodka. Because of the lateness of their arrival, Shuford wisely postponed the beginning of the game for a late start the following day.[69]

Reconnecting with the College's International Graduates

On completion of Shuford's visit to Russia, Shuford flew from Saint Petersburg to Tokyo so that he could host the Naval War College's first Regional Alumni Symposium in Yokosuka, Japan. Mocini had come up with the concept for this symposium in late 2004 while developing the College's maritime security cooperation framework. Mocini concluded that the Naval War College lost effective touch with its distinguished international alumni after they graduated from the College. It appeared to him that, despite a lack of any formal support from the College or any organizational framework, the College alumni were routinely interacting with each other, sustaining the connections that had developed while they were in Newport as they rose to top leadership positions in their navies. Mocini noted as well the absence of any systematic approach for the U.S. Navy to regularize and capture the benefit from the ties generated during their time in

Newport. After discussions with the provost, Mocini conceived a series of international professional symposia that would deliberately build on the graduates' mutual Newport connection. Mocini's thought was for these symposia to bring together senior international officers who were graduates of the Naval Command College and Naval Staff College with selected U.S. counterparts in a professional forum of U.S. Naval War College alumni after they left Newport, to promote an open exchange of professional views, renew friendships, and strengthen trust and cooperation.

Mocini envisioned that the President of the Naval War College and a senior leader of a partner navy in the region would co-host each symposium. His concept included keynote speeches by prominent military leaders in the region, to include alumni and distinguished guests such as four-star commanders, ministers of defense, and chiefs of navy.[70] He also included Naval War College faculty–led panels that discussed contemporary challenges as a prominent feature of these events.[71] Shuford enthusiastically approved Mocini's concept in May 2005. He directed him also to invite the U.S. Navy's three- and four-star officers in the region to give these officers the opportunity to become more familiar with Naval Command College and Naval Staff College alumni in their theater and the potential for maritime security cooperation these alumni provided. Shuford succinctly stated the College's desired effect: "Build enhanced trust and confidence among these alumni; Sustain and re-energize international naval relationships; [and] Generate opportunities for senior U.S. Naval leadership in theater."[72]

Rear Admiral James D. Kelly. Admiral Kelly served as the thirtieth Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan, from 2005 to 2009. Following his retirement from active duty, he became dean of the Naval War College's College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, from 2011 to 2017, and then dean of the College of Maritime Operational Warfare in 2017. *U.S. Navy Photograph*

Mocini planned and executed the College's first Regional Alumni Symposium in Yokosuka, Japan, on 25 and 26 October 2005, with the assistance of Rear Admiral James D. Kelly, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan, and his staff, along with Professor Don Marrin of the Naval War College's War Gaming Department and Ms. Mary McGinnis, the College's protocol officer. The theme of this first event was "Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific Region." After consultation with the provost, Mocini selected the Western Pacific Naval Symposium model of the small group to promote open dialogue and small steps to promote progress as the model for the regional alumni symposia. He invited thirty-eight attendees from Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore, including senior flag officers, younger alumni on the way up, and retired senior flag officers who were influential in their second careers and well connected. Admiral Takashi Saito, Japan's Chief of the Maritime Staff, participated on the first evening and delivered the wrap-up address on the second day of the symposium. U.S. flag officer representatives from Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan; and Commander, Submarine Group Seven actively participated. Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, gave the keynote address at the dinner on the first evening of the symposium.

The reception that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force gave Shuford on his arrival in Japan was a clear signal that the concept for these symposia was valid. As the elevator door opened onto the loggia of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force headquarters at Ichigaya in the Shinjuku section of Tokyo, Admiral

Saito presented himself at attention and rendered a continuous salute with speakers booming out "Anchors Aweigh!" Saito then escorted Shuford into his personal reception area, where the two men sat ringed by some two dozen mid-grade and senior Japanese officers. After a few brief words of welcome, Admiral Saito remarked, "Admiral Shuford, you may not recognize many of the officers around this room [gesturing with each arm in sequence to sweep around the room's circumference], but they all know who you are . . . and they know very well—over decades—the faces of many friends and the institution you represent. These are the jewels of my staff—and they are all graduates of the United States Naval War College."[73] No word or gesture could have provided more concise and emphatic validation of Admiral Arleigh Burke's original vision for the Naval Command College fifty years earlier, or provided a more propitious beginning to what was to become a new means for the Navy to engage its maritime partners.

Shuford reported to Admiral Mike Mullen that the model of small groups seeking small steps was successful and that discussions within these small groups were very candid. Shuford noted the "caliber and sophistication of the discussion indicates [that the] security dialogue in this region is maturing and more open."[74] Concluding that the alumni appreciated the use of a framework that focused on maritime domain awareness, he advised Mullen that "more needs to be done, but lack of political will and sense of urgency are [the] main challenge. Navies will be held ultimately accountable for maritime failures; therefore, each navy must make the case for [maritime domain awareness] each with their own country's leadership."[75] He recommended that "rather than build Navy-to-Navy systems and protocols from scratch, [the] sense was that it is more productive [for] navies to build on . . . existing civil relationships to establish some level of [maritime domain awareness]."[76] In this regard, Shuford highlighted that "MALSINDO anti-piracy efforts"—the Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian navies' patrol of the Malacca Strait—"[were] often cited as [a] model of a regional operational initiative."[77]

Building on this success and using it as a model, Mocini next focused on planning for a second Regional Alumni Symposium, for European and African alumni, to take place in Naples, Italy, on 27 and 28 April 2006. The leadership of the Italian Navy, especially Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti (NCC class of 1990), Commander, Allied Maritime Component Command, Naples, was exceptionally active in co-sponsoring the event, which was held at the Italian Naval Officers' Club in Naples. Admiral Harry E. Ulrich, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, gave the opening address on 27 April. The result was another regional event, with distinguished Naval War College alumni from twenty-five countries in attendance. These countries were Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Mocini then moved on to planning the third symposium, for Latin American alumni. Admiral Rodolfo Codina, commander in chief of the Chilean Navy, personally extended the invitation to sponsor this symposium with Shuford at the Academia de Guerra Naval, the Chilean Naval War College, in Viña del Mar, Chile, from 6 to 8 March 2007. Co-hosted by Shuford and his counterpart, Captain Piero Fagandini, Director, Chilean Naval War College, twenty-eight alumni attended, representing Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, the United States, and Uruguay.

Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford Addresses an Audience at the Naval War College Symposium at Manama, Bahrain, on 21 October 2008. Held in cooperation with the U.S. Naval War College; U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command; the Royal Bahrain Naval Force; and other coalition nations, the symposium highlighted the maritime security operations in the Arabian Gulf, confronting regional challenges, and the importance of enhancing coalition partnerships.

U.S. Navy Photograph by Mass Communications Specialist 3rd Class Matt Snodgrass

The fourth symposium occurred in Manama, Bahrain, from 21 to 22 October 2008. Forty-eight alumni from nine countries attended the symposium co-hosted by Shuford and Brigadier General Abdullah Al-Mansoori, Commander, Royal Bahrain Naval Force and a graduate of both the Naval Staff College and the Naval Command College. Participants from Bahrain, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States actively engaged with each other on the broad strategic and operational challenges of achieving maritime security cooperation.

International Fellows

The fifth component of the College's revised approach to strengthen maritime security cooperation was to reinvigorate and expand the International Fellows program that had existed earlier in the 1990s for research fellows in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Designing the program to solidify relationships between the United States Navy and the navies of allied and friendly partner countries, Mocini envisioned that the Director, Naval Command College would survey the class to determine those who wished to remain as fellows. The director and the dean would then review the list and vet the applicants for their ability to contribute to the objectives of the fellows' program. The President and the provost would then review the recommendation of the director and would select the fellows. Using this selection, the President would then send a letter to each country's head of navy to verify the willingness to allow the officer in question to remain at the Naval War College for an additional year. If the extension was approved, the College would then advise the U.S. Navy's Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity of the College's decision and ask that command to provide the funding from International Military Education and Training or Foreign Military Sales, as appropriate.[78]

Mocini intended that International Fellows in residence at the Naval War College would assist the faculty in developing and teaching elective and core courses, to include participation in case study development. In addition, he expected them to help plan and execute war games and prepare research papers on subjects approved by their respective navies. The core of Mocini's plan envisioned that these fellows would provide students with insights into the fellows' nations' military thinking, broaden perspectives on regional issues, and increase awareness of how different countries and cultures viewed defense and security considerations. In addition, each fellow had an assigned faculty member, who would serve as mentor and partner throughout the duration of the officer's term as a fellow. The program also offered the individual fellow the opportunity to pursue a master of arts degree at Salve Regina University.

A small number of members of the faculty were initially resistant to the International Fellows program. They saw it as a potential distraction from their teaching duties and were skeptical about how the fellows could enhance the institutional effectiveness of the College. Having weighed and addressed most of these concerns, Shuford moved forward with the implementation of the program. Commander Alfredo Blanco of the Chilean Navy, a Naval Command College graduate in 2008, served as a fellow to test the concept during the academic year 2008–2009.[79] Blanco's experiences confirmed the suitability, feasibility, and desirability of the program. Captain Alberto Soto of the Chilean Navy (NCC class of 2009) was the first official fellow, serving as such in academic year 2009–2010. He was able to integrate exceptionally well with the faculty in the Joint Military Operations and the National Security Decision Making Departments.[80]

International Law Initiatives

The sixth program element of the College's plan to strengthen maritime security cooperation took advantage of one of the College's oldest signature capabilities—its focus on international law. From its founding, the Naval War College's institutional reputation for the study of international law, operational law, and ocean policy as they affected U.S. military policy, strategy, and operations was one of its acknowledged strengths. Since its establishment, the International Law Department's faculty had always been involved in substantive research, publication, teaching, and contacts with their colleagues around the world to advance the understanding of international law and ocean policy issues confronting the United States and other nations. It had also worked effectively to shape the development of international law and ocean policy to promote the rule of law.[81]

Professor Dennis Mandsager, Chairman, International Law Department, 1998–2011, Receiving an Award from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

In 2002 Rear Admiral Rempt, on the recommendation of Professor Dennis Mandsager, chairman of the International Law Department in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, decided to exploit these capabilities in a new initiative. He approved the establishment of a relationship with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law to begin in 2003. An independent, nonprofit humanitarian organization founded in 1970 with its headquarters in Sanremo, Italy, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law promoted international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, human rights, refugee law, and related fields of international law.

Mandsager based his concept on the notion of engagement that had marked U.S. policy for some time. He envisioned that the College's International Law faculty would be involved in the teaching of six courses at the College's various counterparts around the world: four basic courses on the law of armed conflict, one on naval operations, and an advanced course.

In 2004, Rear Admiral Ronald Route, on the recommendation of the provost, approved continuing the relationship with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, but questioned its suitability in the future in terms of the Naval War College's existing mission, functions, and tasks statement as well as the College's evolving mission.[82] The International Law Department's relationship with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law constituted an important faculty development opportunity. At the same time, the staff of the U.S. Mission in Geneva, the staff in the General Counsel's Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Navy's Judge Advocate General, and the judge advocate assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy all informally supported this initiative.[83] Yet there was a lingering question about the focus on engagement when there was unease at the national level and within the Navy about just how much the concept of engagement effectively supported the nation's security goals and objectives. Moreover, Route was concerned about creating the impression that NWC was de facto representing the United States in a recognized international forum without the explicit mission tasking to do so, or, as a minimum, at least formal acquiescence by the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

As the College worked its way through the framework that it put in place to strengthen maritime security cooperation, Mandsager was able to demonstrate that it was in the College's interest in terms of its institutional effectiveness to continue the relationship with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law by using Mocini's emphasis on relationships with "counterpart institutions overseas." While the International Institute of Humanitarian Law was not strictly speaking a counterpart war college and notwithstanding the concern about representing the United States, he argued that it was in the interest of the College to take the opportunity to present U.S. views, not always well understood, to international audiences and to learn first-hand the views of other nations.[84] Mandsager also contended that the relationship with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law enabled the International Law Department to establish new contacts in the international law community, which, in turn, he argued would pay dividends in terms of the quality of its conferences and teaching and research efforts. Finally, he argued there had been sufficient, albeit informal, coordination to validate the need for this relationship and that the prospective gains probably outweighed any opportunity costs.[85] Accordingly, Shuford, on the recommendation of the provost, agreed and directed Mandsager to negotiate annual cost-sharing memoranda of understanding, to be signed each year by the provost and president of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.


International Institute of Humanitarian Law
Institut International de Droit Humanitaire
Istituto Internazionale di Diritto Umanitario

SANREMO HANDBOOK
ON
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Prepared under the auspices of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo

Drafting Team

Commander Alan Cole
United Kingdom Royal Navy

Major Phillip Drew
Canadian Forces

Captain Rob McLaughlin
Royal Australian Navy

Professor Dennis Mandsager
Captain, JAGC, U.S. Navy (Retired)
U.S. Naval War College
Editor and Project Coordinator

Sanremo, November 2009

This handbook does not necessarily represent the views of either the International Institute of Humanitarian Law or the government of any member of the drafting team

Title Page of the First English Edition of the *Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement*, 2009. Professor Dennis Mandsager was the editor and project coordinator for this important innovative work that explains the complex ways in which governments develop and implement rules of engagement. The work has been translated into the six official languages of the United Nations, among others.
International Institute of Humanitarian Law

This relationship proved to be beneficial. Mandsager had long recognized the need for a realistic, comprehensive, and

unclassified rules of engagement handbook that could be used by all nations for training, education, exercises, war games, or real-world operations. He also believed that such a handbook could enable the United States to share its fundamental rules of engagement doctrine with nations that sought to collaborate with the United States. He contended that one way to work through these challenges was to partner with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law. The leadership of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law agreed. The publication that was produced, the *Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement,* reflected the results of a three-year project initiated by Mandsager with the full support of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law. The work to produce the document was informed by several workshops conducted at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law plus numerous multinational exercises and courses, which drew input from highly qualified experts from different regions of the world. The *Handbook* reflected best practices from nations across the globe and was, in part, based on the United Nations peacekeeping office model.[86] Published by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law as a working tool, the document was not intended to state the official opinions or positions of individual governments nor of specific international organizations on the different issues considered. Its aim was to guide the reader—and in particular the participants in the military courses of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law—through the intricacies of the generally accepted and widespread concept of rules of engagement.[87] The fact that the *Handbook* has been translated into Arabic, Chinese, French, Hungarian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Thai reflects the success of this initiative.[88]

The Oceans Law and Policy (later International Law) Department was an active participant in the College's initiative to encourage cooperation with postgraduate military institutions in Latin America. It began with a visit by faculty members to the Argentine Naval War College in 1991. Following an offer by then–President of the Naval War College Rear Admiral Joe Strasser at the XVI Conference of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas in 1993 to include other countries in the program, it expanded throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to include faculty visits to institutions in seven South American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay—and Mexico. During these visits, lectures and seminars were provided on a wide variety of operational-law- and maritime-security-related topics mutually negotiated between the department and the host institution. The lectures helped clarify U.S. positions regarding topics such as the law of armed conflict, maritime law enforcement, law of the sea, and rules of engagement/rules for the use of force, as well as helping to shape the development of international law to the benefit of the United States and to promote the rule of law within Latin American navies.

In addition to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and Latin American engagement, International Law faculty participated in a wide variety of other international partnerships, including annual international law exchanges with other NATO navies at the invitation of the German Navy and the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax, Nova Scotia; annual Maritime Security Cooperation Workshops co-sponsored by the Australian Defence Force with participation by a wide variety of Asia-Pacific nations; International Law of Military Operations workshops co-sponsored by the Naval Justice School and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies; operational law exchanges with the JMSDF Maritime Staff College's International Law Office; and providing lectures at numerous overseas academic institutions and military organizations by invitation.

Summing It Up

Shuford's decision to focus on the broader challenge of maritime security cooperation was indeed far-sighted and substantially enhanced the College's institutional effectiveness. It is significant to note that Shuford attached such importance to this effort that it was the subject of his final report to the Chief of Naval Operations before he was relieved as President of the College. He informed the CNO that the maritime security cooperation initiatives of the College achieved greater alignment, and therefore greater effect, with the regional combatant and Navy component commanders' theater security cooperation strategies.[89] Admiral Roughead publicly acknowledged the effects of the College's activities in this regard during the change of command ceremony on 6 November 2008 when he made special reference to maritime security cooperation: "When we started talking about Global Maritime Partnerships, again Jake was in the forefront. Because he knew how important it was to build and maintain the partnerships around the world, to develop the relationships that are key to how we operate and how our friends and partners operate together."[90] He went on to highlight that Shuford had "hosted scores of foreign counterparts and served as our diplomat at Newport. But he also put in place and orchestrated a series of reunions around the world, of graduates of the Naval War College which served to tighten the bonds . . . and brought graduates from many countries together in different regions of the world."[91] He concluded by emphasizing that "I can tell you from personal experience[,] . . . that bringing together of leaders in the region[s] was so important. . . . [It] made such a difference."[92]

NOTES

1. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval War College, Office of the President, *U.S. Naval War College Strategic Plan, 2003,* p. 1.
2. The International Seapower Symposium generated a series of regional symposia to continue the work started at the International Seapower Symposium. These included the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the Chiefs of European Navies Security Symposium, the Inter-American Naval Conference, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Sea Power for Africa Symposium, the Colombia-Caribbean Conference, the Conference of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas (CNWCA), the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, and the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum.
3. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff required geographic commanders in chief to develop theater engagement plans for their respective theaters that covered a period of five fiscal years. See Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning,* CJCSM 3113.01 (Washington, D.C.: 1998). In the case of the Naval War College, there were engagement activities that directly supported such planning. These included activities such as the long-standing annual U.S. Navy–Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Northwest Pacific war game, which directly supported U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Command and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet's engagement objectives; the CNWCA, which had long supported CNO and U.S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command goals; and the Proliferation Security Initiative, discussed earlier in this volume.
4. For the Clinton Administration's strategy, see Executive Office of the President, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: White House, May 1997), pp. 6–14.
5. Admiral Vern Clark, USN, "Maritime Cooperation as Instrument of Security" (remarks, Fourth Regional Seapower Symposium, Venice, Italy, 16 October 2002), p. 1. It is unclear whether the College's planning team knew of Clark's remarks and considered them as they were conducting their strategic planning process.
6. Ibid., p. 4.
7. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 26–29 October 2003* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2004), p. 6.
8. Ibid.
9. In this regard, it is significant to note that it was not until 2008 that DoD formally defined security cooperation as those "activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations." See Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation," DoD Directive 5132.03 of 24 October 2008, p. 11.
10. Douglas J. Feith, "Transformation and Security Cooperation" (remarks, ComDef 2004 Conference, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 8 September 2004), p. 6. See http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/public_statements/speeches/archive/former_usdp/feith (accessed 20 February 2016).
11. In 2003 there were, on average, about thirty-five international officers attending the Naval Command College and about twenty-six attending each of the two offerings of the Naval Staff College each year.

12. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers]: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates, Oral History Project, Interview with Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. Conducted on September 17, 2009 by James Rife, pp. 25–26.

13. Mr. Rick Menard, the provost's executive assistant, was exceptionally helpful in examining the details of implementing this initiative. The same was true for the contributions of Professor Kevin Kelly of the National Security Decision Making Department and Captain Fred Horne, USN, of the Joint Military Operations Department.

14. At the time of this brief, Giblin was serving as a professor of national security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski tasked him to respond to the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel's request because of the work he had done on the relationship with the Japan Maritime Staff College and his long experience while on active duty with navy-to-navy strategic- and operational-level talks in the Pacific.

15. The attempts to establish such an institutional relationship dated back to the early 1950s. Dr. Jim Auer recounts that about "a year prior to the establishment of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force on 1 July 1954, and prior to becoming the first Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS), the CNO-equivalent in Japan, VADM Nagasawa Ko, JMSDF, visited the U.S. to meet with the leadership of the U.S. Navy to discuss organizational challenges that would face the new force. Rear Admiral Sadayoshi Nakayama, JMSDF, who would later become CMS, accompanied him with the express intent of studying the structure and curriculum in place at Newport. The outcome of this process was the establishment of the Maritime Staff College at Yokosuka on 1 September 1954 with Nakayama as its founding president." See James E. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 208. In spite of this, there were no attempts, with one exception in 1989 initiated by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to regularize a relationship between the Naval War College and the Maritime Staff College until 1998. Then the president of the Maritime Staff College, Vice Admiral Katsuji Tani, JMSDF, took the initiative to establish one. See Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., to Professor Vincent Mocini, "PNWC Trip to MSC—Some B/G That May Be of Use to PNWC," e-mail, 15 February 2009.

16. In this regard, the provost delegated the authority to Mocini to compel discussion of planned visits to counterpart institutions overseas by NWC faculty and staff to ensure that they supported Navy and Navy component commander maritime security cooperation objectives but not to make a final decision concerning the suitability of these visits. The President of the Naval War College delegated the authority to approve or disapprove such visits to the provost.

17. Dean Vincent P. Mocini to Professor John Hattendorf, "Your Years as Dean of International Programs," e-mail, 16 March 2015.

18. These included such policy and strategy documents as Executive Office of the President, National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, "Maritime Security Policy," 21 December 2004; Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: 2005); Department of Defense, *QDR* [*Quadrennial Defense Review*] *Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity* (Washington, D.C.: 22 May 2006); Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors," DoD Instruction 5410.17 of 15 September 2006 [hereinafter DODI 5410.17]; Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2005: Winning the Fight . . . and Bridging to the Future* (Washington, D.C.: 3 January 2005), p. 14; and Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, D.C.: October 2007) (which postulated that "integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures . . . or more informal arrangements . . . , send powerful messages to would-be aggressors. . . . Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners. . . . *[T]rust and cooperation cannot be surged*. They must be built over time. . . .").

19. Giblin Papers (privately held): Naval War College, Office of the Provost, "POM 10 Program Review" (briefing, 24 October 2007) [hereinafter "POM 10 Program Review Brief"], slide 3.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., slide 27.

22. "Remarks by Rear Adm. Jacob Shuford, Naval War College Change of Command" (6 November 2008).

23. It is important to note that this narrative does not include the College's initiatives with respect to the PSI, the various international war games such as the long-standing Northwest Pacific game with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course. Though they all were clearly designed to improve maritime security cooperation, they have been described elsewhere in this volume.

24. "POM 10 Program Review Brief," slide 30.

25. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Office of the President, "120-Day Assessment for the Chief of Naval Operations" (briefing, 17 December 2004), slide 4. Once the yearlong-NSC concept had been clarified to a level that was sufficient for programming, budgeting, and execution, the provost and Senteio drafted an e-mail to the Vice CNO, Admiral Bill "Fox" Fallon, to explain the proposed change to the Naval Staff College program and that, unless otherwise directed, the College intended to execute this concept and that the CNO's invitation letters to his counterparts would need to reflect the change. The provost completed his final review of the draft plan on the morning of 25 November 2003 and released it. As it was the day before Thanksgiving, the provost departed the College in mid-afternoon for home. After he reached his home, his wife told him that Fallon had called and wanted to speak with him. When Giblin returned Fallon's call, the Vice CNO told him that the concept and the supporting business case analysis associated with this initiative were so well thought out that he authorized a two-year proof of concept within twenty-four hours of its receipt. As an aside, Fallon asked Giblin, "What took you so long [to make this change]?"

26. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2005*, p. 14.

27. A version of Admiral Prakash's main address was published as Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy (Ret.), "Indo-US Relations: A View from Seawards," in *From the Crow's Nest: A Compendium of Speeches and Writings on Maritime and Other Issues* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers for National Maritime Foundation, 2007), pp. 149–58.

28. Prakash's response was in reaction to a question posed to him by Mocini. Transcribed from Professor Vince Mocini's recounting of Prakash's remarks as contained in a video produced by the Naval War College Foundation. See NWC Foundation, "NWCF—Global Bridge Building," video, 1:04, 15 July 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfie0blqOaY.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. That interest extended to then–Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter. In June 2007, Provost Giblin met privately with Winter to discuss his concerns. The secretary believed that the Navy could strengthen its relationships with the international officers attending NWC by recognizing them as peers through the awarding of master of arts degrees to them. Giblin acknowledged this objective but made it clear to the secretary that doing so could put the accreditation of NWC as a degree-granting institution at risk because of the time spent by the College's

international officers away from the classroom while on the various Field Studies Program trips. Giblin also made the secretary aware of the limitations of the congressional legislation, which authorized the College to award degrees to U.S. officers only, as discussed below.

33. The College conducted a two-year proof of concept in academic year 2004–2005 and academic year 2005–2006. In the first case, the College required exams and papers. In academic year 2005–2006, three options were available. Option I envisioned no written exams and no papers. Option II was the same as Option I but offered the papers and exams to anyone who volunteered, with no grades assigned, just written comments. Option III envisioned a paper approximately fifteen pages in length that would not be graded. Selection of a topic would be left to each student but would require an advisor's approval. Students would be required to submit their papers by April.

34. Hattendorf Papers: Correspondence: Giblin, James F.: James F. Giblin, Jr., 2017 recollections in draft "Strengthening Maritime Security," p. 9.

35. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, RG 25 Records of the Naval Command College, box 9, folder 37: Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN, letter to Vice Admiral Fred Ruge, Federal German Navy, enclosed in correspondence to Vice Admiral Julien J. LeBourgeois, USN, President, Naval War College, 18 February 1975.

36. 10 U.S.C. § 7101, Public Law 101-510, div. A, title IX, sec. 912(a), *U.S. Statutes at Large* 104 (1990), p. 1626.

37. Ibid.

38. DODI 5410.17. Other areas of focus included the role of a free press and other communications media in American life; education; health and human services in the United States; and how American families live and work in cities, towns, and rural areas.

39. Dean Vincent P. Mocini to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Stuff," e-mail, 11 January 2016.

40. Naval War College Archives, RG 25, subgroup 3B8, Naval Command College: "International Maritime Symposium Program, 25–29 June 2007," pp. 3, 6–7.

41. "Bush Joins Short List of Presidents to Visit War College," *Newport Daily News,* 28 June 2007.

42. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files: Bush, George W.: Captain David N. Thorson, USN, to staff, faculty, and students, "Visit of President Bush—Plan of the Day," e-mail, 27 June 2007.

43. "Our View: Bush's Visit Was a Success for Newport," *Newport Daily News,* 29 June 2007, p. A11.

44. Ibid.

45. President George W. Bush, "Iraq and the War on Terror" (remarks, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 28 June 2007), p. 1. Also in Hattendorf Papers, series 4, Subject Files: Bush, George W.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., pp. 6–11.

48. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 19–23 September 2005* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2006), pp. 1, 3, and 183.

49. Ibid., p. 183.

50. Ibid.

51. John B. Hattendorf, ed., with John W. Kennedy, *Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 17–19 October 2007* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009), p. 1.

52. Ibid., p. 2.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 1.

55. Ibid., p. 193.

56. Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., to Professor Vincent Mocini, "PNWC Trip to MSC—Some B/G That May Be of Use to PNWC," e-mail, 16 February 2009.

57. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Navy Staff, "Mission, Functions and Tasks of the Naval War College," OPNAVINST 5450.203D of 23 May 2012, enclosure (1), p. 9.

58. "POM 10 Program Review Brief."

59. See above, chapter 19, pp. 458–59.

60. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 500.6: Kuznetsov Academy: President, U.S. Naval War College and the Chief, Kuznetsov Academy, draft memorandum of understanding, 4 May 2004, Newport, R.I.

61. In April 1968, after a series of incidents in the Sea of Japan, the United States invited the Soviet Union to discuss procedures to reduce the number of such incidents. The Soviet Union replied in November 1970 with an invitation to open discussions in Moscow. Following an exploratory round of talks in October 1971, the accord, subsequently known as the INCSEA Agreement, was signed formally on 25 May 1972 during the summit in Moscow by the Secretary of the Navy for the United States and the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy for the Soviet Union. In May 1973, during the first annual review, a protocol to the agreement was negotiated that extended certain provisions of the agreement to include nonmilitary ships. See "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the Waters outside the Limits of the Territorial Sea, as Amended by the 1973 Protocol to the Agreement and the 1998 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes," 25 May 1972, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm.

62. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Vice Admiral John Morgan, USN, "NWC/KNA College-to-College Agenda," e-mail, 14 October 2005.

63. Ibid.

64. The CNO had regularly invited his counterpart in Russia to send one officer each year to attend the Naval Command College for several years. In response to those invitations, the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) sent the following officers to attend the NCC: Captain First Rank Victor Leonidovich Potvorov, RFN, NCC '94; Captain First Rank Viktor Konusov, RFN, NCC '95; Captain First Rank Alexander S. Skaridov, RFN, NCC '96; Captain First Rank Gregory Leonidovich Zykov, RFN, NCC '98; and Captain Yuriy Grigoryevich Zhuravel, RFN, NCC '99. The RFN recalled Zhuravel from Newport because of NATO's air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo war. Since then, Russia has not accepted any of the CNO's invitations to send students to attend the NCC or NSC. See Former Dean Vincent P. Mocini to Dr. Jim Giblin, "Update to Sailors and Scholars—Strengthening Maritime Security Cooperation," e-mail, 17 February 2017.

65. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN (Ret.), attachment to Shuford to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update of Sailors and Scholars—Strengthening Maritime Security Cooperation," e-mail, 13 February 2017 [hereinafter Shuford attachment].

66. Hattendorf Papers: Subject Files, box 500.6: Kuznetsov Academy: President, U.S. Naval War College and the Chief, Kuznetsov Academy, memorandum of talks, 19 October 2005, Saint Petersburg, Russia. The basis for this memorandum of talks was the 2004 draft memorandum of understanding discussed above.

67. Ibid.

68. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Strategic Research Department, Monthly Planner—July and August 2006.

69. Shuford attachment.

70. Mocini to Hattendorf, "Your Years as Dean of International Programs," 16 March 2015.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford's recollections added in a review of draft of this chapter.

74. Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN, to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, et al., "NWC Westpac Symposium Quicklook," e-mail, 3 November 2005.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid. MALSINDO, initially conceived in July 2004, was a trilateral, coordinated patrol initiative of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia to address the issue of piracy in and around the Malacca Strait.

78. Mr. Randy Weitman to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update of Sailors and Scholars (International Fellowships)," e-mail, 25 July 2016. It is worthy to note that the College created an additional level of International Fellow when Admiral Gary Roughead appointed Admiral Guillermo E. Barrera, former commander of the Colombian Navy, as the first CNO International Fellow.

79. Mr. Randy Weitman to Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., "Update of Sailors and Scholars (International Fellowships)," e-mail, 29 July 2016.

80. Mocini to Giblin, "Stuff," 11 January 2016.

81. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, International Law Department, "The International Law Department" (briefing, November 2004), slide 3.

82. Ibid., slide 18.

83. Ibid.

84. The U.S. military rarely participated in International Institute of Humanitarian Law programs, because of the high travel and per diem costs. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, International Law Department, "Point Paper," 5 April 2013, p. 1 [hereinafter "International Law Department Point Paper"].

85. This international activity had been coordinated with the senior staff in the DoD General Counsel's Office, Navy Judge Advocate General's Office, European Command, Department of State, and Naval Forces, Europe.

86. "International Law Department Point Paper."

87. See International Institute of Humanitarian Law, *Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement* (Sanremo, Italy: November 2009), available at https://iihl.org/sanremo-handbook-rules-engagement/ (accessed 24 August 2023).

88. Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, International Law Department, "Sanremo Rules of Engagement Handbook" (briefing, n.d.), slide 20.

89. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, to Admiral Gary Roughead, USN, "NWC Regional Studies: Follow-Up," e-mail, 17 July 2008.

90. "Remarks by Adm. Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, Naval War College Change of Command" (6 November 2008), p. 2.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup
President, 6 November 2008–30 March 2011

A surface warfare officer, Rear Admiral Wisecup was Commander, Carrier Strike Group Seven (USS *Ronald Reagan* Strike Group) immediately before becoming the fifty-second President of the Naval War College. The second College president from Clark County, Ohio, he followed in the wake of Clarence Williams, the seventeenth President. A 1977 Naval Academy graduate, Wisecup earned a master's degree from the University of Southern California, was an Olmsted Scholar in France, at the University of Strasbourg, and graduated from the Naval War College in 1998. At sea, he was executive officer of USS *Valley Forge* (CG 50) and commanded USS *Callaghan* (DDG 994) and Destroyer Squadron Twenty-One during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He received the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for Inspirational Leadership. Ashore, Wisecup was assigned to NATO Headquarters, in Brussels, served as force planner and ship scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, and was an action officer for Navy Headquarters Plans and Policy Staff. He was a Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group fellow, Director of the White House Situation Room, and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea.

As fifty-second President of the Naval War College, Admiral Wisecup oversaw the continuing growth of the College, inaugurated the Chinese language library for the College's China Maritime Studies Institute, and hosted two highly successful Current Strategy Fora as well as the Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium. His administration saw increased cooperation and support from the Naval War College Foundation with substantial growth in its membership.

Gerald York's portrait of Admiral Wisecup was designed to echo the portrait of Stephen B. Luce by Frederic Vinton, which is the frontispiece to this history of the Naval War College.

Oil Portrait on Linen by Gerald P. York, Image Courtesy of the Artist

Chapter Twenty-Five

The College and Its Curriculum at 125 and Beyond

New leaders faced new challenges in the years leading up to and immediately following the Naval War College's quasquicentennial in October 2009. In the year and a half between late 2007 and mid-2009, three key new leaders took their places: a new provost, a new President, and a new dean of academic affairs.

The New Provost

Ambassador Mary Ann Peters Served as Provost of the Naval War College from 2008 to 2014. A career Foreign Service officer, she had been U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh, 2000–2003, and dean of academics at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, before coming to Newport.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The first of the three new leaders to arrive was Ambassador Mary Ann Peters, who became the College's fourth provost on 8 September 2008. A thirty-year career Foreign Service officer, she served as U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh from 2000 to 2003, receiving the State Department's Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Service for her work in heading the mission's efforts to support the War on Terror. Born in California, she earned her bachelor of arts degree at Santa Clara University and a master's degree in international studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, complemented by additional courses from "Sciences Po," the Institut d'études politiques, in Paris. She began her Foreign Service career in 1975 with her early postings as consul in Frankfurt, Germany; deputy chief of mission in Sofia, Bulgaria; economic advisor in Moscow in the Soviet Union; and the last U.S. consul in Mandalay, Burma. In senior posts, she served as deputy chief of mission in Ottawa, Canada; deputy director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh in the State Department from 1988 to 1990; and Director for European and Canadian Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council from 1995 to 1997, where she worked on the Northern Ireland peace process. Additionally, she was deputy assistant secretary of state overseeing U.S. relations with nineteen Western European countries and Canada.

After retiring from the Foreign Service, she became associate director for international liaison at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. She was serving as dean of

academics at the Marshall Center's College of International and Security Studies when the Naval War College selected her as provost.[1] The new College President arrived in Newport two months after Ambassador Peters.

The Fifty-Second President of the College

Rear Admiral James Philip "Phil" Wisecup relieved retiring Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford on 6 November 2008 to become the fifty-second President of the Naval War College. A graduate of the Naval Academy in the class of 1977 and the Naval War College in 1998, he was serving as Commander, Carrier Strike Group Seven in USS *Ronald Reagan* (CVN 76) from 2007 to 2008 when he was selected to be the fifty-second President of the Naval War College. Wisecup earned a master's degree in international relations from the University of Southern California and was an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Strasbourg, France, in 1982. During Operation DESERT STORM, Wisecup served at sea as executive officer of USS *Valley Forge* (CG 50). While commanding USS *Callaghan* (DDG 994), he received the Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Award for Inspirational Leadership in 1996. During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM following the attacks of 11 September 2001, he was commander of Destroyer Squadron Twenty-One, embarked in USS *John C. Stennis*. Ashore, he had served at NATO Headquarters, in Brussels, and had been Force Planner and Ship Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, and then served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations on the plans and policy staff before becoming a fellow in the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. He became the Director of the White House Situation Room. His first flag assignment was commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Korea from 2005 to 2007.[2]

Change of Command. Rear Admiral James P. "Phil" Wisecup (right) relieved Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford (left) as President of the Naval War College in Spruance Auditorium on 6 November 2008, while the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead (center), presided.

Naval War College Museum Collection

After leaving command of the *Ronald Reagan* Carrier Strike Group in Singapore just the week before, Wisecup relieved Shuford in Newport in early November 2008. During the ceremony, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, praised Shuford for his achievements during thirty-four years of service. Roughead commended him for his leadership during four years of unprecedented mission growth, program expansion, and increased international engagement. The Chief of Naval Operations noted that Shuford's

> initiative and his creativity have put in place new programs and reinvigorated old ones that have restored the reputation of the College as a thought leader in national security and an essential step in the education of any officer whether he wears the navy blue or the uniform of our sister services, or the uniform of our foreign friends and partners from around the world.[3]

In his traditionally brief remarks on taking command, Wisecup underscored the need for a successful Navy to have a place where thinking and preparation can happen, a place where rising leaders can prepare for change and an uncertain future. "For the United States Navy," he said, "that place is here in Newport. The Naval War College has been our 'Home of Thought' for over 120 years. . . . This is the place where the waterfront and the academy merge."[4]

The Navy Band Playing Henry Fillmore's "Men of Ohio" March at Naval War College Graduation in June 2010 in Recognition of Admiral Wisecup's Home State. Fillmore originally composed the march for President Warren G. Harding in 1921.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Coming directly to the War College from sea duty as a serving flag officer in operational command, Wisecup's first question to himself was whether the College was teaching the right things. Although a graduate who already knew the College well, he wanted to see for himself what had changed since his student days, so he embarked on a period of personal discovery. He walked around; listened to students, faculty, and staff; and sat in on classes. After nine months of careful investigation, he concluded: "I find that the institution is very sound . . . with each passing day. I'm convinced of the value of this institution."[5] One of the critical things that Wisecup learned, of which he had not been aware as a student in Newport, was that "there is a culture of constant reassessment that is deeply ingrained, and it's done by the faculty. So, they're constantly looking to update and revise the curriculum every time they teach it."[6] While Admiral Turner had created the fundamental template nearly forty years earlier, it was not static, and Wisecup evaluated that the fundamentals were sound.

The second central point that Wisecup learned was that "many of our people in uniform do not understand what goes on at the Naval War College and have not read much about our own Navy's history or culture."[7] Using himself as a data point, he confessed after his first six months just how much he had not known about the wide range of activities at the College. In particular, he realized that coming to the War College was not "a year off," as some people think. He saw that the problems the Navy and the nation faced were too complex to be handled by officers who had only an "on the job" education. "The program here," he wrote, "is not preparation for officers' next duty assignments, it's preparation for the big events and huge decisions they may have to take or try to influence in the future—an investment, both personal and professional."[8] For Wisecup, this was not a new issue but a continuing challenge. Students who come to the College will always need to learn to synthesize issues, write cogently, and clearly and concisely state what should be done. At the same time, it is up to the Navy to get the most suitable officers to Newport to undertake these studies. It is up to the students individually to do the reading, hone their writing skills, and prepare themselves as critical thinkers. Then, the Navy must use these students as leaders. He pointed out that the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and State Department had in the past all sent top-quality



Professor Sir Hew Strachan, the Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford, Having a Conversation with Admiral Wisecup in the President's Office in Conolly Hall on 3 April 2009.

Naval War College Museum Collection

individuals and future leaders to the College who were at the time of Wisecup's presidency in top leadership positions.[9] For Wisecup, the Naval War College was "the home of thought," a phrase he had found and adopted from the memoirs of former War College President and Chief of Naval Operations William Veazie Pratt.[10] Wisecup used the line in his e-mail signature block, and it soon became widely used around the College during his tenure and after.

One of Wisecup's early personal initiatives was to start a blog on the College's website. He initiated the series on 18 March 2009, naming it *President's Journal*. His purpose was to use a modern means of communication to relate succinctly and regularly what was going on at the College. His blog postings ranged widely, describing conferences, distinguished visitors, significant lectures, and even the books he was currently reading.[11]

The National Debate about Teaching Strategy

In 2007, and again in 2008–2009, public criticism of alleged strategic failures and shortcomings during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led members of Congress to begin to become concerned about how the nation's professional military education system taught strategy. Some critics asserted that the armed forces could win wars on the battlefield but could not achieve the overall strategic objectives of the wars. They reasoned that military leaders must be partly responsible for these failures and that the strategic failures in combat derived from weaknesses in the higher institutions of professional military education, like the Naval War College, where officers learned their strategic thinking.[12]

In mid-March 2009, the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services began a series of hearings in Washington, D.C., to investigate the issue. Representative Victor F. Snyder from Arkansas' Second Congressional District, a Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War, chaired the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which conducted the hearings. A month after these hearings began, the U.S. Army War College conducted a "Teaching Strategy" workshop. This subject of how to teach strategy had been a recurring theme for discussion with anyone involved in that activity. Several past and present Naval War College faculty represented the College at the workshop. Among them was Dr. Stephen O. Fought, professor emeritus and former dean of academic affairs at the Air War College, who had previously taught at the Naval War College for eighteen years when he had been the Director of Electives and Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy; he co-authored a broad-ranging paper titled "Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century."[13]



Professor Paul M. Kennedy, the J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. Since coming to Yale in the 1980s, Paul Kennedy has been a friend, mentor, and academic partner to many Naval War College faculty members as well as a regular lecturer and a member of the Naval War College Press's editorial board. He is shown here lecturing in Spruance Auditorium in February 2015. He was presented the College's Hattendorf Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History.
Naval War College Museum Collection

In addition, Professor Bradford A. Lee, a Strategy and Policy Department professor since 1987, gave an important forty-page paper entitled "Teaching Strategy: A Scenic View from Newport."[14] He examined in detail the practical purposes of the strategy courses in Newport, pointing out that it was not sufficient for officers just to determine the best course of action; they also had to convince others of the wisdom of following the selected course. Otherwise, their thoughts were stillborn in the real world. The secondary purpose of teaching strategy is to develop a student's powers of persuasion.[15] Lee then turned to examine the human capital involved in teaching these courses. The teaching in Newport, he said, was distinctive in two ways within the U.S. military's system of joint professional military education. First, the Naval War College taught with a two-person team of moderators for each group of students: a civilian academic paired with an active-duty military officer. Since strategy bridges policy and operations, this practical employment of human capital provided an example of collaboration across the sometimes-dysfunctional divide found in Washington between civilian academics with backgrounds oriented toward policy and the uniformed officers oriented toward operations. Second, the same faculty taught both the intermediate- and senior-level courses, encouraging versatility and adaptability in the faculty.[16] In conclusion, he turned to the three "learning aids," which he identified as (1) the course themes, which allowed students to think through the process of cycles of war and peace that have resulted as statesmen and warriors matched strategy and policy;[17] and (2) the in-depth study of selected classical theorists, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, then Mahan and Corbett, to think through the chains of cause and effect that connect political ends and the military means to meet them;[18] followed by (3) the mixture of ancient, modern, and contemporary case studies that provide a basic range of three types of wars—global wars, regional wars, and insurgencies—that may overlap or even transition from one to another.[19] In closing, Lee echoed Congressman Ike Skelton in pointing out that whether the "courses are creating strategic thinkers is not the only important question. Of equal importance is a further question: are the military services identifying such thinkers and using them in optimal ways?"[20]

Wisecup Testifies before Congress

After the Army War College conference, the House Committee on Armed Services requested Rear Admiral Wisecup to testify during the summer of 2009. It was the first time a president of the Naval War College had been summoned before Congress since Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser testified eighteen years earlier, in 1991. Admiral Wisecup made three appearances before the subcommittee. The first was on 4 June, when he joined the commandants of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, the Air War College, and the Army War College, and the director of the Marine Corps War College. Each commandant made a brief, five-to-ten-minute presentation on his institution before being subjected to general questions. Wisecup noted,

The Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium Began on the College's 125th Anniversary. One of the attendees was Admiral Guillermo Barrera, commander of the Colombian Navy from 2006 to 2010, shown in this photograph speaking as a delegate to the symposium. A 1993 graduate of the Naval War College, he returned to Newport in 2011 after retiring from forty years of active duty to become the Naval War College's first Chief of Naval Operations Distinguished International Fellow and served until 2024. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

> In my short time as President—seven months on Saturday—I have found the war college to be a professional graduate institution of the highest quality. The faculty and staff members who are satisfied there are doing meaningful work that makes a difference. The students are highly motivated professionals, many right off the front lines overseas, and we invite them in as we learn about the serious business of war.[21]

Admiral Wisecup returned to Washington twenty-one days later, on 25 June, to give additional testimony. In the first part of his prepared statement before providing a broad and detailed overview of the College's teaching and research programs, he answered specific questions posed by the subcommittee. One question inquired about how the Naval War College taught irregular warfare, a subject of topical interest amid the war in Iraq. Wisecup replied that the College covered the topic in the core curriculum and many elective courses. "One of the dedicated elective areas of study," he said, "focuses on insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism."[22] In addition, he noted that all three core courses included the subject. Significantly, he added that just the year before, in 2008, the College had created the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups to promote and support research on the subject and support conferences.[23]

The Naval War College Celebrated Its 125th Anniversary on 6 October 2009. The College distributed these challenge coins for the occasion. In addition, there were 125th anniversary banners placed on the light poles outside the College, a lecture, and a ceremonial cake cutting. The Naval War College Museum launched an exhibit and published a booklet for the occasion entitled *Faces of the Naval War College* that featured portraits and portrait busts of people associated with the Naval War College since its founding.

Naval War College Museum Collection



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

After more than 125 years, the Naval War College continues to serve as one of the premier forums for the education and development of our military's future leaders. By providing your students the opportunity to study the profession of war from a maritime perspective, while also embracing the study of joint and combined warfare, this storied institution has proven its value to our Nation time and time again.

Benefiting from the perspectives of a diverse staff and student body, Naval War College faculty and graduates have been instrumental in successfully leading our Nation through two world wars, the Cold War and this decade's conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a multitude of other operations around the globe. Today, this unique academic environment, set amidst the historic beauty of Newport, Rhode Island, enables its students to view issues and problems through others' eyes, preparing all of them to serve their nations more effectively in an ever-changing and increasingly interconnected world.

The future remains famously difficult to predict. Our best hedge against such uncertainty, however, continues to be investing in our best and brightest young leaders and their education. Their service, inspired and sharpened by the spirit of innovation so evident at the Naval War College, is – as it always has been – the key to meeting any challenge we may face in the years to come.

Sincerely,

M. G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, Wrote This Letter "To the Men and Women of the U.S. Naval War College" for the College's 125th Anniversary.

Naval Historical Collection, MSC 364, MSI 768

In his live testimony on 25 June, Wisecup joined the deputy commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College, the commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College, the commandant of the Air Command and Staff College, and the director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College to discuss the intermediate-level courses in professional military education that these

colleges taught. Wisecup summarized the Naval War College's approach: "We are confident our educational approach, which uses an executive perspective in a seminar-centered environment, requiring an appreciation of alternative viewpoints and the synthesis of complex ideas using multidisciplinary tools, remains on target."[24] He continued, "We expect application of principles to case studies of real events and issues and require our students to provide written analysis of complex open-ended issues. Grading clearly sustains the academic rigor."[25]

The New Dean of Academic Affairs

Dr. John Garofano Served as Dean of Academic Affairs from 2009 to 2015.
Naval War College Museum Collection

In looking to the future support structure for the College's academic programs, Admiral Wisecup and Ambassador Peters concluded that the College needed a full-time dean of academic affairs who was a trained academic. A series of active-duty naval officers occupied the position from its creation in 1973 until 1997, when Captain Calhoun retired and retained the job in a civilian capacity until 2000. Following Calhoun, Dr. Charles Neimeyer held the position for two years until 2002. While James Giblin was provost, the dean's function merged with the responsibilities of the provost. Following Provost Giblin's retirement in 2007, William Spain acted as interim provost and dean of academics. In July 2009, after a national search and unanimous recommendation from the hiring committee, which included a former Naval War College president and an external professor from the University of Rhode Island, Admiral Wisecup and Provost Peters selected Dr. John F. Garofano to be the new dean of academic affairs. At the same time, they decided that they wanted to retain Spain in a position above the dean level and created the post of associate provost for Spain to fill as its first occupant.[26]

Garofano graduated from Bates College in 1982 as a history major. He then earned a master's degree in security studies and international economics at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 1985 and a second master's degree, in government, at Cornell in 1988. He completed his PhD at Cornell in 1991 with a thesis in government, specializing in international relations and American politics, on the subject of "Feasibility, Intervention, and the Definition of Interests: The U.S. in Asia, 1945–1970." As an assistant professor of international relations, he taught at the University of Southern California and the Five Colleges consortium in Massachusetts, which comprises Amherst, Hampshire, Mount Holyoke, Smith, and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. From 1997 to 2000, he served at the Army War College, where he was first professor in its National Security and Strategy Department, then research professor in the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. In 2000, Garofano became a senior fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. He remained there until 2003, when the Naval War College's National Security Decision Making Department (as it was called in 2003) hired him as a professor. Garofano remained in that department until 2007, when he was selected to occupy the Captain Jerome Levy Chair of

Dean of Academic Affairs John Garofano Wearing His Cornell PhD Gown at a Naval War College Graduation. *Photograph Courtesy of Dr. Garofano*

Economic Geography and National Security in the College's Strategy and Policy Department. He served in that position until he became dean of academic affairs in July 2009.[27]

Dean of Academic Affairs

The absence of a full-time dean of academic affairs for a decade, while the office of the provost subsumed it, and the prior history of the position when active-duty or retired naval officers held the post caused several structural, procedural, and cultural challenges that quickly became apparent to Garofano as he assumed the position.[28] His six-year tenure, from 2009 to 2015, had three overarching and simultaneous efforts: (a) carving out a role for a strong dean of academic affairs that could enhance the academic mission; (b) protecting Academic Affairs during a period of consolidation and budget and billet cuts, followed by partial recovery; and (c) protecting graduate-level joint professional military education from initiatives that favored other mission areas. In trying to build his position to lead a separate functioning deanery, Garofano faced severe challenges regarding structure, procedure, and local culture.

Structurally, the office was initially weak without clearly defined roles for a dean of academic affairs in the sense that any civilian college would recognize them. Initially, the dean had little office or administrative support compared with the multiple military and civilian deputies not engaged in classroom teaching in the other deaneries. Given the tempo of activities and his goals, this situation was challenging during Garofano's first few years in the post.

Procedurally, the dean of academic affairs was initially not included in the decision processes usually associated with such a position or with senior leadership at a hybrid civilian-military institution. The situation varied among the four College presidents under whom he served. Still, it would remain a challenge for him even on fundamental issues such as seminar size, classroom quality, academic technology, the number and course of study of international officers, and the creation and public portrayal of nonacademic programs that negatively impacted the core program under Academic Affairs.

Culturally, there was antipathy among academic programs and the deaneries, as well as a lack of understanding by members of other deaneries of the curriculum, the pedagogy involved, and how much the curriculum and the requirements placed on both faculty and students had evolved since they or their peers had passed through the College decades before. A strong associate provost, William Spain, had continued to carry the dean of academic affairs responsibilities during the year before Garofano's appointment. After Garofano became dean, Spain remained in office and controlled many of these areas, though he was extremely busy with other issues.

At first, the new dean of academic affairs had no clear or recognized authority over the curriculum, which needed integration and revision. Each teaching department—National Security Decision Making (from 2011, National Security Affairs), Strategy and Policy, Joint Military Operations, the College of Distance Education, electives, and the Naval Operational Planner Course—developed its syllabi in almost complete independence and, except in rare circumstances, without higher input. In the initial period of Garofano's tenure, the chairs and directors did not have regular meetings with the free and open exchanges that form the basis for cooperative action.

In addition, other complications limited the dean's capabilities. The dean of academic affairs was notionally responsible for teaching performance, but the provost retained the dean of faculty's authority over hiring, firing, promotion, and discipline. The comptroller provided the budget with the associate provost's substantial input. The new dean of academic affairs found that he had no apparent role in determining in which of his departments the dozens of new military faculty would teach each year. In addition, the associate provost retained authority over most student survey instruments, access to accrediting agencies, much of the budget, including the faculty development budget, and, through the provost, the agenda for the Academic Policy Council.

Rear Admiral Wisecup Cuts the Ribbon, Formally Opening the China Maritime Studies Institute's Research Library in McCarty Little Hall on 14 January 2010.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Moreover, the dean of academic affairs needed access to the College President on par with the other deans. Among the significant issues, the dean wanted more control over the number of students who opted out of a core curriculum course to do a group advanced research project in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. This number had reached 16.5 percent of the student body (sixty-seven students in 2009–2010, up from ten in 2004). At the same time, he did not control the makeup of those students. However, the presence or absence of their service and warfare specialties significantly impacted the composition of seminars in the core curriculum. Dean Garofano also found that he had no role in the Advanced Research syllabi or pedagogy. Similarly, the entire electives program was adrift from Academic Affairs, without clear standards or any process for review of courses or syllabi.

For four of Garofano's six years as dean of academic affairs, his office engaged in significant battles over what to say in accreditation self-studies, during the Naval Inspector General's inspection visits, and in responses following each assessment from the teams of experts from the Naval Inspector General and from the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, and in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff–approved Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education. To these can be added debates over the revisions of the College's strategic plan. The associate provost controlled these processes, including those visits for academic and joint military education accreditation. In each case and at each stage (self-study, visit, response), the

The Head Table at the Victorian Military Society's Annual Dining-In, Held at the Atlantic Beach Club, 6 February 2015. A popular organization for many years among War College military and former military faculty members, it is the only authorized scion society in the United States of Britain's Victorian Military Society. It was conceived during a private dinner at the Newport Naval Officers' Club after a showing of the 1964 film *Zulu* in Newport in 1978 and established in 1979 with rules drafted by Captain Howard Storm Browne, Jr., MC, USN (Ret.). The society meets annually, usually on the first Friday in February, "to dine in the almost forgotten ritual of Victorian years, to rejoice in each other's comradeship, to honor brave deeds, and to break the back of the long Rhode Island winter." After dinner and toasts, the evening has typically included a lecture or a brief reenactment of the presentation of testimony from a nineteenth-century court-martial or court of inquiry, on which members of the mess vote.

Left to Right: Brigadier General Edward Kelly, USA (Ret.); Colonel Kevin Doyle, USMCR (Ret.); Ambassador J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy; Chaplain (Colonel) Everett Greene, USA (Ret.), President of the Mess; Colonel Theodore Gatchel, USMC (Ret.); Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.); Captain Thomas J. Hudner, Jr., USN (Ret.), Medal of Honor recipient in the Korean War; Master Sergeant John T. Duchesneau, Rhode Island Army National Guard. In the left foreground is Commander David Demming, USN (Ret.). Not shown: Colonel William R. Spain, USMC (Ret.), Vice President of the Mess. Some of the members shown are wearing the society's oval membership badge, with its black neckband commemorating Victoria, the queen-empress.

Naval War College Museum Collection

central challenge was how to explain accurately the resourcing and support for the core academic mission, and to distinguish what was graduate education from what was training, and what was joint professional military education from what was not. The dean of academic affairs' views often differed from those of the dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the dean of the College of Strategic Leadership, the dean of International Programs, and their deputies. It was the dean of academic affairs' view, shared by others within the deanery, that while other deaneries fulfilled essential functions for the Navy, the primary mission remained joint professional military education at the graduate level, which for four decades had been executed at an unrivaled level of quality, and that unfunded new programs were squeezing this mission. Academic faculty numbers had decreased while student numbers, curriculum development, and external demands increased significantly. Other areas of the College grew, their facilities improved, their faculty numbers increased, and their compensation was superior. There were also serious concerns about imbalances in faculty quality and workloads.

The gradual turnover in personnel provided both challenges and opportunities to make changes in the situation. In addition, Garofano was able to organize and chair hiring committees for some key positions. Among the new critical appointments for Garofano was Dr. David Cooper, an experienced manager in the Senior Executive Service from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who became James V. Forrestal Professor of National Security Affairs and chair of the National Security Decision Making Department (2010–2018). Then, Dr. James E. "Jay" Hickey, a professor and administrator in the College of Distance Education, moved up to the director's position from 2010 to 2015. With the provost's approval, Garofano extended the term of the chair of the Joint Military Operations Department, Captain James Cook, after he retired from active duty while awaiting the arrival of Captain Alan Abramson in 2010–2011. Abramson became an excellent department leader from 2011 to 2014 who appreciated academics. Captain Patrick Molenda became director of the Naval Operational Planner Course (2009–2014) and completed its transition into the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School. In the process, Molenda demonstrated to both the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the combatant commanders that they benefited from the students who received an education in strategy, decision making, and planning in the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School's program.

Dr. James E. "Jay" Hickey. A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1980, Hickey was a career naval flight officer. Prior to joining the Strategy and Policy faculty in 2000, he taught for three years at the United Kingdom's Joint Services Command and Staff College. He was director of the College of Distance Education from 2010 to 2015, then served as associate provost from 2015 and acting/interim provost from July 2020 to August 2022. His father, Captain John A. "Jack" Hickey, taught in the War College's Strategy Department, 1972–1977.
Naval War College Museum Collection

The department and division heads hashed out approaches to dealing with the internal and external problems in Academic Affairs in lengthy, spirited weekly meetings in the dean of academic affairs' office, which in 2010 moved to the room directly adjacent to the President's office. At that time, the chief of staff had vacated that office and moved out to the other side of the President's office with direct access to the aides, President, and provost. In November 2010, the Academic Affairs team produced a memo proposing to the provost several organizational and other changes that should be made, including a deputy dean of academic affairs; alternative delivery methods, including e-readers; different learning management systems; and the reorganization of administrative and travel assistance.

After receiving an assessment of the understaffing in the office of the dean of academic affairs as compared with the other deaneries, the provost eventually agreed to the hiring of a deputy who would, however, be shared on a halftime basis with the provost. In May 2011, this resulted in Garofano hiring Captain Michael J. Sherlock, USN (Ret.), whose previous experience in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies as deputy director of the Strategic Research Department, executive director of the Maritime Strategy Project, and the College's liaison with the Naval Inspector General, combined with his innate sagacity, made him an invaluable member of Garofano's team. Together with Dr. John Maurer of the Strategy and Policy Department, an ideal spokesman for the College's mission, Academic Affairs developed a team that valued graduate-level education, believed in the need for improved rigor and greater integration of the core curriculum, and built up an extensive reservoir of trust in lengthy weekly closed-door meetings of the chairs and directors with the dean. Garofano credited these years' accomplishments to their hard work and the unfailing support of his superiors, Provost Peters and Associate Provost Spain. Later, Dr. Michael F. Pavković as chair of the Strategy and Policy Department (2013–2018), Dr. Timothy Schultz as associate dean for electives and research (from July 2014), and Captain Richard A. "Twig" LaBranche, after he replaced Molenda as Director, Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (2014–2015), along with Colonel Rob Gardner (Ret.), who was hired in 2013 as deputy director of the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School following the untimely death of Professor Paul Romanski, and the many faculty who participated in committees, studies,



Dr. John H. Maurer, the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy, Served as Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department from 2005 to 2013.
Naval War College Museum Collection

Dean Garofano and the Provost, Ambassador Mary Ann Peters, Brief Congressman James R. Langevin, Who Represented Rhode Island's Second Congressional District from 2001 to 2023. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

and outreach deserve credit for implementing the accomplishments made in Academic Affairs during Garofano's tenure.

Curriculum Bifurcation

In late 2010, Provost Mary Ann Peters announced the commencement of the Five-Year Review of the Core Curriculum Bifurcation process and created a task force headed by Dean Garofano. In 2005, under congressional mandate, the College had begun the process of bifurcating the intermediate and senior-level courses, which up to that point had mainly been the same in content under the Navy's policy of sending officers to only one intermediate or senior-level professional military education course during their careers.

During the 2005 effort, Provost and Dean of Academic Affairs James Giblin provided overall supervision, while the teaching departments did the detailed work in differentiating the two courses.[29] Giblin appointed Dr. John Maurer, soon to be chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, to also chair the committee that undertook the work of differentiating between the courses, primarily because he already had thought about this subject for Strategy and Policy and had a plan to do so. Among the group members, Captain Steven Kornatz, chairman of Joint Military Operations, played an essential and unstinting leadership role, helping to foster a team effort across the departments.

Rear Admiral Wisecup Presents the College's 2009 Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award to General Raymond T. Odierno, Commanding General, U.S. Forces in Iraq. A graduate of the Naval War College in 1990, Odierno served in Iraq and from 2011 to 2015 as the thirty-eighth Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.
Naval War College Museum Collection

This initiative created an extraordinary amount of work for the faculty, who developed two new courses while simultaneously teaching the old courses. As John Maurer put it, "The differentiation in the intermediate- and senior-level courses was the most significant change in the curriculum since the Turner reforms of the early 1970s."[30] The work done in creating two courses in the Strategy and Policy Department exemplified what the other departments were doing. In the case of Strategy and Policy, the faculty wanted to avoid creating a "dumbed down" version of what they had taught earlier. Instead, they used the previous course as the basis for the new intermediate-level course. They improved the old course by spelling out the course themes, adding new case studies, improving the course presentation, and more clearly drawing out the application of the historical cases for understanding broad fundamental strategic problems. The overarching theme of the new intermediate course was to demonstrate the strategic effects of operations, highlighting the roles of significant leaders and campaigns in determining outcomes. The new senior-level course was a substantial change to the curriculum. It focused on grand strategy, consideration of long-term competitions, understanding of decisions for war, the economic underpinnings of national strength, the challenges of postwar periods, and the roles of high-level political and military leaders. The eleven course themes in the senior-level course differed from the intermediate course by emphasizing international

relations, economics, and comparative political systems more. One notable new historical case study involved a comparative investigation of civil-military relations by comparing Abraham Lincoln and Otto von Bismarck as statesmen and war leaders. In developing these two new courses, faculty members Bradford Lee, William Fuller, Michael Pavković, Timothy Hoyt, and Scott Douglas played vital roles in writing or revising case studies and providing guidance on how best to teach them to underscore course themes.[31]

Five years later, the immediate task in 2010 was to conduct a full review of the core curriculum as it had developed since 2005, including the core teaching departments—Joint Military Operations, National Security Decision Making, and Strategy and Policy—as well as the College of Distance Education, Maritime Advanced Warfighting School, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, and International Programs. Additional external experts knowledgeable about the College's mission helped as needed. Then, in a future phase, the task force planned to examine the non-core-curriculum areas, including electives and advanced research programs. Dean Garofano initiated the process in December 2010, which he divided into three stages. First, the group reviewed the academic outcomes identified in 2005–2006. They then considered whether and how the curriculum delivered the outcomes. In the final stage, they looked at possible subject-matter and issue-area gaps and redundancies in the curriculum.[32]

Rear Admiral Jan Thörnqvist, Chief of the Royal Swedish Navy and a Graduate of the Naval Command College in 2005, Making an Office Call on Rear Admiral John Christenson in the President's Office in Conolly Hall on 11 March 2013. Promoted to vice admiral in 2016, he served as the Chief of Joint Operations of the Swedish Armed Forces until 2020. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

As the bifurcation review began, the commandant of the Marine Corps, General James F. Amos, initiated an effort to embed "red teams," or internal critics, in key planning and operational staffs at the two-star commander level and above. When the Marine Corps' senior service advisor at the College passed this information to War College President John Christenson (Wisecup's successor), he and Provost Peters supported sending half a dozen volunteer faculty members to Afghanistan. Professor Ronald Ratcliff was the first to volunteer, but few others volunteered immediately. When a gap opened in the College's support for the initiative, Garofano took the opportunity for a ninety-day deployment with the First Marine Expeditionary Force in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The experience in Afghanistan gave Garofano a unique opportunity to gain first-hand experience in two parts of the curriculum that were unfamiliar to him: joint military operations and maritime advanced warfare studies. While working in Afghanistan, Garofano reconnected with Colonel Rob Gardner and recruited him to return to Newport to help run the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School program. Throughout his time in Afghanistan, Garofano remained in touch with Newport by video conferencing and participated in the hiring processes he had initiated. Associate Provost Spain and retired Army Colonel Professor Thomas J. Gibbons took on the daily tasks of leading the bifurcation task force during Garofano's three-month absence.

At the end of academic year 2010–2011, after preparation began that winter, the chairs, directors, and dean of academic affairs had a two-day meeting to formalize the progress and lay the groundwork for the future. Several initiatives and vectors were agreed to or established at this meeting that were refined during the remainder of the calendar year. Previously, each department had separate views on promotion, rank structure, and the content and renewal of the memoranda of understanding that defined individual faculty responsibilities. Now, all the departments under the dean of academic affairs agreed on what it meant to be a successful Naval War College professor, put this in writing, and inserted the language in individual faculty members' memoranda of understanding and in revisions of the Faculty Handbook that Dr. Hickey was overseeing.

The group agreed that Naval War College professors should, in order of descending priority, be excellent teachers, effective curriculum developers, productive scholars or members of their professional community, and enthusiastic providers of College—not just departmental—service. It would be rare for professors to continue in Academic Affairs if they failed at any of these or were less than outstanding on at least two dimensions. The language on what constituted performance levels was tightened, and departments would henceforth provide any performance bonuses using these criteria. All professors were expected to excel at all four pillars.

The College would no longer automatically renew the individual faculty memoranda of understanding. Faculty members would need to pass an internal assessment, which would then be forwarded to the dean of academic affairs for endorsement before going to the provost in her capacity as dean of faculty. The annual employment evaluation form, known as the PARS (Performance Appraisal Review System), became standardized across Academic Affairs, with clear and commonly applied procedures. Department chairs and directors used it to provide extensive initial, mid-term, and evaluative input and feedback for all employees. The dean, provost, and, when necessary, the President of the Naval War College gained excellent visibility on the performance of all faculty. With higher and more-precise standards, performance improved. Unfortunate cases in which failure occurred were also appropriately managed, with termination occasionally resulting.

The varied experiences and approaches of different chairs and their executive assistants and the limited civilian hiring experience of military chairs and directors required an emphasis on increasing diversity among the faculty. To do this, the dean of academic affairs established best practices on hiring policies and protocols, based in part on research done for the hires of those at the table, including stating Title 10 and Title 5 requirements more precisely, providing a completely level playing field, and working toward improved diversity. The result was a series of superb, diverse hires and enhanced performance.

On the curriculum, the dean of academic affairs and chairs agreed to conduct a formal review of the intermediate-level course followed by another for the senior-level course. These reviews commenced almost immediately and culminated in major presentations to the President of the College a year later and to the Joint Chiefs' Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education two and three years later. The overarching plan was to fulfill the promise offered by the move toward bifurcation in 2006 by creating two truly distinct curricula, each one appropriate for the respective career stages of War College students, and to receive accreditation from the New England Association of Schools and Colleges for two separate master's degrees.

The intermediate-level course received priority because of what the dean of academic affairs considered existential challenges from the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies and the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, which had circulated among Washington offices and others the view that the intermediate-level course did not create naval planners on a par with the short Maritime Staff Operators Course or the Executive Level Operational Level of Warfare Course. This discussion became known as "the planner issue," resulting in many acrimonious exchanges.

The dean of academic affairs discovered that several individuals had circulated PowerPoint presentations and position papers claiming that the Maritime Staff Operators Course's several-week-long, Navy-only, all-day format was superior in producing "planners" to the yearlong intermediate-level course, consisting of three core courses and three electives, evening lectures, joint acculturation, graduate-level education, homework, papers, examinations, and five weeks of a joint and Navy planning exercise. Though the other deans had no experience in the current curriculum, they supported this view.

The culmination of the intermediate-level course program review was a daylong briefing to the President, provost, and deans that clarified the course's relevance, continual updating, and ability to prepare students for various future assignments, including those in planning. The long-term results of the reviews were the final refinements of the curricula to create two distinct master of arts programs of study that the New England Association of Schools and Colleges eventually approved formally in 2014–2015. The faculty designed the intermediate-level course for students to gain an understanding of theater security decision making in the National Security Decision Making trimester, focusing on the combatant command level; the strategic effects of military operations in the Strategy and War trimester; and campaigns and joint task force–level operational planning in the Joint Maritime Operations trimester. In the senior-level course, students focused on grand strategy in the Strategy and Warfare course trimester, the making of national security and military strategy and decision making in the National Security and Decision Making course trimester, and combatant command policy, politics, and operations in the Joint Military Operations course trimester.

Each new course now followed a standard format. As a result of the increased coordination and complementarity at each level, the new course syllabi had a standard format regarding objectives, requirements, and outcomes. The departments agreed to a standard cover design and color scheme: yellow for the intermediate-level course and blue for the senior-level course. Significantly, the College submitted these distinct courses to the New England Association of Schools and Colleges as separate master's degree programs. Formally approved as degree programs for the master of arts in national security and strategic studies (senior-level course) and master of arts in defense and strategic studies (intermediate-level course), the courses were renamed, respectively, the Nimitz and Spruance courses at the beginning of the academic year in August 2014.

The Maritime Advanced Warfighting School and the College of Distance Education followed, publishing their syllabi and following the general formatting. Around 2011–2012, the dean of academic affairs required department chairs and directors to submit cover memos with the syllabi explaining what had changed, what remained the same, and where it was going. During this period, the dean and chairs also briefed the Academic Policy Council on these points. Beginning in this time frame, the dean sought, with

only temporary success, to reestablish the role of the Academic Policy Council as an important, regular meeting in which the President and provost would hear directly from the dean, chairs, and directors about curriculum changes and initiatives and, where necessary, make policy decisions in accordance with the council's charter.

The National Security Affairs (formerly the National Security Decision Making) Department underwent the most significant transformation among the core courses as it integrated its previously independent three sub-courses, raising standards and becoming grounded in coherent analytical approaches. The Strategy and Policy Department introduced new modules for lessons from recent wars and emerging threats. The Joint Military Operations Department underwent significant improvement to ensure fulfillment of the naval joint planner's designator (JPN). As part of the curriculum reassessment, the faculty also sought to rationalize assessment tools and grading policies and to increase rigor where necessary. The result was establishing a new range of assessment tools to evaluate student work, including research papers, analytical papers, oral presentations, class participation, and capstone exercises. The teaching departments also brought in high-profile guest speakers and assessors.

As part of the drive for rigor, the faculty also had to ensure quality control in several ways. With the provost's strong support, the College hired a dynamic Writing Center director, who not only led the creation of a student journal but created, with the support of and intensive work across the deanery, a standard style guide and a common writing guide. These efforts also allowed Academic Affairs and its constituent departments to reemphasize and speak in a unified voice on its policy toward plagiarism so that syllabi, administrators, and professors all presented the same standard. The faculty also began to employ new software for plagiarism detection, grammar improvement, and citation management and to provide it to students. For this, the faculty restricted students to using a couple of readily accessible, major style formats to emphasize content over formatting in the pockets of the deanery where that was not the case. The inspection agencies highlighted these innovations as they did other accomplishments.

Rear Admiral Carter Leads the Second Division of the 2014 Saint Patrick's Day Parade in Newport. *Naval War College Museum Collection*

During the presentation of the intermediate-level course review in the spring of 2014, the dean of academic affairs suggested to Rear Admiral Walter E. "Ted" Carter, Jr., who followed Christenson as President, that the College could revamp the electives program to allow greater movement within areas of study for all students.[33] Since the Bureau of Naval Personnel was not utilizing the additional qualification designator codes that the College faculty had spent so much time and effort matching to courses to serve as the organizing principles of the electives program, an initiative that Garofano had led a decade earlier, the College would make adherence to a specific electives

track optional. Admiral Carter agreed. This change led to a renewal of interest in electives; the creation of an "electives fair," mimicking course fairs held at civilian colleges; and students broadening their horizons by moving across different areas of study.

The Academic Affairs team also agreed to reengage on the issue of providing greater recognition for excellence in teaching. With the provost's and Foundation's strong support, Academic Affairs established the Outstanding Military Faculty Teaching Award, which was eventually named the Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler Award for Inspirational Teaching, honoring the former dean of the College of Distance Education, 1976–1977, and chair of the Naval Operations Department, 1977–1981.[34] In addition to creating a student journal named */luce.nt/* to highlight student writing, Academic Affairs expanded the number of student writing awards.

Academic Affairs also revamped and standardized the many student surveys and course and professorial critiques across the deanery. Questions, scales, and formatting were standardized and refocused on learning outcomes rather than individual departmental objectives, while Academic Affairs also emphasized teaching teams in addition to individual performance. These changes resulted in an ability to compare course value, student satisfaction, and teacher performance meaningfully across the departments, resulting in more-useful Academic Policy Council briefs to the President of the College at the end of each trimester. Eventually, the College received approval to hire a Director of Institutional Effectiveness, Dr. Edward J. Gillen, a professional in assessment and surveys.

The Academic Affairs team agreed to establish liaison groups to overcome knowledge deficits regarding the faculty's understanding of other departments' curricula. As a result, departments shared syllabi and worked across department lines on many sessions to eliminate overlap in readings and to fill in gaps to meet the new joint professional military education and U.S. Navy requirements. The dean of academic affairs also launched a plan to share faculty across departments and deaneries. In 2015, the first interdepartmental faculty exchange occurred, between National Security Affairs and Strategy and Policy. At the same time, the faculty and four main programs in the College of Distance Education became more integrated with resident teaching and curriculum development.

The chairs and directors agreed that the lengths of each departmental course needed reexamination along with the annual academic calendar, which department executive assistants had previously produced without the full input of chairs and directors working together. With the agreement of the Joint Military Operations Department, the dean trimmed the Joint Maritime Operations intermediate-level course slightly to provide a few more days to the other courses, allowing the Strategy and Warfare course to restore the Peloponnesian War case study back into the curriculum, a priority for the President, Rear Admiral Christenson, and the Strategy and Policy Department. With Dean of Students Captain Raymond Keledei's support, the other result was a new, active, and extended process for the chairs, directors, and dean to review and adjust the academic calendar, allowing better equalization of the courses and dealing with significant issues such as how to incorporate the newly mandated Ethics Conferences that the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership organized.

The teaching departments agreed to tackle the problems of the group advanced research projects. These research projects absorbed many of the best students as well as scarce student representatives of some of the warfighter communities, taking them out of the core curriculum and reducing service diversity in the classrooms. They also agreed to address the problem of how to grant credit hours for programs that the dean of academic affairs did not oversee. The Academic Policy Council had long precluded these issues from the agenda, so the dean of academic affairs finally added them, along with supporting materials, at the spring 2012 Academic Policy Council with Rear Admiral Christenson.

Regarding the Center for Naval Warfare Studies' group advanced research projects, this council meeting saw the beginning of progress on ensuring at least minimal credit hour review by the dean of academic affairs, a process of overseeing the selection of students for the group advanced research projects and decreasing their numbers, and moving that program to an elective-only format that has been so successful in the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School's programs. Eventually, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies agreed to move to that same format in exchange for several professorial billets to ensure continuity. Some full-time group advanced research students continued, missing part of the core courses. Unless students were attending the War College course for a second time, they typically chose to forgo taking the Strategy and Warfare or Strategy and Policy course owing to workload and the relatively smaller number of joint professional military education requirements satisfied by either course. The College of Operational and Strategic Leadership chose to disband its student research program, the Stockdale Group, rather than transition to an elective-only format. The academic departments considered these outcomes to be a significant improvement. The director of the College of Distance Education, Timothy Jackson; the executive assistant to the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School director, Rob Gardner; and Tim Schultz worked hard on these issues.

The chairs and directors in Academic Affairs agreed to continue to try to explain better what they did as the expansion of other parts of the College brought in increasing numbers of individuals with no experience in joint professional military education or higher education. With some entities within the College exponentially increasing contact with officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Forces Command, and the numbered fleets that focused on tactics, current operations, and training, the dean of academic affairs expanded the Academic Affairs briefs to which he invited the entire College and commenced publishing *The U.S. Naval War College Academic Affairs Newsletter* several times per year to explain to internal and external audiences the Academic Affairs mission, highlight course changes, and spotlight faculty accomplishments and graduating classes.

The new intermediate-level course was created with the Joint Military Operations portion increased to seventeen weeks to create naval planners. Intermediate-level course students graduated from the Naval War College with the naval joint planner's qualification (JPN) following the ten-month course of graduate-level education in history, strategy, policy, plans, and operations—or thirteen months for those involved in group advanced research projects or the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School. At one culminating meeting toward the end of Rear Admiral Christenson's term as President, he directed that the arguments claiming insufficiency in the core program cease. The College of Operational and Strategic Leadership continued and expanded its pilot Maritime Operational Planners Course, arguing that the Joint Maritime Operations

course failed to produce planners of sufficient quality. They succeeded in gaining the support of Admiral William E. Gortney, Commander, Fleet Forces Command, who provided funds for the pilot course, while the College provided faculty billets from overall end strength.

Rear Admiral Walter Carter Presenting Gina Brown of the Eccles Library Staff the Certificate for Being Employee of the Quarter, 13 February 2014.
Naval War College Museum Collection

In the spring of 2014, after the formal review of the intermediate-level course, Academic Affairs presented an all-day brief to the new President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Walter E. Carter, Jr., and the other deans to demonstrate the value of and continuing work to improve the intermediate-level course curriculum for naval planners. However, several areas of the College continued to lobby for expanding the Maritime Staff Operators Course, the Executive Level Operational Level of Warfare Course, and the Maritime Operational Planners Course.

One result of this internal competition, due in some degree to what the dean of academic affairs considered extremely inaccurate briefings to the Bureau of Naval Personnel and others, was that the Naval War College found itself fighting an uphill battle to try to convince the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations of the value of having broadly educated planners. The dean of academic affairs pointed out that the Navy was not effectively employing College graduates. In 2016, of the more than 1,100 active-duty naval officer graduates of the full-time, in-resident intermediate-level course, fewer than six officers were employed at any time in Navy planning billets.

Curriculum Development

In October 2011, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed the Department of Defense to ensure that it had effectively learned from the past decade's experience.[35] This directive resulted in the *Decade of War* study, published in 2012.[36] The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis division of the Joint Staff reviewed forty-six "lessons learned" from previous studies done between 2003 and 2012. The division synthesized the findings of those reports into eleven strategic themes that formed the basis of *Decade of War*. The analysis covered a wide range of types of operations. It included major combat operations in Iraq; counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the Philippines; humanitarian assistance in the United States, Pakistan, and Haiti; experience in Sri Lanka and Kosovo; and emerging regional and global threats. A weeklong "Decade of War" conference in May 2012 further refined the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis division's initial analysis and was included in the published study.[37]

As a result of the *Decade of War* study in 2012, the Naval War College spent the subsequent three cycles of curriculum development extensively revising its curriculum, incorporating the study's most important conclusions. The College's curriculum became realigned to focus more clearly on the levels of warfare described

in the *Decade of War* study. As this occurred, the curriculum revisions also incorporated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's annual special areas of emphasis, while congressional and other inquiries on nuclear issues required significant work.

Following on from these initiatives, General Dempsey stated in a 2013 memorandum to service chiefs his "Desired Leader Attributes [DLAs] for Joint Force 2020":

> The six officer DLAs are the abilities to (1) understand the environment and effect of all instruments of national power, (2) anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty, (3) recognize change and lead transitions, (4) operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command), (5) make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms, and (6) think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations.[38]

In this memorandum, Dempsey directed that "our joint education institutions must consider ways to address the Desired Leader Attributes within their current officer education curricula and as they revise their programs via their internal curriculum review processes."[39] The Joint Chiefs later formalized these points in more detail through revisions to the Officer Professional Military Education Policy instruction.[40]

The dean of academic affairs and his faculty responded to these ideas even as the Joint Chiefs developed them in draft form. The core teaching departments used the new Desired Leader Attributes as an organizing principle in their course reviews for the intermediate-level course review briefings, some Academic Policy Council presentations, and other reports. They became a focal point for curriculum development, particularly for the National Security Affairs and Strategy and Policy curricula. At the same time, Joint Military Operations focused on how best to meet the expectations for the naval joint planner's additional qualification designator in the intermediate-level course.

Earlier in 2013, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert had signed the *Navy Leader Development Strategy* in January, laying out its recommendations for leader characteristics and establishing a common framework for comprehensive and enduring career-long leader development across the Navy. Drafted for the Chief of Naval Operations by the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, it integrated four elements: experience, education, training, and personal development. While all in the Navy were leaders, the flag officers were at the top level of the continuum and expected to be the guardians of the Navy's core values of honor, courage, and commitment; exemplars for the Navy of moral character; forward thinkers, strategic in their judgments; stewards of the naval profession of arms; and conveyors of the highest standards of strength, determination, and dignity.[41]

In the wake of these developments, the President of the College, Rear Admiral Carter, requested a study of how the intermediate- and senior-level courses met these requirements. Over several months, the dean of academic affairs, department heads, and course directors conducted an examination. The report was a detailed analysis concluding that the College's curriculum covered most of the characteristics noted in the *Navy Leader Development Strategy* and that others were not part of graduate-level education but rather experience or training. The dean then held several public meetings to discuss the findings.

In 2011, early in Dr. David Cooper's tenure as chairman of the National Security Decision Making Department, the department was renamed the National Security Affairs Department to better reflect the substance of its courses and faculty and to align with the College's peers in the professional schools. Its capstone Final Exercises were overhauled and have become severe policy exercises reviewed by serious former military and civilian policy makers. Over four years, National Security Affairs recast its three sub-courses under an analytical framework of three levels of analysis that focused on system, state, and leader. These sub-courses aligned so that they progressed along the same topics. The faculty increased the reading load and made it more challenging, while they rationalized grading events. Eventually, they added class participation as a factor in grading as well.

Dr. Mary Raum. Dr. Raum has been a leader at the College for the Women, Peace, and Security program. From 2007 to 2009, she served as course director, leading the bifurcation of the joint military professional education curriculum in decision making and implementation. In 2010, she became a professor in the National Security Affairs Department.

Naval War College Photograph

In March 2011, the White House issued the first comprehensive report on the status of American women since President John F. Kennedy's report in 1963. Nine months later, President Barack Obama issued the nation's first U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, along with an executive order implementing it. President Obama's initiatives accelerated and institutionalized efforts across the government to advance women's participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. They institutionalized a gender-responsive approach to American diplomatic, development, and defense-related work in conflict-affected environments.[42] The White House report on women and conflict supported the provost's and the dean of academic affairs' views that the College needed to include more on that topic in the curriculum. As a result, Dr. Mary Raum took the lead on this topic, briefing faculty and running major workshops. Further emphasis came from a Foundation-supported student writing competition as each Academic Affairs teaching department added more content related to women, peace, and security in its curricula.

Dean Garofano's emphasis on the three *e*'s—economics, energy, and the environment—gained traction from the outset of his tenure with backing from the established Naval War College Foundation–supported academic chairs focused on economic issues. These academics led workshops on the subject and made suggestions for the curriculum. At the same time, the faculty made numerous other adjustments to the curriculum, including incorporating energy and environmental factors during conflict into the course curricula.

Joint Military Operations added an entire module on international law into its courses. For many years, the International Law Department recommended that the College devote more classroom time to this subject. In 2011–2012, Dean Garofano had several meetings on this subject, but after analyzing the situation, the College decided that what was already in the curriculum exceeded the required joint professional military

educational requirements. In the face of pressures for other curricular additions and priorities, the College did not adopt the recommendation for an additional international law component.

Consideration of Faculty Tenure

Over six weeks from mid-September to early December 2013, a college-wide committee led by Academic Affairs examined the issues surrounding the pros and cons of faculty appointments with tenure versus the current system of a rarely granted contract without a specified term. The committee discussed three primary options: traditional academic tenure, the existing contract-without-terminal-date form of tenure, and no tenure. The committee identified numerous issues that needed to be overcome to institute some form of tenure. One of the main hurdles was that there were five main types of faculty members at the College, not all of whom could fit into a single system of standard criteria for tenure. The faculty was a mixture of traditional academics, retired practitioners with doctorates, retired practitioners without doctorates, active practitioners with experience in core mission areas, and active practitioners with expertise in other mission areas. The dominant view of the committee was that traditional academic tenure, as used in civilian colleges and universities, was not appropriate, as it would improve neither morale nor recruiting and would require a potentially disruptive complete overhaul of the faculty appointment and rank systems. The committee concluded that a better fit for the Naval War College would be the current contract-without-term approach with improved procedures implemented systematically across a college-wide system. An alternative second choice was multiple tenure and nontenure tracks for academics and practitioners, as employed by peer professional schools. In early 2014, the dean began to plan meetings to decide among the various courses of action. Still, by April, Rear Admiral Carter had postponed a decision, as he would shortly leave the College for his new assignment as Superintendent of the Naval Academy. As it turned out, it would be several more years before the College reached a decision.[43]

Government Shutdowns, Sequestration, and Furloughs

Since 1980, there have been an increasing number of situations in which Congress has not made the budget authorizations required to fund the federal government before the beginning of the next fiscal year. When these funding gaps have occurred, the federal government has limited the activities of federal agencies, ceased nonessential operations, retained only employees that protect life and property, and furloughed nonessential employees. Government shutdowns of varying lengths occurred in 1980, 1981, 1984, 1986, and 1990. One of the most prolonged shutdowns, lasting five days in November 1995 and twenty-one more days from December to January 1996, occurred during the Clinton administration. As a result, the federal government placed an estimated 800,000 federal employees on furlough without pay, including most of the Naval War College's civilian faculty and staff. Congress eventually restored their pay when it authorized funding for the Department of Defense.[44]

In 2013, a new factor entered the scene with federal budget cuts called "sequestration." This reduction in spending across all federal agencies resulted from the Budget Control Act of 2011 and was scheduled to continue annually through 2025. When the federal government did not take action to reduce the federal budget deficit, it triggered these cuts. On 14 May 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced that the Defense Department was facing an historic shortfall of $30 billion because of provisions of the Budget Control Act of 2011 that took effect on 1 March 2013. Department of Defense funds were shifted from training

Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert and Rear Admiral John Christenson at Naval War College Graduation, 21 June 2013. Admiral Greenert gave the main address for this graduation, which was held in Spruance Auditorium and not in a tent on Dewey Field, as usual. Students were limited to one guest, with no faculty or staff attending.
Naval War College Museum Collection

and facilities maintenance and nonessential programs to sustain higher-than-expected costs in wartime operations in Afghanistan. As sequestration prevented ships from deploying, grounded aircraft, and created the specter of furloughs in the offing, Provost Mary Ann Peters announced that the College's June 2013 graduation would be held in Spruance Auditorium rather than in a large tent on Dewey Field, where the College had typically held it in recent years. "This was a hard decision," she wrote, "but it is not because sequestration has precluded us from spending money on the event. . . . [W]e felt holding the ceremony indoors was the right decision" under the circumstances.[45] As a result, the graduation ceremony was an optional event, and, for the first time in College history, the faculty and staff were excluded from attending. Graduates were only allowed one guest in the auditorium, but the event was video broadcast to overflow rooms, where additional guests could watch it.

Meanwhile, in Washington, after an extensive review of the options to deal with the budget shortfall, Hagel directed that most civilians in the Department of Defense be furloughed one day a week for eleven weeks, beginning 8 July 2013.[46] A month after the start of the furloughs, in early August, Hagel noted that "this has been one of the most volatile and uncertain budget cycles the Department of Defense has ever experienced. Our fiscal planning has been conducted under a cloud of uncertainty with the imposition of sequestration and changing rules as Congress made adjustments to our spending authorities."[47] Thanks to management initiatives, reduced costs, and reprogramming from Congress, Hagel announced that he had reduced the number of furlough days for civilians from eleven to six.

In addition to the six-day sequestration furloughs in 2013, there was also a sixteen-day government shutdown, from 1 to 17 October, as political fights took place between members of the House of Representatives, on one side, and the Senate and President Obama, on the other, over raising the debt ceiling and funding or delaying the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). Congress brought the shutdown to an end by passing the 2014 Continuing Appropriations Act, which temporarily resolved the issues. In anticipation of the shutdown, the dean of academic affairs had developed a shutdown plan focused on maximizing student academic experience while minimizing disruptions to the entire academic schedule.[48]

Earlier in 2013, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) had visited the War College partly to ask what more the College could do without further financial resources. In response to this request, one of the dean of academic affairs' offers was to create the Advanced Studies in Naval Strategy course, later called the Advanced Strategy Program. He also offered to expand the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School and secured internal approval for moving a faculty billet to provide an extra seminar. Both visitors enthusiastically supported these initiatives, which the College brought into effect in record time.

For these and the additional projected rise in student numbers, the College needed approximately one dozen administratively determined and General Schedule billets in addition to gaining support for filling roughly a dozen unfilled military billets from across the services. Limited additional College support for the programs came in June 2014 with the appointment of recently retired Army Colonel David Brown as associate professor of academic affairs. A combat veteran with extensive operational planning experience, he had taught for the previous seven years in the Strategy and Policy Department and served as the departmental executive assistant. Brown was appointed simultaneously to fill three functions: a vital role for the expanded Maritime Advanced Warfighting School, executive director of the Advanced Studies in Naval Strategy Program, and resource manager and executive assistant for the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups.[49]



Academic Affairs Timeline, 2009 to 2015. This PowerPoint slide from January 2015 summarizes the key events in Academic Affairs while John Garofano was dean. *Courtesy Dean Garofano*

Looking back over his six-year tenure as dean of academic affairs, Garofano noted, "We continue to experience problems in communicating the value of graduate-level JPME, and the difference between education and training, rigorous vs. passive pedagogy, and the value of professional academics in educating future senior military leaders. . . ."[50] However, he had succeeded in overcoming resistance to making the dean the chief academic officer, as is usually the case in academia and as both the New England Association of Schools and Colleges and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education teams had recommended. Challenges regarding classroom shortfalls in quantity or quality, perceived or real compensation inequities, and tenure and promotion issues remained in play. They were a morale problem for some faculty members.[51]

Garofano saw striking parallels between the early 1970s and the 2010s in the tensions between the demand for dealing with current problems, gaming, and research and the need for academic space for faculty and students. The differences in judgment that arose during his tenure among Academic Affairs, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership originated in a disagreement over whether the accredited master of arts programs were getting in the way of the College's mission. Countering the negative view of the master of arts programs, Garofano, like Admiral Stansfield Turner and Representative Ike Skelton, believed that officers needed challenging, graduate-level education. As Turner had based his insights on learning from failures in Vietnam, General Dempsey's *Decade*

of War study was based on failures in Afghanistan and Iraq and produced the joint Desired Leader Attributes, which reflected graduate-level education rather than training. "Those were my touchstones—attributes, thinking abilities, and character traits," Garofano wrote, which "only a long, hard program could provide."[52] They suggested program outcomes on the basis of serious research and the bitter experience of two failing wars. Through 2015, the chairs and directors under the dean of academic affairs used them to shape the increasingly distinct intermediate- and senior-level courses and their associated master of arts programs.[53]

Epilogue, 2009–2024

Rear Admiral John N. Christenson
President, 30 March 2011–2 July 2013

A surface warfare officer, Rear Admiral Christenson was President, Board of Inspection and Survey before becoming the fifty-third President of the Naval War College. The fourth of six sons of a Navy Skyraider pilot and a Navy nurse, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981. At sea, he commanded USS *McClusky* (FFG 41); Destroyer Squadron Twenty-One in USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74); and Carrier Strike Group Twelve, the USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65) Strike Group. In 1993, he graduated with distinction and first in his class from the Naval War College. Later, he was a Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Ashore, he commanded the Surface Warfare Officers School in Newport, and as a new flag officer, he served as Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas. On leaving the presidency of the College, he went to serve in Brussels, Belgium, as deputy U.S. military representative to the NATO Military Committee.

As President, Admiral Christenson stimulated innovation at the College, broke new ground in Navy leader education, expanded international outreach, and increased support to fleet operational-level training through his promotion of faculty research and war gaming. The College provided hands-on assistance to fleet staffs in venues such as the Fleet Synchronization Conference, Current Strategy Forum, *Navy Leader Development Strategy,* and International Seapower Symposium. The portrait shows him with three books: *Lucky Bag 1981,* A. T. Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History,* and the 1984 edition of John Hattendorf's *Sailors and Scholars*.

Oil on Linen by Gerald P. York, 2013, Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral Walter E. "Ted" Carter, Jr.
President, 2 June 2013–8 July 2014

A native of Burrillville, Rhode Island, Rear Admiral Carter graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981, was designated a naval flight officer in 1982, and graduated from the Navy Fighter Weapons School, Top Gun, in 1985. He commanded the VF-14 "Tophatters," USS *Camden* (AOE 2), USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70), and the *Enterprise* Carrier Strike Group (CSG-12). He flew 125 combat missions in support of joint operations, accumulating 6,150 flight hours and 2,016 carrier-arrested landings, the record among all U.S. naval aviators. He was awarded both the Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Leadership Award and the U.S. Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership and was appointed an honorary master chief by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy in 2008. On leaving the College, he was promoted to vice admiral and assumed duty as Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.

As the fifty-fourth President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Carter effectively led the College through an unprecedented period of fleet interaction and international engagement. Perceiving the need to create a cadre of U.S. Navy strategists, he led the efforts to establish the Advanced Studies in Naval Strategy Program. Designated by the Chief of Naval Operations to oversee all leadership and ethics training throughout the Navy, he presented a watershed white paper entitled "Ethics in the U.S. Navy" that became the cornerstone for ethical discussions within the Navy and the joint force. He subsequently established the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center in Newport, Rhode Island.

Oil on Canvas by Gerald Slater, 2014, Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III
President, 8 July 2014–25 July 2016

A native of Jacksonville, Florida, Rear Admiral Howe was commissioned in 1984 following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. He graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1995 with a master of arts in national security affairs (special operations/low-intensity conflict) and from the National War College in 2002 with a master of arts. Howe's operational assignments included a full range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and Joint Special Operations communities. He commanded Naval Special Warfare Unit Three in Bahrain, Naval Special Warfare Group Three in San Diego, and Special Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service overseas included multiple deployments to the western Pacific and Southwest Asia, and participation in Operations Earnest Will, Provide Promise, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. His key joint and staff assignments included current operations officer at Special Operations Command, Pacific; chief staff officer, Naval Special Warfare Development Group; assistant chief of staff for Operations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare Command; director of Legislative Affairs for U.S. Special Operations Command; and assistant commanding officer, Joint Special Operations Command. On his departure from the College, he was promoted to vice admiral and assumed duty as associate director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency. As the fifty-fifth President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Howe was the first Navy SEAL to hold that office. Under his leadership, the College focused its efforts on preparing leaders for the challenges of an increasingly complex operational environment and the rise of near-peer competitors. These efforts included reinvigorating a sense of the profession and leading the Navy's initiatives to improve leader development.

Oil on Canvas by Tom Edgerton, 2017, Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley
President, 26 July 2016–10 June 2019

A surface warfare officer, Admiral Harley's assignments included duty in frigates, destroyers, and cruisers. He commanded USS *Milius* (DDG 69) during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, where he accepted a Bronze Star on behalf of his crew, as well as Destroyer Squadron Nine.

As a flag officer, Harley served as Director of the White House Situation Room; Vice Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5) at Central Command; Commander, Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet, Expeditionary Strike Group Seven; President, Board of Inspection and Survey; and Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5). During Rear Admiral Harley's tenure as fifty-sixth president of the Naval War College, he sought to "operationalize, navalize, futurize, and internationalize" the College. This was achieved in part by creating a Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute. He also established the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research to ground the College in history as well as a College of Leadership and Ethics to emphasize leadership principles. In the international arena, he established the International Maritime Staff Officers Course and created a program to allow international students to earn a master's degree. Harley took great pride in serving the faculty and creating a more equitable work environment by tackling gender inequities and ageism. His efforts led to an increase in diversity hirings in the College.

Oil on Canvas by Tom Edgerton, 2020, Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral Shoshana S. Chatfield
President, 1 August 2019–23 June 2023

Rear Admiral Chatfield graduated from Boston University in 1987 with a bachelor of arts in international relations and French language and literature. She received her commission through NROTC and earned her naval aviator wings in 1989. Continuing her education, she graduated from Harvard University in 1997 with a master of public administration, and from the University of San Diego in 2009 with a doctor of education in leadership studies.

Chatfield served as a helicopter pilot and flew the SH-3, CH-46D, and MH-60S, including on multiple deployments to the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf. She commanded the "Island Knights" of HSC-25, the only forward-deployed MH-60S expeditionary squadron. In 2008, Chatfield took command of a joint provincial reconstruction team in Farah Province, Afghanistan. Returning to the Pacific in 2010, she assumed command of Helicopter Sea Combat Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet and of Joint Region Marianas in Guam.

In 2019, Admiral Chatfield was appointed the fifty-seventh President of the Naval War College, becoming the first woman to hold this position. Upon arrival, she emphasized the importance of diversity, equity, and inclusion and increased confidence in the culture of respect and collaboration within the institution. She led the College during a time of extraordinary challenges stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. Chatfield oversaw the successful transition of the College's education and research programs to virtual and hybrid formats. For these efforts, the College received the Meritorious Unit Citation.

Chatfield worked with the newly created Deputy CNO for Warfighting Development (N7) to achieve consequential outcomes in war gaming by coordinating across the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, and interagency organizations, reestablishing governance and prioritization processes, and investing strategically in modeling and simulation tools. She mainstreamed Women, Peace, and Security across the curriculum. She established a new center for strategic deterrence. Her tenure was marked by an emphasis on enhancing fiscal stewardship through data-driven analysis, the identification and accomplishment of strategic initiatives, academic innovation, and the development of future leaders.

After her departure from the Naval War College, she was promoted to vice admiral and assigned as U.S. military representative to the NATO Military Committee.

Oil on Canvas by Jie Ruan, 2023, Naval War College Museum Collection

Rear Admiral Peter A. Garvin
President, 23 June 2023–9 August 2024

Rear Admiral Peter Garvin graduated with merit from the United States Naval Academy in 1989, having earned a bachelor of science in aerospace engineering (astronautics). He is a 2005 graduate of the National War College, having earned a master of science in national security strategy, and a 2015 alumnus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI.

His operational assignments include service with the "Pelicans" of Patrol Squadron (VP) Forty-Five, where he was the 1995 Association of Naval Aviation Pilot of the Year; department head with the "Mad Foxes" of VP-5; navigator aboard USS *Kearsarge* (LHD 3), where he served as flag navigator for the embarked Amphibious Squadron Six; executive and fifty-ninth commanding officer of the "Fighting Tigers" of VP-8; and commander of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing Ten.

His shore assignments include flag lieutenant to Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic; Commander, Task Force Eighty-Four; instructor pilot at the P-3 fleet replacement squadron, VP-30; Washington placement officer at the Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS 441); executive officer for the Director, Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate (J7), Joint Staff; federal executive fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; undersea warfare branch head in the assessments division (N81) and deputy director, unmanned warfare systems (N99) on the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations staff; and executive assistant to the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a flag officer, he served as the twenty-second commander of Navy Recruiting Command, Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group and Patrol and Reconnaissance Group Pacific, and the twentieth Commander, Naval Education and Training Command.

As the fifty-eighth President of the Naval War College, Admiral Garvin modified the core curriculum by implementing a new two–credit hour, yearlong course called "Perspectives on Modern War," and modified the senior-level and intermediate-level Joint Military Operations curriculum to better reflect current and potential future operational environments. He was the local host for the Twenty-Fifth International Seapower Symposium, in September 2023, which brought eighty-nine heads of service to the College. During his watch, the College hosted in 2023 the largest and most complex war game in the College's history, Global 17, with 523 participants from 137 commands. Simultaneously, the Stockton Center for International Law led the production of *The Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare.* The seventh Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative took place in January 2024 and the College of Maritime Operational Warfare co-hosted the first Indo-American Regional Alumni Symposium in Goa, India, in April 2024, with seventeen nations and 100 attendees. In addition, the College of Maritime Operational Warfare expanded its linkages to the Navy's fleet maritime operations centers, facilitated four full certifications, and trained forty officers from the Taiwan Navy. On his departure from the Naval War College, Admiral Garvin was promoted to vice admiral as President, National Defense University.

U.S. Navy Photograph

Rear Admiral Darryl L. Walker
President, 9 August 2024–

A career naval aviator, Admiral Walker enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1985 as an air traffic controller and graduated from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 1990 with a bachelor of science in professional aeronautics. He received his commission in the U.S. Navy through the Naval Aviation Officer Candidate School and was designated a naval flight officer in 1992. He graduated from the Naval War College in 2002 with a master of arts in national security and strategic studies. Prior to his return to the Naval War College, Walker served as deputy commander of Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber (Navy), U.S. Tenth Fleet. As the fifty-ninth President of the Naval War College, Admiral Walker is the first African American to hold the position.

U.S. Navy Photograph

An After Lookout Reports

Over a century and a quarter, the Naval War College has left a discernible wake in developing the naval profession in the United States. Defined by a continuing devotion to the education of naval officers for high command, it has stressed to its students an understanding of the fundamental ideas in the conduct of strategy and tactics, branching out from these primary concerns to related areas such as international law, logistics, management, and economics. The College has always sharply contrasted its approach with technological and scientific education, arguing consistently that its focus is on the highest professional aspects in understanding the nature and character of warfare and the purpose, function, and limitations of a navy.

For much of its history, the Naval War College's view of education has consistently been opposed fiercely by certain groups within the Navy. The College has had to battle all its life to obtain recognition and widespread appreciation for its goals from a service that has accepted much more quickly the rationale for technological education on the means of warfare, practical training at sea, and on-the-job training rather than focusing on the phenomenon of war, preparation for it and ending it. In a comment made in his published memoirs, Admiral J. O. Richardson, a 1932 graduate of the College, exemplified the continuing problem of a negative attitude toward the College: "As late as 1930, I said to the Chief of Naval Operations that, although I had applied many times, I had never gone to the war college. He replied, 'Failure to attend the war college has never hurt anyone.'"[54] Nearly a century later, when this book was written, Richardson's point is underscored by the fact that while several Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and service chiefs from the Army, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps, as well as numerous future chiefs of navy from other countries, have attended the Naval War College, few recent American Chiefs of Naval Operations have been graduates. After Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, who was a student in 1970–1971, even before Admiral Stansfield Turner's educational reforms and the granting of master's degrees, there were none for twenty-seven years, until Admiral Lisa Franchetti, who graduated in 2002, became Chief of Naval Operations in 2023. The fact that the currently serving Chief of Naval Operations is a graduate suggests that the pattern is changing.

Over the years, many of the dominant figures in the College's history have been reformers with a broad following among their colleagues. Men such as Luce, Mahan, Taylor, Sims, and Turner were strong-willed characters who criticized the Navy's system and aggressively tried to change it. Perhaps only naturally, those figures in the College's history who have been most widely accepted and played vital roles in positions outside the College, such as Pratt, Spruance, and Colbert, changed the College less dramatically during their presidencies but no less perceptively as the home of innovative and broad naval thinking.

However, this fact has sometimes identified the Naval War College in popular imagination within the service with radical reformers rather than as the representative of the mainstream view. In many respects, this reputation has been unwarranted. Yet, often, it has taken the continuing personal and direct interest of the Secretary of the Navy, or in later years, the Chief of Naval Operations and even Congress, to allow the College to achieve its long-standing goals of educating the most capable officers in the Navy. In this respect, Secretaries of the Navy William E. Chandler, B. F. Tracy, and Josephus Daniels, along with Chiefs of Naval Operations W. V. Pratt, Chester Nimitz, Robert B. Carney, Arleigh Burke, and the successive chiefs following Thomas Moorer—Elmo Zumwalt, James Holloway III, Thomas Hayward, and James Watkins—have played direct and critical roles in bringing the College to the forefront of the naval profession in the

United States. Nearly every President of the College has had to fight the Navy's personnel system to get suitable officers with the capability for higher command to attend the College.

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce charted the Naval War College's course a century ago, but like any course line, it has been set by winds, currents, and helmsmanship over the years. While rarely straying far, the actual track suggests a sinuous course that at different times has favored one or another set of elements from among the significant number that make up the College's area of interest: national policy, maritime strategy, fleet tactics, operational planning, international law, management, economics, logistics, international relations, and diplomatic, military, and naval history. Often, leaders have steered toward either practical application or theoretical research rather than the direct relationship between them that Luce had envisaged. At times, there has been a tendency to promote training rather than education, and either breadth or depth of thought in the curriculum, each at the expense of the other. An institution such as the Naval War College needs to remain responsive to the continually changing elements within the naval profession while at the same time striving to maintain high educational standards to get across to its students the fundamental thinking that has endured over the centuries. The shifts in emphasis that have gone too far in either direction are attributed to the absence of corporate memory and a lack of continuity in policy, faculty, and staff, which was not rectified until the 1970s.

Throughout much of its history, many naval officers were reluctant to come to the Naval War College. Many have doubted that it could help their careers. At the same time, detailers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel and its predecessor, the Bureau of Navigation, were reluctant to send "front-runners." Others have sometimes suspected that only the second-rate officers attended. Although a pioneer in promoting advanced professional education along broad lines with high academic standards, the Naval War College did not reach for many years the full acceptance of its role within the Navy that other service colleges in the United States achieved within their own services. Ironically, many of the other service colleges adopted ideas first applied at Newport, as the Naval War College also used concepts and approaches taken from its sister colleges. Nonnaval students have often won the Naval War College's academic prizes and achieved the highest grades. Curiously, officers from other services have frequently regarded the Naval War College in a better light than naval officers do. This situation may no longer be true, because of the significant changes of the last few decades.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, which the U.S. Congress passed in 1986, marked a significant watershed for change not only for the command structure within the Department of Defense but also for professional military education and the Naval War College. It established a national professional military education system that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress oversee. As a result, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs established uniform professional standards across the Department of Defense through the Officer Professional Military Education Policy, which is regularly updated. But as Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth told the Congressional Panel on Military Education in 1988, "Joint education cannot be separated from a general understanding of learning, professional education in general, and the organic qualities of an already existent curriculum. . . . [W]hat ultimately education contributes to a successful military commander and strategist is a habit of mind and judgment and not a checklist of requirements satisfied."[55] These aspects have repeatedly led Naval War College leaders to assert that joint and academic accreditation are

complementary and necessary. The academic accreditation process to award master's degrees established uniform and continuing standards for teaching, faculty, governance, research, and academic support shared across American higher education and established standards for the College's educational credibility in a manner that is not otherwise available. One side effect of these developments has been the need to manage the range of inspections and accreditation processes more effectively with the growing range of responsibilities that the College acquired from the late 1990s onward. All this resulted in a notable growth in academic administration with a provost, associate provosts, deputy deans, and directors inserted between the faculty and the College President.

Within the naval service, the nature of modern navies produces a natural conflict between divergent views that stress extensive technological knowledge of equipment, practical experience at sea and on staff, and a broad understanding of the nature of warfare. Although the doubters and critics of the College might often stress one aspect over another, the challenge that Stephen B. Luce made to the Navy remains the continuing inspiration of the Naval War College in its work to lead officers to understand the total range of the naval profession as they prepare for high command. "One thing must be borne in mind," Luce reminded us:

> At the firing of the first gun proclaiming war, the so-called "inspiration of genius" may be trusted only when it is the result of long and careful study and reflection.
>
> Art is a jealous mistress; most of all so is the art of war.
>
> If attendance here will serve, in any degree, to broaden an officer's views; extend his mental horizon on national and international questions, and give him a just appreciation of the great variety and extent of the requirements of his profession, the College will not have existed in vain.[56]

As the Naval War College ended its first century and a quarter of service, it recovered from the protracted uncertainty that followed World War II. Successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in the 1970s and 1980s established a degree of emphasis on and interest in the College that had not been seen in fifty years. By the 1980s, the prime requisites for fully achieving Luce's vision were finally in place: systematic guidance at the highest levels, carefully chosen College leadership, and increasingly more students selected on merit in courses taught by a first-class resident faculty. These permit the highest academic standards and the best available information to be used to engender innovative professional thinking while, at the same time, balancing a broad outlook with in-depth investigation.

In its second century, the Naval War College remains open to the most capable officers. It is the only naval institution in the United States devoted to educating officers in the highest aspects of the naval profession, preparing them for the most responsible duties that can devolve upon them, and preparing them for cooperative assignments in joint service positions with other services.

NOTES

1. "Mary Ann Peters," *American Academy of Diplomacy,* https://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/member/mary-ann-peters/.
2. Biography of Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, in James P. Wisecup, President's Forum, *Naval War College Review* 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010), p. 6.
3. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File, Wisecup box 5: NWC News: Wisecup Assumes Command of Naval War College, 11 November 2008.
4. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File, Wisecup box 5: RADM Wisecup Change of Command remarks, 6 November 2008.
5. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Ms. Coll. 23 Hattendorf Papers [hereinafter Hattendorf Papers], series 4, box 500.3: Naval War College, History Associates Files, 2001–2009, Oral History Interview with Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup by James Rife, 12 August 2009, pp. 4–5.
6. Ibid., p. 4.
7. James P. Wisecup, President's Forum, *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009), p. 9.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Ibid., p. 12.
10. Gerald E. Wheeler, *Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor's Life* (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, 1974), p. 71.
11. Naval War College Archives, RG 28 Presidents File, Wisecup box 5: NWC Blog file.
12. Robert H. Dorff, introduction to *Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response,* ed. Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), pp. 1–2.
13. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen O. Fought, "Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century," in Marcella, *Teaching Strategy,* pp. 79–104.
14. Bradford A. Lee, "Teaching Strategy: A Scenic View from Newport," in Marcella, *Teaching Strategy,* pp. 105–48.
15. Ibid., p. 108.
16. Ibid., pp. 109–11.
17. Ibid., pp. 116–19.
18. Ibid., pp. 119–25.
19. Ibid., pp. 126–32.
20. Ibid., p. 144.
21. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.3: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates Files, 2001–2009, LexisNexis Congressional Wisecup Testimonies, 4 June 2009, p. 12 of 37.
22. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.3: Subject Files: Naval War College, History Associates Files, 2001–2009, LexisNexis Congressional Wisecup Testimonies, 25 June 2009, p. 3 of 21.
23. Professors Andrea Dew and Marc Genest, as co-directors with Deputy Director Captain Thomas Sass, established the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups in January 2008 with financial support from donors to the Naval War College Foundation. See Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: CIWAG.
24. LexisNexis Congressional Wisecup Testimonies, 25 June 2009, p. 8 of 35.
25. Ibid.
26. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.6, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects: J–Z: Provost: Spain to Hattendorf, 28 June 2024.
27. "Professor John F. Garofano, Ph.D.," *U.S. Naval War College,* https://usnwc.edu/Faculty-and-Departments/Directory/John-F-Garofano.
28. The "Dean of Academic Affairs" section is an edited version of Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: Garofano to Hattendorf, 15 March 2016.
29. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.6, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects: J–Z: S&P: John Maurer to Hattendorf, e-mail, 29 December 2015.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: Provost Peters to All NWC Faculty, e-mail, 9 December 2010; Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: Dean Garofano to All NWC Faculty, e-mail, 13 December 2010.
33. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: file Intermediate Level Course.
34. See obituary "Thomas Robert Weschler," *Mystic Funeral Home,* https://www.mysticfuneralhome.com/obituary/3645924.
35. The entire "Curriculum Development" section is an edited version of Garofano to Hattendorf, 15 March 2016; and Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: Garofano to Hattendorf, 14 July 2024, with "Academic Affairs Time Line."
36. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Decade of War,* vol. 1, *Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (Suffolk, Va.: 2012), available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA570341.pdf.
37. Defense Technical Information Center abstract to ibid., available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA570341.
38. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of the Military Services et al., "Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020," memorandum CM-0116-013, 28 June 2013, available at https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2014/CJCS%20Joint%20Education%20Review%20Implementation%20Memo%20only.pdf.
39. Ibid.
40. CJCS Instruction 1800.01 series.
41. *Navy Leader Development Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: 2013), pp. 7, 11. See also Rear Admiral James Kelly, "Strengthening Our Naval Profession through a Culture of Leader Development," *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 1 (Winter 2014), available at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/3.
42. White House Office of the Press Secretary, "White House Releases First Comprehensive Federal Report on the Status of American Women in Almost 50 Years," press release, 1 March 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/01/white-house-releases-first-comprehensive-federal-report-status-american-; White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security," press release, 19 December 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/19/fact-sheet-united-states-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security.
43. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: Garofano to DAA Tenure Committee, 10 December 2013, with report; Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: "Report to Provost," 9 January 2014; Hattendorf Papers,

series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: Garofano to RADM Carter, 8 April 2014.

44. Clinton T. Brass, *Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects,* RL34680 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), summary and pp. 1, 7, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/RL34680. See also *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Government Shutdowns in the United States," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_shutdowns_in_the_United_States.

45. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: file Furlough, 2013: Provost Peters to NWC Staff and Faculty, "Graduation Update for Faculty & Staff," e-mail, 10 May 2013.

46. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: file Furlough, 2013: Provost Peters to NWC Staff and Faculty, "Message from Secretary of Defense Hagel on Furloughs," e-mail, 14 May 2013. See also the Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations Major Claimant (Command) Organization, "Chief of Naval Operations NV111/Budget Submission Office (BSO) 11 Planning Guidance."

47. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: file Furlough, 2013: Provost Peters to NWC Staff and Faculty, "Hagel Announces Reduction in Civilian Furlough Days," e-mail, 6 August 2013.

48. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: file Furlough, 2013: John Garofano to NWC Staff and Faculty, "Academic Affairs Shut Down Plan," e-mail, 1 October 2013.

49. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: file Advanced Studies in Naval Strategy: Provost Peters to NWC Staff and Faculty, "Welcome Aboard Professor (Col) Dave Brown," e-mail, 2 June 2014.

50. Garofano to Hattendorf, 15 March 2016.

51. Ibid.

52. Hattendorf Papers, series 4, box 500.5, Subject Files: Naval War College History Subjects A–J: Dean of Academics: Garofano to Hattendorf, 11 July 2024.

53. Garofano to Hattendorf, 14 July 2024.

54. James O. Richardson, *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Retired), as Told to Vice Admiral George C. Dyer, USN (Retired),* with an introduction by Edwin B. Hooper (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, 1973), p. 109.

55. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Professional Military Education: Hearings before the Panel on Military Education of the Comm. on Armed Services,* 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1990, Committee Print 100-125, p. 858. Quoted by Rear Admiral Wisecup in his 2009 testimony. See LexisNexis Congressional Wisecup Testimonies, 25 June 2009, p. 6 of 21.

56. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, eds., *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1975), p. 44.

NAVAL WAR CO
NEWPORT, R

APPENDIX A

Chronology of Courses and Significant Events at the United States Naval War College, 1884–2019

Year	Date	Event
1884	3 May	At suggestion of Commodore Stephen Luce, Secretary of the Navy W. E. Chandler appoints a board of 3 officers to report on the subject of postgraduate education for officers.
	13 June	Board headed by Luce recommends establishment of a war college.
	6 Oct.	Navy Department General Order 325 establishes a Naval War College (NWC) at Newport, R.I., in the former poor-house and deaf and dumb asylum on Coasters Harbor Island with Luce as "Superintendent."
1885	4 Sept.	First summer course begins with 9 students and a faculty composed of Luce, an Army officer, and a civilian professor of international law. Ends 30 September.
1886	22 June	Luce detached for sea duty without relief.
	26 Aug.	Captain A. T. Mahan reports and assumes NWC presidency.
	6 Sept.	Course begins with 21 students. Ends 20 November.
		William McCarty Little introduces first lecture on war gaming.
1888	6 Aug.	Course begins with 14 students. Ends 5 November.
1889	11 Jan.	Navy Department orders consolidation of College with Torpedo Station.
	12 Jan.	Mahan detached on temporary duty. Commander Caspar Goodrich assumes NWC presidency.
	5 Aug.	Course begins with 12 students. Ends 25 October 1890.
1890		No course held.
	1 May	*Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, by Mahan, is published.
1891		No course held. Bureau of Navigation (BuNav) cites shortage of officers.
1892	28 May	First new building (present Luce Hall) completed.
	21 July	Mahan returns and assumes NWC presidency.
1893		No course held.
1893	10 May	Mahan detached for sea duty. Commander Charles Stockton, President.
	4 Oct.	First visit by a Secretary of the Navy. Hilary Herbert inspects NWC.
	15 Nov.	Commander Henry C. Taylor assumes NWC presidency.
1894	12 June	Course begins with 25 students, including first foreign officers, 2 from Royal Swedish Navy. Ends 30 September.
1895	June	Course begins with 25 students. Mahan returns as lecturer. Ends 15 October, includes a Danish officer.
1896	1 June	Course begins with 27 students. Ends 15 October.
	31 Dec.	Captain Taylor detached for sea duty. Goodrich returns and assumes NWC presidency.
1897	1 June	Course begins with 22 students. Ends 15 September.
	2 June	Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt addresses War College students and faculty.
1898	19 Apr.	United States declares war on Spain. Staff, including Goodrich, ordered to sea. Planned course cancelled. College closed for duration of the Spanish-American War.
	12 Aug.	Cessation of hostilities between United States and Spain.
	2 Nov.	Captain Stockton assumes NWC presidency.
1899	31 May	Course begins with 4 students. Others from fleet in bay attend part-time. Ends 1 October.
1900	12 Mar.	General Order 11544 constitutes Navy General Board. NWC President assigned as *ex officio* member.
	1 June	Course begins with 30 students, including 2 from the Revenue Cutter Service. Ends 30 September.
	25 Oct.	Stockton detached for sea duty. Captain French E. Chadwick assumes NWC presidency.
1901	2 June	Course begins with 28 students, including Rear Admiral Shepard (first flag officer student). Ends 1 October.

1901	27 Nov.	U.S. Army War College established in Washington, D.C.
1902	2 June	Course begins with 25 students. Main problem plays a Russo-Japanese conflict in Far East. Ends 1 October.
1903	June	Chadwick becomes first NWC President to occupy the quarters built in 1896 for the Training Station Commandant, vacating them in November.
	2 June	Course begins with lecture by Stephen Luce to 21 students. Main problem, U.S.-German war in Far East. Ends 1 October.
	16 Nov.	Chadwick detached for sea duty. Captain Charles Sperry assumes NWC presidency.
1904	1 June	Course, now designated "summer conference," begins with 21 students. 9 flag officers attend on temporary duty. Ends 1 October.
	17 June	New library in the North Annex (present Mahan Hall) completed.
1905	3 Mar.	First librarian, Frederick Hicks, appointed.
	1 June	Summer conference begins with 21 students. Ends 30 September.
1906	24 May	Sperry promoted and detached for sea duty. Captain John P. Merrell assumes NWC presidency. He begins the unbroken residence of NWC Presidents in what now becomes the NWC President's House.
	1 June	Summer conference begins with 17 students, including W. S. Benson, later first Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Ends 1 October.
1907	1 June	Summer conference begins with 15 students. Ends 1 October.
1908	1 June	Summer conference begins with 25 students. Ends 1 October.
	8 July	Summer conference interrupted at direction of President Theodore Roosevelt. General Board and Department bureau chiefs join NWC staff and students in "Battleship Conference."
	22 July	President Roosevelt arrives in USS *Mayflower* (PY 1) and chairs Battleship Conference at NWC for the day.
	1 Sept.	Secretary of the Navy Metcalf closes Battleship Conference.
1909	1 June	Summer conference begins with 26 students plus General Board in attendance on occasion. Ends 30 September.
	6 Oct.	Merrell retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers assumes NWC presidency.
1910	1 June	Summer conference begins with 26 students plus General Board in attendance on occasion. "Estimate of situation and formulation of orders" introduced. Ends 1 October.
1911	2 June	Summer conference begins with 28 students. Ends 30 September.
	1 Oct.	First long course begins with 4 students from summer conference; course ends 30 September 1912.
	20 Nov.	R. P. Rodgers retires from active duty. Captain William Ledyard Rodgers assumes NWC presidency.
1912	1 June	Summer conference begins with 28 students. Ends 30 September.
	1 Oct.	Long course begins with 6 students from summer conference.
1913	1 Feb.	U.S. Naval Postgraduate School established at Annapolis, Md.
	2 June	Summer conference begins with 26 students. Ends 1 October—last such course.
	1 Oct.	1912 long course ends. First diplomas awarded to graduates of 1911 and 1912 long courses. 1913–1914 long course begins with 6 students. Ends 3 July 1914.
	15 Dec.	Rodgers detached for sea duty. Rear Admiral Austin Knight assumes NWC presidency.
1914	1 Jan.	Long course begins with 13 students. Ends 22 December.
	17 Jan.	General Order 70 establishes NWC curriculum at two long courses per year.
	1 Apr.	General Order 89 establishes NWC correspondence courses.
	13 July	Long course begins with 6 students. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels speaks. Ends 26 June 1915.
	1 Dec.	Death of Alfred Thayer Mahan in Washington, D.C.
1915	1 Jan.	Course begins with 14 students. Ends 22 December.
	3 Mar.	Formation of Office of Naval Operations in Navy Department.
	14 Mar.	Death of William McCarty Little in Newport, R.I.
	5 July	Course begins with 20 students. Ends 26 June 1916.
1916	2 Jan.	Course begins with 15 students. Ends 15 December.
	31 May	Battle of Jutland between British Grand Fleet and German High Seas Fleet—most studied action at the NWC.

1916	5 July	Course begins with 19 students. Disbands in April 1917.
	7 Oct.	German submarine *U-53* at Newport. Commanding officer calls on NWC President.
1917	2 Jan.	Course begins with 20 students. Course disbands in April.
	16 Feb.	Knight detached for sea duty. Captain William Sims assumes NWC presidency.
	24 Mar.	Rear Admiral Sims reports to Navy Department for duty.
	6 Apr.	United States enters World War I. NWC closes for the duration of the war, except for the library.
	1 May	Commander C. P. Eaton (Ret.) assumes NWC presidency, acting.
	9 June	Sims detached from NWC.
	21–30 Sept.	With the approval of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Vice Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak, Russian Navy, with 6 Russian officers visit the Newport Naval Training Station and meet NWC acting President Charles P. Eaton. While in Newport, the members of the Russian Naval Mission use the College for meetings to share their experiences of World War I and to develop their recommendations for U.S. naval assistance to Russia.
	21 Nov.	Commodore James Parker (Ret.) assumes NWC presidency, acting.
1918	11 Nov.	Armistice Day, end of World War I hostilities.
1919	17 Mar.	Captain Reginald Belknap assumes NWC presidency, acting.
	11 Apr.	Sims returns to Newport and assumes NWC presidency.
	1 July	First postwar course begins with 31 students. Ends 2 June 1920.
	2 Dec.	Course begins with 30 students. Ends 20 November 1920.
1920	20 Mar.	Sims in Washington to testify before Senate Naval Affairs Committee regarding World War I naval operations.
	1 July	Course begins with 30 students. Ends 21 May 1921.
	1 Dec.	Secretary of the Navy in annual report recommends NWC be moved to Washington, D.C.
	28 Dec.	Course begins with 45 students. Ends 20 November 1921.
1921	6 May	Approval by Bureau of Navigation to schedule one course per year.
	30 June	1922 class begins with 45 students. Ends 20 May 1922.
1922	20 Mar.	U.S. Senate ratifies Washington Treaty on naval limitations.
	18 Apr.	Samuel Gompers, labor leader, addresses NWC.
	3 July	1923 class begins with 50 students, including Chester W. Nimitz, Harold Stark, and Thomas Hart. Ends 20 May 1923.
	14 Oct.	Sims retires from active duty. Captain D. Blamer, acting.
	3 Nov.	Rear Admiral Clarence Williams assumes NWC presidency.
1923	21 Feb.	U.S. Army Industrial College established in Washington, D.C.
	6 Mar.	General Order 98 establishes NWC junior course.
	7 July	1924 classes begin with 49 senior, 22 junior students. Graduation 29 May 1924.
1924	13 Feb.	Vice Admiral K. Ide and Japanese delegation visits NWC. Included is Captain I. Yamamoto, IJN, later Commander in Chief (C-in-C), Combined Fleet, 1940–1943.
	7 July	1925 classes begin with 46 senior, 25 junior students. Graduation 29 May 1925.
1925	24 Jan.	NWC observes total eclipse of sun with temperature at 6°F.
	5 July	1926 classes begin with 43 senior, 25 junior students. Graduation 27 May 1926.
	5 Sept.	Rear Admiral Williams detached for sea duty. Rear Admiral William Veazie Pratt assumes NWC presidency.
1926	1 July	Logistics division established as part of NWC staff.
	2 July	1927 classes begin with 44 senior, 26 junior students. Graduation 27 May 1927. Senior class includes Raymond Spruance.
	25 Sept.	Formation of "kitten ball league" (softball). First organized NWC athletics.
1927	21 May	U.S. Fleet in Narragansett Bay after Army-Navy exercises off New England.
	24 May	Critique of exercises held at NWC by C-in-C, Admiral Charles Hughes.
	1 July	1928 classes begin with 40 senior, 38 junior students. Graduation 29 May 1928.
	17 Sept.	Pratt detached for sea duty.
	19 Sept.	Rear Admiral Joel Pringle assumes NWC presidency.

1928	31 May	NWC initiates correspondence courses for Naval Reserve officers.
	3 July	1929 classes begin with 48 senior, 52 junior students. Senior class includes H. Kent Hewitt. Graduation 28 May 1929.
1929	1 July	1930 classes begin with 48 senior, 35 junior students. Graduation 26 May 1930.
1930	27 Jan.	Admiral H. K. Tu, Chinese Navy, visits NWC.
	30 May	Pringle detached for sea duty. Captain S. W. Bryant, acting.
	16 June	Rear Admiral Harris Laning assumes NWC presidency.
	1 July	1931 classes begin with 44 senior, 37 junior students. Graduation 29 May 1931.
	10 Sept.	First America's Cup races held off Newport.
1931	1 July	1932 classes begin with 42 senior, 37 junior students. Graduation 27 May 1932.
	21 July	U.S. Senate ratifies London Treaty on naval limitations.
	27 Oct.	General of the Armies John Pershing and Marshal Pétain of France visit NWC as part of Yorktown Sesquicentennial celebration.
1932	1 July	1933 classes begin with 48 senior and 48 junior students. Ernest J. King and William F. Halsey included in senior class. Graduation 26 May 1933.
1933	16 Feb.	Marine Corps Schools team presents advanced base problem to NWC.
	13 May	Laning detached for sea duty. Captain Adolphus Andrews, acting.
	3 June	Rear Admiral Luke McNamee assumes NWC presidency.
	6 July	1934 classes begin with 52 senior, 36 junior students. Graduation 25 May 1934.
	16 Aug.	CNO approves advanced course at NWC.
1934	8 May	Pringle Hall dedicated.
	29 May	McNamee retires from active duty. Captain H. D. Cooke, acting.
	18 June	Rear Admiral Edward Kalbfus assumes NWC presidency.
	1 July	1935 classes begin with 11 advanced, 45 senior, 40 junior students. Graduation 24 May 1935.
	11 July	Admiral Joseph Reeves, C-in-C, U.S. Fleet, addresses NWC in the first use of Pringle Hall auditorium.
	9 Oct.	Change to Navy Regulations deletes NWC President from General Board membership and shifts NWC from CNO to BuNav direction.
1935	1 July	1936 classes begin with 11 advanced, 45 senior, 22 junior students. Graduation 22 May 1936.
1936	15 May	Colonel Robert McCormick, publisher of *Chicago Tribune,* addresses NWC.
	2 July	1937 classes begin with 12 advanced, 50 senior, 10 junior students. Graduation 14 May 1937.
	28 Sept.	Death of William Sowden Sims in Boston, Mass.
	15 Dec.	Kalbfus detached for sea duty. Captain H. D. Cooke, acting.
1937	2 Jan.	Rear Admiral Charles P. Snyder assumes NWC presidency.
	1 July	1938 classes begin with 6 advanced, 52 senior, 15 junior students. Graduation 13 May 1938.
1938	17 May	Congress passes Vinson-Trammell Act authorizing "two ocean" Navy.
	6 July	1939 classes begin with 9 advanced, 53 senior, 17 junior students. Graduation 27 May 1939.
	21 Sept.	Major hurricane strikes Narragansett Bay area.
	1 Oct.	Addition to Mahan Hall completed to expand library facilities.
1939	27 May	Snyder detached for sea duty. Captain J. W. Wilcox, acting.
	30 June	Kalbfus returns and assumes NWC presidency.
	5 July	1940 classes begin with 9 advanced, 53 senior, 17 junior students. Graduation 26 May 1940.
	1 Sept.	Outbreak of World War II in Europe.
	8 Sept.	President Roosevelt declares "limited national emergency."
1940	3 July	1941 classes begin with 5 advanced, 28 senior, 5 junior students. Graduation 15 May 1941.
	12 Aug.	President Franklin D. Roosevelt visits Narragansett Bay area, including NWC.
1941	1 Feb.	Formation of U.S. Atlantic Fleet under Admiral E. J. King.
	25 Mar.	Navy Department announces discontinuance of regular NWC courses for duration of national emergency. NWC to remain open for short six-month courses as directed.
	10 June	First short courses begin with command class of 34 students, preparatory staff class of 18 students. Graduation 2 December.

1941	1 Dec.	Kalbfus retires from active duty and is recalled to duty as NWC President in rank of rear admiral (retired), raised to rank of admiral (retired) in June 1942.
	7 Dec.	United States enters World War II.
	30 Dec.	U.S. Fleet reorganization effected with Admiral Ernest J. King as Commander-in-Chief (COMINCH) in Washington, D.C.
1942	9 Jan.	Courses begin with 24 command, 9 preparatory staff students. Also special plotting course of 8. Graduation 6 June.
	26 Mar.	Duties of CNO and COMINCH combined under Admiral King.
	13 May	Bureau of Navigation redesignated Bureau of Personnel.
	1 July	Courses begin. 38 command, 56 preparatory staff students. Graduation 18 December.
	2 Nov.	Kalbfus detached to Navy Department. Rear Admiral William S. Pye assumes NWC presidency.
1943	1 Jan.	Courses begin with 32 command, 54 preparatory staff students. Graduation 15 June.
	1 June	First Army-Navy Staff College class arrives for month of study at NWC. Classes continue until end of war with 337 students in 12 classes.
	1 July	Courses begin with 28 command, 48 preparatory staff students. Graduation 15 December.
1944	1 Jan.	Courses begin with 29 command, 56 preparatory staff students. Graduation 14 June.
	1 July	Rear Admiral Pye retires from active duty and is recalled to duty as NWC President in rank of vice admiral (retired). Courses begin with 27 command, 58 preparatory staff students. Graduation 16 December.
	15 July	Pye Board reports on postwar officer education.
1945	1 Jan.	Courses begin with 27 command, 51 preparatory staff students. Graduation 28 June.
	8 May	V-E Day. Germany surrenders.
	1 July	Courses begin with 32 command, 53 preparatory staff students. Graduation 16 December.
	14 Aug.	V-J Day. Japan surrenders.
	10 Oct.	COMINCH headquarters in Washington dissolved.
1946	2 Jan.	Course begins with 29 students in command and staff class. Graduation 15 June.
	1 Mar.	Pye retires. Admiral Raymond Spruance assumes NWC presidency.
	1 Apr.	Army Industrial College redesignated Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
	13 July	1947 classes begin with 65 senior, 36 junior students. First State Department attendee in senior class. Graduation 25 May 1947. Commodore Richard W. Bates begins work on World War II battle evaluation.
	1 Aug.	National War College opens in Washington with 105 students.
	10 Aug.	U.S. Navy General Line School opens at Newport with 600 students.
1947	20 Jan.	First planning meeting for new NWC logistics course: Spruance, Vice Admiral R. B. Carney, and Captain H. E. Eccles.
	2 Feb.	Armed Forces Staff College opens in Norfolk with 150 students.
	12 July	1948 classes begin with 69 senior, 34 junior, 46 logistics students. Graduation 15 May 1948.
	20 July	Logistics course begins under Eccles.
	18 Sept.	Establishment of unified National Military Establishment with Army, Navy, and Air Force, under the Secretary of Defense.
	1 Oct.	Air War College established at Montgomery, Ala.
1948	2 Jan.	Navy opens second General Line School at Monterey, Calif.
	22 May	Sims Hall (former Barracks C of Training Station) dedicated by NWC.
	10 June	First two-week Reserve Officer Course begins at NWC.
	1 July	Spruance retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Allen Smith, Chief of Staff, acting.
	10 July	1949 classes begin with 65 senior, 52 logistics, 34 junior students. Graduation 13 May 1949.
	1 Oct.	NWC starts publishing *Information Service for Officers*, later named the *Naval War College Review*.
	1 Nov.	Smith detached for sea duty. Vice Admiral Donald Beary assumes NWC presidency.
	29 Dec.	Secretary of the Navy approves Spruance's recommendation for a civilian professor of history, but position not funded for three years.
1949	4 Apr.	Formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

1949	9 May	First "Round Table Discussions," forerunner of present Current Strategy Forum, begin.
	10 Aug.	National Military Establishment becomes Department of Defense (DoD).
	12 Aug.	1950 classes begin with 64 senior, 53 logistics, 36 junior students. Graduation 16 June 1950.
1950	10 Feb.	New command and staff course organized within NWC.
	10 Apr.	Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, RN, visits NWC.
	28 May	Beary hospitalized. Rear Admiral T. Ross Cooley, Commander, Naval Base, assumes additional duty as NWC President.
	25 June	Korean War begins.
	11 Aug.	1951 classes begin. 56 strategy and tactics (S&T), 31 strategy and logistics (S&L), 31 command and staff (C&S) students. Graduation 13 June 1951.
	2 Oct.	Army War College reopens after World War II closure.
	17 Oct.	Cooley detached. Captain H. D. Felt, acting.
	1 Dec.	Vice Admiral Richard Conolly assumes NWC presidency.
1951	24 May	Financier Bernard M. Baruch addresses NWC.
	11 July	Chief of Naval Personnel authorizes funding for full-time, resident civilian professorships in international law and maritime history.
	10 Aug.	1952 classes begin with 66 S&T, 47 S&L, 73 C&S students. Graduation 14 June 1952. New two-year course of 6 in Advanced Study of Strategy and Seapower (S&S) now starts.
1952	9 June	First "Global Strategy Week" begins, replacing Round Table Discussions.
	14 July	CNO authorizes establishment of a Naval War College Museum.
	9 Aug.	1953 classes begin with 4 S&S, 73 S&T, 56 S&L, 108 C&S students. Graduation 10 June 1953. First full-time civilian academic chairs filled.
	1 Sept.	*Information Service for Officers* renamed *Naval War College Review*.
1953	27 July	Korean armistice effective.
	14 Aug.	1954 classes begin with 6 S&S, 130 NW, 96 C&S students. S&T and S&L courses replaced by Naval Warfare (NW). Graduation 16 June 1954.
1953	2 Nov.	Conolly retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Thomas Robbins, Chief of Staff, becomes acting President, NWC.
	25 Nov.	Secretary of the Navy names Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History and Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy.
1954	3 May	Vice Admiral Lynde McCormick assumes NWC presidency. McCormick is the first submarine officer to be President of the College.
	23 Aug.	1955 classes begin with 5 S&S, 67 NW2, 66 NW1, 114 C&S students. NW course split into first-year (NW1) and second-year (NW2) sections. Graduation 15 June 1955.
1955	18 Aug.	1956 classes begin with 2 S&S, 59 NW2, 72 NW1, 124 C&S students. Graduation 12 June 1956. NWC briefing team to indoctrinate Naval Reserve units formed.
1956	17 Mar.	Major winter storm hits area, causing extensive damage to ships at recently completed Coddington Cove piers.
	19 Apr.	CNO approves new Naval Command (international) Course at NWC.
	16 Aug.	McCormick dies suddenly at Newport. Rear Admiral Robbins, Chief of Staff, becomes acting President.
	17 Aug.	1957 classes begin with 5 S&S, 59 NW2, 74 NW1, 132 C&S, and 23 Naval Command (NC) students. Graduation 12 June 1957.
	5 Sept.	Rear Admiral Robbins appointed President, NWC. Robbins is the first naval aviator to hold the presidency.
1957	1 Aug.	Robbins detached for duty in Washington. Vice Admiral Stuart Ingersoll assumes NWC presidency.
	14 Aug.	1958 classes begin with 71 NW2, 95 NW1, 127 C&S, 28 NC students. Graduation 11 June 1958.
	4–30 Sept.	President Eisenhower spends month vacationing on Naval Base occupying Quarters A. Meets with officers of new Naval Command Course, signs Civil Rights Act, entertains King Leopold of Belgium.
1958	29 May	Francis Cardinal Spellman addresses NWC.
	15 Aug.	1959 classes begin with 156 NW, 111 C&S, 25 NC students. NW1 and NW2 classes are combined in Naval Warfare. Graduation 10 June 1959.

1958	Aug.	Eisenhower again vacations in Newport, occupying quarters of NWC Chief of Staff at Fort Adams.
	7 Nov.	Commissioning of Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS) in Sims Hall.
	19 Nov.	Madame Chiang Kai-shek addresses NWC.
1959	2 June	Separate war-gaming department formed, removing NEWS from Strategy Department.
	21 Aug.	1960 classes begin with 157 NW, 171 C&S, 25 NC students. Alexander Haig, Secretary of State in 1981–1982, included in C&S class. Graduation 15 June 1960. Naval Long-Range Studies Project established at NWC.
1960	12 Feb.	NWC directed to provide NEWS time and instruction for fleet units.
	21 Apr.	First military-media conference.
	30 June	Ingersoll retires from active duty. Vice Admiral Bernard Austin assumes NWC presidency.
	July	Eisenhower again vacations at Fort Adams.
	15 Aug.	Correspondence Course Department redesignated Extension Education Department.
	19 Aug.	1961 classes begin with 153 NW, 178 C&S, 24 NC students. Graduation 14 June 1961.
	6 Nov.	NWC hosts first conference of heads of senior service colleges.
1961	2 Feb.	Naval Long-Range Studies Project becomes Institute of Naval Studies (INS).
	19 June	INS conducts Limited War Symposium at NWC.
	18 Aug.	1962 classes begin with 156 NW, 149 C&S, 26 NC students. Graduation 20 June 1962.
	28 Sept.	President John F. Kennedy visits NWC.
	3 Oct.	General of the Army Eisenhower addresses NWC.
	12 Oct.	Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz addresses NWC.
1962	9 Apr.	NWC hosts first conference of heads of naval war colleges of the Americas.
	28 May	Two-week counterinsurgency course closes 1961–1962 academic year at NWC.
	17 Aug.	1963 classes begin with 150 NW, 175 C&S, 26 NC students. Graduation 19 June 1963.
	18 Aug.	George Washington University cooperative graduate degree program begins with 180 enrollees.
	22 Oct.	Cuban missile crisis—Newport-based ships deploy to Caribbean.
1963	11 Apr.	Austin on temporary duty for court of inquiry—loss of submarine USS *Thresher*.
	16 Aug.	1964 classes begin with 159 NW, 160 C&S, 27 NC students. Graduation 7 June 1964. Among them are the first two Afro-American students to attend the College: Commander Samuel L. Gravely, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander George I. Thompson.
	1 Nov.	Institute of Naval Studies relocated to Cambridge, Mass., and becomes Center for Naval Analyses (CNA).
	22 Nov.	Assassination of President Kennedy. Word passed at NWC during lecture by Chief of Naval Personnel.
1964	28 Jan.	Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall designates Founders Hall (then Building 10, serving as Naval Base Headquarters) as a registered national historic landmark honoring A. T. Mahan.
	24 Feb.	First George Washington University degrees presented to 16 students from NWC faculty and staff.
	8 June	Secretary of State Dean Rusk opens Global Strategy session.
	31 July	Austin retires. Vice Admiral Charles Melson assumes NWC presidency.
	14 Aug.	1965 classes begin with 154 NW, 189 C&S, 24 NC students. Graduation 16 June 1965.
	10 Sept.	Second extension to Mahan Hall for library stack space approved by Congress.
	9 Dec.	Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson addresses NWC.
1965	3 Apr.	CNO approves reorganization of NWC built around School of Naval Warfare, School of Naval Command and Staff, and Correspondence School.
	18 May	NWC hosts meeting of Military Education Coordination Conference.
	13 Aug.	1966 classes begin with 150 NW, 191 C&S, 22 NC students. Graduation 15 June 1966.
	1 Dec.	Department of Defense team, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Morris, visits NWC, first stop on inspection tour of senior military colleges.
1966	25 Jan.	Melson retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Francis E. Nuessle, Chief of Staff, becomes acting President.
	15 Feb.	Vice Admiral John T. Hayward assumes NWC presidency.
	29 Mar.	General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses NWC.

1966	10 June	Commander Rita Lenihan, NWC staff, selected as Director, WAVES, USN.
	12 Aug.	1967 classes begin with 143 NW, 146 C&S, 21 NC students. Graduation 14 June 1967.
	23 Nov.	Secretary of State Dean Rusk addresses NWC.
1967	1 Apr.	Automatic data processing introduced in NWC administrative work.
	5 May	First meeting of Naval War College Board of Advisors.
	1 July	NWC budgetary support shifted from Bureau of Naval Personnel to CNO (Op 09B).
	14 Aug.	1968 classes begin with 95 NW, 117 C&S, 31 NC students. Graduation 26 June 1968. Interim C&S class commences two weeks of NWC instruction with remainder of work through correspondence school.
1968	1 July	Position of Professor of Libraries established. Professor E. Schwass incumbent.
	14 July	First senior officers' executive management course convenes, 40 attendees. Course primarily for flag and general officer selectees. Four-week duration.
	16 Aug.	1969 classes begin with 143 NW, 152 C&S, 26 NC students. Graduation 25 June 1969.
	30 Aug.	Hayward retires from active duty. Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert assumes NWC presidency.
	28 Nov.	CNO approves NWC plan to expand facilities to accommodate 700 students by 1980.
1969	1 Jan.	NWC budgetary support returned to Bureau of Naval Personnel.
	l Feb.	Naval Historical Collection established. A. S. Nicolosi director.
	22 Aug.	1970 classes begin with 169 NW, 190 C&S, 30 NC students. Graduation 22 June 1970.
	1 Sept.	Chair of Air Strike Warfare, first military chair, established.
	17–20 Nov.	CNO hosts First International Seapower Symposium at NWC.
	28 Nov.	Naval War College Foundation established under laws of Rhode Island. John Nicholas Brown first president. Rear Admiral Richard Bates (Ret.) executive director.
1970	21 Aug.	1971 classes begin with 181 NW, 225 C&S, 30 NC students. Graduation 21 June 1971.
	9 Nov.	Dedication of William McCarty Little war-gaming room in Sims Hall.
1971		Naval Command Course renamed Naval Command College (NCC).
	1 Feb.	Student team from C&S presents personnel study in Pentagon to Secretary of the Navy and CNO.
1971	13 Mar.	President Richard Nixon at naval base for graduation of son-in-law, Ensign David Eisenhower, from Officer Candidate School.
	27 Apr.	Establishment of deputy to President billet. Rear Admiral G. Tahler reports.
	21 July	Establishment of Naval Education and Training Command at Pensacola, Fla.
	17 Aug.	Colbert detached. Vice Admiral Benedict J. Semmes assumes NWC presidency.
	23 Aug.	1972 classes begin with 202 NW, 244 C&S, 29 NC students. Graduation 29 June 1972.
	1–5 Nov.	Second International Seapower Symposium.
1972	30 June	Semmes retires from active duty. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner assumes NWC presidency.
	7 Aug.	Naval Staff Course begins with 15 students. Graduation 20 December.
	15 Aug.	NWC bookstore opens in Navy Exchange Building west of Sims Hall.
	24 Aug.	1973 classes begin with 186 NW, 232 C&S, 32 NC students. Formal convocation and academic procession on Dewey Field. Graduation 30 June 1973. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner announces establishment of new curriculum and creation of three academic departments: Strategy, Management, and Tactics; George Washington University courses end for Naval Warfare students.
	22 Sept.	Luce Hall placed on National Register of Historic Places.
	6 Dec.	Author Herman Wouk gives first "Spruance Lecture" in auditorium of completed Spruance Hall. Building formally dedicated the next day, 7 December, with Mrs. Spruance and Rear Admiral S. E. Morison participating.
1973	22 Jan.	Second Naval Staff Course begins with 16 students. Graduation 30 June.
	17 Apr.	DoD announces major shore reductions and fleet withdrawals from area.
	25 June	Global Strategy Discussions replaced by three-day Current Strategy Forum. Governor Jimmy Carter, USNA '47 classmate of Turner's, speaks to Forum.
	6 Aug.	Third Naval Staff Course begins with 14 students. Graduation 21 December.
	30 Aug.	1974 classes begin with 181 NW, 222 C&S, 31 NC students. Graduation 28 June 1974.
	15–19 Oct.	Third International Seapower Symposium.
	23 Oct.	NWC hosts visit from Brazilian Naval War College staff and students.

1973	30 Nov.	Death of Richard Colbert at Bethesda, Md.
	27 Dec.	Death of Richard Bates in Newport, R.I.
1974	28 Jan.	Fourth Naval Staff Course begins with 17 students. Graduation 14 June.
	1 Mar.	Naval Base, Newport becomes Naval Education and Training Center (NETC).
	28 Mar.	Dedication of Conolly Hall.
	25 June	Dedication of Colbert Plaza, seaward of new building complex.
	9 Aug.	Turner detached to sea duty. Vice Admiral Julien LeBourgeois assumes NWC presidency.
	25 Aug.	Fifth Naval Staff Course begins with 18 students. Graduation 20 December.
	28 Aug.	1975 classes begin with 214 NW, 176 C&S, 38 NC students. Graduation 1 July 1975.
1975	20 Jan.	Sixth Naval Staff Course begins with 21 students. Graduation 13 June.
	1 Mar.	Opening of NWC Center for Advanced Research, reflecting addition of research to the mission statement.
	17 Mar.	Johnny Cash concert.
	12–17 May	Soviet officers from warships at Boston visit NWC.
	28 July	Seventh Naval Staff Course begins with 17 students. Graduation 19 December.
	29 Aug.	1976 classes begin with 137 NW, 167 C&S, 32 NC students. Graduation 17 June 1976.
	13 Oct.	The Two Hundredth Anniversary of U.S. Navy. NWC President reviews parade and speaks at Newport ceremonies.
	10 Nov.	The Two Hundredth Anniversary of U.S. Marine Corps. Ceremonies on Dewey Field.
1976	13 Jan.	Eighth Naval Staff Course begins with 19 students. Graduation 11 June.
	16 Jan.	Formation of National Defense University in Washington, D.C.
	28 Apr.	Dedication of Hewitt Hall, which includes new library.
	25 June	Tall ships visit Newport. Ships depart for N.Y. 1 July.
	4 July	National Bicentennial Day. Full honors at noon by NETC and ships.
	7–9 July	Fourth International Seapower Symposium.
	8 July	NWC hosts Naval Command Course Conference celebrating twentieth anniversary of founding of the international course.
	9 July	Kempenaar Park between Luce and Founders Halls dedicated.
	10 July	President Ford visits NWC and NETC to greet Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip embarked in HMS *Britannia*.
1976	13 July	Dedication of International Plaza, area between Spruance and Mahan Halls.
	26 July	Ninth Naval Staff Course begins with 15 students. Graduation 1 December.
	25 Aug.	1977 classes begin with 150 NW, 186 C&S, 32 NC students. Graduation 30 June 1977.
	1 Oct.	Disestablishment of First Naval District. NWC now within Fourth District.
	29 Nov.	Canadian Forces Staff College conducts exercise on NEWS.
1977	24 Jan.	Tenth Naval Staff Course begins with 16 students. Graduation 17 June.
	1 Apr.	LeBourgeois retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Huntington Hardisty assumes NWC presidency. NWC commences six-week extension course at New London Naval Base for Polaris-based officers.
	30 June	Rear Admiral Henry Eccles (Ret.) completes twenty-five years of service on NWC staff since reporting upon his retirement from active duty 1952.
	1 July	Office of Naval Intelligence formally establishes Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office at NWC. It had been set up informally in August 1976. Reaffirmed by Secretary of the Navy, 2 May 1979.
	18 July	Eleventh Naval Staff Course begins with 13 students. Graduation 16 December.
	15 Aug.	1978 classes begin with 138 NW, 181 C&S, 39 NC students. Graduation 27 June 1978.
	30 Sept.	U.S. Marines end their eighty-three-year watch in guarding the halls of NWC since 1894.
	13 Oct.	Hardisty detached for overseas duty. Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale assumes NWC presidency.
1978	16 Jan.	Twelfth Naval Staff Course begins with 19 students. Graduation 16 June.
	8 Mar.	Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger addresses NWC in Spruance Auditorium. All attendees required to wear mess dress or civilian black tie.
	26 May	Dedication of Founders Hall as NWC Museum.
	30 June	First NWC alumni gathering, addressed by Stockdale in Washington.
	12 July	Thirteenth Naval Staff Course begins with 18 students. Graduation 15 December.
	16 Nov.	Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Board on Education and Training meets at NWC.
1979	15 Jan.	Naval Staff Course renamed the Naval Staff College (NSC). Class Fourteen begins with 22 students. Graduation 18 June.

1979	20 Apr.	The 105th annual meeting of U.S. Naval Institute (first ever in Newport) held in Spruance Auditorium.
	15 July	NSC Class Fifteen convenes with 18 students. Graduation 14 December.
	22 Aug.	Stockdale retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch assumes NWC presidency. 1980 classes begin with 127 NW, 156 C&S, 32 NC students. Graduation 25 June 1980.
	3–5 Oct.	Fifth International Seapower Symposium.
1980	9 Jan.	NSC Class Sixteen begins with 20 students. Graduation 13 June.
	11 July	Bicentennial of arrival of Rochambeau's army in Newport. NWC President is principal speaker at City of Newport ceremony in Eisenhower Square.
	16 July	NSC Class Seventeen begins with 21 students. Graduation 19 December.
	20 Aug.	1981 classes begin with 110 NW, 137 C&S, 31 NC students. Graduation 24 June 1981.
	30 Oct.	NWC hosts first Tactical Symposium.
1981	7 Jan.	NSC Class Eighteen begins with 22 students. Graduation 12 June.
	28 June – 1 July	Sixth International Seapower Symposium.
	1 July	Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) established. The Honorable R. J. Murray first director.
	15 July	NSC Class Nineteen begins with 26 students. Graduation 18 December.
	18 Aug.	1982 classes begin with 162 NW, 147 C&S, 37 NC students. Graduation 25 June 1982.
	27 Aug.	Humorist Art Buchwald lectures on Colbert Plaza to more than 1,500 attendees.
1982	20 Jan.	NSC Class Twenty begins with 26 students. Graduation 25 June.
	21 July	NSC Class Twenty-one begins with 17 students. Graduation 17 December.
	17 Aug.	Welch retires from active duty. Captain David Self, Deputy, acting. 1983 classes begin with 141 NW, 148 C&S, 36 NC students. Graduation 24 June 1983.
	14 Oct.	Rear Admiral James E. Service assumes NWC presidency.
	28 Oct.	CNO hosts conference of fleet commanders in chief at NWC. Updated Naval War Gaming System is used to show latest wargaming developments.
1983	19 Jan.	NSC Class Twenty-two begins with 20 students. Graduation 24 June.
	7 Feb.	First post-command class, later named Integrated Warfare Course, begins with 12 students. Graduation 18 March. Courses continue through 1983 as follows: 28 March–17 June, 12 students; 9 May–17 June, 21 students; 27 June–5 August, 23 students; 12 September–14 October, 21 students.
	4 June	Centennial of Naval Training Station (presently NETC, Newport). Founded by Luce.
	15 July	Dedication of the Nott Auditorium, War Gaming Department, Sims Hall, in memory of Captain Hugh G. Nott.
	18 July	NSC Class Twenty-three begins with 17 students. Graduation 1 December.
	16 Aug.	1984 classes begin with 154 NW, 159 C&S, 34 NC students. Graduation 22 June 1984.
	24 Sept.	United States loses America's Cup to Australia in seven-race series off Newport.
	7–10 Nov.	Seventh International Seapower Symposium.
	18 Nov.	First formal graduation ceremony for phased-input NW and C&S students.
1984	9 Jan.	1984 post-command courses begin. Schedule as follows: 9 January–2 March; 26 March–15 June; 9 June–31 August; and 10 September–2 November. Total of 75 students in four courses anticipated.
	18 Jan.	NSC Class Twenty-four begins with 19 students. Graduation 22 June.
	16 July	NSC Class Twenty-five begins. Graduation 1 December.
	21 Aug.	1985 classes begin.
	1 Oct.	Centennial Week at NWC ending on 6 October. One hundredth anniversary of founding of the College with Centennial Convocation.
	30 Dec.	NSC Class Twenty-six begins, representing 24 countries. Graduation 14 June 1985.
1985	21 June	101st graduation held on Dewey Field. Army General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command, addresses 303 resident U.S. and international and 67 off-campus graduates. College of Naval Warfare (CNW), 139; College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS), 105; NCC, 35; NSC, 24; Center for Continuing Education, 67.
	12 July	NSC Class Twenty-seven begins, representing 22 countries. Graduation 13 December. Service detached. Captain Robert B. Watts, acting.

1985	31 July	NCC class begins, representing 35 nations.
	8 Aug.	Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott becomes forty-third NWC President.
	13 Aug.	Classes begin.
	20–23 Oct.	Eighth International Seapower Symposium.
	30 Dec.	NSC Class Twenty-eight begins, representing 23 countries. Graduation 13 June 1986.
1986	20 June	102nd graduation on Colbert Plaza. Admiral James L. Holloway III (Ret.) addresses 326 resident U.S. and international and 68 off-campus graduates. CNW, 149; CNCS, 116; NCC, 38; NSC, 23; Center for Continuing Education, 68. Integrated Warfare Course Class 86-2 graduates.
	12 Aug.	Marryott detached and ordered to be Superintendent of the Naval Academy. Captain Robert B. Watts, acting. 1987 classes begin.
	2 Sept.	Rear Admiral J. A. Baldwin, Jr., becomes forty-fourth NWC President.
	5 Oct.	An early-morning fire damages the main reading room in the College's Henry E. Eccles Library.
	7 Nov.	Graduation. Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations), addresses graduates. CNW, 12; CNCS, 25.
1987	15 Jan.	NSC Class Thirty begins, representing 38 nations.
	10 Mar.	Graduation. Vice Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Director, Navy Program Planning, OP-090, addresses graduates. CNW, 15; CNCS 31.
	19 June	103rd graduation ceremony held on Colbert Plaza. Admiral Huntington Hardisty, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, addresses 306 resident U.S. and international and 94 off-campus graduates. CNW, 141; CNCS, 108; NCC, 33; NSC, 24; College of Continuing Education (CCE), 94.
	16 July	NSC Class Thirty-one begins, representing 25 nations. Graduation 18 December, addressed by Kurth, NWC President.
	11 Aug.	Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth relieves Baldwin as President during academic convocation, beginning 1988 classes. Admiral Kinnard R. McKee, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, is the principal speaker.
	26–28 Oct.	Ninth International Seapower Symposium.
	6 Nov.	Graduation. Mr. Seth Cropsey, Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, addresses graduates. CNW, 16; CNCS, 22.
1988	14 Jan.	NSC Class Thirty-two begins, representing 26 nations.
	4 Mar.	Graduation held in Spruance Auditorium. Rear Admiral Robert C. Austin, Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School, addresses graduates. CNW, 14; CNCS, 19.
	16 May	Congressional Panel on Professional Military Education hearings held in Mahan Conference Center. The panel, chaired by Rep. Ike Skelton, Mo., includes Reps. Jack Davis, Ill.; Owen Pickett, Va.; and John Rowland, Conn.
	17 June	104th graduation ceremony held on Colbert Plaza. The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III, Under Secretary of the Navy, addresses 348 resident U.S. and international and 123 nonresident graduates. CNW, 160; CNCS, 124; NCC, 38; NSC, 26; CCE, 123.
	4 Nov.	Graduation. Coast Guard Vice Admiral James C. Irwin, Commander, Atlantic Area and Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, addresses graduates. CNW, 13; CNCS, 19.
	16 Dec.	Graduation for NSC Class Thirty-three, representing 23 nations. Addressed by Kurth, NWC President.
1989	16 Feb.	Professor Paul M. Kennedy, J. Dilworth Professor of History at Yale University, delivers the fifteenth annual Raymond A. Spruance Lecture in Spruance Auditorium. The evening lecture is entitled "The Sinews of War."
	21–23 Feb.	Joint Staff's Initial Certification Group visits NWC to evaluate NWC's pilot program for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I.
	3 Mar.	Graduation in Spruance Auditorium. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Howard B. Thorsen, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area and Commander, Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, addresses graduates. CNW, 22; CNCS, 37.
	16 June	105th graduation ceremony, held on Colbert Plaza. Admiral Lee Baggett, Jr. (Ret.), addresses graduates. CNW, 148; CNCS, 104; NCC, 34; NSC, 23; CCE, 140.
	27 June	Rear Admiral Kurth presents statement to the Department of Education and National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility on NWC's request for authority to grant a master's degree.

1989	2 Aug.	Rear Admiral Kurth, Colonel Steve Staley, Professor Richmond Lloyd, and Dr. Alvin Bernstein testify before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, and Military Education Panel on chartering the Naval War College to grant master's degrees. 1 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington. Rep. Ike Skelton, Mo., presiding.
	17–20 Sept.	New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC) evaluation team makes first visit to NWC to consider accreditation for a master's degree.
	18 Sept.	President's House, built and designed by local architect Creighton Withers in 1896 for the Naval Training Station's commandant, placed on National Register of Historic Places.
	22–25 Oct.	Tenth International Seapower Symposium.
	17 Nov.	Graduation. Vice Admiral John T. Hayward (Ret.) addresses graduates. CNW, 20; CNCS, 22.
	28 Nov.	NEASC evaluation team makes favorable report on its initial visit to NWC for granting master's degree.
	15 Dec.	Graduation for NSC Class Thirty-five, representing 23 nations. Rear Admiral (Sel.) George A. Huchting, Deputy Director, Navy Office of Technology Transfer and Security Assistance, addresses graduates.
1990	18 Jan.	NSC Class Thirty-six begins, representing 26 nations.
	1 Mar.	Rear Admiral Kurth makes statement on NWC's application for granting a master's degree before a meeting of NEASC's Commission on Institutions of Higher Education in Nashua, N.H. NEASC defers its decision on accreditation until Congress grants NWC degree-granting authority.
	14 Mar.	Graduation in Spruance Auditorium. The Honorable J. Daniel Howard, Under Secretary of the Navy, addresses CNW, 18; and CNCS, 17 graduates.
	6 June	Army General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks to staff, faculty, and student body in Spruance Auditorium.
	22 June	106th graduation held on Dewey Field. The Honorable Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, addresses 331 resident U.S. and international and 178 nonresident graduates. CNW, 149; CNCS, 121; NCC, 35; NSC, 26; CCE, 178.
	12 July	NSC Class Thirty-seven begins, representing 22 nations. Graduation 14 December, addressed by Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, NWC President.
	17 July	Kurth retires with thirty-six years of naval service. Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser becomes forty-sixth NWC President. Rep. Ike Skelton, Mo., is guest speaker for the change of command ceremony.
	5 Nov.	President George H. W. Bush signs the act of the 101st Congress that approves 1991 Defense appropriations and includes authorization for the Naval War College to grant the master of arts degree in national security and strategic studies.
	16 Nov.	Graduation. Rep. Ronald K. Machtley, R.I., addresses graduates. CNW, 18; CNCS, 23.
1991	17 Jan.	NSC Class Thirty-eight begins, representing 23 nations.
	13 Mar.	The Executive Committee of NEASC votes to grant initial accreditation to the Naval War College retroactively effective to 20 September 1989. College receives notification in letter dated 27 March. Graduation in Spruance Auditorium. Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence (Ret.) addresses graduates. CNW, 12; CNCS, 25.
	20 Mar.	CNO Admiral Frank B. Kelso II approves College's proposal to award retroactively the master's degree to graduates since March 1985 after NEASC approves accreditation.
	29 Mar.	Joint Staff initial certification for CCE, JPME Phase I.
	17 Apr.	Rear Admiral Strasser testifies before the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Professional Military Education on the implementation of the Skelton Panel's recommendations.
	14–15 May	Newly established NWC Board of Advisors holds first meeting.
	21 June	107th graduation held on Colbert Plaza. Admiral James Watkins (Ret.) addresses graduates. CNW, 167; CNCS, 153; NCC, 37; NSC, 23; CCE, 143. NWC awards first master of arts degree to CNW and CNCS students.

1991	11 July	NSC Class Thirty-nine begins, representing 19 nations. Graduation 12 December, addressed by Strasser, NWC President.
	6–9 Oct.	Eleventh International Seapower Symposium.
	8–9 Nov.	Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, commander in chief of the Russian Navy, visits and addresses students and faculty.
	15 Nov.	Graduation. Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler (Ret.) addresses graduates. CNW, 19; CNCS, 27.
1992	11 Mar.	Graduation in Spruance Auditorium. The Honorable G. William Whitehurst, former Va. congressman and university lecturer in public affairs, Old Dominion University, addresses graduates. CNW, 14; CNCS, 22.
	19 June	108th graduation held on Colbert Plaza. Rep. Ike Skelton, Mo., addresses graduates. CNW, 159; CNCS, 151; NCC, 32; NSC, 26; CCE, 176.
	16 July	NSC Class Forty-one begins, representing 22 nations. Graduation 17 December, addressed by Strasser, NWC President.
	13 Nov.	Graduation. Admiral Henry M. Mauz, Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, addresses graduates. CNW, 25; CNCS, 42.
1993	14 Jan.	NSC Class Forty-two begins, representing 24 nations.
	18 Feb.	NWC submits required report to NEASC on its progress in establishing a Board of Advisors, nationwide faculty searches, and improved assessments of learning outcomes.
	Feb.	The Joint Staff's Professional Accreditation for Joint Education (PAJE) accreditation team visit to NWC for CNW, CNCS, and CCE initial JPME Phase I.
	10 Mar.	Graduation in Spruance Auditorium. Vice Admiral William A. Owens, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments, addresses graduates. CNW, 21; CNCS, 37.
	19 Apr.	Army General George A. Joulwan, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, speaks to CNW and CNCS in Spruance Auditorium.
	18 June	109th graduation held on Colbert Plaza. Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses graduates. CNW, 163; CNCS, 156; NCC, 36; NSC, 24; CCE, 170.
	15 July	NSC Class Forty-three begins, representing 21 nations.
1993	17 August	Academic convocation.
	7–10 Nov.	Twelfth International Seapower Symposium.
	10 Nov.	Graduation in Spruance Auditorium. Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (N4), addresses graduates. CNW, 38; CNCS, 42.
1994	13 Jan.	NSC Class Forty-four begins, representing 24 nations.
	9 Mar.	Graduation held for 62 graduates in Spruance Auditorium. Strasser, NWC President, delivers the address prepared for Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, who was to be the guest speaker. CNW, 24; CNCS, 38.
	30 Apr.	Completion of installation of the College-wide computer local area network (C-Net), a system of microcomputers, servers, and printers for electronic mail and the academic, war gaming, and research needs of the College.
	2 May	Plans submitted for construction of Strategic Maritime Research Center.
	2–6 May	Russian–United Kingdom–United States (RUKUS) Naval War Game held at NWC.
	17 June	Graduation held on Colbert Plaza. The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, addresses 576 graduates. CNW, 159; CNCS, 179; NCC, 33; NSC, 21; CCE, 184.
	19 Aug.	College designated as a World War II fiftieth anniversary commemorative command with first meeting of the College's coordinating committee.
	1 Oct.	Democratic House Majority Leader Dick Gephart, Mo., and Democratic candidate for R.I. Representative from First District Patrick Kennedy visit NWC to meet with NWC President.
	23–26 Oct.	NEASC comprehensive evaluation team for continuing accreditation visits NWC.
	26 Oct.	The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, speaks in Spruance Auditorium as part of the Contemporary Civilization Lecture Series.
	10 Nov.	Graduation held in Spruance Auditorium. Vice Admiral George W. Emery, Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet/Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic, addresses 79 students. CNW, 33; CNCS, 46.

1994	15 Dec.	NSC Class Forty-five graduation. Rear Admiral Strasser, NWC President, addresses 21 graduates.
1995	3 Mar.	NEASC Commission on Institutions of Higher Learning continues NWC accreditation.
	8 Mar.	Graduation. Admiral William J. Flanagan, Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, addresses graduates. CNW, 22; CNCS, 36.
	9 Mar.	Media and National Security Conference held in Spruance Auditorium. Addresses given by Mr. James Warren, the *Chicago Tribune;* Mr. Dan Rather, *CBS Evening News* and *48 Hours;* and Mr. Dan Howard, Vice President for Government Affairs, UNISYS Corporation. Panel discussions moderated by Professor Robert Turner, Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law, with the following panel members: Mr. James Warren; Rear Admiral Philip A. Dur, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (N3B/N5B); and Mr. Jack Dorsey, military correspondent for the Gannett News Service.
	15 May	Congressman Curt Weldon addresses CNCS students on "Congress and National Security."
	16 June	Graduation held on Colbert Plaza. Army General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses graduates. CNW, 144; CNCS, 176; NCC, 36; NSC, 22; CCE, 164.
	29 June	Strasser retires. Rear Admiral James R. Stark becomes forty-seventh NWC President. Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, is the guest speaker at the change of command and retirement ceremony.
	14 July	U.S. House of Representatives National Security Committee (Reps. Patrick Kennedy; Neil Abercrombie; James Longley, Jr.; Paul McHale; Joe Scarborough; Ike Skelton; John Tanner) visit Naval Education and Training Center and NWC for briefings and tours.
	5–8 Nov.	Thirteenth International Seapower Symposium.
	9 Nov.	Graduation held in Spruance Auditorium. Vice Admiral Douglas J. Katz, Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, addresses graduates. CNW, 27; CNCS, 42.
1996	Mar.	Major revision to Joint Military Operations curriculum and educational methodology.
	6 Mar.	Graduation. Vice Admiral William A. Earner, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), addresses graduates. CNW, 30; CNCS, 46.
	14 June	Graduation. Rep. Ike Skelton, Mo., addresses graduates. CNW, 152; CNCS, 173; NCC, 38; NSC, 25; CCE, 201.
	8 Nov.	Graduation. Rear Admiral William W. Pickavance, Jr., addresses graduates. CNW, 31; CNCS, 52.
1997	4 Mar.	Graduation. Vice Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., addresses graduates. CNW, 34; CNCS, 48.
	20 May	The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, addresses students, staff, and faculty at the Evening Lecture Series.
	13 June	Graduation. Sen. John H. Chafee, R.I., addresses graduates. CNW, 144; CNCS, 169; NCC, 8; NSC, 28; CCE, 188.
	Sept.	Over 1,000 students commence study in 50 continuing education seminars, each led by NWC adjunct faculty members.
	Sept.	Admiral Joseph Prueher, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, speaks at a special Pearl Harbor kickoff reception recognizing the valuable role that an NWC education played in his career.
	20 Oct.	Groundbreaking ceremony celebrating the commencement of construction of the new Strategic Maritime Research Center, later named McCarty Little Hall. Attended by Admiral Jay L. Johnson; Sen. John H. Chafee; Sen. Jack Reed; Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy; Rep. Robert A. Weygand. New center due to open spring 1999.
	2–5 Nov.	Fourteenth International Seapower Symposium.
	14 Nov.	Graduation. Vice Admiral Henry C. Giffen III, Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, addresses graduates. CNW, 35; CNCS, 49.
	24 Nov.	General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, addresses students, staff, and faculty.

1998	11 Mar.	Graduation. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, OPNAV, N6, addresses graduates. CNW, 31; CNCS, 46.
	12 Mar.	Media Conference—"America, the Military and the Media: Staying Connected in a Time of Cultural Gaps."
	30 Mar.	The Honorable John M. Deutch, former Director, CIA, addresses students, staff, and faculty.
	27 Apr.	Mr. Al Berkeley, President, NASDAQ, addresses students, staff, and faculty at the Evening Lecture Series.
	19 May	The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, addresses students, staff, and faculty at the Evening Lecture Series.
	May	PAJE team visit to NWC for CNW to reaffirm accreditation for JPME Phase I.
	19 June	Graduation. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher addresses graduates. CNW, 125; CNCS, 142; NCC, 34; NSC, 31; CCE, 253, representing largest group of nonresident program graduates in the eighty-four-year history of the College of Continuing Education.
	24 July	Stark retires after thirty-three years of naval service. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski becomes forty-eighth President. Change of command ceremony conducted by Admiral Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations. Formal stand-up of Navy Warfare Development Command as part of NWC, Rear Admiral Bernard Smith, commander, and Rear Admiral Peter A. C. Long, first Provost, NWC.
	Sept.	Nonresident Seminar Program continues to expand. Over 1,000 students begin classes, forming 54 seminars on 19 satellite campuses. For the first time, classes offered in Naples, Italy; Kings Bay, Ga.; and Mechanicsburg, Pa. Nonresident programs recommended for accreditation until 2003.
	Sept.	PAJE team visit to NWC to reaffirm JPME Phase I accreditation for CNCS and CCE.
	13 Nov.	Graduation. Vice Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/N5), addresses graduates. CNW, 22; CNCS, 39.
	8–9 Dec.	Current Events Forum attended by NSC, NWC faculty, U.S. Coast Guard cadets and faculty, University of Rhode Island honors program students and faculty, Providence College honors students and faculty, and NWC Foundation members.
1999	10 Mar.	Graduation. Vice Admiral Edward Moore, Jr., Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Ambassador and Special Coordinator for Cyprus, addresses graduates. CNW, 27; CNCS, 38.
	11–12 Mar.	Civil-Military Relations Conference—"In Crisis or in Transition?"
	June	Fiftieth anniversary of the Secretary of the Navy's Current Strategy Forum at NWC.
	18 June	Graduation. Admiral Joseph Lopez (Ret.) addresses graduates. CNW, 124; CNCS, 139; NCC, 35; NSC, 32; CCE, 277.
	Aug.	Naval Operational Planner Course and the Mahan Scholars Program begin.
	Sept.	NWC and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) partnership for JPME Phase I initiated.
	10 Sept.	Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) Class 1999 graduates 11.
	22 Sept.	The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, presents evening lecture entitled "Justice at the Millennium: Through the Looking Glass and into the Crystal Ball."
	27 Sept.	Strategic Maritime Research Center, McCarty Little Hall, dedication and ribbon cutting held. Keynote address given by Admiral Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations.
	14 Oct.	Dr. Donald Kagan, Yale professor, presents evening lecture entitled "The Endings of War as Bases for Peace."
	7–10 Nov.	Fifteenth International Seapower Symposium.
	12 Nov.	Graduation. Vice Admiral Patricia A. Tracey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Military Personnel Policy, addresses 71 graduates. CNW, 29; CNCS, 42.
2000	8 Mar.	Graduation. The Honorable Jerry M. Hultin, Under Secretary of the Navy, addresses graduates. CNW, 29; CNCS, 48.
	16 June	Graduation. Rep. Ike Skelton, Mo., addresses graduates. CNW, 134; CNCS, 154; NCC, 35; NSC, 31; CCE, 266. Skelton awarded an honorary degree.
	8 Sept.	NOPC Class 2000 graduates 10.

2000	9 Nov.	Graduation. Admiral Harry D. Train II (Ret.) addresses graduates. CNW, 26; CNCS, 51.
2001	7 Mar.	Graduation. Cebrowski, NWC President, addresses graduates. CNW, 30; CNCS, 54; NCC, 34.
	18 May	Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges approves the extension of the master's program to the Fleet Seminar Program.
	15 June	Graduation. Former President George H. W. Bush addresses graduates. CNW, 128; CNCS, 150; NCC, 34; NSC, 32; CCE, 301. Bush awarded an honorary degree.
	23 July	The Honorable James G. Roche, Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, and Dr. Newt Gingrich, Chief Executive Officer, The Gingrich Group, address the Office of the Secretary of Defense Summer Study group.
	22 Aug.	Cebrowski retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt becomes forty-ninth NWC President. Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, guest speaker at change of command ceremony.
	Sept.	First increment of the web-enabled correspondence course fielded.
	6 Sept.	NOPC Class 2001 graduates 9.
	Sept.	The planned International Seapower Symposium cancelled due to the 9/11 attacks.
	28 Sept.	Sen. Jack Reed, R.I., attends briefings.
	1 Oct.	Command of the Navy Warfare Development Command transfers to Commander, Fleet Forces Command, affecting NWC's mission.
	9 Nov.	Graduation. Sen. Jack Reed, R.I., addresses graduates. CNW, 27; CNCS, 45. Reed awarded an honorary degree.
2002	4–5 Mar.	Admiral Robert J. Natter, Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command, speaks to a group of 125 war veterans invited to the Naval War College by Congressman Patrick Kennedy.
	8 Mar.	Graduation. Admiral William J. Fallon, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, addresses graduates. CNW, 30; CNCS, 53.
	14 June	Graduation. Sen. Pat Roberts, Kans., addresses graduates. CNW, 128; CNCS, 143; NCC, 35; NSC, 28; CCE receiving master's degree, 17; CCE, 292.
2002	July	NWC President approves renaming the College of Continuing Education the College of Distance Education (CDE).
	Sept.	Ten NWC alumni killed on 11 September 2001 awarded honorary degrees.
	5 Sept.	NOPC Class 2002 graduates 12.
	15 Nov.	Graduation. The Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, addresses graduates. CNW, 22; CNCS, 44; CDE, 7.
2003	12 Mar.	Graduation. The Honorable David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, addresses graduates. CNW, 26; CNCS, 52; CDE, 13. Chu awarded an honorary degree.
	May	PAJE team visit to NWC to reaffirm JPME Phase I accreditation for CNW.
	21 May	Dedication of the Chairmen's Classroom, Conolly Hall room 138.
	20 June	Graduation. The Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, addresses graduates. CNW, 155; CNCS, 147; NCC, 46; NSC, 36; CDE receiving master's degree, 41; CDE, 331.
	9 July	Rempt detaches, proceeds to Annapolis, and is promoted to vice admiral as Superintendent of the Naval Academy. Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route becomes fiftieth NWC President.
	Aug.	Halsey Group Program begins.
	10 Sept.	NOPC Class 2003 graduates 11.
	5–10 Oct.	PAJE team visit to NWC to reaffirm JPME Phase I accreditation for CNCS and CCE.
	26–29 Oct.	Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium.
	14 Nov.	Graduation. Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, addresses graduates. CNW, 38; CNCS, 45; CDE, 22.
2004	Feb.	CD-ROM-based correspondence program accredited for JPME Phase I.
	12 Mar.	Graduation. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, addresses graduates. CNW, 27; CNCS, 47; CDE, 17.
	7 May	Dedication of the President's (later Stansfield Turner) Conference Room, Conolly Hall room 210, in honor of Admiral Stansfield Turner.
	17 June	Dedication of the Naval Staff College Wardroom in Pringle Hall in memory of Captain Walter B. "Bud" Woodson.

2004	18 June	Graduation. Richard Haas, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, addresses graduates. CNW, 146; CNCS, 147; NCC, 39; NSC, 34; CDE receiving master's degree, 47; CDE, 405. Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler (Ret.) receives an honorary degree.
	Aug.	Proof of concept for NSC ten-month program begins.
	12 Aug.	Route proceeds to Washington and is promoted to vice admiral as Naval Inspector General. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford becomes fifty-first NWC President.
	10 Sept.	NOPC Class 2004 graduates 13.
	26–29 Sept.	New England Council on Higher Education (NECHE, formerly part of NEASC) comprehensive evaluation team for continuing accreditation visits NWC.
	17 Nov.	Graduation. Admiral John B. Nathman, Vice Chief of Naval Operations (N09), addresses graduates. CNW, 28; CNCS, 46; CDE, 25.
2005	Mar.	Proof of concept for JPME Phase II program begins.
	9 Mar.	Graduation. Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, Chief of Navy Reserve, Commander, Navy Reserve Force, is scheduled to speak but cancels due to weather. Shuford, NWC President, addresses graduates. CNW, 33; CNCS, 60; CDE, 11.
	17 June	Graduation. Richard L. Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, addresses graduates. CNW, 130; CNCS, 143; NCC, 49; NSC Class of 2005, 21; NSC Class Sixty-six, 40; CDE receiving master's degree, 85; CDE, 314; NWC at NPS Program, Monterey, Calif., 238.
	9 Sept.	NOPC Class 2005 graduates 13.
	19–23 Sept.	Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium.
	16 Nov.	Graduation. L. James Woolsey, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, addresses graduates. CNW, 23; CNCS, 50; CDE, 38.
2006	9 Mar.	Graduation. C. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, addresses graduates. CNW, 23; CNCS, 59; CDE, 29.
	29 Mar.	NOPC Class 2006A graduates 12.
	May	Primary PME Course for Officers and Enlisted introduction online via Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) begins.
2006	16 June	Graduation. Sen. Richard Lugar, Ind., addresses graduates. CNW, 149; CNCS, 145; NCC, 48; NSC Class of 2006, 29; NSC Class Sixty-eight, 36; CDE receiving master's degree, 105; CDE, 346; NPS Program, 213. Lugar awarded an honorary degree.
	Sept.	First Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) course for international flag and general officers held in Newport. The course focuses on U.S. Naval Forces Central Command.
	6 Sept.	NOPC Class 2006B graduates 16.
	25 Sept.	At a dinner at the Atlantic Beach Club in Middletown in honor of Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, who would retire as executive director of the Naval War College Foundation in November 2006, Rear Admiral Shuford presents Strasser with the Navy Distinguished Public Service Medal and announces that the private dining room adjacent to the Hewitt Hall Café would be named for Strasser. During Strasser's tenure at the Foundation, the endowment grew from about $3 million to $14.5 million.
	1 Oct.	China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) founded as part of the Strategic Research Department within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
	15 Nov.	Graduation. Vice Admiral John J. Morgan, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5), addresses graduates. CNW, 26; CNCS, 59; CDE, 43.
2007	2 Mar.	Graduation. Rear Admiral Roger T. Nolan (Ret.), Executive Director, Naval War College Foundation and former Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, R.I., addresses 40 graduates.
	13–18 May	PAJE team visit to NWC for JPME Phase II accreditation for CNW.
	15 June	Graduation. Admiral James G. Stavridis, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, addresses graduates. CNW, 138; CNCS, 145; NCC, 52; NSC Class of 2007, 35; NSC Class Seventy, 40; CDE receiving master's degree, 133; CDE, 442; NPS Program, 269. Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser awarded honorary degree.
	7 Sept.	NOPC Class 2007 graduates 30.

2007	Oct.	College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL) established.
	17–19 Oct.	Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium. On the opening day of the symposium, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Conway, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, jointly announce the "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."
	Nov.	First Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC), taught by COSL, convenes.
	7 Nov.	Graduation. CNCS, 65.
	15 Nov.	Graduation. CNW, 42.
2008	Jan.	Introductory and Basic PME Courses introduced online via NKO.
	8 Feb.	Graduation. CNCS, 64.
	4 Mar.	Graduation. CNW, 38.
	20 June	Graduation. Sen. Jack Reed, R.I., addresses graduates. CNW, 202; CNCS, 273; NCC, 54; NSC Class of 2008, 37; NSC Class Seventy-two, 39; CDE receiving master's degree, 188; CDE, 582; NPS Program, 280.
	4 Aug.	Global '08 war game begins, marking the return of Navy Title X War Gaming at NWC. The game series had previously been held annually from 1979 to 2001.
	5 Sept.	NOPC Class 2008 graduates 30.
	1 Oct.	The Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA) shifts from reporting to Commander, Naval Education and Training Command, to President, Naval War College.
	5 Nov.	Graduation. Army Lieutenant Colonel James L. Cook, National Security Decision Making Department, addresses graduates. CNCS, 67.
	6 Nov.	Shuford retires from active duty. Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup becomes fifty-second NWC President.
	18 Nov.	Graduation. Dr. Karl Walling, Strategy and Policy Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 35.
2009	5 Jan.	Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) established.
	13 Jan.	NSC Class Seventy-four begins.
	10 Feb.	Graduation. Professor John R. Schindler, National Security Decision Making Department, addresses graduates. CNCS, 65.
	11 Mar.	Graduation. Dr. John H. Maurer, Chair, Strategy and Policy Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 42.
2009	Apr.	NOPC evolves into the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS).
	30 Apr.	Ribbon cutting for Maritime Operations Center battle lab in Evans Hall for COSL's MSOC.
	4–7 May	PAJE team visit to NWC to reaffirm JPME Phase II accreditation for CNW.
	4 June	Wisecup testifies before House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on how successful senior professional military schools are at producing military strategists.
	16–17 June	Sixtieth Current Strategy Forum.
	19 June	Graduation. Rep. Ike Skelton, Mo., addresses graduates. CNW, 139; CNCS, 154; NCC, 52; NSC Class of 2009, 35; NSC Class Seventy-four, 37; CDE receiving master's degree, 159; CDE, 536; NPS Program, 301.
	25 June	Wisecup testifies before House Armed Services Committee on "Raising Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational Level: JMPE I and II at the Services' and Joint Command and Staff Colleges."
	24 July	War Gaming Department concludes week-long Global '09.
	10 Sept.	MAWS Class 2009 graduates 29.
	1 Oct.	Updated versions of officer and enlisted Primary Professional Military Education courses launched online through NKO.
	6–9 Oct.	Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium.
	6 Oct.	One hundred twenty-fifth anniversary of NWC.
	25–30 Oct.	PAJE team visit to NWC to reaffirm JPME Phase I accreditation for CNCS and CCE.
	30 Oct.	Graduation. Professor William J. Hartig, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses graduates. CNCS, 55.
	13 Nov.	Graduation. Professor Donald W. Chisholm, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 29.
2010	8 Jan.	Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses NWC students.
	14 Jan.	Ribbon cutting for China Maritime Studies Institute research library.
	15 Jan.	NSC Class Seventy-six begins.
	3 Feb.	Graduation. Dr. Marc A. Genest, Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy, Strategy and Policy Department, and

2010 co-director of CIWAG, addresses graduates. CNCS, 72.
18–24 Feb. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet hosts CFMCC.
26 Feb. Graduation. Commander Neil J. Thompson OBE, RN, Professor, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 43.
11 June Graduation. The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International, L.C., addresses graduates. CNW, 139; CNCS, 155; NCC, 51; NSC Class of 2010, 35; NSC Class Seventy-six, 35; CDE receiving master's degree, 165; CDE, 587; NPS Program, 290.
July Air Force Colonel Mark Matsushima posthumously awarded an honorary degree.
July Halsey Charlie research group renamed the Gravely Naval Warfare Research Group in honor of Vice Admiral Samuel L. Gravely.
30 July Ribbon cutting for Mahan Reading Room restoration and cleaning and Spruance Hall upgrades.
Aug. NWC starts pilot program with students using tablet computers for course material.
16 Aug. Academic convocation.
10 Sept. MAWS Class 2010 graduates 27.
3–8 Oct. War Gaming Department hosts Global '10.
31 Oct.–5 Nov. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command hosts CFMCC.
Nov. Endowed John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies established.
2 Nov. Graduation. Dr. John Maurer, Chair, Strategy and Policy Department, addresses graduates. CNCS, 71.
16 Nov. Graduation. Professor William J. Hartig, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 35.

2011 3 Feb. Graduation. Dr. Marc A. Genest, Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy, Strategy and Policy Department, and co-director of CIWAG, addresses graduates. CNCS, 63.
10–16 Feb. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet hosts CFMCC.
Mar. First Executive Level Operational Level of War Course (ELOC) taught by COSL.
1 Mar. Graduation. Professor William J. Hartig, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 36. National Security Decision Making (NSDM) Department name changed to National Security Affairs (NSA).
30 Mar. Wisecup detached, reporting as the Naval Inspector General and promoted to vice admiral. Rear Admiral John N. Christenson becomes fifty-third NWC President.
12–14 Apr. Commander, U.S. Africa Command co-hosts Regional Alumni Symposium, in Stuttgart, Germany.
3 May CDE recognized with a best practices award for distance learning programming in online technology for government/military by the United States Distance Learning Association.
5 May Sen. and President Pro Tempore Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, delivers the Philip A. Crowl lecture at the CDE Washington, D.C., dinner for distance students.
10 June Graduation. Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, addresses graduates. CNW, 131; CNCS, 164; NCC, 49; NSC Class of 2011, 46; NSC Class Seventy-eight, 39; CDE receiving master's degree, 162; CDE, 407; NPS Program, 393. Roughead awarded an honorary degree.
15–22 July Global '11 conducted at NWC.
16 Aug. Academic convocation.
8 Sept. MAWS Class 2011 graduates 32.
19–21 Oct. Twentieth International Seapower Symposium.
21 Oct. Admiral Guillermo Barrera, NCC 1993, former chief of the Colombia Navy, returns to the Naval War College at the invitation of CNO Admiral Gary Roughead as the first Chief of Naval Operations Distinguished International Fellow. Admiral Nirmal Verma, NCC 1993, Indian Navy, joins him in 2015, and in 2017, Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, NCC 2004, Royal Norwegian Navy, and Admiral Tomohisa Takei, NCC 1999, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
24–28 Oct. Russian naval officers from the Kuznetsov Naval Academy join NWC for a combined operations game.
27 Oct. Dr. Michael B. Oren, Ambassador of Israel to the United States, presents an evening lecture at NWC, co-hosted with Salve Regina University's Pell Center.

2011	1 Nov.	Graduation. Captain Thomas C. Sass, Major General "Wild Bill" Donovan Special Operations Chair, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses graduates. CNCS, 60.
	13–17 Nov.	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command hosts CFMCC.
2012	7 Feb.	Graduation. Dr. Martin L. Cook, Admiral James Bond Stockdale Professor of Professional Military Ethics, addresses graduates. CNCS, 59.
	9–15 Feb.	Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet hosts CFMCC.
	28 Feb.	Graduation. Professor William J. Hartig, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 32.
	29–30 Mar.	NWC holds its first Women, Peace and Security Conference, organized by Professor Mary Raum.
	8 May	NWC hosts twenty-fifth annual CDE Dinner and Philip A. Crowl Lecture Series in Washington, D.C. Sen. Jack Reed, R.I., is the guest speaker.
	14–18 May	Commander, U.S. Navy Forces Europe-Africa hosts CFMCC.
	23 May	Director, Navy Staff signs out updated Missions, Functions, and Tasks instruction. Updated missions are to educate and develop leaders, support defining the future Navy and associated roles and missions, support combat readiness, strengthen global maritime partnerships.
	15 June	Graduation. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, addresses graduates. CNW, 138; CNCS, 161; NCC, 93; NSC Class of 2012, 46; NSC Class Eighty, 37; CDE receiving master's degree, 191; CDE, 530; NPS Program, 368.
	20 Aug.	Academic convocation.
	7 Sept.	MAWS Class 2012 graduates 32.
	18 Oct.	Army General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks to students.
	23 Oct.	Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command, addresses students. CNO introduces newest edition of the CNO Professional Reading Program, which NWC manages.
	16 Nov.	Graduation. Dr. Marc A. Genest, Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy, Strategy and Policy Department, and co-director of CIWAG, addresses graduates. CNW, 27; CNCS, 60.
2013	21 Feb.	Graduation. Rear Admiral John F. Kirby, Chief of Information, addresses graduates. CNCS, 71.
	6 Mar.	Graduation. Dr. John H. Maurer, Chair, Strategy and Policy Department, addresses graduates. CNW, 28.
	9 May	CDE's annual NWC dinner in Washington, D.C., includes the Honorable Dr. Richard J. Danzig, seventy-first Secretary of the Navy, as guest speaker for the Crowl Lecture.
	21 June	Graduation. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, addresses graduates. CNW, 133; CNCS, 167; NCC, 65; NSC Class of 2013, 45; NSC Class Eighty-two, 44; CDE receiving master's degree, 184; CDE, 511; NPS Program, 339. The event is held in Spruance Auditorium and not in a tent, as usual, due to fiscal constraints of sequestration. Students limited to one guest each with no faculty or staff attending.
	2 July	Christenson detached. Rear Admiral Walter E. Carter, Jr., becomes fifty-fourth NWC President. Carter is the first Naval Flight Officer to serve as President.
	26 July	Arctic Regional Studies Group launched to examine the maritime implications of the changing Arctic region.
	19 Aug.	Academic convocation.
	5 Sept.	MAWS Class 2013 graduates 32.
	20 Sept.	First Maritime Operational Planners Course, an eleven-week course taught by COSL, graduates 13.
	15 Oct.	International Seapower Symposium, scheduled for 22–25 October, cancelled due to government shutdown.
	13 Nov.	Commander, U.S. Southern Command hosts CFMCC.
	19 Nov.	Graduation. Rear Admiral Bruce Lindsey, USN, Director for Operations, Joint Staff, addresses graduates. CNW, 19; CNCS, 53.
2014	6–12 Feb.	Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet hosts CFMCC.
	24 Feb.	The digital launch of *The Nimitz Graybook*. Dr. Craig Symonds speaks on "Nimitz and Leadership."
	4 Mar.	Graduation. Scheduled speaker Rear Admiral Peter A. Gumataotao, Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic, replaced

2014		by Admiral Guillermo Barrera. CNW, 32; CNCS, 58.
	7 Apr.	Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense, Christine Fox, addresses students.
	11 Apr.	International Law Department renamed Stockton Center for the Study of International Law.
	15 Apr.	NWC marks one hundredth anniversary of distance learning education and nonresident programs.
	May	Admiral Michael S. Rogers awarded an honorary degree.
	6 May	Ribbon cutting for Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (NLEC), established on 1 May 2014 as an echelon three command under NWC.
	20 May	One hundredth MSOC class convenes, addressed by Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford (Ret.), former NWC President.
	21–23 May	Tenth Regional Alumni Symposium in Manila, Philippines. Co-hosted by Philippine Navy.
	12 June	NWC and Pell Center co-host Sen. John McCain, Ariz., for an evening lecture at NWC.
	20 June	Graduation. Admiral John M. Richardson, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, addresses graduates. CNW, 120; CNCS, 168; NCC, 47; NSC Class of 2014, 47; CDE receiving master's degree, 173; CDE, 486; NPS Program, 402.
	8 July	Carter detaches, proceeding to Annapolis and promoted to vice admiral as Superintendent of the Naval Academy. Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III becomes fifty-fifth NWC President. Howe is the first Navy SEAL to serve as President.
	18 Aug.	An article in the Autumn issue of the *Naval War College Review,* "Navy Nexus," by Rear Admiral Carter and Professor John Jackson, announces that beginning with the 2014–2015 academic year, the College's Senior Level Course will be known as the Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Course in National Security and Strategic Studies. The Intermediate Level Course will be renamed the Admiral Raymond A. Spruance Course in Maritime Warfare and Strategic Studies.
	5 Sept.	MAWS Class 2014 graduates 35.
	12 Sept.	Global '14 concludes.
	16–19 Sept.	Twenty-first International Seapower Symposium.
2014	3–5 Nov.	NECHE comprehensive evaluation team for continuing accreditation visits NWC.
	19 Nov.	Navy announces attendance at SEA required of all senior chiefs to promote to master chief, starting in fiscal year 2017. Graduation. Professor Toshi Yoshihara addresses graduates. CNW, 16; CNCS, 46.
2015	3 Mar.	Graduation. CNW, 30; CNCS, 55. Dr. Marc Genest, Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy, Strategy and Policy Department, addresses the graduates.
	3–8 May	PAJE team visit to NWC to reaffirm JPME Phase II accreditation for CNW, and Phase I for CNCS and CCE.
	19 June	Graduation. CNW, 143; CNCS, 172; NCC, 49; NSC, 60. Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert addresses the students.
	17 Nov.	Graduation. CNW, 22; CNCS, 39. Dr. Sarah C. M. Paine, William S. Sims Professor of History and Grand Strategy, addresses the graduates.
2016	1 Mar.	Graduation. CNW, 27; CNCS, 65. Dr. Andrea Dew, Strategy and Policy Department, addresses the graduates.
	10 May	To mark the centenary of the battle of Jutland, the Maritime History and War Gaming Departments organize a Jutland War Game along the lines the games were played in the 1920s and 1930s and conducted on the original gaming floor in Pringle Hall. Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe plays the role of commander of the High Sea Fleet and Director of Naval History Rear Admiral Samuel Cox plays the opposing role of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe leading the Grand Fleet. Dean Thomas Culora plays the role of German Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper while Vice Admiral J. Philip Wisecup, USN (Ret.), plays David Beatty. Dr. Nathaniel Sims, grandson of Admiral William S. Sims, and North Sturtevant, grandson of Commodore Dudley W. Knox, participate and donate historical items and family papers to the Navy, marking the launch of the NWC's programs to highlight the centenary of the First World War and the role of professional military education in educating the NWC's "five-star" for the Second World War.
	31 May	CNO Admiral John Richardson announces the disbandment of the Strategic Studies Group after thirty-five years of service

2016 upon completion of its current work. The last director is Vice Admiral J. Philip Wisecup, USN (Ret.).

17 June Graduation. CNW, 137; CNCS, 178; NCC, 46; NSC, 72. Congressman Steve J. Israel, Third District, N.Y., addresses the graduates. From this date, CNW graduates continue to receive the NWC's master's degree in national security and strategic studies. CNCS graduates receive for the first time the NWC master's degree in defense and strategic studies.

26 July Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III detaches, proceeds to McLean, Va., promoting to vice admiral as Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency. Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley becomes the fifty-sixth President of the Naval War College.

31 Aug. Russia Maritime Studies Institute established with Michael Petersen as founding director.

20–23 Sept. Twenty-second International Seapower Symposium. Approximately two hundred senior officers from 106 countries attend.

4 Oct. NWC inaugurates National Security Studies Program for spouses and significant others.

15 Nov. Graduation. CNW, 12; CNCS, 44. Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley addresses the graduates.

2017 1 Feb. NWC launches Institute for Future Warfare Studies with Vice Admiral J. Philip Wisecup, USN (Ret.), as acting chairman.

28 Feb. Graduation. CNW, 24; CNCS, 50. Colonel Joseph McGowan, USA, Joint Military Operations Department, addresses the graduates. First graduate certificates in Ethics and Emerging Military Technology awarded.

17–18 May College hosts first Past Presidents' Colloquium. Present: Vice Admiral and Mrs. Howe, Rear Admiral and Mrs. Kurth, Rear Admiral and Mrs. Stark, Rear Admiral and Mrs. Shuford.

1 June Establishment of the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research. The formal inauguration event for the center occurs on 23 September at a luncheon event during the McMullen Naval History Symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy, where the Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral Samuel J. Cox, USN (Ret.), is the featured speaker.

12 June College of Operational and Strategic Leadership disestablished and replaced by College of Maritime Operational Warfare and College of Leadership and Ethics.

16 June Graduation. CNW, 130; CNCS, 188; NCC, 48; NSC, 56. Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley addresses the graduates.

25 July College announces the establishment of new funded academic chairs: Rear Admiral Grace Hopper Chair of Cyber Security; Madeleine K. Albright Chair of Women, Peace, and Security Studies; Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Chair of Science, Space, and Technology; and a future Condoleezza Rice Chair of Women in National Security and Diplomatic Studies.

2 Aug. Admiral John Richardson, CNO, dedicates the Future Forces Gallery, located in the Learning Commons, in honor of Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.).

7–11 Aug. NWC holds first Future Warfighting Symposium.

9 Aug. College announces the selection of Dr. Milan Vego as the College's first University Professor. The title recognizes superior scholarship and a depth of understanding and accomplishment that enables teaching across the spectrum of the NWC curriculum. Subsequent appointments: 14 August 2017, Dr. S. C. M. Paine; 13 October 2017, Dr. John Maurer; 31 July 2018, Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese; 4 August 2018, Dr. Thomas Nichols.

20–25 Oct. Global VIII war game held. Largest high-classification war game held at NWC up to this point. More than 425 participants, with 29 flag, general, and Senior Executive leaders present, including Commandant of the Marine Corps; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, Pacific Air Force; Commander, Third Fleet; Commander, First Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Special Operations Forces, Pacific.

27 Oct. NWC publishes Naval War College Instruction 5450.2, with new statement of NWC Mission, Functions, and Tasks.

2017	12–17 Nov.	Inaugural Leader Development Course convened at Bolger Center, Potomac, Md., with 22 flag officers and 5 Senior Executive Service (SES) civilians. This is for new two-stars and SES civilians, and is branded "Partners in the Navy Profession." It is subsequently named the Intermediate Flag and Executive (IFLEX) course.
	21 Nov.	The College announces a new faculty policy to replace the previous practice of "appointment without terminal date" with an established tenure policy. This includes the provision that all current and future full professors have tenure. In addition, it establishes three categories of professors—professor-scholar, professor-practioner, and professor-researcher—as the first step in creating criteria for tenure. Further polices on faculty promotion and tenure promulgated on 19 April 2018 and 24 July 2019.
	7 Dec.	NWC Monterey JPME program graduates 97.
2018	30 Jan.	Chair held by Dr. Mary Raum for Women, Peace, and Security Studies updated and named in honor of Ambassador Swanee Hunt.
	6 Mar.	Graduation. Professor William F. Bundy addresses graduates. CNW, 12; CNCS, 49.
	19 Mar.	President, NWC, directs the creation of a position for a Strategic Communications Director to be effective 1 August. Captain John Odegaard, USN (Ret.), becomes the first occupant of the new position in June 2018.
	23 Mar.	NWC Monterey JPME program graduates 74.
	5 Apr.	CNO Admiral John Richardson formally announces the establishment of the College of Leadership and Ethics under Dean Margaret Klein.
	15 June	Graduation. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis addresses students. CNW, 151; CNCS, 172; NCC, 48; NSC, 56; CDE, 1,109. First 10 selected NCC students receive master of arts degree in national security and strategic studies and first 10 selected NSC students receive master of arts degree in defense and strategic studies.
	7 Aug.	General David Petraeus gives the inaugural Admiral Stansfield Turner Memorial Lecture and dedicates the Admiral Stansfield Turner Walkway (former de Weldon Passageway) between Mahan and Spruance Halls. After renovations, the walkway opens for use on 17 September.
	12–18 Aug.	Inaugural Leader Development Course for three-star level convened at Bolger Center, Potomac, Md. This is branded "Navigating Uncharted Waters" and is subsequently named Advanced Flag and Executive Service (AFLEX) course.
	29 Aug.	NWC announces creation of the Admiral James R. Hogg Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute, Dr. Peter Dombrowski, interim director. The new center replaces the former Center for Cyber Conflict Studies, founded by Dr. Chris Demchak, Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper Professor of Cyber Security.
	17 Sept.	MAWS Class 2018 graduates 33.
	18–21 Sept.	Twenty-third International Seapower Symposium held. 106 countries represented.
	4 Oct.	College announces the creation of Faculty Publication Awards, funded by Naval War College Foundation: $1,000 for single-author books; $500 for co-authored books.
	12 Oct.	Rochefort Group established. The mission of this advanced warfighting group in the College of Maritime Operational Warfare is to grow and mature information warfighting in our curriculum and fleet support.
	24–25 Oct.	Final part of "Breaking the Mold" Workshop. Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work attend the two-day workshop that reexamines the predictable models of operations that our strategic rivals expect. The first part was held 7–8 March 2018.
	25 Oct.	CNO NAVADMIN Message 251459Z: "Officers in year group 2015 and beyond will be required to graduate from an in-residence [professional military educational] program prior to assuming Major Command." This is the first time since the founding of the College that the Navy has made such a requirement.
	29 Oct.	College announces that the Mahan Reading Room will be known as the "Professors' Library and Reading Room," and be the repository of books donated by retiring faculty members.

2018	14 Nov.	Graduation. The graduating class is composed of 45 Navy, 6 Army, and 1 Marine Corps officers—42 of whom are students enrolled in the intermediate-level CNCS and 10 in the senior-level CNW. Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley delivers the address.
	19 Dec.	First NWC Genocide Conference held, organized by Professor Hayat Alvi.
2019	15 Jan.	First meeting of the Advisory Faculty Senate.
	12 Feb.	Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer releases Under Secretary Thomas Modly's *Education for Seapower (E4S)* report, calling for major reforms and improvement to the Navy's educational system. Among other things, the secretary's accompanying implementing memorandum establishes the position of Chief Learning Officer for naval education and a Naval University system that aligns under one office the Naval War College, Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University, and a future Naval Community College.
	27 Feb.	President, NWC announces that the College will offer three distinct graduate certificate programs that go beyond the master's degree. The two new certificate programs will join the Ethics and Emerging Military Technology program: *Maritime History* and *China Studies*.
	5 Mar.	Graduation. Dr. Robert W. Hutchinson delivers the address. CNW, 5; CNCS, 46.
	14–15 Mar.	College hosts naval history conference on lessons from World War I and the legacy of Admiral William S. Sims.
	10 June	Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley steps down as President and is administratively reassigned. The Provost, Dr. Lewis Duncan, named acting President. The Chief of Naval Operations cancels the Current Strategy Forum, planned for 11–12 June, the day before it is set to begin.
	14 June	Graduation. Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer addresses students. CNW, 148; CNCS, 170; NCC, 51; NSC, 59; CDE, 1,246. Members of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King's family attend graduation exercises and receive honorary certificates
2019		from Secretary of the Navy Spencer, marking the role of the Naval War College and professional education in shaping the "five-star" thinkers of the Second World War. Having graduated from the staff course in 1916 and, then, the correspondence course in 1924, King subsequently completed the senior residence course in 1933. However, he was called away early to assume duty at the Navy Department as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. During the 2019 graduation exercises, the King family received replica certificates to highlight the three-time "five-star" graduate of the NWC.
	2 July	Acting President Duncan directs internal reorganization with organizations that previously reported directly to the President now reporting to a dean: Stockton Center for International Law under Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies; Alumni Affairs under Dean, International Programs; and Hattendorf Historical Center under Dean, College of Leadership and Ethics.
	1 Aug.	Rear Admiral Shoshana S. Chatfield assumes command without a formal ceremony as fifty-seventh President of the Naval War College on her arrival. Chatfield is the first female and the first helicopter pilot to serve as President.
	16 Aug.	Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), delivers the Admiral Stansfield Turner memorial lecture.
	6 Sept.	MAWS Class 2019 graduates 43 students.
	19 Sept.	Graduation of 83 Naval War College students at the Naval Postgraduate School marks the eightieth class since the program's establishment in September 1999. 5,452 students have earned an NWC Command and Staff diploma with JPME Phase I certification through this program since 1999.
	1 Oct.	John R. Kroger, former president of Reed College, attorney general of Oregon, and U.S. Marine, becomes the Navy's first Chief Learning Officer, thereby moving the Naval War College from a second-echelon command to a third-echelon command.

2019	7 Oct.	College celebrates its 135th anniversary with the presence of four former Presidents: Rear Admiral James Stark, Vice Admiral Rodney Rempt, Vice Admiral John Christenson, and Vice Admiral P. Gardner Howe III.
	13 Nov.	Graduation. Associate Dean of Academics Timothy Schultz addresses students. CNW, 8; CNCS, 32.
	15 Nov.	NWC's College of Distance Education begins the first eight seminars in a streamlined program to deliver intermediate-level JPME I certification in ten months, improving on the eighteen-month program under the former Web-Enabled Program.
	4 Dec.	Conolly Hall room 210, the former Stansfield Turner Conference Room, renamed in honor of Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale. Stockdale's son, James Stockdale II, attends.
	12 Dec.	NWC Monterey JPME program graduates 92.



Naval War College Organizational Chart, August 2024. In 2022, Rear Admiral Chatfield began a new rationalization of the College's organization. After discussions among senior leaders, this was completed under Rear Admiral Garvin in 2024. See page 443 for the 2003 organization chart. *PNWC, Memorandum for All Hands, 5000, N00, 15 Jul 24*

APPENDIX B

List of the Presidents of the U.S. Naval War College

The following list assigns numbers to each President of the Naval War College, but does not give a number for officers who served as acting President. The names of acting Presidents are given only when they fill a gap between permanent appointments as President. Officers who served as President in two or more separate and distinct assignments are given a number for each assignment.

	Rank	Name	From	To
1.	Rear Admiral	Stephen Bleecker Luce	6 Oct 1884	22 June 1886
2.	Captain	Alfred Thayer Mahan	22 June 1886	12 Jan 1889
3.	Commander	Caspar Frederick Goodrich	12 Jan 1889	22 July 1892
4.	Captain	Alfred Thayer Mahan	22 July 1892	10 May 1893
5.	Commander	Charles Herbert Stockton	10 May 1893	13 Nov 1893
6.	Commander	Henry Clay Taylor	15 Nov 1893	31 Dec 1896
7.	Captain	Caspar Frederick Goodrich	31 Dec 1896	23 Apr 1898

Note: *During the period from 22 March 1898 to 2 November 1898, the activities of the War College were discontinued on account of the participation of the United States in the Spanish-American War.*

8.	Captain	Charles Herbert Stockton	2 Nov 1898	25 Oct 1900
9.	Rear Admiral	French Ensor Chadwick	25 Oct 1900	16 Nov 1903
10.	Captain	Charles Stillman Sperry	16 Nov 1903	24 May 1906
11.	Rear Admiral	John Porter Merrell	24 May 1906	6 Oct 1909
12.	Rear Admiral	Raymond Perry Rodgers	6 Oct 1909	20 Nov 1911
13.	Captain	William Ledyard Rodgers	20 Nov 1911	15 Dec 1913
14.	Rear Admiral	Austin Melvin Knight	15 Dec 1913	16 Feb 1917
15.	Captain	William Sowden Sims	16 Feb 1917	28 Apr 1917

Note: *During the period from 28 April 1917 to 11 April 1919, the academic activities of the War College were discontinued on account of the participation of the United States in the First World War. During this period, the reserve force of the Second Naval District used the College buildings and a series of three acting Presidents maintained the administrative side of the College.*

	Commander	Charles P. Eaton (Ret.) (Acting)	1 May 1917	21 Nov 1917
	Commodore	James Parker (Ret.) (Acting)	21 Nov 1917	17 Mar 1919
	Captain	Reginald R. Belknap (Acting)	17 Mar 1919	11 Apr 1919
16.	Rear Admiral	William Sowden Sims	11 Apr 1919	14 Oct 1922
	Captain	D. Blamer (Acting)	14 Oct 1922	3 Nov 1922
17.	Rear Admiral	Clarence Stewart Williams	3 Nov 1922	5 Sept 1925
18.	Rear Admiral	William Veazie Pratt	5 Sept 1925	17 Sept 1927
19.	Rear Admiral	Joel Roberts Poinsett Pringle	19 Sept 1927	30 May 1930
	Captain	S. W. Bryant (Acting)	30 May 1930	16 June 1930
20.	Rear Admiral	Harris Laning	16 June 1930	13 May 1933
	Captain	Adolphus Andrews (Acting)	13 May 1933	3 June 1933
21.	Rear Admiral	Luke McNamee	3 June 1933	29 May 1934
	Captain	H. D. Cooke (Acting)	29 May 1934	18 June 1934
22.	Rear Admiral	Edward Clifford Kalbfus	18 June 1934	15 Dec 1936
	Captain	H. D. Cooke (Acting)	15 Dec 1936	2 Jan 1937

	Rank	Name	From	To
23.	Rear Admiral	Charles Philip Snyder	2 Jan 1937	27 May 1939
	Captain	J. W. Wilcox (Acting)	27 May 1939	30 June 1939
24.	Rear Admiral	Edward Clifford Kalbfus	30 June 1939	16 June 1942
	Admiral	Edward Clifford Kalbfus (Ret.)	16 June 1942	2 Nov 1942
25.	Rear Admiral	William Satterlee Pye	2 Nov 1942	1 July 1944
	Vice Admiral	William Satterlee Pye (Ret.)	1 July 1944	1 Mar 1946
26.	Admiral	Raymond Ames Spruance	1 Mar 1946	1 July 1948
	Rear Admiral	Allen Edward Smith (Acting)	1 July 1948	1 Nov 1948
27.	Vice Admiral	Donald Bradford Beary	1 Nov 1948	28 May 1950
	Rear Admiral	Thomas Ross Cooley (Acting)	28 May 1950	17 Oct 1950
	Captain	Harry D. Felt (Acting)	17 Oct 1950	1 Dec 1950
28.	Vice Admiral	Richard L. Conolly	1 Dec 1950	2 Nov 1953
	Rear Admiral	Thomas H. Robbins Jr. (Acting)	2 Nov 1953	3 May 1954
29.	Vice Admiral	Lynde D. McCormick	3 May 1954	16 Aug 1956
	Rear Admiral	Thomas H. Robbins, Jr. (Acting)	16 Aug 1956	4 Sept 1956
30.	Rear Admiral	Thomas H. Robbins, Jr.	5 Sept 1956	1 Aug 1957
31.	Vice Admiral	Stuart H. Ingersoll	13 Aug 1957	30 June 1960
32.	Vice Admiral	Bernard L. Austin	30 June 1960	31 July 1964
33.	Vice Admiral	Charles L. Melson	31 July 1964	25 Jan 1966
	Rear Admiral	Francis E. Nuessle (Acting)	25 Jan 1966	15 Feb 1966
34.	Vice Admiral	John T. Hayward	15 Feb 1966	30 Aug 1968
35.	Vice Admiral	Richard G. Colbert	30 Aug 1968	17 Aug 1971
36.	Vice Admiral	Benedict J. Semmes, Jr.	17 Aug 1971	30 June 1972
37.	Vice Admiral	Stansfield Turner	30 June 1972	9 Aug 1974
38.	Vice Admiral	Julien J. LeBourgeois	9 Aug 1974	1 Apr 1977
39.	Rear Admiral	Huntington Hardisty	1 Apr 1977	13 Oct 1977
40.	Vice Admiral	James B. Stockdale	13 Oct 1977	22 Aug 1979
41.	Rear Admiral	Edward F. Welch, Jr.	22 Aug 1979	17 Aug 1982
	Captain	David Self (Acting)	18 Aug 1982	14 Oct 1982
42.	Rear Admiral	James E. Service	14 Oct 1982	12 July 1985
	Captain	Robert Watts (Acting)	12 July 1985	8 Aug 1985
43.	Rear Admiral	Ronald F. Marryott	8 Aug 1985	12 Aug 1986
	Captain	Robert Watts (Acting)	12 Aug 1986	2 Sept 1986
44.	Rear Admiral	John A. Baldwin	2 Sept 1986	11 Aug 1987
45.	Rear Admiral	Ronald J. Kurth	11 Aug 1987	17 July 1990
46.	Rear Admiral	Joseph C. Strasser	17 July 1990	29 June 1995
47.	Rear Admiral	James R. Stark	29 June 1995	24 July 1998
48.	Vice Admiral	Arthur K. Cebrowski	24 July 1998	22 Aug 2001
49.	Rear Admiral	Rodney P. Rempt	22 Aug 2001	9 July 2003
50.	Rear Admiral	Ronald A. Route	9 July 2003	12 Aug 2004
51.	Rear Admiral	Jacob L. Shuford	12 Aug 2004	6 Nov 2008
52.	Rear Admiral	James P. Wisecup	6 Nov 2008	30 Mar 2011
53.	Rear Admiral	John N. Christenson	30 Mar 2011	2 July 2013
54.	Rear Admiral	Walter E. Carter, Jr.	2 July 2013	8 July 2014
55.	Rear Admiral	P. Gardner Howe III	8 July 2014	25 July 2016
56.	Rear Admiral	Jeffrey A. Harley	25 July 2016	10 June 2019
	Dr.	Lewis Duncan (Acting)	10 June 2019	1 Aug 2019
57.	Rear Admiral	Shoshana Chatfield	1 Aug 2019	23 June 2023
58.	Rear Admiral	Peter A. Garvin	23 June 2023	9 Aug 2024
59.	Rear Admiral	Darryl L. Walker	9 Aug 2024	

APPENDIX C

Key Naval War College Officials, 1972–2024

A list for earlier years may be found in *Naval War College Register of Officers, 1884–1968* (1970).

Vice President and Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff

1971–1972—Rear Admiral Graham Tahler, USN
1972–1973—Captain Hugh G. Nott, USN

Deputy to the President

1972–1973—Rear Admiral William L. Harris, USN
1973–1974—Rear Admiral Charles S. Williams, Jr., USN (also Dean of Academics)
1974–1975—Captain Hugh G. Nott, USN (also Dean of Academics)

Deputy to the President/Chief of Staff

1975–1976—Colonel J. W. P. Robertson, USMC
1976–1978—Captain William A. Platte, USN
1978–1980—Captain Render Crayton, USN
1980–1983—Captain David L. Self, USN
1983–1988—Captain Robert B. Watts, USN
1988–1991—Captain Clyde J. Vanarsdall III, USN
1991–1993—Captain Robert A. Maier, USN
1993–1997—Captain Mack A. Thomas, Jr., USN
1997–2001—Captain Terry J. Pudas, USN (Executive Assistant, 1998–2001)
2002–2004—Captain John C. Meyer, USN
2004 —Captain William C. Reed, USN
2004 —Captain James B. Bridge, USN
2005–2006—Captain David Burnes, USN
2006–2008—Captain David N. Thorson, USN
2008 —Captain Michael F. Van Vleck, USN
2008–2012—Captain Russell P. Knight, USN
2012–2013—Captain William J. Nault, USN
2013–2015—Captain George E. Lang, Jr., USN
2015–2016—Captain Francis M. Molinari, USN

Vice President and Chief of Staff

2016–2019—Captain Tamara K. Graham, USN
2019 —Captain Damon Amaral, USN (Acting)
2019–2022—Captain Joseph C. Girard, USN
2022–2024—Captain Michael J. Rak, USN
2024– —Captain Peter F. Halvorsen, USN

Provost

1998–2000—Rear Admiral Peter A. C. Long, USN
2000–2002—Rear Admiral Barbara E. McGann, USN
2002–2007—Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. (also Dean of Academics)
2007–2008—William R. Spain (Acting)
2008–2014—Ambassador Mary Ann Peters
2014–2015—William R. Spain (Acting)
2015–2020—Dr. Lewis Duncan
2020–2022—Dr. James E. Hickey (Acting)
2022– —Dr. Stephen J. Mariano

Associate Provost

2009–2015—William R. Spain
2015–2021—Dr. James E. Hickey
2021–2023—Dr. Thomas J. Gibbons

Associate Provost for Education and Faculty

2023– —Dr. Thomas J. Gibbons

Associate Provost for Academic Services

2023– —Dr. Michael H. Bush

Associate Provost for Outreach and Engagement

2023–2024—Dr. Bradley Carter

Associate Provost for Research

2019 —Dr. William F. Bundy
2023– —Dr. Jeremiah Ross Dancy

Senior Historian, John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research

Chairman, Maritime History Department (Center for Naval Warfare Studies)

2003–2016—Dr. John B. Hattendorf
2016–2017—Dr. David A. Kohnen (Acting)

Director, John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research (President's Office, 2017–2019; College of Leadership and Ethics, 2019–2024)

2017–2020—Dr. David A. Kohnen
2020–2023—Rear Admiral Margaret D. Klein, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2023–2024—William J. Nault (Interim)

Senior Historian (Associate Provost for Research, 2024)
2024– —Dr. Michael F. Pavković

Dean of Academics
Dean of Academics
1973–1974—Rear Admiral Charles S. Williams, Jr., USN (also Deputy)
1974 —Commander Paul L. Merwin, USN (Acting, Executive Assistant to Dean)
1974–1975—Captain Hugh G. Nott, USN
1975–1976—Captain John J. Ekelund, USN
1976–1977—Captain Huntington Hardisty, USN
1977–1978—Captain Michael T. Midas, USN (Acting, Executive Assistant to Dean)
1978–1980—Captain William A. Platte, USN
1980–1983—Captain James B. Kramer, USN
1983–1985—Captain James M. Conway, USN
1985–1986—Captain Howard F. Burdick, Jr., USN
1986–1988—Captain William S. Hodgkins, USN
1988–1991—Captain Elizabeth G. Wylie, USN
1991–1993—Captain Stephen T. Holl, USN
1993–1997—Captain William M. Calhoun, USN

Dean of Academic Affairs
1997–2000—Dr. William M. Calhoun
2000–2002—Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
2002 —Dr. James F. Miskel (Acting)
2002–2007—Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr. (also Provost)
2007–2009—William R. Spain (Acting)
2009–2015—Dr. John Garafano
2015–2016—Dr. Timothy P. Schultz (Acting)

Dean of Academics
2016–2023—Dr. Philip Haun
2023–2024—Dr. Timothy Schultz (Acting)
2024– —Dr. Doyle K. Hodges

Director of College of Naval Warfare (CNW)
1973–1974—Colonel Robert D. Slay, USMC
1974–1975—Captain Herbert W. Smevog, USN

Director of College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S)
1972–1974—Captain Troy E. Stone, USN
1974–1975—Captain David N. Denton, USN

Dean of Students
1975–1978—Captain David N. Denton, USN
1978–1980—Captain Allen L. Kruger, USN
1980–1983—Captain George W. Crowninshield, USN
1983–1986—Captain William K. Sullivan, USN
1986–1989—Captain Earl R. Riffle, USN
1989–1992—Captain Wendell R. Alcorn, USN
1992–1994—Captain John D. Dolquist, USN
1994–1996—Captain John C. Scrapper, USN
1996–1997—Captain Gina M. Tecco, USN
1997–1998—Captain Duane J. Phillips, USN
1998–1999—Captain Dennis M. Gillespie, USN
1999–2000—Captain Duane J. Phillips, USN
2000–2002—Captain Daniel C. Simonds, USN
2002–2005—Captain David A. Williams, USN
2005–2008—Captain James P. Murray, USN
2008–2009—Captain T. W. Malloy, USN
2009–2010—Captain Sharon B. L. Campbell, USN
2010–2013—Captain Raymond F. Keledei, USN
2013–2016—Captain John Griffin, USN
2016–2020—Captain Patrick Keyes, USN
2020–2023—Captain Cynthia A. Dieterly, USN
2023– —Captain Brian D. Doherty, USN

Dean of Administration
1973–1974—Captain Hugh G. Nott, USN
1974–1975—Captain Eugene C. Kenyon, USN
1975–1976—Captain William C. Rae, Jr., USN
1976–1977—Captain Arthur O. Riendeau, Jr., USN
1977–1980—Captain Arcenio Alves, Jr., USN
1980–1984—Captain Richard D. Coogan, USN
1984–1987—Captain Charles P. Silvia, USN
1987–1990—Captain Joseph P. Marnane, USN
1990–1992—Captain Terrence N. Tehan, USN
1992–1993—Captain Anthony J. Kibble, USN
1993–1997—Captain Floyston A. Weeks, USN
1997–2000—Captain Linda S. Taylor, USN

Comptroller/Financial Manager
2000–2004—Commander Steven L. Smith, USN
2004–2005—Commander Melinda Matheny, USN
2006–2016—Steven L. Smith
2016–2017—Brian Hennessey (Acting)
2017–2019—Mark S. Murphy
2019–2020—Brian Hennessey (Acting)
2020– —Jeff Capuno

Chairman, Strategy and Policy
Strategy and History Department
1972 —Dr. Philip A. Crowl

Strategy and Policy Department
1972–1973—Dr. J. Kenneth McDonald
1973–1980—Dr. Philip A. Crowl
1980–1983—Dr. Robert S. Wood
1983–1984—Captain Thomas A. Fitzgerald, USN (Acting, Executive Assistant)
1984–1990—Dr. Alvin H. Bernstein
1990–1992—Dr. William C. Fuller, Jr.
1992–2002—Dr. George W. Baer
2002–2005—Dr. Thomas M. Nichols

2005–2013—Dr. John H. Maurer
2013–2018—Dr. Michael F. Pavković
2018–2020—Dr. David R. Stone
2020–2023—Dr. Kevin D. McCranie
2023– —Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich

Chairman, National Security Affairs
Department of Management (1972)
1972–1973—Dr. Robert D. Williams
1973–1975—Dr. Warren F. Rogers
1975–1981—Dr. William E. Turcotte

Department of Defense Economics and Decision Making (DEDM) (1981)
1981–1986—Dr. William E. Turcotte

National Security Decision Making (NSDM) (1986)
1986–2002—Dr. William E. Turcotte
2002–2010—Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese
2010–2011—Dr. David Cooper

National Security Affairs (2011)
2011–2018—Dr. David Cooper
2018– —Dr. Derek S. Reveron

Chairman, Joint Military Operations
Tactics Department (1972)
1972–1973—Captain William K. Yates, USN
1973–1974—Captain Eugene C. Kenyon, USN
1974–1975—Captain Chantee Lewis, USN

Department of Naval Operations (1975)
1975–1977—Captain Philip J. Ryan, USN
1977–1981—Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, U.S. Navy, Ret.
1981–1983—Captain Hugh F. Lynch, USN
1983–1985—Captain Jerome F. Watson, USN

Operations Department (1985)
1985–1989—Captain Timothy E. Somes, USN
1989–1991—Colonel Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC
1991–1994—Captain Hiram W. Clark, Jr., USN
1994–1996—Captain David Watson, USN

Joint Military Operations (1996)
1996–1999—Captain George W. Jackson, USN
1999–2001—Colonel William R. Spain, USMC
2001–2002—Captain Michael L. Felmly, USN
2002 —Colonel Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC (Acting)
2003–2005—Captain Anthony Ruoti, Jr., USN
2005–2006—Captain Steven Kornatz, USN
2006–2008—Captain James S. Maynard, USN
2008–2010—Captain James K. Cook, USN
2010–2011—James K. Cook
2011–2014—Captain Alan Abramson, USN
2014–2015—Alan Abramson
2015–2016—Captain Richard A. LaBranche, USN
2016–2019—Captain Edmund B. Hernandez, USN
2019–2020—Captain Scott M. Smith, USN
2020–2022—Captain Christopher F. Rohrbach, USN
2022– —Captain John Porado, USN

Dean of Advanced Research; Director, Center for Advanced Research
1972–1975—James E. King
1976–1981—Hugh G. Nott

Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies
1981–1983—Hon. Robert J. Murray
1983–1999—Dr. Robert S. Wood
1999–2004—Dr. Alberto R. Coll
2004 —Kenneth H. Watman (Acting)
2004–2006—Kenneth H. Watman
2006–2014—Robert C. Rubel
2014–2015—Thomas J. Culora (Acting)
2015–2020—Thomas J. Culora
2020–2022—Peter A. Dutton (Acting)
2022–2024—Dr. Paul D. Brister
2024– —Captain Michael O'Hara, USN (Interim)

Director, Global War Game and Advanced Concepts Department
1985–2001—Orville E. Hay

Director, Advanced Research Department
1981–1983—Lieutenant Colonel Orville E. Hay, USMC
1983–1986—Franklin R. Uhlig, Jr.
1986–2003—Dr. John B. Hattendorf
2003 —Dr. Carnes Lord

Chair, War Gaming Department
1969–1971—Captain C. H. Smith, USN
1971–1973—Captain F. N. Quinn, USN
1973–1975—Captain Donald Henderson, USN
1975 —Captain F. R. Bartlett, USN
1975–1981—Captain Herbert A. Cherrier, USN
1981–1983—Captain Ralph C. Kemper, USN
1983–1986—Captain Marshall B. Brisbois, USN
1986–1988—Captain Joseph S. Hurlburt, USN
1988–1992—Captain John H. Heidt, USN
1992–1994—Captain Stephen M. Buescher, USN
1994–1995—Captain John I. Dow, USN
1995–1997—Captain Terry J. Pudas, USN
1997–1998—Captain F. G. Orchard, USN
1998–2000—Captain W. O. Cooke, USN
2000–2001—Captain George Kindel, USN (Acting)
2001–2004—Kenneth H. Watman

2004 —Robert C. Rubel (Acting)
2004–2006—Robert C. Rubel
2006–2008—Captain Mark Seaman, USN (Acting)
2008–2016—David A. DellaVolpe
2016 —Don Marrin (Acting)
2016–2021—Richard A. LaBranche
2021–2024—Captain Michael O'Hara, USN
2024– —Dr. Jonathan Compton

Officer in Charge, Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment, Newport
1976–1979—Captain Ralph N. Channell, USN
1979 —Commander Frank P. Notz, USN
1979–1982—Captain Ronald C. St. Martin, USN
1982–1984—Captain Esmond D. Smith, Jr., USN
1984–1986—Captain Donald H. Estes, USN
1986–1988—Captain Gary W. Hartman, USN
1988–1993—Captain Knute M. Schmidt, Jr., USN
1993–1994—Captain Donald H. Estes, USN
1994 —Commander Charles H. Breen, USN
1994 —Captain D. R. Carrington, USN
1994–1997—Captain Richard M. Ruzicka, USN
1997–1999—Commander Charles H. Breen, USN
1999 —Lieutenant Commander J. J. Shea, USN
1999–2002—Captain B. W. Carter, USN
2002 —Commander Deborah A. Hendrick, USN
2002–2004—Captain Eileen F. MacKrell, USN
2004–2007—Captain Maureen A. Neville, USN
2007–2010—Captain David C. Foley, USN
2010–2013—Captain Maureen A. Neville, USN
2013–2014—Commander Eduardo Recavarren, USN
2014–2017—Commander Greg J. Ridolfi, USN
2017–2019—Captain Victoria I. Gribus, USN
2019–2021—Captain Thomas Peterson, USN
2021–2023—Captain Jeffrey J. Jakuboski, USN
2023–2024—Commander Peter T. Beuttenmuller, USN (Acting)
2024– —Captain Michael Goad, USN

Officer in Charge, Meteorology and Oceanography Detachment
2005–2006—Lieutenant Commander Rick Fritsch, USN
2006–2008—Lieutenant Commander Michael Rocheleau, USN
2008–2010—Lieutenant Commander Charles R. Allen, USN

Chair, Strategic and Operational Research Department
Strategy and Campaign Department (1983)
1983–1994—Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel

Strategic Research Department (1994–2015)
1994–2001—Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel
2001–2004—Dr. Jonathan Pollack
2004–2005—Dr. Alberto Coll
2005–2013—Dr. Peter J. Dombrowski
2013–2015—Dr. Andrew C. Winner

Decision Support Center Department (1994–2006)
1994–1996—Bradley S. Drasbek
1996–2006—Dr. Lawrence E. Modisett

Warfare Analysis Research Department (2006–2015)
2006–2008—Dr. Lawrence E. Modisett
2008–2014—Thomas J. Culora
2014–2015—Dr. William F. Bundy (Acting)

Strategic and Operational Research Department (2015—following merger of Warfare Analysis and Strategic Research Departments)
2015–2019—Dr. Andrew C. Winner
2019– —Dr. Colin Jackson

Editor, *Naval War College Review* and Naval War College Press
Apr 1970–May/Jun 1975—Commander Robert M. Laske, USN
Summer 1975—Lieutenant (j.g.) Jeffrey P. Bacher, USNR (Interim)
Fall 1975–Summer 1977—Lieutenant Commander B. M. Simpson, III, USN
Fall 1977–July/Aug 1981—Commander W. R. Pettyjohn, USN
Sept/Oct 1981—Captain F. C. Caswell, Jr., USN (Interim)
Nov/Dec 1981–Sept/Oct 1985—Frank Uhlig, Jr.
Nov/Dec 1985–Summer 1988—Robert M. Laske
Autumn 1988–Autumn 1993—Frank Uhlig, Jr.
Winter 1994–Spring 2003—Thomas B. Grassey
Spring 2003–Summer/Autumn 2004—Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher
Winter 2005–Autumn 2005—Dr. Peter Dombrowski
Winter 2006–Autumn 2023—Dr. Carnes Lord
Winter 2024– — Steven P. Stashwick (Managing Editor)

Director, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group
1981–1983—Hon. Robert J. Murray
1983–1985—Dr. Robert S. Wood
1985–1989—Ambassador Marshall Brement
1989–1993—Hon. Robert B. Pirie, Jr.
1993–1995—Ambassador Francis J. McNeil
1995–2013—Admiral James R. Hogg, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2013–2017—Vice Admiral James P. Wisecup, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Chair, Stockton Center for International Law
Oceans Law and Policy Department (1989)
1988–1998—Richard J. Grunawalt

International Law Department (1998)
1998–2011—Dennis L. Mandsager
2011–2014—Dr. Michael N. Schmitt

Stockton Center for the Study of International Law (2014)
2014–2017—Dr. Michael N. Schmitt

Stockton Center for International Law (2017)
2017– —Dr. James C. Kraska

Dean, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL)
Dean, College of Naval Leadership
2006–2007—Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Dean, College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL)
2007–2008—Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2008–2011—Thomas M. Bayley (Acting)
2011–2017—Rear Admiral James Kelly, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Dean, College of Maritime Operational Warfare (2017)
2017 —Rear Admiral James Kelly, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2017–2022—Rear Admiral Michael S. White, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2022– —Rear Admiral (LH) Edward B. Cashman, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Director, Maritime Advanced Warfighting School
Naval Operational Planner Course (1998)
1998–2001—Captain Edward F. Caffrey, Jr., USN
2001 —Captain Paul A. Romanski, U.S. Navy, Ret. (Acting)
2002–2005—Captain Michael R. Critz, USN
2005–2009—Captain C. W. J. Richardson, Jr., USN

Maritime Advanced Warfighting School
2009–2014—Captain Patrick A. Molenda, USN
2014–2015—Captain Richard A. LaBranche, USN
2015–2019—Captain Brian D. Koehr, USN
2019– —Captain Christopher M. Senenko, USN

Dean, College of Leadership and Ethics
2017–2023—Rear Admiral Margaret D. Klein, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2023–2024—William J. Nault (Interim)
2024– — Dr. Jeffrey R. Macris

Dean, International Programs
2003–2012—Vincent P. Mocini
2012– —Thomas E. Mangold, Jr.

Director, Naval Command College (NCC)
1972–1974—Captain Charles O. Borgstrom, Jr., USN
1974–1976—Captain Troy E. Stone, USN
1976–1977—Captain William J. Bredbeck, USN
1977–1980—Captain Christopher Withers, USN
1980–1981—Captain Rodney V. Hansen, USN
1981–1982—Captain Charles G. Andres, USN
1982–1984—Captain Francis X. Mezzadri, USN
1984–1987—Captain Wright H. Ellis, USN
1987–1990—Captain Howard D. Kirkpatrick, USN
1990–1992—Captain Marvin R. Rice, USN
1992–1994—Captain Charles C. Nute, USN
1994–1999—Captain Kenneth G. Bixler, USN
1999–2001—Captain John D. Roberts, USN
2001–2003—Captain Vincent P. Mocini, USN
2003–2006—Captain Bradley B. Smith, USN
2006–2008—Captain Steven D. Kornatz, USN
2008–2011—Captain Stephen M. Senteio, USN
2011–2012—Vincent P. Mocini
2012–2015—Captain Perry Yaw, USN
2015–2016—Captain Derek Wessman, USN
2016–2020—Captain Kevin McGowan, USN
2020–2021—Captain William H. Shipp, USN
2021–2024—Captain Michael Quan, USN
2024– —Captain Mikael Rockstad, USN

Director, Naval Staff College (NSC)
Director, Naval Staff Course
1972–1977—Captain Jack Q. Quinn, USN

Director, Naval Staff College (1977)
1977–1980—Captain Jack Q. Quinn, USN
1980–1982—Captain Paul H. Molenda, USN
1982–1985—Captain Joseph P. Marnane, USN
1985–1987—Captain Curtis G. Borchardt, USN
1987–1989—Captain Richard L. Magalis, USN
1989–1991—Captain Robert Anson, Jr., USN
1991–1994—Captain Harry T. Hinman III, USN
1994–1996—Captain John E. Odegaard, USN
1996–1998—Captain Claude D. Swaim, USN
1998–2001—Captain James R. Stapleford, USN
2001–2003—Captain Fred B. Horne, USN
2003–2007—Captain Stephen M. Senteio, USN
2007–2009—Captain Robert S. Winneg, USN
2009–2012—Captain Richard A. Rainer, Jr., USN
2012–2017—Captain Mark L. Turner, USN
2017–2018—Captain Todd Libby, USN
2018–2019—Captain Gabriel E. Soltero, USN
2019–2020—Captain Michael A. Marston, USN
2020–2023—Commander Mark Yehl, USN
2023– —Captain Ryan Logan, USN

Chief of Naval Operations Distinguished International Fellows
2011–2024—Admiral Guillermo Barrera, Colombian Navy, Ret.
2015– —Admiral Nirmal Verma, Indian Navy, Ret.
2017– —Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Royal Norwegian Navy, Ret.
2017–2020—Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Ret.

Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE)
Director, Center for Continuing Education (CCE)
1972–1975—Colonel Richard B. Taber, USMC
1975–1976—Captain Philip C. Donovan, USN
1976–1977—Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, U.S. Navy, Ret.
1977 —Captain Thomas R. Cotten, Jr., USN
1977–1983—Captain Eugene E. Sheehy, USN
1983–1986—Captain Robert A. Hall, USN

Director, College of Continuing Education (1986)
1986–1988—Captain David G. Clark, USN
1988–1991—Captain Andrew J. Rochells, USN
1991–1993—Captain Jeffrey L. Richard, USN

1993–1994—Captain Charles J. Rafter, USN
1994–1996—Captain Charles R. Sipe, Jr., USN
1996–1998—Captain John E. Jackson, USN
1998–2002—John E. Jackson

Director, College of Distance Education (CDE) (2002)
2002–2010—Timothy H. Jackson
2010–2015—Dr. James E. Hickey
2015–2018—Walter Wildemann

Dean, College of Distance Education (2018)
2018–2023—Walter Wildemann
2023– —Dr. Stephen L. Pierce (Interim)

Library Director and Professor of Libraries
1968–1986—Earl Schwass
1986–2009—Robert E. Schnare, Jr.
2009–2011—Terry J. Metz
2011–2022—Dr. Allen Benson
2023– —Lori J. Brostuen (Acting)

Public Affairs Officer
1973–1974—Commander Jack A. Garrow, USN
1974–1976—Lieutenant Commander Charles Battaglia, USN
1976–1979—Commander Carleen Hess, USN
1979–1983—Commander Clarence M. Cummins, USN
1983–1984—Captain James E. Wentz, USN
1984–1986—Commander Stephen E. Becker, USN
1986–1989—Commander Patrick H. Saxon, USN
1989–1992—Commander Elmer L. Ahlwardt, USN
1992–1995—Commander John H. Woodhouse, USN
1995–1997—Captain John A. Gallant, USN
1998–1999—Commander Gary Shrout, USN
1999–2001—Lieutenant Commander Christopher A. Dour, USN
2001–2005—Commander Susan M. Haeg, USN
2005–2008—Commander Karen Sellers, USN
2008–2014—Commander Carla McCarthy, USN
2014–2015—Commander Kelly Brannon, USN
2015 —Lieutenant Commander Doug High, USN (Acting)
2015–2018—Commander Barbara Mertz, USN
2018–2023—Commander Gary Ross, USN
2023– —Lieutenant Commander Peter S. Pagano, USN

Chairman, Naval War College Foundation
President
1969–1972—John Nicholas Brown
1972–1973—Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, U.S. Navy, Ret.
1973–1977—John Monsarrat
1977–1980—S. E. Freund
1980–1983—J. William Middendorf II
1983–1986—Robert M. Aiken, Jr.
1986–1988—B. Franklin Reinauer II
1988–1989—Nils Anderson, Jr.
1989–1992—Charles Stetson
1992–1995—Townsend Hornor

Chairman
1992–1995—Townsend Hornor
1994–1996—Frederick C. Brehm
1996–1998—Austin Volk
1998–2000—Robert Turpin
2000–2002—Albert Freidrich
2002–2004—Paul P. Daley
2004–2006—D. Robert McGinnis
2006–2008—John J. D'Luhy
2008–2010—Rear Admiral Glenn E. Whisler, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2010–2013—Peter A. Pelletier
2013–2015—Major General Stephen A. Seiter, U.S. Army, Ret.
2015–2017—Joseph D. Roxe
2017–2020—William A. Obenshain
2020–2023—Philip M. Bilden
2023– —Daniel E. Holland III

Executive Director, Naval War College Foundation
1969–1973—Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, U.S. Navy, Ret.
1974–1993—Captain Walter B. Woodson, U.S. Navy, Ret.
1993–1999—Captain Elizabeth G. Wylie, U.S. Navy, Ret.
1999–2000—Commander Tylor Field II, U.S. Navy, Ret. (Interim)
2000–2006—Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2006–2011—Rear Admiral Roger T. Nolan, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2011 —Peter A. Pelletier (Interim)
2011–2017—Captain John E. Odegaard, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2017–2018—William A. Obenshain (Interim)
2018–2019—Rear Admiral Christopher J. Paul, U.S. Navy, Ret.
2019 —William A. Obenshain (Interim)
2019– —Captain George E. Lang, Jr., U.S. Navy, Ret.

Faculty Marshal
1984–1997—Dr. Richard Megargee
1997–2010—Dr. Richmond Lloyd
2010– —Dr. Charles Chadbourn

APPENDIX D

Distinguished Graduates, 1885–2024

Recipients of the Naval War College's Honorary Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies

	Date of Award
Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, Ret.	June 1994
Representative Ike Skelton (D-Mo.)	June 2000
President George H. W. Bush	June 2001
Senator Jack Reed (D-R.I.)	November 2001
The Naval War College Students and Alumni Killed on 11 September 2001	September 2002

The three active students were Angela Houtz, of La Plata, Md.; Lieutenant Jonas Panik, of Mingoville, Pa.; and Commander Dan Shanower, of Naperville, Ill.

The seven alumni recognized were Captain Gerald F. DeConto, U.S. Navy, of Sandwich, Mass.; Lieutenant Commander Robert R. Elseth, U.S. Navy, of Vestal, N.Y.; Captain Lawrence D. Getzfred, U.S. Navy, of Elgin, Neb.; Lieutenant Commander Patrick J. Murphy, U.S. Navy, of Flossmoor, Ill.; retired Captain Jack Punches, U.S. Navy, of Clifton, Va.; Commander Robert A. Schlegel, U.S. Navy, of Gray, Maine; and Major Kip Taylor, U.S. Army, of McLean, Va.

Hon. David S. C. Chu	March 2003
Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, U.S. Navy, Ret.	June 2004
Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.)	June 2006
Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, U.S. Navy, Ret.	June 2007
Colonel Mark Matsushima, USAF (Posthumously)	July 2010
Admiral Gary Roughead, USN	June 2011
Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN	May 2014
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, USN	June 2015
Rear Admiral Cynthia M. Thebaud, USN	12 May 2016
Vice Admiral Ronald A. Route, U.S. Navy, Ret.	March 2018
Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis	15 June 2018
Consul General of Japan, Boston, Rokuichiro Michi	18 March 2019
Hope H. van Beuren	14 June 2019
Her Imperial Highness Princess Akiko of Mikasa	10 December 2019

Recipients of the Naval War College's Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award

Year of Award		*Class Year*
1996	General John M. Shalikashvili, USA; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	1970
1997	Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN; Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China	1973
1998	Admiral Robert E. Kramek, USCG; 20th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard	1981
1999	General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC; Commander, U.S. Southern Command	1983
2000	Admiral Robert J. Natter, USN; Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	1987

2001	Admiral William J. Fallon, USN; Commander, U.S. Central Command	1978
2002	Colonel Charles J. Precourt, USAF; Chief of the Astronaut Corps	1990
2003	Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, USN; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe	1975
2004	General Michael W. Hagee, USMC; 33rd Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1987
2005	Ambassador Christopher R. Hill; U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, Poland, Republic of Korea, and Iraq; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs	1994
2006	Vice Admiral David L. Brewer III, USN; Vice Chief, Naval Education and Training Command	1994
2007	Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Commander, United States European Command	1985
2008	General James E. Cartwright, USMC; Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	1991
2009	General Raymond T. Odierno, USA; Commanding General, U.S. Forces, Iraq	1990
2010	Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., USCG; 24th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard	1990
2011	Dr. Clifford L. Stanley, Major General, USMC; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness	1983
2012	Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN; Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	1994
2013	Vice Admiral Robert S. Harward, USN; Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command	1993
2014	General David M. Rodriguez, USA; Commander, U.S. Africa Command	1997
2015	Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN; Commander, U.S. Cyber Command	1992
2016	General Mark A. Milley, USA; 39th Army Chief of Staff	2000
2017	General Lori Jean Robinson, USAF; Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command	1996
2018	Admiral Scott H. Swift, USN; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet	1993
2019	Vice Admiral Bruce Grooms, U.S. Navy, Ret.; former Deputy Chief of Staff for Capability Development at Allied Command Transformation	1993
2020	General John W. Raymond, USSF; Commander, U.S. Space Force	2003
2021	Admiral Charles “Chas” Richard, USN; Commander, U.S. Strategic Command	2000
2022	The Honorable Carlos del Toro; 78th Secretary of the Navy	1996
2023	Admiral Lisa Franchetti, USN; 33rd Chief of Naval Operations	1999
2024	General Randy A. George; 41st Chief of Staff, U.S. Army	2008

Naval War College Graduates Who Have Held U.S. Cabinet Posts

		Class Year
General Alexander Haig	59th Secretary of State	1960

Naval War College Graduates Who Have Become Service Secretaries in the United States

		Class Year
Carlos Del Toro	78th Secretary of the Navy	1996

Naval War College Graduates Who Have Become Chiefs of Service in the United States

		Class Year
Commodore Ellsworth P. Bertholf	4th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard	1895
Admiral William S. Benson	1st Chief of Naval Operations	1906
Major General George Barnett	12th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1906
Admiral Edward W. Eberle	3rd Chief of Naval Operations	1913
Major General Ben H. Fuller	15th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1920
Admiral Charles F. Hughes	4th Chief of Naval Operations	1924
Admiral William V. Pratt	5th Chief of Naval Operations	Staff, 1911–1912; NWC President, 1925–1927
Admiral William H. Standley	6th Chief of Naval Operations	1921
Major General John H. Russell, Jr.	16th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1908
Admiral Harold R. Stark	8th Chief of Naval Operations	1923
Major General Thomas Holcomb	17th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1908
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King	9th Chief of Naval Operations	1933
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz	10th Chief of Naval Operations	1923
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman	12th Chief of Naval Operations	1927
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.	20th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1937
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer	18th Chief of Naval Operations; 7th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	1953
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt	19th Chief of Naval Operations	1953
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward	21st Chief of Naval Operations	1959
General John M. Shalikashvili	13th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	1970
Admiral John B. Hayes	16th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard	1960
General Carl E. Mundy	30th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1977
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda	25th Chief of Naval Operations	1971
Admiral Robert E. Kramek	20th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard	1981
General Michael W. Hagee	33rd Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	1987
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr.	24th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard	1990
General Raymond T. Odierno	38th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army	1990
Admiral Paul F. Zukunft	25th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard	1997
General Mark A. Milley	39th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; 20th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	2006
Admiral Lisa Franchetti	33rd Chief of Naval Operations	1999
General Randy A. George	41st Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army	2008

Naval War College Graduates Who Have Become U.S. State Department Ambassadors

		Class Year
Admiral William H. Standley	U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union	1921
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance	U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines	1927
Admiral Alan G. Kirk	U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, Soviet Union, Republic of China	1929
Admiral Joseph W. Prueher	U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China	1973
Christopher R. Hill	U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, Poland, Republic of Korea, Iraq	1994
Paul W. Jones	U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia, Poland	2000
Maura Connelly	U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon	2001
Robert E. Patterson, Jr.	U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan	2002
Thomas Hart Armbruster	U.S. Ambassador to the Marshall Islands	2004
Mary Beth Leonard	U.S. Ambassador to Mali, the African Union, Nigeria	2004
Helen Reed-Rowe	U.S. Ambassador to Palau	2008

Naval War College Graduates Who Have Become Heads of State in Other Countries

		Class Year
Wolfgang Larrazábal	36th President of the Republic of Venezuela	1957
Émile Lahoud	11th President of the Lebanese Republic	1973
H.M. Aho'eitu 'Unuaki'otonga Tuku'aho Tupou VI	King of Tonga	1988

Naval War College Graduates Who Have Become Chiefs of Service in Other Countries

Graduates of the Naval Command College

Class Year

1957

Germany—Vice Admiral Gert Jeschonnek
Philippines—Commodore Heracleo J. Alano
Venezuela—Vice Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal

1958

Colombia—Vice Admiral Augusto G. Porto-Herrera
Ecuador—Rear Admiral Jorge Wolf Franco
Japan—Admiral Takaichi Itaya
Philippines—Commodore Santiago C. Nuval
Thailand—Admiral Amorn Sirigaya

1959

Ecuador—Rear Admiral Ramón Alban
Philippines—Rear Admiral Ramón A. Alcaraz
Venezuela—Rear Admiral Juan Torrealba Morales

1960

Ecuador—Captain Alsacio D. Northia
Mexico—Admiral Humberto E. Uribe
Philippines—Commodore Pastor G. Viado
Vietnam—Rear Admiral Tran Van Chon

1961

Greece—Admiral Peter J. Arapakis
Italy—Vice Admiral Gino De Giorgi
Japan—Admiral Teiji Nakamura
Thailand—Admiral Tada Ditbanjong
Vietnam—Vice Admiral Chung T. Cang

1962

Burma—Rear Admiral Chit Hlaing
Colombia—Admiral Jaime Parra-Ramírez
Mexico—Admiral Hector Ramírez De Arellano
Pakistan—Admiral Mohammad Shariff

1963

Japan—Admiral Kazuomi Uchida
Mexico—Admiral Miguel Angel Gomez Ortego
Vietnam—Captain Nguyen Duc Van

1964

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Ramón E. Jiménez
Philippines—Commodore Ismael C. Lomibao
Thailand—Admiral Siritorn Nipon
Vietnam—Captain Tran Van Phan

1965

Republic of Korea—Admiral Chong-Yon Hwang
Philippines—Commodore Dioscoro E. Papa
Venezuela—Rear Admiral Armando Perez Leffmans
Vietnam—Rear Admiral Tanh Nguon Lam

1966

Brazil—Admiral Henrique Saboia
Colombia—Admiral José Alfonso Díaz

1967

Argentina—Rear Admiral Fernando M. Vazquez
Iran—Admiral Ramzi A. Attaie
Japan—Admiral Ryohei Ohga
Taiwan—Admiral Chang-Tung Yeh
Thailand—Admiral Dusit Sittisiri
Venezuela—Vice Admiral Felix J. Mendoza

1968

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Olgo M. Santana
Iran—Admiral Kamal Habibolahi
Peru—Vice Admiral Juan F. Egusquiza
Turkey—Admiral Emin Göksan

Graduates of the Naval Command College

1969

Ethiopia—Rear Admiral Berhanu Tesfaye
Greece —Vice Admiral Odysseus N. Kapetos
Iran—Rear Admiral Ahmed Madani
Taiwan—Admiral Ho-Chien Liu
Turkey—Admiral Irfan Tinaz

1970

Brazil—Admiral Mario Cesar Flores
Colombia—Admiral Hector S. Calderon-Salazar
Finland—Rear Admiral Juha Y. Tikka
India—Admiral Radhakrishin H. Tahiliani

1971

Belgium—Vice Admiral André J. P. Schlim
Philippines—Rear Admiral Serapio Castillo Martillano

1972

India—Admiral J. G. Nadkarni
Mexico—Admiral Mauricio Schleske
Tunisia—Rear Admiral Bechir Jedidi

1973

Denmark—Admiral Sven E. Thiede
Japan—Admiral Hiroshi Nagata
Peru—Admiral Oscar Anderson-Noriega

1974

Lebanon—General Fares G. Lahoud
Nigeria—Vice Admiral Akintunde A. Aduwo
Pakistan—Admiral Saeed Muhammad Khan
Philippines—Rear Admiral Tagumpay R. Jardiniano

1975

Ghana—Rear Admiral Chemogoh Keven Dzang
Guatemala—Captain José Antonio Contreras Roca
Israel—Vice Admiral Ze'ev Almog
Saudi Arabia—Rear Admiral Ibrahim Mohammed Al-Saja
Sweden—Vice Admiral Peter Nordbeck
Tunisia—Rear Admiral Habib Fedhila

1976

Brazil—Admiral Sergio G. F. Chagasteles
Canada—Vice Admiral Peter W. Cairns
Republic of Korea—Vice Admiral Yun Kwang-ung
Lebanon—Brigadier General Antoine J. Kreidi

1977

Germany—Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann
Netherlands—Commodore Leendert Willem Snoek
Taiwan—Admiral Chung-lien Ku
Thailand—Admiral Wichitr Chamnankarn

1978

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Juan de Jesús Jorge Cabrera
Ghana—Commodore Stephen G. Obimpeh
Guatemala—Captain Carlos Lazo-Azurdia
India—Admiral Vijai Singh Shekhawat
Jordan—Lieutenant Colonel Younis Islam Kamal
Saudi Arabia—Vice Admiral Talal S. Al-Muffaddi
Turkey—Admiral Ilhami Erdil
Venezuela—Vice Admiral Juan Argenis Garcia

1979

Australia—Vice Admiral Donald B. Chalmers
Israel—Vice Admiral Abraham Ben-Shushan
Republic of Korea—Admiral Hong-Yeol Kim

1980

Australia—Vice Admiral Ian D. G. MacDougall
Denmark—Rear Admiral Johan A. Ruth
Ghana—Rear Admiral Benjamin Ohene-Kwapong
Greece—Admiral Iraklis Drikos
Israel—Vice Admiral Michael Ram
Kenya—Major General Simon Mbilu
Republic of Korea—Admiral Pyong-Tae An
Lebanon—General Émile Lahoud
Portugal—Admiral António C. Fuzeta da Ponte

1981

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral José Santos Sánchez
Ghana—Commodore Joseph D. Opong
Japan—Admiral Takeo Fukuchi
Portugal—Admiral Antonio M. Andrade-Silva
Sweden—Vice Admiral Frank Rosenius

1982

Bangladesh—Rear Admiral Mohammad Mohaiminul Islam
Ireland—Commodore John J. Kavanagh
Israel—Vice Admiral Ami Ayalon

Graduates of the Naval Command College

Kenya—General Joseph R. E. Kibwana
Pakistan—Admiral Mansurul Haque
Philippines—Vice Admiral Virgilio Q. Marcelo
Thailand—Admiral Hao-Charoen Thira
Turkey—Admiral Ozden Ornek

1983

Denmark—Rear Admiral S. Torp Petersen
Jordan—Colonel Atif Rasheed Hameed
Singapore—Rear Admiral Chin Lian James Leo

1984

India—Admiral Madhvendra Singh
Liberia—Captain Patrick D. Wallace

1985

Denmark—Vice Admiral Knud E. J. Borck
Honduras—Captain Carlos Cristobal Cano Culley
Jordan—Major General Hussein Ali Mahmoud Al-Khasawneh
Saudi Arabia—Vice Admiral Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al Saud

1986

Bangladesh—Rear Admiral Mohammad Nurul Islam
Ecuador—Rear Admiral Miguel Saona Roca
Peru—Vice Admiral Fernando D'Alessio Ipinza

1987

Brazil—Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho
Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Iván A. Vargas Céspedes
Japan—Admiral Toru Ishikawa
Saudi Arabia—Admiral Dakheel Allah Ahmed Al-Wagdani
Singapore—Rear Admiral Siew Jin Kwek
Thailand—Admiral Satripan Keyanon

1988

El Salvador—Captain Fernando Menjivar Campos
Israel—Vice Admiral Yedidia Ya'ari

1989

Colombia—Admiral Edgar Romero Vásquez
Greece—Admiral Panagiotis Chinofotis
Malaysia—Admiral Tan Sri Ilyas Din
Nigeria—Vice Admiral Jubrila Olukayode Adisa Ayinla
Portugal—Admiral Nuno Gonçalo Vieira Matias
Senegal—Captain Seydou Bangaly
Sweden—General Håkan Erik Gunnar Syrén

1990

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Rafael L. de Jesús Monzón Brea
India—Admiral Arun Prakash
Japan—Admiral Takashi Saito
Pakistan—Admiral Shahid Karimullah

1991

El Salvador—Rear Admiral Mario Argueta Franco
Finland—Vice Admiral Esko A. Illi
Honduras—Rear Admiral Giordano Bruno Fontana Hedman
Israel—Vice Admiral David Ben-Bashat
Japan—Admiral Eiji Yoshikawa
Morocco—Rear Admiral Mohamed Laghmari
Peru—Vice Admiral Humberto León Rabines Gironda
United Arab Emirates—Brigadier General Mohammed Khalfan M. Al-Muhairi

1992

Nigeria—Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi

1993

Algeria—General Mohammed Lakmeche
Colombia—Admiral Guillermo Enrique Barrera-Hurtado
Côte d'Ivoire—Rear Admiral Megna Malick Diomande
Denmark—Rear Admiral Kurt Birger Jensen
Ecuador—Admiral Victor H. Rosero Barba
El Salvador—Captain Guillermo Jiménez Vásquez
India—Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma
Mexico—Admiral Sergio Enrique Henaro Galán
Philippines—Vice Admiral Eduardo Mario Ramirez Santos
Singapore—Rear Admiral Richard Lim Cherng Yih

1994

Honduras—Captain Ricardo Reyes Rivera
Portugal—Admiral Francisco António Torres Vidal Abreu
United Arab Emirates—Brigadier General Ahmed Mohammed Hassan Al-Sabab

1995

Ecuador—Vice Admiral Hector Holguin Darquea
New Zealand—Rear Admiral David Ian Ledson
Sweden—Rear Admiral Jörgen F. Ericsson

Graduates of the Naval Command College

1996

Colombia—Vice Admiral Alvaro Echandia Duran
Ecuador—Vice Admiral Aland Javier Molestina Malta
Kuwait—Lieutenant General Abdulrahman Mohammed Al-Othman
Malaysia—Admiral Dato' Sri Abdul Aziz bin Haji Jaafar
Netherlands—Rear Admiral Jacques G. A. Brandt

1997

Chile—Admiral Edmundo González Robles
Denmark—Vice Admiral Tim Sloth Jørgensen
India—Admiral Rabinder K. Dhowan
Japan—Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano
Singapore—Rear Admiral Lui Tuck Yew

1998

Bulgaria—Vice Admiral Plamen Ivanov Manushev
Denmark—Rear Admiral Lars Kragelund
Ecuador—Rear Admiral Marco G. Salinas
Netherlands—Rear Admiral Léon Bruin
Norway—Vice Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth

1999

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Iván Alejandro Peña Castillo
Finland—Rear Admiral Veli-Jukka Pennala
Japan—Admiral Tomohisa Takei
Latvia—Captain Hermanis Cernovs
Philippines—Vice Admiral Mateo Mendoza Mayuga

2000

El Salvador—Vice Admiral Marco Antonio Palacios Luna

2001

Mexico—Admiral Vidal Francisco Soberón Sanz

2002

Latvia—Captain Ilmars Lesinskis

2003

Bahrain—Brigadier General Abdullah Saeed Al-Mansoori
Bulgaria—Rear Admiral Ditmar Denev
El Salvador—Captain Guillermo Jiménez Vásquez
Finland—Rear Admiral Kari Juhani Takanen
Malaysia—Admiral Zulkilfili Bakar
Philippines—Vice Admiral Ferdinand S. Gole

2004

Bolivia—Rear Admiral Hugo Contreras Llanos
Croatia—Rear Admiral Robert Hranj
Egypt—Rear Admiral Mohammed Abdel Aziz El Sayd
Japan—Admiral Hiroshi Yamamura
Malaysia—Admiral Tan Sri Mohd Reza bin Mohd Sany
Norway—Rear Admiral Lars Saunes
United Arab Emirates—Vice Admiral Ibrahim Saleem Al-Musharrakh

2005

Bulgaria—Vice Admiral Emil Eftimov
Jordan—Brigadier General Ibrahim Al-Naimat
Kuwait—Brigadier General Jassim Mohammed Al-Ansari
Lebanon—Rear Admiral Villa Nazih Jbaily
Philippines—Vice Admiral Danilo M. Cortez
Sweden—Rear Admiral Jan Anders Thörnqvist

2006

Australia—Vice Admiral Michael Noonan
Denmark—Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen
Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Miguel E. Peña Acosta
Latvia—Colonel Aivars Mežors
Lithuania—Captain Olegas Marinicius
Philippines—Vice Admiral Alexander P. Pama
Singapore—Rear Admiral Lew Chuen Hong
Tunisia—Rear Admiral Adel Jehane
United Arab Emirates—Major General Saeed Al Nahyan

2007

Ecuador—Rear Admiral Renán Ruiz Cornejo
Germany—Vice Admiral Jan C. Kack

2008

Bahrain—Commodore Mohammad Yousif Al-Asam
Bulgaria—Rear Admiral Mitko A. Petev
India—Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi
Latvia—Captain Aleksandrs Pavlovics
Poland—Rear Admiral Jarosław Ziemiański

2009

India—Vice Admiral Rajesh Pendharkar
Japan—Admiral Akira Saito
Romania—Rear Admiral Mihai Panait

Graduates of the Naval Command College

2010

Belize—Captain Elton Bennett
Lithuania—Captain Arūnas Mockus
Poland—Rear Admiral Miroslaw Mordel
Senegal—Rear Admiral Oumar Wage

2011

Montenegro—Captain Darko Vuković

2012

Argentina—Admiral Julio Horacio Guardia
Belize—Rear Admiral John Borland
El Salvador—Captain Miguel A. Castillo Guardado
Estonia—Commodore Igor Schvede
Philippines—Vice Admiral Adeluis Bordado

2013

Bulgaria—Rear Admiral Kiril Mihaylov
El Salvador—Captain René F. Merino Monroy
Georgia—Captain Ramaz Papidze
Ghana—Rear Admiral Peter Kofi Faidoo
Lebanon—Rear Admiral Hosni K. Daher
Papua New Guinea—Captain Philip Polewara
Sweden—Rear Admiral Jens Nykvist

2015

Lebanon—Captain Haissam Dannaoui

2016

Estonia—Captain Juri Saska
Ghana—Rear Admiral Issah Yakubu

2018

Haiti—Commissaire Principal Jean Pedro Mars

2021

Norway—Commodore Geir Hestvik

Naval War College Graduates Who Have Become Chiefs of Service in Other Countries

Graduates of the Naval Staff College

1972

Singapore—Colonel James Aeria

1973

Ghana—Commodore Stephen G. Obimpeh
Lebanon—General Émile Lahoud
Liberia—Captain Samuel Weaka Peters

1974

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Iván A. Vargas Céspedes
Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral José Santos Sánchez
Ireland—Commodore John J. Kavanagh
Lebanon—Rear Admiral Samir Ali Khadem
Liberia—Captain W. Kelly Garnett
Morocco—Vice Admiral Mohamed Triki
Spain—Admiral Gonzalo R. Martin-Granizo
Taiwan—Admiral Yung Ching Miao

1975

Bolivia—Admiral Alberto Saenz Klinsky
Ghana—Commander Keith M. Dadzie
Guatemala—Captain Edgar Villanueva
Nigeria—Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako
Saudi Arabia—Vice Admiral Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al Saud
Tunisia—Rear Admiral Brahim Barrak

1976

Japan—Admiral Yasumasa Yamamoto

1977

El Salvador—Captain Humberto P. Villalta
Japan—Admiral Kazuya Natsukawa
Kenya—General Joseph R. E. Kibwana

1978

Lebanon—Rear Admiral Alberto Ramez Ghorayeb
Liberia—Captain Patrick D. Wallace
Malaysia—Admiral Datuk Mohd Ramly bin Abu Bakar
Nicaragua—Lieutenant Colonel Arturo Mohrke
Panama—Captain José S. Motta

Graduates of the Naval Staff College

1979

Jordan—Colonel Atif Rasheed Hameed
Lebanon—Rear Admiral Elie Hayek
Senegal—Captain Mamadou M. Thioubo

1980

Côte d'Ivoire—Captain Fako Kone
El Salvador—Captain Fernando Menjivar Campos
Ghana—Rear Admiral Thomas K. Annan
Honduras—Captain Carlos Cristobal Cano Culley
Jordan—Major General Hussein Ali Mahmoud Al-Khasawneh
Qatar—Brigadier General Saif Ahmed Al-Mannai
Sri Lanka—Admiral Mohan D. A. R. Samarasekara

1981

Australia—Vice Admiral Russell E. Shalders
El Salvador—Rear Admiral Mario Argueta Franco
Republic of Korea—Admiral Hae Il Nam
Malaysia—Admiral Dato' Sri Mohd Anwar bin Hj Mohd Nor
Nigeria—Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi

1982

Dominican Republic—Rear Admiral Víctor F. García Alecont
Honduras—Brigadier General Arnulfo Cantarero López
Iceland—Commander Sigurður S. Ketilsson
Singapore—Rear Admiral Teo Chee Hean
Turkey—Rear Admiral Engin Heper

1983

Kuwait—Major General Marzpook Haimeed Al-Bader
Sudan—Lieutenant Colonel Abdelrhman M. Abdalla

1984

Haiti—Captain Ambroise L. Seide
Honduras—Rear Admiral Giordano Bruno Fontana Hedman
Panama—Captain José R. Rosas
Senegal—Captain Ousseynou Kombo
Sri Lanka—Rear Admiral Sarath P. Weerasekera
Yemen—Brigadier General Taher Ali Al-Magaleh

1985

Bahrain—Brigadier General Yousif Ahmed Malallah
Bolivia—Admiral Jorge Badani Lenz
Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Iván A. Peña Castillo
Haiti—Captain Charles A. André
Kenya—Major General Pastor Omudho Awitta
Kuwait—Major General Ahmad Yousef Al-Mulla

1986

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Rafael L. de Jesús Monzón Brea
Gabon—Rear Admiral Ignace Martin Mavoungon
Liberia—Captain John B. Wulue
Togo—Colonel Fogan Kodjo T. Adegnon
Trinidad and Tobago—Commander Francis Weekes

1987

Guatemala—Captain Alfredo Herrera Cabrera
India—Admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi
Jordan—Brigadier General Atallah M. Oudat
Republic of Korea—Admiral Yoon-Hee Choi
Tunisia—Rear Admiral Tarek Faouzi El Arbi

1988

Barbados—Lieutenant Commander Charles Vincent Coleridge Belle
Côte d'Ivoire—Captain Megna Malick Diomande
Qatar—Brigadier General Nassar Abdullah Al-Noaimi
Tonga— H.M. Aho'eitu 'Unuaki'otonga Tuku'aho Tupou VI
Trinidad and Tobago—Commodore Garnet Best

1989

Bahrain—Brigadier General Abdullah Saeed Al-Mansoori
Côte d'Ivoire—Captain Gaston Mian
Nigeria—Vice Admiral Jubrila Olukayode Adisa Ayinla
Singapore—Rear Admiral Lui Tuck Yew

1990

Cape Verde—Lieutenant Colonel Eliseu Sousa Lopes
El Salvador—Captain José Misael Vanegas Fonseca
Oman—Rear Admiral Abdullah bin Khamis bin Abdullah Al-Raisi
Turkey—Admiral Recep Bülent Bostanoğlu

1991

Bahrain—Major General Mohammed Bin Isa al-Khalifa
Bangladesh—Vice Admiral Muhammad Farid Habib
Barbados—Commander David A. Dowridge

Graduates of the Naval Staff College

Ecuador—Vice Admiral Aland Javier Molestina Malta
Egypt—Rear Admiral Osama Mounir Rabie
Guatemala—Captain Carlos Alvarado Fernandez
Indonesia—Admiral Slamet Soebijanto
Sri Lanka—Vice Admiral Thisara S. G. Samarasinghe
Tonga—Captain Sosaia Lausi'i Ma'afu

1992

Bangladesh—Vice Admiral Ahmed Uddin Zahir
Ecuador—Rear Admiral Marco G. Salinas
El Salvador—Captain Walter Ricardo Rivera Alemán
Kuwait—Brigadier General Jassim Mohammed Al-Ansari
Nigeria—Vice Admiral D. J. Ezeoba
Saudi Arabia—Vice Admiral Fahd Al-Ghofaily
Trinidad and Tobago—Captain Kent Vincent Moore

1993

Bahamas—Commodore Davy F. Rolle
Colombia—Vice Admiral Roberto Garcia Márquez
El Salvador—Captain Guillermo Jiménez Vásquez
Gabon—Vice Admiral Hervé Nambo Ndouany
Sierra Leone—Captain A. B. Sesay
Tunisia—Rear Admiral Mohamed Khamassi

1994

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Homero Luis Lajara Sola
Gambia—Captain Ebou Jallow
Saint Kitts and Nevis—Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E. Wallace
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines—Lieutenant Commander David Robin
United Arab Emirates—Vice Admiral Ibrahim Salem Al-Musharrakh

1995

Bolivia—Rear Admiral Hugo Contreras Llanos
Ghana—Rear Admiral Peter Kofi Faidoo
Lithuania—Rear Admiral Kęstutis Macijauskas

1996

Albania—Rear Admiral Kristaq Gerveni
Bangladesh—Admiral Shaheen Iqbal
Cape Verde—Admiral António Duarte Monteiro
Congo—Captain René Nganongo
Estonia—Commodore Igor Schvede
Lithuania—Captain Olegas Marinicius
Trinidad and Tobago—Captain Jeewah Ramoutar

1997

Benin—Commander Amidou Ale Ibraima
Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Edmundo Félix Pimentel
Ecuador—Rear Admiral Darwin Jarrín Cisneros
India—Admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi
Jamaica—Captain Sydney R. Innis
Latvia—Rear Admiral Ingus Vizulis
Morocco—Rear Admiral Abdenbi Bakadir
Seychelles—Lieutenant Colonel André Ciseau
Singapore—Rear Admiral Jackson Chia

1998

Bulgaria—Rear Admiral Mitko A. Petev
Ghana—Rear Admiral Seth Amoama
Latvia—Captain Aleksandrs Pavlovics
Lebanon—Rear Admiral Villa Nazih Jbaily
Qatar—Brigadier General Saif Ahmed Al-Mannai
Qatar—Brigadier General Ali Ahmed Saif Al-Bedeed
Singapore—Rear Admiral Ng Chee Peng
Slovenia—Captain Boris Geršak
Taiwan—Admiral Lee Hsi-Min

1999

Bahamas—Commodore Roderick Bowe
Ireland—Vice Admiral Mark Mellett
Jamaica—Commander Kenneth A. Douglas
Seychelles—Colonel Michael Anselme Marc Rosette

2000

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Miguel E. Peña Acosta
Estonia—Commander Ahti Piirimagi
Israel—Vice Admiral Eli Sharvit
Maldives—Brigadier General Zakariyya Mansoor
Morocco—Commander Kerrou Maalouf

2001

Bolivia—Vice Admiral Waldo Leonel Calla Gutiérrez
Honduras—Rear Admiral Hector Orlando Caballero Espinoza
Latvia—Captain Rimants Strimaitis
Namibia—Rear Admiral Sinsy Nghipandua

2002

Bahamas—Commodore Tellis Bethel
Benin—Captain Albert Ezin Badou
Croatia—Vice Admiral Predrag Stipanovic

Graduates of the Naval Staff College

Guyana—Captain Orin Gordon Porter
Jordan—Brigadier General Ibrahim Al-Naimat
Latvia—Captain Kaspars Zelcs
Lithuania—Captain Arūnas Mockus
Singapore—Rear Admiral Chung Han Lai

2003

Belize—Major Lloyd Jones
Bolivia—Vice Admiral José Manuel Puente Guarachi
Brunei—First Admiral Penigran Norazmi bin Muhammed
Haiti—Captain Leon Charles
Honduras—Rear Admiral Jesús Humberto Benitez Alvarado
Philippines—Vice Admiral Robert A. Empedrad

2004

Estonia—Commander Ivo Vark

2005

Jamaica—Captain David Chin Fong

2006

Fiji—Captain John Fox

2007

Dominican Republic—Vice Admiral Edmundo Félix Pimentel

2008

El Salvador—Captain René F. Merino Monroy
Estonia—Captain Jüri Saska

2009

Jamaica—Rear Admiral Antonette S. Wemyss-Gorman
Suriname—Lieutenant Colonel Marino Acton

2010

Djibouti—Colonel Waïs Omar Bogoreh

2011

Poland—Vice Admiral Ryszard Demczuk
Djibouti—Commander Bouh Abdpoulaye
Trinidad and Tobago—Air Commodore Darryl Daniel

2012

Lebanon—Colonel Ahmed Daher Djama

2013

Bahamas—Commodore E. Raymond King
Madagascar—Rear Admiral GA Jacquy Honoré

2017

Montenegro—Commander Goran Durkovic

2018

Saint Kitts and Nevis—Major Walter Bass

2019

Jamaica—Commander Alvin R. Gayle

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Est. 1884
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

U.S. Naval War College
686 Cushing Road,
Newport, Rhode Island 02841

Updated January 30, 2019

U.S. Naval War College Campus Map